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To Mary, Alex and All sa Hill
ABSTRACT
Crimes of violence involving civil aviation Interests and airline passengers have developed and diversified since their original 
perpetration in the 1930s. Intergovernmental cooperative efforts to suppress the offences have largely been based upon international l e g a l , administrative activities, with the intention of producing a near-global, standardised regime of norms concerning the apprehension, 
extradition, prosecution and punishment of persons responsible for 
acts of aviation hijacking, sabotage and airport attack. While the I suppressive qualities of the regime have been demonstrated in terms of 
common air c r i m e s , the internationally recognised norms have had 
little effect in countering the actions of f a n a t i c a 1 offenders 
motivated by political a i m s . While c o n c e n t r â t ing upon law-based , 
policy options premised on the notion of deterrence, governments 
have failed fully to recognise a pressing need for preventive 
activities to be improved as a principal component of crime 
suppression machinery. With terrorist weaponry and abilities becoming increasingly sophisticated, with most available aviation security staff and apparatus being unreliable in processes of detection and 
with the civil aviation market expanding rapidly, imprecise and 
unenforced state-imposed standards of aviation security require radical and global upgrading ~ an expensive and politically difficult 
option for most governments to consider. Proposals for 
intergovernmental security development schemes need urgent consideration, with p assenger-financed options offering some practical 
solutions to otherwise potentially insoluble p r o b l e m s . Ultimately, 
prospects of advancement must depend upon the political will of major governments, which continue to regard the integrity of aviation security systems as a low priority for global standardisation.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
"What is at stake is the protection of human beings, the 
sovereignty of states, the safety of international traffic and an 
international order free from violence."^
"Terrorism directed against civil aviation is the single most 
serious problem facing the industry today."*
1.1. Introductory Comments on the R e search Programme
This research was undertaken between October 1986 and November 1990 at 
the Universities of Aberdeen and (from October 1989) St. Andrews, under the expert supervision of Professor Paul Wilkinson. The 
subject, the prevention of crimes of violence against aviation with 
particular reference to offences against air 1ine passengers, proved at 
first difficult to research because of the reluctance of authorities and individuals to divulge information regarding security norms, 
subscribing to the widespread but unconvincing idea that "precautions can only be precautions so long as nothing is said about them.".* As 
increasingly distressing and needless acts of violence took place, 
however, a greater interest in the research was e n g e n d e r e d , with 
valuable material being received from within the industry and found in 
the media.^
The library services of the Universities of Aberdeen, St, Andrews, 
Glasgow and Dundee provided much useful research material, while the 
British Library Document Supply C e n t r e ’s excellent Inter-Library Loan 
system was invaluable for providing obscure legal and technical texts. 
Many international organisations and institutions provided unique 
research information, with certain individuals supplying (often at
^H.D. Genscher, 28 September 1976, quoted in H, Steelman.
“I n t e r n a t ional Terrorism vis-a-vis Air-Hijacking," Southwestern 
University Law Review 9 (1977), p. 110.
*8.0. Eser, Director-General of the International Air Transport 
Association, November 1986, quoted in G . Norton, "Tourism and 
International Terrorism," The Uorld Today 63/2 (1987) , p. 31.
* Lufthansa spokesman, Stefan Mil sober, quoted in The German Tribune, 
22 January 1989, p. 14.
In particular, the eventual willingness of security technology 
firms to supply reports of their s y s t e m s ’ performance, academic papers and news report reprints must acknowledged.
their own expense) a great deal of unusual documentation. The 
bibliography at the end of the thesis conceals the generosity of many 
p e r s o n s .
During the course of research, the current writer was privileged to be 
able to attend several international conferences on air law, aviation 
security and terrorism in the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and France, on two occasions representing the International Foundation of Airline Passengers Associations at the 
European Civil Aviation C o n f e r e n c e ’s Working Group on Security Matters. The meetings of the Working Group were completely 
confidential, so that no attempt could be made in this thesis to 
include any element of deliberations made during closed s e s s i o n s . 
Nevertheless, discussions and interviews with fellow r eprés e n t â t ! ves 
from European and north American states and from the industry proved 
to be very useful in broadening perspectives on the problems faced in the civil aviation i n d u s t r y .
1.2. Thesis Topic
This thesis concerns problems of international cooperation to improve standards of aviation security with reference to the passenger. In deciding upon a research topic, three factors were foremost in the
current w r i t e r ’s m i n d . First, it was deemed necessary to find a well- 
documented field of research which could provide adequate materials to 
consult yet on which could be built an original and useful thesis. 
While much existing literature describes the development and contents 
of the suppression regime regarding violent air crime, there are few recently written texts which analyse its continuing and evolving weaknesses. As a r e s u l t , scope was identified for producing a work 
which extended upon previous legal writings with analysis of 
practical, preventive means of crime suppression. Second, a keen interest in public international law, international organisation, 
terrorism and air policy determined that any research should revolve around the general area of air crime, which has long occupied the 
attention of various intergovernmental a g e n c i e s . Third, the active involvement In the project of the International Foundation of Airline Passengers Associations (IFAPA) ensured that t r a v e l l e r s ’ concerns and interests would easily be promoted and that discussion of the vast field of aviation security would be limited largely to questions of 
preventive activity as they relate to airline passengers and their b a g g a g e . These factors combined to form the basis of the research.
The result of the studies undertaken over four years is this thesis, 
which can be divided into three thematic categories. The initial 
thrust of the thesis (contained in Chapter 2) seeks to establish that 
g o v e r n m e n t s ’ diplomatic efforts to suppress crimes of violence against 
aviation and its users have failed to constrain the activities of ideologically motivated o f f e n d e r s . Of particular interest is the case 
study of the Kuwait Airways Flight 422 hijacking incident of April 
1988 (assessed in Chapter 3) which also acts as an introduction to the 
theme of airport security ~ the second theme of the thesis. Detailing the changing security needs of the industry, Chapters 6 to 7 discuss the history of aviation security, the new threats facing the 
industry from well-equipped and able terrorists, the search for advanced means of countering such dangers and means of implementing adequate standards of airport security throughout a diversely characterised industry. The t h e s i s ’ final area of interest (found in
Chapter 8) concerns organisational measures which require to be taken 
to facilitate changes in security on a global scale. Throughout the 
w o r k , it is stressed that progress tends to be slow and erratic on 
account of reluctance among states and certain sectors of the industry 
to take the politically complex and financially expensive steps 
required for appropriate reform.
1.3. Defining the Boundaries of V i o l ent Air C r ime With R e fere n c ethe Passenger to
The civil aviation industry Is different from all others in the types 
of serious offences which can be committed against persons associated 
with it. In particular, the tendency for aviation interests to be targeted because of their associations with particular states or regions must be considered carefully in any discussion of the 
phenomena involved. In terms of violent air crime, three distinct offence categories can be identified which are of key interest to 
scholars of political violence and Internat ional relations. These are 
the crimes of unlawful diversion of aircraft (commonly referred to as 
"hijacking"); sabotage of aviation Interests, with particular reference to aircraft in flight ; and attacks against airports and 
their u s e r s . These categories will each be considered immediately 
below.
1.3.1. Hijacking
The offence commonly termed "aircraft hijacking" has been described 
concisely by Evans in the following way :
"the diversion of an aircraft from its scheduled destination by
force or threat thereof."®
Boyle correctly observes that "most hijackings have been derived from 
the changing social and political climates of various areas of the 
w o r l d " . ‘ B o y l e ’s remark, however, should not prompt the notion that 
all acts of hijacking - or, indeed, of violent air crime generally - 
must involve an overtly political motivation.* McWhinney has expertly 
outlined the different hijacking trends which have been observed since 
the late 1960s, grouping the principal types as "east-west" political escapes, "lunatic fringe" hijackings (most with some variety of Cuban 
involvement) from the early 1960s, profit-oriented diversions which he 
terms "skyjackings", and "privileged c o m b a t a n c y " acts, classically
®A.E. Evans, in A.E. Evans and J .F . Murphy, Legal Aspects of 
International Terrorism (Lexington: Heath, 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 3.
*R.P. Boyle, "International Action to Combat Aircraft Hijacking," 
Lawyer of the Americas 6 (1972), p. 661.
*L.Z. Freedman and Y . Alexander (e d s .), Perspectives on Terrorism 
( W i l m i n g t o n : Scholarly Resources, 1 9 83) , p. 3.
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associated with Palestinian h i j a c k i n g s .*
Several writers have adopted similar classifications in an attempt to 
categorise the principal forms of offender into readily identifiable 
motivational groups, such as disgruntled nationals, "flying 
commandoes", mentally deranged, common criminals and extortionists;*' 
insane persons, mercenaries, political representatives and freelance 
revolutionaries ;^® refugees, criminals, mentally deranged and criminal groups ; * * and asylum seekers, felonious escapees, the mentally 
defective, criminal extortionists and ideological or political t e r r o r i s t s . * * It should be clear that a major difficulty facing 
policy makers concerned with combating these acts is that the term 
"hijacking" only barely serves to cover a broad range of very 
different offences. In the words of McWhinney;
"Our conclusion must be that so far from being one simple, 
comprehensive problem, aerial hijacking reduces, on examination, 
to a series of different problems, involving widely different 
personality profiles or professional backgrounds on the part of 
the main actors ; widely different personal or political 
motivations on the part of those actors ; and, finally, widely 
different choices of means and techniques for effectuating their 
intention on the part of the actors, depending in part upon their 
relative intelligence end technological sophistication and in part upon the immediate results desired to be a c h i e v e d . "* *
A general impression of the changing rate of development of hijacking
®E. M c W h i n n e y , Aerial Piracy and International Law (Dordrecht : 
Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 8 >■ 13. One recent indicator of a possible 
trend is to be found in an interview given by the Soviet Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation, Mikhail Timofeyev, in which it was 
confirmed that the Soviet state carrier, Aeroflot, had suffered over 70 hijacking attempts in its history, with a remarkable 
thirteen attempts being made in a seven week period from early June 
to late July 1990. Soviet Ueekly, 25 July 1990, reprinted in
Novostl Press Agency press release, July 1990. For other
information on trends see C.J. Visser, Civil Aviation Remains 
Vulnerable to Terrorism (Arlington: Flight Safety Foundation,1988), p. 4.
* A, A b r a m o v s k y , “The Constitutionality of the Anti-hijackingSecurity System," Buffalo Law Review 22 (1972/73), p. 126.
^*^D.A. Baldwin, "Bargaining with Airline Hijackers, " in W.I. Zartman 
(ed.) The Fifty Percent Solution (London : Yale University Press,
1976), p. 405.
 ^^  C . Dudley, "Hijacking and Terrorist Attacks Against Aircraft and 
Airport Installations," Journal of the Insurance Institute of London 65 (1976 - 77), P. 66.
**S.B. Rosenfield, "Air Piracy: Is it Time to Relax our Security?"
New England Law Review 9 (1973), pp. 88 - 90.
 ^* McWhinney (1987), p. 14.
can be obtained by reference to recorded data on its incidence :'* 
T ABLE 1.1.
MjLCARRim.tUJAMING§_ WORLPMim.  ^_193L-
y e a r ..1931
19321947194819491950195119521953195419561957195819591960196119621963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975197619771978197919801981198219831984198519861987 
1'
 ...    NUMBER OF HIJACKINGS
11946 0
1
7
6
4
1
2 
11955 0
1
0
6
9
U
3 
1 
2
5
46 35 87 83 58 62 
22 26 25 18 
3125 23 382930 3326 26 13 
13 15
TOTAL 797
 ^ US Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Norldwide Significant Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation, 1980 
- 1985; and Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation^ 1986 - 1988.
%
Current trends appear to indicate that aircraft hijackings are 
diminishing in n u m b e r , although some serious cases have occurred, in 
defiance of global trends. Although it may, occasionally, be possible 
to characterise a particular incident in terms of a givenclassification, it is not possible to draw adequate statistical 
conclusions from the information available. One reason for this is 
the uncertainty of available data, as even the best published 4
statistics do not claim to be comprehensive. Another factor involves 
the inability to determine precisely the nature of each hijacking and 
the motivations and aims of each o f f e n d e r . Nevertheless, if recent 
data covering January 1980 to December 1988 are analysed, it is 
possible to group hijackings according to their very general purposes 
or characteristics.^® Incidents may be classified according to:
1) a predominant political motivation, which includes demands 
for political or religious publicity, constitutional reform, 
prisoner or hostage releases, funds for political causes and 
guerilla or mercenary transport ; * *
2) certain transportational demands, such as instructions to 
divert an aircraft to or from, for example, Cuba, the Soviet 
Bloc, the P e o p l e ’s Republic of China, war zones and prisons;
3) their predominant cause being one of private extortion or 
theft ;
4) the p e r p e t r a t o r s ’ unstable mental state or delusion ; and
5) remaining unknown c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
Taking these loose groupings, the following table of incidents can be 
produced to characterise the 266 hijackings and serious attempts at 
hijacking civil aircraft which have occurred during the period under 
investigation :
^®Data are drawn from US Federal Aviation Administration, Noridwide 
Signif icant Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation, 1980 - 1985 ;
and Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation, 1986 - 1988.
* ^  This category of political hi jackings therefore includes the 
particularly dangerous and difficult grouping of terrorist aircraft 
diversions.
— ■'•‘i; ‘ t
1ADLP A.Z.
HIJACKINGS AND ATTEMPTS FROM 1 JANUARY .1980 DECEMBER _li88_ GROUPED.BY MAJOR CAUSE 
YEAR (19 _ _8Z_ 86 .87 J O T A L
MAJOR CAUSE Political 7 13 9 3 9 13 4 3 2 63
Transportational 21 9 20 29 17 10 10 7 9 132
Private extortion 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 7 Î
Mental factors 1 0 0 0 2 5 3 2 3 16
Un k n 0 w nJ-Ac tor s_.. . . . 5.. .. 4„ . 4_ . 1 ....,,.7 .. 4_ . 6 ..2. _38
TOTAL 38 28 33 36 30 35 21 18 17 256 1
Clearly, although transportationally-motivated hijackings constitute 
the greatest current diversion threat to aviation, there remains a 
notable, though apparently small and declining, risk of hijackings 
being perpetrated for political reasons of various types. As shall be demonstrated, the decline in the incidence of political hijackings has 
been accompanied by an increase in the use of in-flight sabotage.
otage
Reference to any comprehensive listing of hijacking incidents reveals 
that while occasional acts of political hi jacking (such as the Kuwait Airways siege, discussed below) still occur, a decline has taken place in most forms of reported acts of diversion from the mid 1970s to the 
present d a y .  ^* No attempt is made here to explain in detail the 
reasons for this decline, except to note that such factors as heightened aviation security and improved domestic and international 
legal responses probably each contributed to a reduction in incidence. As the tables below r e v e a l , however, the decline in political 
hijackings throughout the 1980s has been accompanied by an increase in 
the number and effectiveness of sabotage incidents ~ now an almost 
purely terrorist mode of attack.*®
**Note, however, the increase in refugee escape hijackings from the 
Soviet Union to western states from the late 1980s onwards. 
Novosti Press Agency news release quoted from Investis, 25 July 1990.
* ® Sources of data in tables : US Federal Aviation Administration data
to 31/12/88 (listed in bibliography) and news reports to 07/12/89. Examples concern only civil aircraft in service and do not include 
cases in which explosive devices were infiltrated for the purpose 
of t r a n s i t . Also excluded are Instances of, or attempts at, 
destruction by external attack, internal gunfire and violence during hijackings.
Table 1.5.
C H R O N O L O GY OF FATAL IN-SE R VICE CIV I L AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE MAY 1949 - 27 NOVEMBER 1 9 8 9 * ’ INCIDENTS.
DATE____ _ _ . j A I R U m _ A N D J U L R U ; A F T______ DEATHS _ __ RANK
07/05/49 Philippine Airlines DC-3 13 29E09/09/49 Quebec Airways (Canada) DC-3 23 24
11/04/55 Air India Constellation 16 26E01/11/55 United Air Lines (US) DC-6B 44 1625/07/57 Western Airlines (US) CV-240 1 34E08/09/59 Mexicana DC-3 1 34E06/01/60 National Airlines (US) DC-68 34 1828/04/60 Lines Aéropostal Vénézolans DC- 3 13 29E22/05/62 Continental (US) B-707 45 1508/12/64 Alas Airlines (Bolivia) C-47 15 2808/07/65 Canadian Pacific Airlines DC -68 52 1322/11/66 Aden Airways DC-3 28 2112/10/67 British European Airways Comet 48 66 11
05/08/69 Philippines Airlines HS 748 1 34E22/12/69 Air Vietnam (South Vietnam) DC- 6B 32 1921/02/70 Swiss Air Coronado 47 1421/04/70 Philippine Airlines HS 748 36 1702/06/70 Philippine Airlines Fokker F -27 1 34E20/11/71 China Airways (Taiwan) Ca r a v e l le 25 2326/01/72 Jugoslavenska Aerotransport DC- 9 27 2215/06/72 Cathay Pacific Airways (HK) CV- 880 81 919/03/73 Air Vietnam (South Vietnam) DC- 4 59 1217/12/73 Pan American (US) B-707 30 2008/09/74 Trans World Airlines (US) B- 707 88 703/06/75 P h i 1 ippine Airlines BAC-111 1 34E01/01/76 Middle East Airlines (Lebanon) B-720 82 806/10/76 Cubans DC-8 73 1024/05/78 General Aviation (Kenya) Piper Aztec 4 30E18/08/78 Philippine Airlines BAC-111 1 34E13/10/81 Air Malta B-737 2 3311/08/82 Pan American (US) 8-747 1 34E23/09/83 Gulf Air (Bahrain) B-737 112 523/01/85 Lloyd Aereo Boliviano 8-727 1 34E23/06/85 Air India B-747 329 102/04/86 Trans World Airlines (US) B- 727 4 31E08/05/86 Air Lanka (Sri Lanka) L-1011 16 26E29/11/87 Korean Air (South Korea) B-707 115 401/03/88 BOP Air (South Africa) Bandeirante 17 2521/12/88 Pan American (US) B-74 7 259 220/09/89 UTA (France) DC-10 170 527/11/89 Avianca (Colombia) 8-727 107 6
These data reveal not only the current development of a worrying trend
* ’ In column four of this table, the heading " R a n k ” refers to rating by death toll of each offence detailed. Hence, the
India incident of 23 June 1985 is ranked "1" to denote 
involved the highest number of fatalities of any act of 
sabotage to date. The letter "E" is used to signify 
ranking with another or other i n c i d e n t (s ) .
the
Air 
that it 
aviation an equal
towards the greater use of sabotage tactics by air offenders, but also suggests that in cases of sabotage of aircraft in service in which fatalities have been recorded, terrorists are becoming much more able 
to kill efficiently. Note that of the above examples the five top 
ranking incidents (by fatality) have occurred since 1983. The almost 
constant advance of the death toll created by sabotage bombings in 
civilian aircraft is reproduced by decade in the table b e l o w . Note in 
particular, the sudden rise in deaths per incident in the 1980s.
TABLE 1.4.
D E A THS/ F A TAL S A B O T A GE INCIDENTS, 1949 - 1989
d e c a d e .... FATALJ:!!LGIP.ENTS_._ __ D E / m i S / I N M D E N T ^
1949 2 36 18. 00
1950-59 4 62 15. 50
1960-69 9 286 31. 78
1970-79 14 555 39. 64
1980-89 1 2 ....... 1133 . _ ._94.42
TOTAL 41 2072 50. 54
Further indications that a sabotage crisis has developed are to be 
found in a statistical analysis of all sabotage-related offences documented throughout the 1980s. The table below, compiled from several s o u r c e s , demonstrates that although few tragedies on the scale 
of the Air India or Pan Am disasters have taken place, an average of over two bomb explosions per year was recorded during the decade and 
that, on average, almost five serious offences Involving explosives 
and aircraft have occurred annually.
TABLE 1.5.
AVIATION S A B O T A G E O F FENCES, 1980-89
Fatal explosions on board 12aircraft
Non-fatal explosions on 9
board aircraft
Devices placed on board 15
aircraft (no explosion)
Devices intended for 7aircraft (explosion in airport)
Serious attempts 5
Conspiracy . .... ........ _ _ 1
TOTAL 49
1
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1.3.3. Airport Atta c k
From existing data,*® serious acts of violence at airports which have 
actually taken place (rather than those which may be contemplated) can be classified into two major and often compatible methodological types : attacks using explosive or incendiary devices, and those which
employ firearms. In the former case, an aim of the offender may be to 
inflict structural damage upon the airport or upon its facilities or 
aircraft, or to kill or injure possibly large numbers of p a s s e n g e r s , -fvisitors and personnel circulating throughout the buildings. In the |case of purely terrorist attacks the primary objective will normally ?
be to make a violent political gesture in a well known public place of 
international and commercial significance, where persons of many 
nationalities are likely to be present, so being brought into the 
conflict waged by the terrorist against a state or against the 
international order as a whole. Whatever the motivation may be, an 
accompanying aim will often be to attract media coverage to the I
incident, either to highlight a stated cause or to draw attention to some unstated but circumstantially obvious grievance connected with 
either the state on which the airport is located or the state of carriers operating therein.
Airport bombings are usually character!sed by their obvious political nature, differing in form from many firearms incidents which are not 
restricted in any sense to acts of terror violence. This is 
particularly true in states which operate libertarian gun laws, so making it easier for their citizens to carry a r m s . Clearly, however, 
the most obvious and pressing danger in dealing with firearms cases at airports must relate to attack by terrorists - an horrific possibility
for most airport terminals and entrance halls, not simply because oftheir normal 1 y high passenger density and nationally identifiable 
check-in desks at which often long queues of travellers stand grouped together, but also because access from outside a terminal to its hubs 
of activity are typically unimpeded by security measures. Together 
with architectural trends of recent decades which often result in 
major airports being based on open-plan models, these features allow terrorists to make swift entry, locate a suitable target and carry out 
their crimes without security forces present being able to make 
timeous or adequate r e s p o n s e . * * ,
Another means of classifying airport attack types is by degree of
involvement of the offender. It is obvious that a grenade or gun
attack taking place in the heart of an airport terminal poses a very 
different threat from an explosion caused by a device located in a piece of baggage apparently waiting for retrieval at a carousel or in a public l o c k e r . The danger of a bomb placed in a litter bin or under a seat requires a set of preventive and responsive activities which 
will differ from those needed to answer the threats from letter bomb, 
mortar attack or non-fissile nuclear contamination. The hi story of 
airport attacks has illustrated that, irrespective of security |
measures taken, the airport has remained an important target t y p e .
The complexities and expense entailed in introducing security measures
*®FAA statistics (listed in bibliography). 
* * Visser (1988), p. 8.
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to public buildings of high transitory population turnover ensure that 
it can only he a difficult and costly task to make airports an 
unattractive venue for terrorist attack. Coupled with this is the 
fact that anti-hilacking measures at airports have slightly reduced 
the dangers of in-flight crimes but have also served to pass the 
burden of threat to targets which represent weaker links in the 
security chain, such as airports and airline ticket offices, so making 
them prime targets for terrorists.
Related problems concern the inability of even the most successful and 
well-developed of airports to preclude the possibility of attack. 
With other varieties of air crime there is a danger of incidents 
increasing in third world countries where a lack of finance impedes 
the fullest applicable introduction of aviation security provision, 
and in smaller, provincial airports which are less well p r o t e c t e d . 
With acts of violence at airports, however, more sites than those 
which the public might predict to be prime targets (for example, B e i r u t , Athens and Cairo) are in fact in the front line of illegal 
violence. The following table, the data of which are incomplete and 
concern only cases of airport bombings, is taken from an ICAO Working 
Paper and casts light on the problem in a survey covering thirteen 
years between 1973 to 1985:
TABLE 1.6.
ACTS OF AIRPORT JflOLENCE, 1973 1985
y e a r NUMBER. 0F_ INCIDENTS . ..LOCATION1973 3 Calvi; Athens ; Rome1974 2 Heathrow; Los Angeles1975 2 Orly; La Guardi a1976 4 Tel Aviv; Delhi; Beirut ; Ajaccio1979 2 Frankfurt1981 2 Collingwood; Cairo1982 2 Miami ; Los Angeles1983 2 N a r i t a ; Orly1984 2 Kabul; Beirut1985 4 Frankfurt: Vienna; Rome; N a r i ta*
As so many advanced n a t i o n s ’ airports have been sites of serious 
criminal violence in recent years it is evident that domestic and 
international measures to counteract the threats are insufficient for 
the purpose and that awareness of the dangers involved has not been 
heightened to a level which would prompt concerned agencies to meet 
the current crisis with workable s o l u t i o n s . It may be that 
governments and aviation authorities are prepared to see an 
“acceptable" level of killing and destruction at the w o r l d ’s airports 
in return for the very considerable savings in time, money and effort which would be required to diminish the problem by developing and introducing high technology physical security p r o c e d u r e s . The same 
argument could easily be used to justify failing to secure vulnerable 
but nationally identifiable airline ticket offices, attacks against 
which constitute the most common single category of reported violent
forking Paper A26 - NP/4U p. 2
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air crime.^ %
1.3.4. Political factors in the Offences
It has already been stated that the offence of hijacking can be 
committed for a variety of reasons. Eaually, other types of violent 
air crime can be used for different purposes, ranging from common 
murder and extortion to publicity-seeking and vandalism. In the 
forthcoming discussion, the category of general offence type which 
will be of greatest interest will be that which is motivated by 
political factors, in which an act is undertaken with the specific aim 
of coercing, intimidating or otherwise challenging a political power. 
More than any other form of offence, this type can truly be described as "aviation terrorism" because it displays an intention to present 
overtly violent, political opposition to interests representing or 
associated with constitutional powers, such as national carriers, 
international airports, etc. It would be impossible to present a detailed history of terrorist activities in a thesis of this length. Instead, the following table, drawn from various statistical sources, 
is provided to indicate some of the most important political examples 
which have occurred in recent years. Should further information be needed, press accounts of the incidents may be easily obtained from archives.
TABLE 1.7.
POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED ACTS OF VIOLENT AIR CRIME, 1968 1989
DATE . TARGET INCIDENT TYPE23/07/68 El A1 B-707 Hi lacking
05/08/69 Philippine HS 748 Sabotage29/08/69 TWA B-707 Hijacking22/12/69 Air Vietnam DC-6B Sabotage21/02/70 Swissair Coronado Sabotage21/02/70 Austrian Caravelle Sabotage21/04/70 Philippine HS 748 Sabotage06/09/70 TWA B-707 H iiacking/Destruction06/09/70 Swissair DC-8 H ijacking/Destruction06/09/70 Pan American B-747 H ijacking/Destruction06/09/70 El A1 8-707 Hi jacking09/09/70 BOAC VCIO Hi jacking/Destruction20/11/71 China Airways Caravelle Sabotage26/01/72 JAT DC-9 Sabotage08/05/72 Sabena B-707 Hijacking30/05/72 Lod Airport Airport Attack15/06/72 Cathay Pacific CV-880 Sabotage29/10/72 Lufthansa 8-727 Hi jacking19/03/73 Air Vietnam DC-4 Sabotage20/07/73 JAL B-747 Hijacking/Destruction25/11/73 KLM 8-747 Hi jacking17/12/73 Rome Airport Airport Attack
17/12/73 Pan American B-707 Sabotage
**FAA statistics (listed in bibliography). 
Terrorist Threat to Travellers." fkl Report 
22 .
See W . Sater, "The 
6(4) (1986) pp. 21 -
13
17 12 73 Lufthansa B-737 Hi jacking08 09 74 TWA B-707 Sabotage22 11 74 British Airways VC 10 Hijacking27 06 76 Air France A-300 Hi jacking28 09 77 JAL DC-8 Hijacking
13 10 77 Lufthansa B-737 Hijacking12 01 79 Tunis Air 8-727 Hi jacking
16 01 79 MEA B-707 Hi jacking07 09 79 Alitalia DC-8 Hijacking14 01 80 Alitalia D C -9 Hi jacking18 01 80 MEA 8-720 Hijacking28 01 80 MEA B-720 Hi jacking31 01 80 Air France Hi jacking
10 03 80 MEA B-707 Hi jacking02 03 81 PIA 8-720 Hi jacking27 03 81 SAHSA B-737 Hi jacking28 03 81 Garuda DC-9 Hijacking24 05 81 Turkish DC-9 Hi jacking29 09 81 Indian 8-737 Hijacking26 11 81 Air India B-707 Hi jacking07 12 81 Libyan B-727 Hi jacking07 12 81 Avensa B-727 Hijacking07 12 81 Aéropostal DC-9 fl) Hi jacki ng07 12 81 Aéropostal DC-9 (2) Hi jacking24 02 82 Kuwait B-707 Hijacking26 02 82 Air Tanzania B-737 Hi jacking28 04 82 ANHSA Dash-7 Hijacking04 08 82 Indian B-737 Hi jacking20 08 82 Indian Hi jacking22 06 83 Libyan B-707 Hi jacking06 07 83 Iran Air B-747 Hi jacking15 07 83 Paris Orly Airport Bombing27 08 83 Air France 8-727 Hijack i ng23 09 83 Gulf Air B-737 Sabotage
10 03 84 UTA DC-8 Sabotage05 07 84 Indien Airbus Hi jacking
31 07 84 Air France B-737 Hijacking/Destruction24 08 84 Indian B-737 Hi jacking05 il 84 Saudi L-lOîl Hijacking24 11 84 Somali B-707 Hi jacking04 12 84 Kuwait Airbus Hi jack Î ng
11 06 85 Alia B-727 Hi jacking
14 06 85 TWA B-727 Hi jacking23 06 85 Air India B-747 Sabotage23 06 85 Tokyo Airport Airport Attack/Attempted Sabotage23 11 85 Egyptar B-727 Hijacking/Destruction27 12 85 Rome Airport Airport Attack27 12 85 Vienna Airport Airport Attack02 04 86 TWA 8-727 Sabotage
17 04 86 El Al B-747 Attempted Sabotage08 05 86 Air Lanka L-1011 Sabotage05 09 86 Pan American B-747 Hi jacking/Destruction
14 09 86 Seoul Airport Bombing25 12 86 Iraai B-737 H ijacking/Destruction24 07 87 Air Afrique DC-10 Hijacking
11 11 87 Beirut Airport Bombing29 11 87 Korean B-707 Sabotage
01 03 88 BOP Air Bandeirante Sabotage
14
05/04/88 Kuwait 8-747 Hijacking21/12/88 Pan American B-747 Sabotage20/09/89 UTA DC-10 Sabotage27/11/89 Avianca B-727 Sabotage
1..4, Literature Review
Many sources exist to analyse the derivation and history of aviation 
violence and trends which have occurred in its development.^* A very 
large number of descriptive and largely uncritical writings have been 
devoted in whole or in part to discussing the contents of the various 
agreements made since the early 1 9 6 0 s . A few writings have ventured 
into a more critical analysis of the treaty law and the international
**Boyle (1972), p. 461; W.A. Crenshaw, "Terrorism and the Threat to 
Civil Aviation" (Ph.D. d i s s . , University of Miami, 1987) pp. 31 - 60 ; J.T. Dailey, "Skyjacking; Problems and Potential Solutions - A 
Symposium - Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates," 
Viîlanova Law Review 18 (1973), d p . 1004 - 1008; Dudley (1976 - 
77), pp. 74 - 79 ; R.A. Friedlander, "Banishing Fear from the Skies: 
A Stautory Proposal." Ouauesne Law Review 16 (1977 - 78),
**C.N. Brower, "Skyjacking; Problems and Potential Solutions - A 
Symposium - International Enforcement of Air Security - United States' Initiatives," Villanova Law Review 18 (1973); H.G. Dawson, 
"Civil Aviation, Hijacking and International Terrorism - An 
Historical and Legal Review" (New York: International Bar
Association, 1986) photocopied; H.G. Dawson, “Hijacking and the 
Law," $olicitors” Journal 130 (1986); Y . Dinstein, "Criminal
Jurisdiction over Aircraft Hijacking," Israel Law Review (1972): 
C . Emanuelli, "Legal Aspects of Aviation Terrorism: The Piecemeal 
vs, the Comprehensive A p p r o a c h , “ Journal of International Law and 
Economics 10 (1975); S.Z. Feller, "Comment on Criminal
Jurisdiction over Aircraft Hijacking," Israel Law Review 7 (1972); 
R.L. Pick, J.I. Gordon and J.C. Patterson, "Aircraft Hijacking: 
Criminal and Civil Aspects," University of Florida Law Review 22 (1969), pp. 86 - 90; M.E. Fingerman, "Skyjacking and the Bonn 
Declaration of 1978; Sanctions Applicable to Recalcitrant Nations." 
California Uestern International Law Journal (1980); R. Hirano. 
"Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft of 1963," University of Tasmania Law Review 8 (1964), p. 
44; G.L. Hughes, "The Law in Australia Relating to the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft," University of Tasmania Law Review 6 (1978),
pp. 49 - 56; R.F, Klimak, "International Law - Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft - The 
Tokyo Convention," De Paul Law Review 20 (1971); A.I. Mendelsohn. 
"In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture under the
Tokyo Convention," Virginia Law Review 53 (1967); C . November,
"Aircraft Piracy; The Hague Hijacking Convention," International 
Lawyer 6 (1972); J.M. Sharp, "Canada and the Hijacking of
Aircraft," Manitoba Law Journal 5 (1973), p p . 454 - 458; Steelman (1978), pp. 99 - 104; O.M. Trelles II, "International Law and 
Aircraft Hijacking," New Zealand Law Journal 4 April 1978. pp. 118 
- 122: P.M. Troncoso Cortes, "Conventions on Unlawful Interference
with Aircraft ("Pirateria Aeria") a Hard Line," Revista del Colegio 
de Abogados de Puerto Rico 34 (1973). p p . 545 - 563.
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legislative efforts to date.?* The legislative development of the 
international legal regime is also quite well documented. with a few 
notable commentators having passed comment on its evolution.
In the practical field of aviation security, very little of depth and 
of current interest to the student of international affairs is to be 
found in the public domain. Published textbooks understandably and 
correctly tend to dwell on the vital but mundane questions associated 
with day to day low budget airport management, at the expense of broader political considerations of threat and response.** The few 
books and articles which have been written on security policy 
interests are normally slightly outdated. dealing as they do with 
matters about which little background information is available and
Abramovsky, "Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft. Part I : The Hague 
Convention," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 13 f 19741; A. 
Abramovsky, “Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft. Part IT: The
Montreal Convention," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 14 
(1975); A. Abramovsky, "Multilateral Conventions for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft.
Part III: The Legality and Political Feasibility of a Multilateral
Air Security Enforcement Convention." Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 14 (19751; B. Cheng, "The Hague Convention on 
Hijacking of Aircraft 1970 - The Legal Aspects," Aeronautical
Journal 76 (1972); B. Cheng in B, Cheng and E.D. Brown (eds.l, 
"Aviation, Criminal Jurisdiction and Terrorism: The Hague
Extradition Prosecution Formula and Attacks at Airports."
Contemoorarv Problems in International Law: Essays in Honour of
Georg Schwarsenburger on his Eightieth Birthday (London; Stevens, 
1988), p. 25; G.F. FitzGerald, "Recent Proposals for Concerted Action Against States in Respect of Unlawful Interference with
International Civil Aviation," Journal of Air Law and Commerce 40
(1974): R.J. McGrane. "A Search for an International Solution to
the Problem of Aircraft Hijacking," Auckland University Law Review
2 (1975): E. McWhinney, Aerial Piracy and International Law(Leiden: Siithoff, 1971); McWhinney (1987); A. Samuels, "The Legal
Problems; An Introduction," Journal of Air Law and Commerce 37
(1971); W . Schwenk, "The Bonn Declaration on Hijacking," Annals of 
Air and Space Law 4 (1980).
**R.P. Boyle, "Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed in Flight: An
International Convention," American Criminal Law Quarterly 3 (1964 
- 65), PP. 69 - 71; Cheng. (1972); J.J. Lambert, Terrorism and 
Hostages in International Law (Cambridge; Grotius, 1990).
**F.C. Dorey, Aviation Security (London: Granada, 1983); K.C, Moore. 
Airportf Aircraft and Airline Security (Los Angeles: Security
World Cpublishing Co., 1976).
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which concern fast-chanqing Issues of technology.**
More practical information can be found by referring to the standards 
and guides produced by states and international o r g a n ! sat i o n s , The US 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) supplies generous amounts of 
useful background material on the nature of US security systems and 
statistics on security lapses worldwide. Much interesting information 
can also be gathered from the British House of Commons Select 
Committee on T r a n s p o r t ’s reports on airport security, of which there 
have been two since 1986.3* Most recently. the US P r e s i d e n t ’s 
Commission Report on Aviation Security and Terrorism provided in 1990 
a valuable, if selectively-critical, analysis of the most difficult 
security weaknesses.**
The United N a t i o n s ’ Specialised Agency for aviation, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) produces Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) on security contained in an annex to its constituent 
document, the Convention on International Civil Aviation, known as the 
Chicago Convention. 1944.** Annex 17, entitled Security 
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful 
Interference. which entered force on 15 July 1974 and has since undergone several periodic reviews, was designed to encourage I C A O ’s global membership to adhere to a list of minimum norms on security, an 
objective which resulted in highly diluted, general and lenient 
standards being framed.** For this reason, the Annex cannot be
* * F . Brenchley, "Living with Terrorism: The Problem of Air Piracy," 
Conflict Studies No. 184 (1986). See ICAO Bulletin for regular 
short articles on security issues. For a contemporary approach to 
the subject see R . Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Uarfare: 
Forecasts and Remedies (London: Routledge, 1990); R ,Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992
(London: Routeledge, 1990). Also of great interest is A. Lewis and 
M . Kaplan, Terror in the Skies - Aviation Security Proceedings of 
the First International Seminar on Aviation Security (Jerusalem: 
International Seminar on Aviation Security, 1990).
**House of Commons Committee on Transport, Fourth Report from the 
Transport Commi ttee. Session 1985 - 86, Airport Security. (London: 
HMSO, 1986); and House of Commons Committee on Transport. Third 
Report from the Transport Committee, Session 1988 - 89, Airport
Security. (London: HMSO, 1989). See also British Government,
Government Response to the Fourth Report of the Commi ttee, Sessionr w #  - 86. (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1986).
**P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, Report
of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990).
**Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, Chicago. 15 UNTS; UKTS 8 (1953), Cmd 8742; 148 BFSP 38; TIAS 1591; 61 Stat (2) 1180; 3 Bevans 944: SATS 20 (1968); JOF 3 Jun 47: 10Vert A 96: 39 AJIL SUPD 111; 45 ILD 349; 15 Ruster 7397; 1
Churchill 11: 5 Peaslee 390. Entered into force 4 April 1947.
**Dawson (1986) II, p. 32
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regarded as being a particularly important vehicle for security 
enhancement, far less a useful or detailed guide to the extent of 
security preparedness throughout the world. Indeed, even as a 
supposedly global standard, the Annex is unable to offer anything more 
than the most simple and vague exhortations, resulting in each state 
party to the document employing its own national security programme in isolation, rather than as part of a unified global system.** The US 
P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission was in no doubt concerning the status of Annex 17:
"Currently, there is no uniform international civil aviation 
security system in place to assure a consistent level of security 
for passengers. Many nations have adopted the standards of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a IJ.N. body, 
which recommends standards and practices for aviation security. However. the ICAO standards prescribe a very basic or low level 
of security that is inadequate for high threat international 
airports. ICAO lacks any oversight authority or ability to impose sanctions for noncompliance."**
More detailed and sensitive information regarding the technicalitiesof security is believed to be found in the ICAO Security Manual for 
the Prevention of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation, a document 
closely guarded from public view by the Organization. Fearing that 
terrorists could take advantage of the details contained in the 
handbook. ICAO has always limited its circulation to its member states, apparently unaware that by so doing terrorists will gain access to its secrets through state sponsors.** This simple problem Illustrates the greater difficulty continually faced by ICAO in having 
in its membership nations which have not always adhered to the highest Ideals of state conduct with respect to aviation.
ItS. The Implications of Violent Air Crime
The use of violence against aviation is undertaken often to attack a 
national interest of a state, sometimes with the intention of discouraging passengers from using certain or all flight services. 
The economic implications of such activity should not be 
underestimated. After the TWA hijacking of June 1985, a financial 
shock wave passed through the industry - in 1986 more than 40,000 US citizens cancelled flight reservations to European capitals - a major 
downturn from previous figures.** Indeed, by the summer of 1986
* * Condé Nast Traveler, March 1989, p. 32.
** P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990). p. 27.
**Note that a similar handbook on security activities in western 
Europe is published and freely available. European Civil Aviation Conference, Manual of ECAC Recommendations and Resolutions Relating 
to Facilitation and Security Matters. (Paris: European CivilAviation Conference, September 1988).
**A.J. Goodpaster et ai., Combatting International Terrorism: U.S. - 
Allied Cooperation and Political Rill. (Washington D.C.: Atlantic 
Council of the United States. 1986) p . 38.
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surveys of passenger trends had revealed that travellers' bookings 
from the United States to Europe had declined by between 30 and 80 per cent, depending on destination.** An OECD study has also revealed 
that aviation terrorism has been at least partially responsible for 
tourism declining in target states by as much as 35 or 42 per cent.**
It is interesting to note that some state responses to security lapses are implemented with the intention of inflicting economic injury on
other nations. A good example of this is the public warnings Issued 
in June 1986 bv the US Administration to travellers intending to use 
Athens airport. This protest against lax security was made in order 
to accelerate Greek security reform activities through the imposition 
of economic pressures. Security was raised to a tolerable standard by July 1986 and the public notices were withdrawn, but only after an
estimated $300 million (US) of tourist revenues had been lost to
G r e e c e .* °
In addition to governments, the subject of aviation crime should be of 
pressing and direct interest to the industry itself. This was demonstrated in the wake of the widely publicised terrorist bombing of a US carrier's aircraft over the Scottish town of Lockerbie on 21
December 1988. In May 1990, Pan American World Airways announced that the Lockerbie d i s a s t e r ’s undermining of public confidence had resulted 
in losses totalling almost $250 million (US).*i With an act of
sabotage permitted by negligent security resulting in the loss of anaircraft worth in excess of that figure and in the possibility oflegal action to reclaim damages far in excess of such a sum, carriers 
and authorities should be aware that the very financial existence of 
some actors in civil aviation may in future depend on scrupulous adherence to high standards of security.** At the very least. the
* * Plane Facts, June/July 1986. p . 2, The US Travel Data Center revealed that, following the above-noted TWA incident, 850,000 US reservations for overseas flights were cancel led and another
220,000 were altered to domestic flights, out of a total of 6.5million. Norton (1987), p. 31.
**T-J.C, Joy, Aviation Security (Management Aspects): Government
National and Regulatory Viewpoint. Unpublished paper presented at 
International Aviation Management Training Institute Conference on 
Aviation Law and its Impact on Management, Bali, Indonesia. 10 May 1990.
**Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1988), p p . 51 - 52. For adetailed discussion of terrorism's impact on international tourism see H, Handszuh in Lewis and Kaolan (eds.) (1990). pp. 70 - 71: and
R. Bar-On in Lewis and Kaplan (eds.) (1990). p p . 83 - 103.
* * The Independent. Saturday 12 May 1990, o. 2.
**F.R.J. Laity, Aviation Security (Management Aspects). Unpublishedpaper presented at International Aviation Management TrainingInstitute Conference on Aviation Law and its Impact on Management.Bali, Indonesia, 10 May 1990; M.H. MacKenzie-Orr. "Aviation 
Security in an Age of Terrorism." Flight Safety Digest (December1988) P. 5.
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cost-conscious industry should realise that the containment of 
terrorism can also bring with it the containment of insurance costs 
and incident administration expenses.**
Paradoxically, while the consequences of hijacking, aircraft sabotage 
and airport attacks can be devastating and can pose major economic problems, it is also tempting to over-emohas i se the importance of 
violent air crime. Without wishing to trivialise, it is necessary to 
state that in terms of human loss, air crime has never been a major 
numerical killer. Indeed, even in 1985 (so far the year with the 
highest air crime mortality figures) 473 persons were killed in acts 
of violent air crime and a further 375 were injured, throughout the world.** In the same year in England and Wales alone, a total of 
590,734 fatalities occurred, the table below outlining some statistics 
on common causes of violent deaths:*s
TABLE 1,8.
SOME MAJOR VIOLENT CAUSES OF DEATH IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1985
CAUSE OF DEATH.Motor Vehicle Accidents FATALITIES4832
Accidental Falls 3907
All Other Accidents 
and Adverse Effects 3743
Suicide and Self Inflicted 
Injury
Homicide and Injury Purposely Inflicted by Persons
4419
344
Other Violence 1764
TOTAL 19009
Even when compared with the above figures for a very small percentage 
of the w o r l d ’s population, the global statistics on death attributable 
to violent air crime seem insignificant. Yet, as with data on 
homicide (the smallest figure in the above table) their true meaning 
is to be found in their criminal nature. Irrespective of economic considerations, violent crimes deserve to be opposed on purely legal 
grounds. As serious offences against society and against innocent 
airline passengers and crews, air crimes require to be taken seriously
**For information on air crime, insurance and uninsurable 
liabilities, see Dudley (1976 - 77), pp. 87 - 93. See also McGrane
(1975), p. 8 3 ; H.J. Iglarsh, "Fear of Flying: Its Economic Costs," 
Terrorism 10 (1987), p. 45.
**Dawson (1986) II, p . 1.
* Demographic Yearbook 198? (New York : United Nations, 1989). p.500.
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“ a lesson which should have been learned after the destruction of Pan 
Am Flight 103, which constituted the most serious act of mass murder 
ever to have been investigated in Scottish legal history. From the 
viewpoint of the airline industry also, homicidal killings have become 
much more than an economic nuisance. Since the mid-1980s, 
approximately one third of all deaths and serious injuries occurring in civil aviation have been attributed to violent air crime, which 
thus constitutes the industry's greatest cause of death.** No further 
justification need be forwarded for examining this phenomenon.
1.6, Aviation Security - Delineating a Field of Interest
Aviation security comprises the range of techniques employed in maintaining the rights of aviation users and employees and of the general public to be safe from aviation offences, a viation-related 
acts of violence and consequences of such offences and acts. As 
terrorist threats to aviation are diverse, unpredictable and adaptable, it is necessary for the activities covered by the heading 
of aviation security to be wide-ranging, variable and flexible. 
Moreover, it would be wrong to leave room for suggestion that any 
particular form of security activity can enjoy a definitive application against all modes of assault.
Rather, aviation security must rely upon an extremely broad range of activities for its sure operation. In addition to the high-visibilitv 
security activities which travellers notice at many airports prior to departure, many different forms and administrative levels of activity 
unseen to the passenger must combine to produce an integrated network 
of communication and control from intergovernmental strata to the 
operational sector, at all times bearing in mind the essential truth 
that the "most crucial of all weapons in the struggle againstterrorists is good intelligence on their activités."** The low quality of current multilateral intelligence integration can be determined from such incidents of negligence as the international
fiasco over the warnings of attack prior to the Pan Am flight 103 d i s a s t e r .*®
At the international level, intergovernmental cooperation will
continually be required on such vital areas as intelligence
cooperation, risk assessment, integration of police. military and 
industry initiatives, promotion of research into the phenomena 
involved and development of strategies to counter aviation violence. 
The inability of US and western European police, security and 
intelligence bodies to share vital pieces of information regarding 
possible threats to aviation before the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy 
highlights the need for improved channels of communication to be 
opened between and within governmental agencies. Because of the
**Joy (1990).
**6renchley (1986), p . 3.
**0n the theme of passenger warnings, little can be added to the excellent discussion contained in the Report of the President's
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, p p . 83 - 9 5 . See also The Daily Telegraph, Wednesday 16 May 1990.
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political delicacy of this ares, progress in it is almost bound to be 
painfully slow and a subject for narrowly defined, long term projects.
At the level of the state, it is crucial for a lead agency to be appointed by government to promote the interests of aviation security, to act as the central channel of communication for security matters 
within the state and to promulgate clear and enforceable norms for the 
operation of the activities. In the United Kingdom, interest in security is divided as much by accident as by design among several bodies, with the Department of Transport notionally being in command. 
It would make more sense for such delicate intelligence and state security matters to be in the exclusive (or near-exclusive) domain of 
an agency better equipped to take appropriate initiatives in the 
field. Giving control to interior ministries would seem a useful partial solution to s t a t e s ’ Intelligence coordination difficulties, as 
it would permit the subject area to be treated as a matter of policing or of internal security, rather than as an adjunct to transport policy.
At operational levels within airports, it is vital to set in place 
managerial systems of control which can assess and channel security 
and intelligence information received and use it to maximum effect. 
For this to be facilitated, it is also necessary to deploy sufficient numbers of trained and highly motivated personnel, equipped with the 
tools and skills required to meet the needs of an industry facing the threats of attack by dedicated and intelligent terrorists. Only by 
presenting aviation security as a network of interdependent 
activities, can an accurate representation be created of the ideal to 
which it aspires. Similarly, only by recognising that imperfections 
within one level of communication or control are sufficient to 
jeopardise the effectiveness of the whole, can a true impression of 
civil aviation security's vulnerability be gained.
It is obvious that it would be impossible to discuss in detail the 
infinite variety of activities and lapses which can be imagined 
involving aviation security. Clearly, some means of narrowing this 
field of interest is required at this stage. This thesis is, in large 
part, directed at analysing political violence which directly affects 
airline passengers and the measures which can be taken to control such 
violence. For this reason, it is appropriate to limit the scope of 
the Chapters concerned with security issues to a discussion of airport 
security as it most fundamentally relates to passengers, with 
particular reference to the security screening techniques which are 
currently being developed and which have received little critical 
appraisal. This stress is not intended to imply that cooperative, organisational, administrative and other activities are in any sense 
mere additions to an overridingly important theme of passenger 
screening, for they are themselves central to the question of 
terrorism suppression. Rather, the necessary delineation of scope is 
drawn so as to include within it areas of keen passenger interest 
which can be identified as requiring specially urgent consideration.
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CHA P T E R 2
I N T E R N M I Q N m J i n f M P T ^  SyfPRESSIpN^pF V I p L E m  AIR_CRIME
"Nowadays it is fashionable to speak of the international 
community, as if there does exist some sense or spirit of 
community among States. But what we have in reality, especially 
on the international level, is essentially a conglomerate of 
egoistic entities which each considers its own national interests as supreme. In fact, where does one find a politician who will be so bold as to place the interests of other countries first? 
And in case we become indignant or too complacent, one should ask the question how many of us would vote for politicians who consistently profess to subordinate national interests to 
allegedly world interests? But what is worse. States are often so preoccupied with their own little internal problems, including 
not the least electoral or popularity problems, or are so lacking 
in sophistication in the subject in question that it is an 
extremely difficult and slow process trying to persuade them to agree even to international rules and procedures that are 
ultimately in their own interest. What one must do in this area is, therefore, to bear in mind these political and international realities, both in our assessment of what has already been done 
and in what we are hoping to achieve."*
"The idea of prohibitory legislation as a cure-all, or even a 
limiting element against terrorist actions, is itself dubious."*
2 .1. Introduction
This Chapter concerns the legal issues surrounding violent air crime, 
which are discussed in order to illustrate the general thrust of 
intergovernmental suppression activity which has taken place since the early 1 9 6 0 s . The international community has achieved a considerable 
amount in its creation of an almost global regime covering the 
administration of post-incident legal activity, with particular emphasis having been placed on detention, extradition, prosecution and punishment of air offenders. Throughout this Chapter it is the 
intention to illustrate that the law-based achievements of three decades have proved unable to suppress all dangers posed by hijacking, sabotage of aircraft and airport attack. While the promulgation of
*B. Cheng in P.M.J. Mendes de Leon and T.L. Zwaan, (eds.), Aviation 
Security (conference proceedings) (Leyden: International Institute
of Air and Space Law, 1987) p. 24.
*I.R. Horowitz, “Can Democracy Cope with Terrorism?" Civil Liberties feview 4 (1977), p. 31.
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criminal law norms is always a necessary step in the quest for ordered 
society? it is correct to note that penal standards can never alone be 
expected to suffice as a complete deterrent to prospective offenders.* 4
^  W m i n M  is ^  tJLon
Any detailed discussion of criminal air law must involve issues of t
international activity, not least because many of the offences entailed can take place between two or more states. In such
circumstances jurisdictional problems can easily become apparent, 
threatening the success of legal activities and so posing major 
questions for nations intent on bringing offenders to justice.
Criminal jurisdiction can be briefly summed up as the ability of any 
sovereign state to take legal action against persons suspected of 
having breached a criminal law. Shubber has accumulated a fine
selection of definitions of the term from notable legal authorities, 
which together present a clear indication of its nuances.* Among the 
more useful contributions presented by Shubber is Jennings' confident 
statement of the nature of jurisdiction:
"The first principle of jurisdiction is that every State is competent to punish crimes committed upon its territory. This 
rule requires no authority to support it; it is everywhere regarded as of primary importance and of fundamental character."*
This contention is entirely fair, as it is well established that sovereign nations can legislate and enforce criminal laws for their 
own territories without fear of external interference in legal processes. Mann took the subject of competence in jurisdiction one 
step further in his useful comment on the implications of the term:
"When public international lawyers pose the problem of
jurisdiction, they have in mind the S t a t e ’s right under
international law to regulate conduct in matters not exclusively of domestic concern.'* jHence, criminal jurisdiction becomes an issue of some Interest endpossible debate when it relates to matters of competing concern tomore than one sovereign power. Equally, it can raise legal questionswhere no state appears able to exercise powers over suspectedoffenders with, at best, only tenuous links to the state in question.
*Dawson (1986) I, p. 736. For an interesting discussion of
deterrence as a legal concept, see M.C. Bassiouni, "Prolegomen to
Terror Violence,' Creighton Law Review 12 (1979) p. 771.
*S. Shubber, Jurisdiction Over Crimes on Board Aircraft, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) pp. 48 - 56.
*R.Y. Jennings, "Extra-territorial Jurisdiction and the United
States Anti-trust Laws," 33 British Year Book of International Law,(1957) p. 148, quoted in S. Shubber (1973) I I , p. 50.
*F,A. Mann, "The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law." 
Ill Recueil des Cours de L ’Académie de Droit International, (1959)
pp. 181 - 2, quoted in Shubber (1973) II, p. 49.
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One early practical example of this is to be found in the English case 
of R, V. Keyn, in which the court was forced to decide whether or 
not an appellant should originally have been brought to trial for an 
offence committed neither on British territory nor on a British vessel. In determining that there were no grounds for such a 
prosecution, Cockburn C.J. noted:
"Now, no proposition of law can be more incontestable or more universally admitted than that, according to the general law of
nations, a foreigner, though criminally responsible to the law of 
a nation not his own for acts done by him while within the limits 
of its territory, cannot be made responsible to its law for acts 
done beyond such limits."*
In the absence of express legislation to the contrary, no
determination of criminal liability should have been possible. Of course, nothing would prevent liberal promulgation of statute laws 
from forming a jurisdictional regime sufficiently broad to permit, for example, a court in state A convicting a person from state B of having 
committed a criminal offence in state C against a citizen of state D . ' 
The majority ruling in the case of The Lotus (1927) made clear that states enjoy "a wide measure of discretion"* in extending their 
criminal jurisdiction beyond their physical boundaries:
"Though it is true that in all systems of law the principle 
of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it 
is equally true that all or nearly all these systems of law 
extend their action to offences committed outside the territory 
of the State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary 
from State to State. The territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and 
by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty } 0
Notwithstanding the permissive approach taken by the ruling in The 
Lotus, in practice a state's criminal legal system will almost always 
require for its operation some practical connection between the state 
in which it operates and the allegedly criminal actions of any person
j
*Cockburn, C.J. in R. v. Keyn, (1876) 2 EX. D ., p. 160, in Shubber (1973) II, p. 55.
*Sundberg has commented that the jurisdictional rights established 
by and for Sweden and Norway are particularly broad. J.W.F. Sundberg, "Piracy: Air and Sea," De Paul Law Review 20 (1971) d,395.
'Permanent Court of International Justice, (1927) A 10, p . 19, cited 
in B. Cheng, "Crimes on Board Aircraft," Current Legal Problems 12 (1959), P. 185.
lopermanent Court of International Justice, (1927) A 10, p. 20, cited 
in Cheng (1959), p. 184.
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brought for trial before a court within that state.** Bases of jurisdiction have thus developed, according to which prosecutions may 
be unambiguously premised on certain linkages between the suspect, the
victim and/or the locus of the offence.** In international practice, 
these bases evolved gradually, emerging in states' legal philosophies 
in different ways and at different times. One common feature of all 
jurisdictional bases, however, was that their development had been 
unable to predict the rapid creation of a new, unprecedented and 
unique operating environment - namely the skies.**
The remarkably rapid development of international civil aviation in
the twentieth century brought with it a major legal problem for states 
which had grown accustomed to traditional jurisdictional bases' operating characteristics. With legal systems almost depending upon gradual evolution over centuries (as had taken place with many of the standards in the corpus of maritime law) most nations were completely 
unarmed to deal with a new and unfortunately unexpected species of 
violent activity, as nothing had alerted states to the possibility of crimes on board aircraft engaged in international flights.** Cheng's 
influential, early work in this field, dating from 1959, provides many 
useful insights into the difficulties then being discovered.*^ Of special interest, he commented on two cases of the period, USA v. 
Cordova and Santano, from 1950** and /?. v. Martin and Others, from 
six years la t e r , * ’
**S,Z. Feller, in M.C. Bassiouni and V.P 
International Criminal Law Vol. 2; Thomas, 1973) p. 13.
Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on 
(Springfield; Charles C.
**For a full discussion of jurisdictional bases see M.C. Bassiouni,
International Extradition and Rorld Fuhlic Order (Leyden:
Sijthoff, 1974), PP. 205 - 270; Feller in Bassiouni and Nanda
(eds.) (1973) Vol. 2, pp. 17 - 34 ; J. Gaynes, "Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach," Cornell
International Law Journal 2 (1978), pp. 75 - 8 0 ; Mendelsohn(1967), pp. 511 - 513.
*3J. Fenston and H. De Saussure, "Conflict in the Competence and 
Jurisdiction of Courts of Different States to Deal with Crimes 
Committed on Board Aircraft and the Persons Involved Therein," 
McGill Law Journal 1 (1952), p . 6 6 ; R . Wilberforce, "Crime in
Aircraft," Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 67 (1963), p . 175.
**McWhinney (1987), p. 78.
**Cheng (1959), p. 177.
**(1950) U.S.Av.R. 1; 3 Avi 17,306, in Cheng (1959), p. 177. Seealso M.J. Foley, “The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974 - A Step Beyond 
the Hague Convention," South Texas Law Journal 48 (1975), p. 357;and A.W. Knauth, "Crime in the High Air - A Footnote to History,"
Tulane Law Review 25 (1951), p. 446.
* ’ [1956] 2 Q.B. 272.
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Cordova and Santano were two male passengers flying on a US-registered 
aircraft to New York from Puerto Rico one day in 1948. Over the high 
seas (and so outwith the airspace of any state) the men disagreed over 
the question of a missing bottle of rum. In the argument, they became 
violent and Cordova bit both the pilot and a stewardess. Upon landing, the men were charged with assault before the District Court 
of the Eastern District of New York. Despite the certainty of the 
facts and the large number of witnesses who had seen the incident, the 
case was dismissed because it was discovered that the court had no 
jurisdiction in the matter. The prosecution had maintained that US 
legislation outlawing crimes committed "on board American vessels on 
high seas" could cover the facts of the case: however it was noted
that as the alleged assaults had occurred neither on a vessel nor on 
the seas (being instead in an aircraft over the high seas) and as no 
other statute existed conferring jurisdiction, the prosecution could 
not proceed.
The US Congress was not slow in recognising the dangers involved in 
their aircraft being oases of lawlessness when flying over the high 
seas. In 1952, legislation was passed extending criminal jurisdiction 
beyond traditional territorial limits to encompass international Iflights.** In theory, had the legal loophole not been corrected, even ■
such serious offences as mass murder over the high seas could not have been prosecuted. It is, perhaps, interesting to note that the US 
legislature acted to rectify the problem only after a US-registered 5
aircraft was involved in an in-flight incident. This illustrates the reactive approach to sir crime so often taken by governments.
Another problem for many states involved the impossibility of prosecution even where sufficient statutory authority for Jurisdiction existed, because it is necessary to prosecute an alleged offender 
under a relevant criminal law. In the case of Martin (the facts of 
which were broadly similar to those of Cordova and Santano) jurisdiction was not at issue, because the British Government had 
previously extended its criminal laws to its aircraft in flight. As Cheng commented, the problem facing the English court concerned the geographical extent of the specific legislation under which the prosecution had been raised:
"In Martin’s case the court would have had jurisdiction had ;
there been a rule of substantive law making the act complained of 
a criminal offence. But since the law invoked by the prosecution was held not applicable to events on board a British aircraft outside Britain, there was in law no offence and the defendants 
were set f r e e . "*'
■iThese two cases together demonstrate the extent of the legal lacuna '
which widely existed with regard to aviation as recently as the 1950s.
2-3. I M e r n a t  l o n a J _ L e t a i . I nit iat iy.es
Until the early 1960s, no globally-based multilateral approach had
*»U$ Public Law 516, July 12, Î952 
*'Cheng (1959), p. 178.
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been taken to crimes of air violence. As the incidence and severity 
of such acts escalated in the 1950s - the offence of hijacking 
evolving from an infrequent and simple means of escape for common 
fugitives to a more regular, criminally motivated form of diversion - 
it became apparent that what few national laws covered the offences 
were gravely inadequate for containing the dangerous' new threats 
posed. A lacuna in the criminal law of many states soon became apparent on account of h i j a c k i n g ’s originality as an offence. In the 
worst of cases, jurisdictional and custodial problems admitted the 
possibility of no municipal law applying to a case.** While certain 
grounds for asserting jurisdiction were sometimes clearly applicable, others were of uncertain validity internationally on account of 
jurisdictional incompatibilities between states of differing legal 
traditions. Also, many states took, as they continue to take, an 
implacable view of hijackers as political offenders or simply as refugees fleeing tyranny. To circumvent these international inconsistencies of practice, states and scholars turned to existing forms of international law in the hope of finding easily adaptable 
n o r m s .
2 . 4 . P i ra c y J u r e G e n t ium
The novelty of hijacking and of the resultant inconsistencies of state practice on the issue meant that customary international law was ill- 
equipped to deem the offence an international crime, Such a 
categorisation would have resulted in the offence being treated in a 
similar way to such crimes as piracy, slavery and genocide. Had its characteristics corresponded sufficiently to those of piracy Jure 
gentium. many of the jurisdictional problems encountered could have been avoided by allowing any state to arrest, prosecute and punish 
hijackers on the basis of universal jurisdiction. It is now settled, 
however, that the two offences cannot be equated.** The customary international law of piracy was codified in the Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas 1958, which can be applied to acts of piracy involving aircraft. However, the pertinent Articles, Articles 14 - 22, concern a crime which bears little resemblance to hijacking in its common 
forms.
Under Article 15 (1) piracy must be committed for "private ends". 
Politically motivated aircraft seizures, as well as those perpetrated 
by the insane, fall outwith this category. Secondly, Article 15 (11 
(b) states that piratical acts take place "outside the jurisdiction of 
any State". As Joyner has noted, hijacking is a "continuous wrong" and as such should be regarded as having been committed within the airspace of at least the state in which the seized aircraft lands,
**S. Shubber, "Aircraft Hijacking Under the Hague Convention 1970 - A 
New Regime?" International and Comparâtive Law Quarterly, 22(1973), p. 725.
**S. Shubber, "Is Hijacking of Aircraft Piracy in International Law?" 
British Yearbook of International Law, 43 (1968/69), p. 204; H.F. 
Van Panhuys, "Aircraft Hijacking and International Law," Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 9 ( 1970) pp. 4 - 1 2 ; S.F, Wurfel,"Aircraft Piracy - Crime or Fun?" Nil H a m  and Mary Law Review 10 (1969), pp. 841 - 842.
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even if the decisive act of seizure takes place over the high seas.** 
Thirdly, with certain exceptions, Article 15 (1) (a) establishes that the act of piracy must commence on one ship or aircraft and be
directed against another. This criterion could conceivably be met in 
an act of hijacking but no instances of it are recorded in air crime statistics.
This definition of piracy cannot accommodate the characteristics of
unlawful seizure of aircraft.** Hijacking, therefore, continued torequire the attention of the international community which, since the 
early 1960s has attempted to use the legislative mechanism of the
multilateral convention to create bases for universal!sed jurisdiction in which the community of nations could voice its confidence and which 
the norms concerning piracy Jure gentium could not provide. A global î
agreement could equate the jurisdictional properties of hijacking to 
those of piracy, as any state could elect to detain and prosecute any alleged offender captured within its territory.** It is important to I
note, however, that such jurisdiction would represent merely a %
discretionary right for states and so the introduction of conventional 
jurisdiction could not, of itself, mandate action by states.**
2.5, The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed onBoard .Aire r a f t ,.. 19 6 3^
In formulating air law agreements with the potential for global
application, the forum of ICAO has been used to some effect.** Itsfirst attempt at controlling the crime of hijacking is to be found in
the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, known as the Tokyo Convention 1 9 6 3 . * ’ On account of the 
novelty involved in drafting a treaty to deal with air crime, the 
Tokyo Convention was greeted with rather more enthusiasm than its
**N.D. Joyner, Aerial Hijacking as an International Crime (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1974), P. 114.
’ ^November (1972), p . 643.
**Abramovsky, Part II, (1975), pp. 228 - 229.
**Shubber (1973) II, p. 701.
**For information on the structure and organisation of work of ICAO see T . Buergenthal, Law-Making in the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969); and M ,Sassella, "The International Civil Aviation Organization: Its
Contribution to International Law," Melbourne University Law Review 8 (1971).
* ’Convention on Offences and Certain Other acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, 14 September 1963, Tokyo, 704 UNTS 219; 1963 UNJY8 136; UKTS 126 (1969) Cmnd 4230; 20 UST 2941; TIAS 6768; ATS 14 (1970);JOF 27 Feb 1971; 1971 RTAF 12; 37 Vert A 495; 2 ILM 1042; 58 AJIL566; 75 RGDIP 289. Entered into force on 4 December 1969. By 1989133 states had signed the agreement. For a discussion of the
history of the proposals which were eventually enacted in the Tokyo 
Convention see Boyle (1964 - 65), pp. 68 -71.
**8renchley (1986), o. 10.
z'Steelman (1977), p. 100.
Abramovsky and P.L. Greene, "Unilateral Intervention on Behalf 
of Hijacked American Nationals Held Abroad," Utah Law Review (1979), pp. 237 - 8.
Tokyo Convention Article 3(1). On the powers of pilots and the 
duties of states, see Chapter III of the Tokyo Convention.
**Lissitzyn, "Hijacking, International Law and Human Rights" in 
McWhinney (1971), p p . 117 - 8.
**Cheng observes that the rights outlined in Article 3 (2) alreadyexisted irrespective of the Convention and can be utilised irrespective of the treaty. Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.)(1989), p. 33.
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provisions deserved. In fact, it soon proved to be "distinctly mild 
in its provisions."**
The modest aim of the agreement was to ensure that for any given 
offence or violent act taking place on board an aircraft in flight, at 
least one state - the state of registration of the aircraft - would be |empowered to exercise criminal jurisdiction. In addition, it sought &
to provide for in-flight remedial action to be undertaken, to 
establish international recognition of aircraft commanders' rights to control activities in flight and to mandate the timely continuation of 
affected journeys.*' The inherent pre-occupation with vital questions of jurisdiction and treatment of offenders would later develop to characterise the rationale of all ICAO air crime Conventions, sadly at 
the expense of other equally important factors which might readily 
have been considered.** In securing a right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the offence in the state of registration of the 
aircraft, Article 3 of the Convention at least managed to impose adegree of order in an otherwise lawless situation by stating that "the
State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise 
jurisdiction over offences and acts committed on board."**
The development of the Tokyo Convention cannot be regarded as anything
more than a c odification of pre-existing customary international law 
norms in an effort to concretise previously amorphous obligations, because it would be ludicrous to suggest that the advent of the agreement bestowed on states any rights which had not already been 
available to them in their domestic activities. The Convention merely 
acted to set out common ground upon which all states participating at 
the Tokyo Conference had agreed.**
It is fair to conclude that the important sections of the Tokyo i
Convention are either ineffective, on account of their 
restrictiveness, or are merely declaratory of existing norms.** Any 
of its unequivocal or novel provisions are of only secondary significance to the Convention's impact on the acts with which it is supposed to deal, such as the rules of Chapter III on the powers of 
the aircraft commander. Hence, the Tokyo Convention accomplishes
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little other than its formation of basic rules for in-flight control. 
It fails to deal with the hijacker or his illegal activities, defining 
no offences or penalties and providing only a minimal system of 
discretionary rights (and few effective mandatory obligations) in 
custodial and jurisdictional matters.
Seeking universal support and trusting that sovereign states would act 
with an element of respect for the spirit of the Convention, it seemed 
both expedient and sufficient to limit the extent of States' 
obligations and leave provisions open to a large measure of state 
discretion. This naïve intention was undermined, however, by two practices emerging in the late 1960s. First, western European countries consistently granted political asylum to refugees escaping 
political suppression in the Soviet bloc. Second, certain states extended this policy to cover political offenders - a more 
controversial action which would involve granting political asylum to 
common criminals with no legitimate political justification for any 
claim of sanctuary. Contraventions of Article 11 by states seeking to detain aircraft and their inhabitants for political purposes (as, for example with Algeria in 1968) further highlighted the inadequacies of the Convention in its Inability to enforce the standards it sought to 
introduce on a global scale.
For these reasons, the Tokyo Convention cannot be viewed as a serious attempt to deter hijackers or to prevent their acts. Inhibited by domestic political and legislative difficulties, particularly in 
implementing Chapters IV and V on the unlawful seizure of aircraft and 
the powers and duties of states,** by a general lack of urgency towards the problem and by a growing awareness that a viable solution 
was not to be found in such a nominal instrument, states were slow to 
enact the Convention. As a result of this, it entered into force some six years after its completion, the cause of its eventual 
implementation being a worldwide upsurge in hijackings of all types political, t r a n s p o r t â t ional and extortionist ~ only serving to 
emphasise the inadequacies of the Tokyo Convention. As shall be demonstrated, subsequent agreements made little progress upon the original C o n v e n t i o n ’s internal conflict between providing effective 
solutions and seeking universal support.
In light of the Tokyo C o n v e n t i o n ’s failure to meet the threat of 
hijacking, efforts shifted from facilitating a safe continuation of interrupted flights to more positively combating the perpetrators of illegal acts of violence against aviation, by attempting to limit 
their capacity for escaping justice. In particular, most states agreed on the "urgent need to provide appropriate measures for 
punishment of o f f e n d e r s " . *%
**A b r a m o v s k y , (1974) Part I, p. 390.
*spreamble to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970.
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& 6 ,  The Convention,., for . the.Sug^resslon . of U M a ÿ f u l _  S e i z u r g  of
Aircraft,, 1970
December 1970 witnessed the adoption of the Hague C o n v e n t i o n , w h i c h  
in its first Article established "the offence" of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft and so created a definition capable of universal and uniform 
incorporation into municipal legal s y s t e m s . * ’ As shall be 
demonstrated, the intention of the drafters at the Hague drafting conference was to produce an agreement radically extending the initial advances made at Tokyo, by relying on two legal measures designed to 
deter offenders, namely extradition and prosecution. It was hoped 
that by employing the device described in the legal maxim aut dedere 
aut judicare (meaning "either deliver or prosecute") greater certainty of offenders being punished would be achieved.**
Rather than introduce a conventionally established system of universal jurisdiction, as had been suggested at the Conference by the delegate
of Austria, in which any state, whether a party to the Convention or 
not, could prosecute suspected offenders found on its territory, the Conference opted for the 5urisdiet ionally more restrictive provisions 
of Article 4 . * ’ It was agreed as a minimum standard that each 
Contracting State should "establish its jurisdiction" (that is, empower itself with the capacity to prosecute acts of in-flight 
violent air crime) when the offence is committed on board its registered aircraft (or on board aircraft leased without crew to a person in that state), when it receives a flight containing an alleged 
offender or when such a person is located on its territory. The
Article also implies that such jurisdictional powers should be 
implemented whenever circumstances required.
Article 4 is the measure above all others which lifted the Hague
Convention from the low jurisdictional standards of its 1963 predecessor and provided a much needed degree of legal sophistication 
in attempting to solve a difficult and complex problem. The 
obligation of a signatory under Article 4 to "establish its
jurisdiction over the offence" in a number of different ways
(discussed above) was the means by which the Convention ensured that 
its parties would provide for themselves sufficient jurisdictional powers and so be ready to act against offences committed within their
**Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December 1970, The Hague. 860 UNTS 105; 1970 UNJYB 131; UKTS 39(1972), Cmnd 4956; 22 UST 1641; TIAS 7192; JOF 23 Feb 73; 1973 RTAF 
6; 46 Vert A 635; 10 ILM 133; 65 AJIL 440; 2 HRR 178; 11 Ind JIL155; 75 RGDIP 297. Entered into force on 14 October 1971. Bv 1989
127 states had signed the agreement.
*’For a discussion of the political factors which shaped the terms of 
the agreement in 1970, see Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1989), pp. 37 ™ 40.
**The maxim is sometimes found in the alternative form, aut dedere 
aut punire, meaning "either deliver or punish".
* 'Di nste in (1972), p. 200.
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sphere of interest - however they chose to define such interest.*'
Unlike the Tokyo Convention, the agreement of 1970 gave great emphasis
to extradition processes, by which alleged offenders can be moved from 
one jurisdiction to another for the purpose of standing trial. By the late 1960s, a surprising lack of international integration of extradition laws on hijacking continued to prevail, with several needless loopholes existing to prevent any serious attempts at judicially-based rendition of suspects. It is interesting to note 
that, even with the growing acceptance of the Tokyo Convention, by the beginning of 1969 the United States had yet to conclude extradition 
agreements on hijacking with either the United Kingdom or France.** 
The treaty of 1970 was intended to rectify such omissions. Radically 
extending the underlying objective of the earlier agreement, which was the securing of jurisdiction in at least one Contracting State, the Hague Convention aims at the definitive establishment of criminal 
jurisdiction over the offence in a broad selection of countries party 
to the agreement, in order to allow greater involvement by interested parties and wider opportunities for extradition of suspects from one state to another. In this way, otherwise unconnected states are linked in an unambiguously defined network for the purposes of suspect 
rendition. In practice, jurisdictional primacy (or the ability to exercise legal action over an offence when other states might also be
interested in so acting) falls to the state in which the suspected
offender is apprehended.**
By imposing no duty to extradite, Article 4 was left open topossibilities of abuse. It fails to take account of the fact that-the natural tendency of the hijacker to divert an aircraft to a safe haven 
will often be rewarded on arrival by an offer of sanctuary. The 
utility of any proposal for mandatory extradition, however, is also tempered by very serious humanitarian and political considerations. 
For example, it would be unreasonable and politically unfeasible to expect states to conform to a provision obliging them to return 
political refugees to tyrannical regimes. At the Hague Conference, a 
US proposal to require extradition was diluted when several European states plus Australia, Canada and some others voiced deep reluctance 
to enter an agreement which limited their powers to deal as they
wished with Political offenders.** As Shubber noted in reference to 
the drafters of the Hague Convention and their unstinting search for
**B. Cheng in A.W.6. Kean, 8. Cheng and Sir F . Tymms, "The Latest on 
Hijacking," Aeronautical Journal 77 (1973), p. 340.
**I.A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1971), p. 42 and o. 132, f . 1.
**Feller (1972), p. 208. Approaching the problem from another
direction, Emanuelli has correctly pointed out that:
... there are no principles that regulate the question of
concurrent jurisdiction in the case where more than one State requests the extradition of the offender." Emanuelli (1975), d . 508.
**Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 77.
7^
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universal membership of the agreement:
... had they opted for a mandatory extradition, the 
chances of a large partnership would probably have been 
compromi s e d . "* *
By choosing a system which granted states absolute freedom to refuse extradition requests, the drafters hoped to encourage support for the agreement while recognising the necessity of allowing signatories a 
realistic level of discretion to decide upon the fate of detained 
offenders. The wording of the Convention made it clear, however, that 
in the absence of extradition, Contracting States would be expected to 
resort to prosecution of suspects. Nevertheless, with regard to an apparent duty contained in Article 4 (1) which is incumbent upon states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the offence, it is evident that the Hague Convention offers no certainty of prosecution. 
While mandatory prosecution, either in preference to or following rendition, is clearly intended in the wording of Article 7 (which deals with the issue of trials) in reality prosecution is little more 
than optional- Article 7 merely obligates a Contracting State having detained a suspect to “submit the case to its competent authorities 
for the purpose of prosecution". For this reason, it is incorrect to suggest that "the Contracting State no longer has the option left open 
by the Tokyo Convention, to decide neither to extradite nor to try o f f e n d e r s . "*^
a
The Article was designed to ensure the prosecution of political
offenders and even of political refugees in every case, so as to mandate punitive action by all Contracting States and thus minimise 
the anti-social activities of hijack havens. This is clear from the wording, “without exception whatsoever" which simultaneously displays 
the d r a f t e r s ’ deep concern for their aim and illustrates their naïvity 
in failing to recognise that the very states against which the Article 
was directed would either elect to abstain from signing or ratifying 
the document or else pay lip-service to the agreement's provisions. 
Contracting States could, in fact, fully undermine the basis ofArticle 7 and hence of the Convention as a whole, while acting fully 
in conformity with its provisions. In such a scenario, a s u s p e c t ’s case would first be submitted to the s t a t e ’s competent authorities most likely a department under the direct control of a government
minister - which would then opt to proceed no further with the case
**Shubber (1973) I, P. 725. See also McWhinney (1987), pp. 4 3 - 4
*^Brenchley (1986), p. 11.
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and to release the individual.**
This weakness inherent in Article 7 permits abuse of the agreement by 
unscrupulous executive branches? but it should not simply be viewed as a failure of the C o n v e n t i o n ’s drafters. Rather, it should be 
recognised as a limitation of treaty law in general. While the 
dilution of an earlier, stronger version of Article 7 by its drafters 
was in part intended to encourage accession by western European and 
Middle Eastern states (which were adamant in their defence of 
political exceptions to a general rule of extradition) the primary 
obstacle to creating an effective provision was one of state sovereignty in the C o n v e n t i o n ’s potential capacity for interference 
with domestic criminal justice systems. For some states, such as the 
United Kingdom, to have subscribed to an article mandating prosecution 
would have entailed radical domestic constitutional legal changes 
which would not have been c o u n t e n a n c e d . * ’ In such a situation, therefore, conventional law proves unsuited to the creation of 
forceful laws required, leaving Article 7, in the words of Abramovsky, as both "beneficial and inimical to the solution of the hijacking problem".** Simultaneously it enables interested Contracting States 
to exercise - with a useful element of discretion - jurisdiction over 
acts of aircraft seizure, while implicitly permitting a de facto 
grant of safe haven from prosecution and extradition.**
Broadly similar problems to those of extradition and prosecution exist in relation to the Hague C o n v e n t i o n ’s prescription on penalties, contained in Article 2, the shortest in the agreement:
"Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable
by severe p e n a l t i e s . "
**McWhinney (1987), P. 48; R. Sabel in Lewis and Kaplan (eds.)
(1990), P. 112. One example of suspected air saboteurs being freed 
under dubious circumstances prior to trial took Place in Italy in 
1972 after a bomb had exploded on board an El A1 aircraft, causingsome damage to its reinforced baggage hold. Although Italianpolice had arrested two suspects on firm evidence received from 
unwit ting accomplices, authorities released the men, citing as 
justification that the device used "was not adequate to destroy the 
airliner," C. Dobson and R. Payne, The Reapons of Terror:
Internat ional Terrorism at Rork (London: Macmillan, 1979) p. 124.
* ’Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 77.
**Abramovsky (1974) Part I, p. 398.
**In addition to s t a t e s ’ discretion, very practical considerations 
can militate against the operation of the Hague C o n v e n t i o n ’s prosecution provisions. As Sundberg remarked in connection with a Swedish hijacking case, attempted prosecution in the absence of strong and satisfactory evidence can risk the legally and 
politically undesirable consequence of "a scandalous acquittal". 
In such circumstances, it may be more prudent for prosecuting 
authorities to take advantage of Article 7 ’s loophole, opting to drop charges. Sundberg, (1971) p . 416.
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This measure was hoped to present a system suitable for application in 
diverse legal systems, proving politically acceptable for ratification 
purposes and which would not interfere with sovereign s t a t e s ’ rights 
to impose penalties deemed appropriate by them. This resort to 
compromise. however, produced once again a supine article, incapable 
of meeting the demands made of it. What was required was a definitive 
common standard which, in fact, could have been achieved while 
catering for s t a t e s ’ individual sentencing policies. Instead, Article 
2 ’s loosely worded provisions reflect those of Article 7. The 
limitations of the general medium of treaty law are such as to 
militate against the success of Article 2 encouraging, indeed 
requiring, a compromise to be made to provide rules on punishment 
acceptable to a broad constituency, no matter how weak the resultant rules may become. Had the article set out a fixed penalty for acts of 
hijacking, then many states wishing to grant asylum on the grounds of 
a political offence exception would have eschewed the Convention in its entirety. On the other hand, states taking a firmer line on 
punishment would be unwilling to implement an instrument aimed at deterrence and international control if it did not incorporate some 
common standard on punishment. As it seems to have been impossible to have reconciled the interests of the eastern bloc, western Europe, the 
United States and Middle Eastern states, it is not surprising that the 
Hague Conference ultimately adopted Article 2 as it now stands, in an effort to salvage some degree of order, however inexact.
In terms of controlling non-political aviation crime, it was always clear that effective punitive measures would provide the agreement 
with the powers required to establish the framework for worthwhile 
norms on suppression.*' In Article 2, however, this framework was eroded by the politically expedient compromises of states. The resultant variations in the severity of punishment simply encourage 
the hijacker, whether refugee, extortionist or terrorist to seek 
sanctuary in the most ideologically compatible state available to him or her. Furthermore, this inequality has proved to be a limitation in 
the operation of Article 7 ’s extradition procedures with, for example, 
extradition being refused if penalties in the requesting state are not 
permitted in the requested state. Thus, Italian authorities opted to prosecute US Marine Corporal Raffaele Minichiello, rather than allow 
extradition to the United States, where capital punishment could have been i m p o s e d . A l s o ,  the possibilities of abuse of a discretionary 
punitive system are illustrated by the fact that Minichiello served 
only eighteen months of a seven-and-a-half year sentence imposed by an 
Italian court.** Thus, even if the Hague C o n v e n t i o n ’s exhortation to 
impose severe penalties were to be implemented, it would not rule out 
the possibility of a state pardon from the executive, or of parole, 
being granted to avoid future terrorist blackmail. Evidence of the Hague formula being misused by certain states under pressure from 
terrorist groups is offered by Clutterbuck:
S'It should be noted that some scholars doubt the existence of any deterrent effect from imprisonment on the activities of terrorists. 
See Bassiouni (1979), p p . 768 - 775.
Joyner (1976), p. 211, f. 103. 
s s f b i d . , p. 174, f. 25.
"Virtually every convicted Palestinian hijacker has been freed, 
usually very soon, and often as a direct result of a further 
terrorist incident or the threat of one."**
Historically, states have always sought to maintain a measure of 
freedom in determining whether or not suspects should be delivered to another sovereign power's jurisdiction for the purpose of prosecution 
particularly when political factors are present compounding the 
difficulty of the decision-making process.** A principal inadequacy 
of the Hague Convention involves its failure to provide unequivocal 
terms on dealing with so-called "political offences" which are regarded by some states as constituting an exception to the general 
rule that alleged offenders should be rendered up to jurisdictions 
wishing to place them on trial.
The Convention's failure is due to the irreconcilability of different states' domestic policies on this issue. The Soviet Union and other 
eastern European states have consistently argued that in the absence 
of agreed penalties being imposed, automatic extradition of hijackers 
to the state of registration of the aircraft should always take precedence over purported "rights" to grant political asylum. In this 
way, it is claimed, jurisdiction over offences could be premised on 
one clear basis. International disputes would therefore be prevented, 
the state which usually has the greatest interest in securing prosecution would always take control of the case and no incentive 
would exist for hijackers to land in friendly states. (This final 
point rests on the rather doubtful assumption that universal adherence and implementation would take place.)
Conversely, western European countries and many Middle Eastern states
have consistently favoured the overt recognition of political offence exceptions,** while the United States has remained selectively 
doubtful of their utility in the context of air crime but recognises 
the inherent difficulties in operating any internationally agreed
**R. Clutterbuck, Kidnap, Hijack and Extort ion : The Response
(London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 8.
**C. Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to 
Extradition : The Delicate Problem of Balancing the Rights of the
Individual and the Internai ional Public Order (Deventer: Kluwer.
1980) pp. A - 18. For an excellent review of early writers' views 
on the legitimacy of political offence exceptions to extradition see B. Africa Pol it ical Offences in Extradition (Manila: Benioayo, 1926), pp. 97 - 107, More recent analysis can be found in L.C: 
Green, “Extradition v. Asylum for Aerial Hijacking," Israel Law 
Review 10 (1975), p. 207: F.C. Pedersen, "Controlling
International Terrorism; An Analysis of International Force and Proposals for Multilateral Cooperation," Toledo Law Review 8(1976), pp. 231 - 241.
* * M c Whi nney (1987), P. 98.
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system of mandatory e x t r a d i t i o n . ’ * In truth, the Soviet stance 
displays a failure to grasp the political realities of a world in 
which sovereign powers need not bind themselves to norms which they do 
not trust, while the western approaches condemn norms on the issue to 
a level of near power lessness. Clearly, standardisation of the 
subject cannot be expected to be found easily.
Article 7 ’s requirement to act "without exception whatsoever" is intended to guarantee the taking of judicial action in all cases, be 
they motivated from the very best and understandable of Intentions. 
Any step closer to mandatory extradition, however, would have been 
unacceptable to the many states wishing to take a case by case 
approach in considering a hijacker's circumstances and their domestic 
political climates. However, as has been noted above, a de facto 
political offence exception may be deduced from Article 7 's loophole regarding the submission of a case to "competent authorities". In any 
case, in the absence of any express reference to political offence exceptions or to fixed penalties in the Convention, there is no 
impediment to courts tacitly and imperceptibly giving weight to motivational factors in sentencing convicted o f f e n d e r s . s ?
International law can easily be limited by such constraints as states' 
domestic priorities, fears, prejudices and practical capacities. It 
is perhaps unfortunate - though certainly not surprising - that the negotiations of 1970 resulted in the somewhat artless muddle of the Hague Convention. In recognising a right to refuse extradition, in failing to specify clear requirements on prosecution, in ignoring 
vital issues of punishment, in omitting reference to parole and in its 
silence over granting political asylum, the Convention benefits states 
which seek the pragmatic accommodation of both punishment and asylum 
for offenders - options which should never be viewed as mutaullv exclusive. On occasion, France has granted political asylum after 
imprisonment, to political offenders and refugees who have employed 
hijacking to facilitate escape, as in the cases of Holder-Kerkow and 
B r o w n . 58 More remarkably, however, the Federal Republic of Germany granted, in 1972, political asylum to ten Czech nationals despite 
their having killed the pilot of the aircraft which they hijacked.** As McWhinney has pointed out:
"In the actual jurisprudence, countries like Sweden, Switzerland, France, Austria, Greece, West Germany, Denmark, Italy, have persistently refused to consider extraditing hijackers where 
there is clear, or even colourable, evidence of a "political" motive for the hijacking. These countries have preferred, instead - rendering lip service at least to the principle aut 
dedere. aut punire - to try the hijackers before their own
**F.E. Loy, "Some International Approaches to Dealing with Hijacking 
of Aircraft," International lawyer 4 (19701, p, 450.
s'Green (1975), p. 215.
*:Fingerman (1980), pp. 129 - 130.
5*A.E. Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking: What is Being Done?" American
Journal of International Law 67 (1973), p. 652.
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national criminal courts, the sentences generally being, because 
of the "political" element, very light. or even nominal to the 
point of being absurd,"*®
In summarising the faults of the Hague Convention it is appropriate to 
observe that the reliance placed by its drafters on the strengths of 
multilateral cooperation was always bound to be inadequate to control 
the crimes against which the Convention is directed. First, because 
the success of the international agreement depends upon universal 
ratification for any measure of success, the refusal of even one 
active hijack haven to accede can result in the entire venture being 
considerably less than a complete success from the outset. 
Furthermore, it is equally clear that as a convention of this type is 
merely declaratory of the intentions and undertakings of states at 
some time in the past, the agreement's operational qualities will not 
even derive from extensive membership if Contracting States recant or 
acquiesce in their undertakings. While these difficulties are common 
to international agreements as a whole, the plight of the Hague 
Convention lies in the additional fact that it attempts to secure the 
compliance of sovereign powers with politically delicate undertakings 
while making no attempt to enforce that compliance with sanctions in 
the event of breach.
In assessing the value of the Hague Convention it is important to 
consider its measures dealing with jurisdiction, extradition, 
prosecution and punishment as key impediments to controlling acts of 
violent air crime. Indeed, the delegate of France at the Hague 
Conference summed u p  the shortcomings of the agreement when he noted:
"It contains the obligation of apprehension of the alleged 
offender, the possibility of extradition. the obligation of 
reference to the competent authority and the possibility of 
p r o s e c u t i o n . "*^
In addition to barring progress in the struggle against hijackings, 
these same considerations have prevented a law-based solution from 
being fully developed to assist in countering aviation sabotage, which 
for administrative reasons was not included in the Hague Convention 
but which was dealt with shortly after the completion of the document, 
at a Conference convened by ICAO in Montreal.
2.7. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971
The problems of the international community In dealing with unlawful 
interference with aircraft were timeously shown by the explosion on 
board a Swissair aircraft on 21 February 1970, in which forty-seven
*®McWhinney (1987), p . 98.
*^ICAO Doc. S877-LC/161, P. 17.15, reprinted in S.K. Aorawala. 
Aircraft Hijacking and International Law (New York: Oceana, 1973). p. 132.
**Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1989), p. 42.
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k i l l e d . *3 While an act of aircraft sabotage 
the jurisdiction of one state, it will assume 
if the offence originates outwith that state 
escapes from it to another country, or is 
For this reason, and because of the numerous 
risks Dosed to civil aviation by unlawful acts of 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Safety of Civil Aviation was formulated in 1971 at 
As the only factor which had prevented the Hague 
from dealing with aviation sabotage had been a lack of an international legal agreement on the issue was urgently 
required and as the Conference of the previous year had efficiently catalysed a determined, albeit imperfect. fusion of wills, the Hague 
Convention was deemed to be a suitable model on which to base the new i n s t r u m e n t .
passengers and crew were often takes place within international dimension 
or if the perpetrator otherwise found abroad, 
and immense 
interference, 
against the 
M o n t r e a l . * *
Conference 
time, as
Because of their close drafting similarities. it follows that the 
latter of the two agreements became tainted with the imperfections of 
the former. From the outset, therefore, the Montreal Convention was predestined to be unable to deter the crimes which it was intended to suppress. In addition to the familiar problems of air crime, the 
drafters at Montreal were forced to contend with the additional 
factors of identifying and detaining suspects. most of whom would not 
be on board the aircraft at the time of their attack. As the two earlier Conventions of Tokyo and the Hague concern only violent acts 
committed on board aircraft "in flight" neither could have been used 
to cover external interference with or destruction of stationary 
aircraft situated on the ramp at airports.** This was due to a 
reluctance on the part of the drafters to interfere with state 
sovereignty by imposing international obligations where national laws might have sufficed.** By the late 1960s, however, it had become 
evident that terrorist attacks would not dimish in number without 
multilateral action, so necessitating a firmly based approach to these types of offence.
Reference to the Montreal Convention reveals a striking similaritybetween it and the Hague agreement. Indeed, in all major respects the
two sets of standards are virtually identical. For example. with 
regard to jurisdictional bases, the Montreal C o n v e n t i o n ’s Article 5 
mirrors the rules of the Hague Convention, Article 2. Equally, 
although the Montreal agreement would have benefited from the
incorporation of a more strict and definite sentencing scheme to
reflect the inevitable severity of the destructive crimes involved.
*3 Joyner (1974). p . 217, f . 12.
**Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation, 23 September 1971, Montreal. 1971 UNJYB 143;UKTS 10 (1974) Cmnd 5524; 24 UST 564. TIAS 7570: JOF 13 Oct 76:1976 RTAF 43; 57 Vert A 732; 10 ILM 1151; 66 AJIL 455; 11 Ind JIL742; 76 RGDÏP 303. Entered into force on 26 January 1973. By 1989137 states had signed the agr|eement.
\**Tokyo Convention. Article 1(3%: Hague Convention, Article 3(1).
* *A b r a m o v s k y , (1975) Part II, p.%278.
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the Conference predictably resorted to the terms of the Hague 
C o n v e n t i o n ’s Article 2. On the question of extradition, the Montreal 
Convention, Article 7, made no progress on the measures of the earlier 
Article 7 on which it was modelled. Thus, the inconsistency of 
purpose displayed in the earlier agreement's tacit acceptance of 
political offence exceptions remains, leaving the Montreal Convention 
as a bad copy of an imperfect blueprint.
2.8, ICAO's Attempt at Universal Enforcement of the Regime
Although all three air crime Conventions contain provisions on the settlement of disputes which could be used in arbitration or before 
the International Court of Justice, it was deemed necessary by several 
parties to the agreement that efforts should be undertaken to draw up 
norms on enforcing o b l i g a t i o n s . * ’ ICAO once more turned to the medium 
of the multilateral convention to impart some much needed power to the agreements. In the belief that the Conventions' obligations could be 
enforced by negotiating a new instrument, in 1973 the 63 member ICAO 
Legal Committee considered three proposals for multilateral mechanisms.** One proposal made by Denmark, Finland. Norway and 
Sweden, was to adopt a new convention sanctioning "joint action" to be carried out via the ICAO Council against parties in breach of their 
obligations under the Conventions of Tokyo, the Hague and Montreal 
Another suggestion forwarded by France was to amend ICAO's constituent document, the Chicago Convention 1944, in order that it would incorporate the principal provisions of the Hague and Montreal agreements and thus enable expulsion from the Organisation for serious breach of their norms. Finally. it was proposed by the USSR that a protocol could be drafted appending to the agreements of 1970 and 1971 a provision mandating extradition to the state of registration of an effected aircraft.**
Despite these provisions containing useful and progressive proposals, 
basic flaws existed to render each inoperable. For example, the joint 
action agreement envisaged by the Committee could have had no effect 
against states which had not implemented the earlier Conventions. The amendment to the Chicago Convention would almost certainly have taken several years to formulate, let-alone to receive ratification by two- thirds of ICAO's membership. which would have been required for
* ’Cheng in Cheng and Brown feds.) (1988), d p , 46 and 51.
**For a detailed analysis of the preparatory bargaining which was carried out within an ICAO Legal Committee sub-committee see
McWhinney (1987), pp. 48 - 55.
**PitzGerald (1974). d p . 178 - 180: McWhinney (1987), p p . 55 - 57.
This proposal continues to be supported by official Soviet opinion, with a senior Soviet official commenting in 1990;
"We have long since been persistently trying to have the 
obligatory extradition of criminals accepted as a norm. We 
are convinced that this is the most effective measure to 
combat piracy in the air. "Mikhail Timofeyev, Izvesfia, 25 
July 1990, reprinted in Novosti Press Agency press release. July 1990. p. 2.
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imp l e m e n t a t i o n , ’ ® Furthermore, as successful amendment would in no 
way have guaranteed either a workable olan or a solution which was not already effectively available under the terms of the Chicago 
Convention, such oroDosals were r e j e c t e d . ’ * With regard to systems 
advocating mandatory extradition, such as that of the Soviet Union to 
aooend a protocol to the Hague Convention, widespread opposition was 
voiced by many states in order to safeguard their coveted political 
offence exceptions to e x t r a d i t i o n . ’ ’
After extensive discussions, no agreement on enforcing the existing 
Conventions was reached. A principal reason for this impasse was the 
nature of the joint action suggested in the numerous proposals before the ICAO Legal Committee. In particular, the issue of imposing trade 
and other sanctions divided states. Some less developed states, for example, viewed such joint action as being an attempt by I C A O ’s larger 
aviation powers to limit their freedom of action as sovereign entities. Accordingly, these countries refused to enter any agreement 
calling for united action to be taken by all states against others in breach of their o b l i g a t i o n s . ’  ^ By contrast, the Soviet Union and 
France cited Article 41 of the UN Charter In arguing somewhat unconvincingly that only the UN Security Council could be competent to 
impose collective aviation sanctions. Among several other arguments, France also maintained that under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 34 and 35. it would be inadmissable for any sanctions agreement to operate against states outwith the consensual 
limits of the treaty r e g i m e . ’ *
A conservative stance within ICAO on the issue of alienating states,
further militated against the imposition of sanctions. As Cheng noted :
" ... the international community was not cuite ready to 
majority rule for the imposition of s a n c t i o n s . " ’ * accept
Although the failure of states to agree upon a new set of enforcement standards can be rated as a sad, though predictable, shortcoming of 
the Organization, the disunity over the issue might, at least, have
’^Chicago Convention, Article 94 and J, Gentler, "Amendments to the Chicago Convention: Lessons from Proposals that Failed," Journal of 
Air Law and Commerce 40 (1974), p . 253. For a discussion of 
amendment procedures see Buegenthal (1969), pp. 207 - 209.
’*Abramovsky (1975) Part III, p p . 456 - 457.
’’FitzGerald (1974), p. 210.
, p. 201.
’*Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 23 May 1969, Vienna. UN Doc A/Conf 39/27; UKTS 58(1969), Cmnd 7964; 1969 UN JIB 140; 63AJIL 875(1969); 8 ILM 679; 9 Ind JIL 288: 29 ZAORV 711. Entered
into force 27 January 1980. See also Brower (1973), p. 1030: 
McWhinney (1987), pp. 58 ~ 59,
’*Cheng (1973), p. 338.
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prevented an ideological fragmentation of ICAO between hard line 
western powers and the many Middle Eastern states which voted against 
all proposals a d v a n c e d . ’* The partial isolation of hijack havens 
might have been advanced by the implementation of a broadly based 
multilateral agreement extending measures of enforcement, yet the body 
empowered to make such an agreement found itself unable to act on 
account of s t a t e s ’ distrust of the u n k n o w n . ”  Despite the efforts of 
the Legal Committee and a number of particularly violent contemporary 
acts of aviation terrorism to focus attention on the problem in hand, 
the Rome Diplomatic Conference and ICAO Assembly of 1973, which had 
been expected to frame workable norms, were u n a b le to reach agreement 
in any form, perhaps on account of an undue complacency born of ageneral belief that the problems of the 1950s and 1960s had already
been s o l v e d .’*
2.9. The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 1988.
In addition to efforts designed to enhance the performance of I C A O ’s 
aut dedere aut judicare standards, one example exists of an attempt 
by the Organization to extend the scope of its regime since the
framing of the Montreal Convention in 1971. The upsurge since that
time of terrorist violence taking place at international airports, 
directed against prospective airline passengers, led to a
supplementary Protocol to the agreement being framed at a diplomatic 
conference convened on 9 February 1988 as the first true extension of 
the regime for over fifteen y e a r s . ”
Sadly, a predictable emphasis was placed at the conference on theperceived need to extend the Hague formula to acts of airport violence, without any recognition being made of the fact thatperfectly workable legal frameworks should already exist in ICAO
member states and be sufficient for the task of securing the 
punishment of offenders. Rather than address the true security needs
’*K.L. Milte, “Prevention of Terrorism Through the Development of 
Supra-national Criminology," Journal of International Law and 
Economics 10 (1975), o. 533.
’ ’For a concise discussion of the Rome Conference 1973 and the events
surrounding it see R.G. Bell, "The U.S. Response to TerrorismAgainst International Civil Aviation," Orbis 19 (1975), p p . 1337 - 1340.
’^McWhinney (1987), p . 133. Note, in contrast, that air crime was still a problem for the aviation community. Dawson points out that 
only three weeks prior to the Rome Conference, on 5 August 1973, an 
attack on Athens airport resulted in four deaths and 55 injuries, Dawson (1986) II, p. 19.
’’Protocol for the S u p p r e s s i on of Unlawful Acts of Violence at 
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 24 February 1988, Montreal. Mise 6(1988) Cm 378; ICAO Doc 9518. Entered into force 
on 6 August 1989. For detailed discussions of the drafting
procedures and provisions of the Montreal Protocol, see Cheng in
Cheng and Brown (1989), particularly at pp. 25 - 26 and 29 - 30.
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of airports, delegates at Montreal preferred to retreat to 
discussions of outdated and unnecessary legal norms. Further 
critical analysis of the 1988 Protocol can be found in a detailed 
report of its provisions published by the current writer.*®
The prolonged inability of the international community to provide 
reliable international agreements on all aspects of aviation crime has 
demonstrated the inadequacies of the adopted consensual approach to 
questions of terror violence and I C A O ’s inability to catalyse 
agreement from an ideologically disparate membership. These factors 
shall be discussed below.
2.10. Limitations of Global Treaty Law
To be effective, a treaty depends upon its parties adhering to the
compliance norms which it establishes.** However, the success of a 
treaty will usually be determined in large measure during the process 
of its drafting. Conventions are formulated according to a consensus 
reached among states of diverse interests and political alignment. 
Whether a measure is incorporated in an agreement is therefore 
dependent not upon its viability and appropriateness, but rather uoon 
its popularity and its ability to unite sufficient support from a 
broad selection of state delegations. In this way, for example, it is 
unlikely that any convention made within the confines of ICAO would 
provide for fixed periods of imprisonment for convicted offenders, 
even if this promised some degree of success in deterring illegal 
act s ,
Also, as illustrated by the operation of the Hague Convention. 
Articles 2 and 7, multilateral agreements on hijacking cannot easily 
operate as instruments of deterrence without at least near universal 
consensus in drafting and subsequent uniform implementation. As a 
result, an initial goal of wide ratification must be met before the
actual objectives of the agreement can be reached. However, because
support for a draft convention increases across s t a t e s ’ ideological 
divides as the severity and clarity of its articles is diminished, and 
because the two aims of universal membership and optimal viability are 
mutually exclusive, it follows that compromise must be employed in the 
drafting process as a balancing device. This militates against the 
promulgation of strong-worded and clearly drafted provisions and so 
results in the eventual adoption of ambiguous and weak undertakings. 
McWhinney has expertly expressed the difficulties to be encountered:
... there seems to be something of an inverse relation between 
the number of States taking part in a multilateral convention, 
and the specificity and concreteness - or "bite" - of that 
convention. In other words, the greater the number of people who 
take part in the convention, the more likely it is that the 
convention Twill be] vague and general or purely hortatory in its 
substantive contents, and lacking in specific remedies that are 
immediately operational in terms of actual problem-solving. That
*®R. Hill. "Airport Violence and the Legal Principle Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare. " Terroris/n and Political Violence 1 T 1989): 78.
» * Joyner (1974). p. 227.
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this should be so is not of course surprising: rather than run
the risk of public failure involved in the break-up of a 
diplomatic conference without an agreed consensus document to 
produce at the end of it, the emphasis tends to be upon strictly verbal accommodations achieved through formulae expressed at such a very high level of generality and abstraction that they can 
mean all things to all men ...
The acquisitive nature of insular, self-interested states frequently 
results in a fragmentation of opinion around similar p r o p o s a l s . such 
that broadly compatible measures are opposed by blocs of ideologically 
allied states. This practice was illustrated at the Rome Conference, 
in which a clear divergence of opinion existed over the introduction 
of enforcement sanctions for the existing Conventions.** This 
amounted to a lack of positive agreement, rather than to any marked 
disunity between the delegates, concerning both the nature of the 
change and the type of mechanism to be used. Included in the 
proposals for a new protocol to the Hague and Montreal Conventions, 
for example. were suggestions from the USSR, Greece, The Netherlands 
and Nicaragua. In view of these s t a t e s ’ inability to develop a common 
approach to the problems of enforcement. it is fair to conclude that 
it is clearly possible for states to defeat proposals the contents of 
which they broadly favour. By taking an intransigent stance, they can 
and do prevent the adoption of measures of common benefit and 
considerable significance.
The characteristics of working conventions also prevent ease of 
operation and adaptability. Once agreement has been reached, a 
convention can do no other than lock it terms into an unchanginq 
document, ensuring not only a degree of historic certainty within its 
terms, but also of unavoidable rigidity of provision. Because an 
agreement is unable, of itself, to evolve and adapt to changing 
circumstances, unforeseen requirements and operating conditions. the 
most obvious means of updating it must be the cumbersome and time- 
consuming process of amendment - at best a continuing requirement 
which risks producing a range of different norms accepted by some
states, but rejected by others. This rigidity derogates from the
organic qualities needed in any regime concerned with the regulation 
of a constantly evolving area of interest, such as the suppression of 
a form of political violence or the deterrence of air crime as a 
whole. Clearly, a more pragmatic solution to the problems involved requires to be identified.
Taking account of the above-noted factors, the observation may validly 
be made that unlawful acts of seizure and interference cannot 
sufficiently be contained and deterred by the implementation of the
Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions and the Montreal Protocol, at
least when considered in isolation. McGrane is correct to claim that 
"no really effective solution" was achieved by the regime in terms of 
providing for the suppression of air crimes.** Not only have states
* ’McWhinney (1987). p. 35. 
*:FitzGerald (1974), p. 201
®*McGrane (1975), p. 91.
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disagreed over appropriate enforcement, but the agreements themselves ■’<
have always been objects of controversy, thus creating rather than 
dispelling international tensions.
Trends in air crime, and especially in aviation terrorism. indicate 
that any efforts to halt the advance of the offences concerned rarely 
meet with total success. When, in 1970 and 1971, the world attempted 
to suppress aircraft hi jacking and sabotage by establishing its
international framework for prosecuting and punishing offenders, some 
terrorists were probably deterred but others were prepared to use the 
tactics of aircraft diversion and destruction to further their cause 
or organisation, while others looked for easier targets elsewhere in 
the industry. The Hague and Montreal Conventions were looked to as 
pioneering international agreements which might herald a new age of 
peace in the airways. Regrettably, as has been noted above. the 
treaties were based in large part upon a fundamentally wrong
assumption - that political terrorists would en masse take note of 
globally promulgated legal norms and in so doing would be deterred 
from resorting to crime.
This ensured that the Hague formula would remain ineffectual, often
being unable to influence the actions of the most determined,terrorist offenders. It is intriguing, therefore, to note the
willingness with which most of the world's governments have returned 
to it as the one true means of reaching global agreement on a broad 
range of international terrorism types. Its piecemeal approach has
been accepted over the years, so that while its basic standards have
been adapted for application against such diverse criminal activities 
as hostage taking*^ and theft of nuclear materials,*® no overall
approach to terror violence as a whole has been adopted. Instead, it 
has been left to the UN family (including ICAO) to work on an acf hoc 
basis to Plug the gaps in the response system, whenever such gaps are 
perceived. Remarkably, the Hague formula commands a position of 
importance despite patently having failed to deter so many committed 
and dangerous fanatics and having made no effort to introduce 
practical measures for incident prevention. One likely reason for its 
popularity with states is that it is an essentially inoccuous set of
standards, unlikely ever to be enforced and thus easily ignored oroverruled. It demands remarkably little of states and their legal 
authorities and so is a low risk mode of global regulation which has 
been proven to adapt easily to different styles of offence. The 
w o r l d ’s norm creating response to air crime has been politically
“safe", yet practically sterile - left unaccompanied by any
substantially more meaningful standards which might prove excessively 
contentious within the international community. As Horowitz has 
astutely remarked:
^International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 17 
December 1979, New York. Un Gen Ass Resn/34/146, GAOR, 34th Sess, Supp 46, p. 245; Mise 12 (1980), Cmnd 7893; 18 ILM 1456; 20 Ind JIL 337; 40 ZAORV 305. Entered into force 14 June 1983.
* Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3 March 1980, Vienna. Mise 27 (1980), Cmnd 8112; 18 ILM 1419. Entered
into force 8 February 1987.
“The seeming inability of national and international 
legislative bodies to curb terrorism derives, at least to some 
extent, from an appreciation of the political costs i n v o l v e d . " * ’
To adopt a financial ana logy, where political expense must be incurred 
by states, investment will often only be made when potential profit is 
thought to be guaranteed. The failure of the Hague formula to be more 
strongly worded might be attributable to an inability of states to 
identify worthwhile goals to be followed, because, as Falk has stated:
“Law does not operate as an autonomous force. Its rules on crucial matters gain effectiveness as their claims overlay 
perceptions of self-interest."**
The existing regime of agreements represents the lowest common 
denominator for universal norm standardisation. It is unlikely that a significantly more powerful collection of global, judicially-based answers could be found in the short term to the difficult legal and 
political questions posed by international terrorism. One reason for 
this must be the unwillingness of governments to venture into the uncertainties and vagaries of meaningful cooperation. Put another 
way, the international regime has failed to overcome political acts of air crime because of states' overriding reluctance to pass powers from 
the domestic to the intergovernmental level. In the words of 
F r i e d l a n d e r :
“Truly effective preventive and punitive measures have not been 
achieved because domestic political considerations have taken priority over international n e e d s . " ® ’
Better than any other commentator, Cheng sums up the pre-eminent factor to be grasped in assessing the traditional ad hoc use of legal 
measures in addressing violent air crime:
... it may perhaps be ê propos to make two observations.
First, it may be questioned whether this piecemeal and 
purely reactive approach is the best way to tackle 
international problems in general and international terrorism in 
particular. However, from this point of view, possibly all governments more or less require not merely a demonstrated need 
but also a popularly felt need for action, the response to which carries political mileage, whether national or international, 
before they decide to spare valuable executive, legislative or 
diplomatic time to deal with any problem. Thus, the hope for any comprehensive approach, however desirable in itself, is probably, 
apart from its inherent difficulties, not very realistic.
Secondly. for perhaps very much the same reasons, what 
governments do is sometimes solely or largely a mere public 
relations exercise in order to show that something has been done, 
that some response has been made. Often, after all the fanfares,
* ’Horowitz (1977), p. 31.
**R. Falk quoted in Milte (1975), p. 535, f. 59 
**Friedlander (1977 - 78), p. 287.
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at the end of the day. in terms of legal obligations. no more
than a mouse is born. However, at times the dreadful moans that 
accompany the m o u n t a i n ’s labour can denote genuine difficulties, 
as experience has shown with both the duty to prosecute and the duty to extradite in the Hague C o n v e n t i o n . ”’®
The above factors indicate that a principal reason for the popularity 
of the Hague formula is, as Cheng has noted, its ability to be employed as a tool of public relations - a means of showing 
governments to be concerned and active in their condemnation of 
terrorism without actually requiring them to take any of the difficult 
decisions or necessary action positively to suppress terr o r i s m . ’ * In 
short. the use of the Hague formula may seem to have been an 
inadequate response, but it is certainly a predictable and
understandable one which would be certain to attract broad 
intergovernmental support, due to the a g r e e m e n t s ’ inability to fix the suppression of air crime as a genuinely taxing issue and a high 
priority for states.
2.^1. Regional and Bilateral Administrative Agreements
While the forum of a universal agency has traditionally proved unable 
to overcome the problems of air crime. regional initiatives have at
least displayed a greater propensity for success, on account of more
ideological similarities and legal compatibilities being likely to be 
found on the abandonment of global bargaining. The community of
interest which can, on occasion, be found in such fora as the Council
of Europe and the Organization of American States. can also permit 
extensive agreement to be reached where more diversely constituted 
bodies produce loosely worded norms. As an example. the EuropeanConvention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 1 9 7 7 ’’ displayed greater 
unity and direction in framing than either the 1970 or 1971 ICAO 
agreements. by consciously attempting to foreclose political offence 
exceptions to extradition in a number of cases. Also, "extradite or
prosecute" standards of the O A S ’s Convention to Punish the Acts of 
Terrorism taking the form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance. 1 971.’* take the 
form of an obligatory norm, quite likely to be able to bind the 
members of the OAS community. The very extensive limitations of these
’®Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1989). p . 45.
’ ’European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. 27 January 1977. Strasbourg. ETS 90; 25 EYB 289; UKTS 93 (1978), Cmnd 7390: 57 Vert A 738: 81 R6DIP 606: 37 ZAORV 685. Entered into force 4August 1978.
’ ’Convention to Protect and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form 
of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of 
International Significance. 2 February 1971, Washington D.C.. PAUTS 37; 27 UST 3949; TIAS 8413: 65 AJIL 898; 76 RGDIP 638.
Entered into force 16 October 1973.
48
agreements are discussed e l s e w h e r e . ’* In passing. it should be noted 
that Clutterbuck has described the legislative weaknesses to be found 
in the European Convention in the following terms:
"fElven the most responsible European states. however much 
plagued by terrorism. are not prepared to commit themselves
without a loophole to regard the terrorist offences listed in
Article 1 (hijacking, kidnapping. attacks on diplomats or bombs 
etc endangering innocent people) as political. nor to extradite 
or prosecute offenders "without exception whatsoever". Some at 
least would certainly not have signed the Convention. still less 
ratified It. without the inclusion of Articles 5 and 13 which, in 
fact. directly contradict Article 1 and make it virtually 
meaningless. And, iust in case they were unable to find any
other way of evading an inconvenient obligation. they have only
to deliver a letter to the Secretary General under Article 14 
with immediate effect."'”
Another important example of norm formulation on a regional scale can
be identified in the bilateral agreements which are drafted by states
with a common criminal problem, such as the Soviet Union and its 
neighbours or the United States and Cuba. Not only can bilateral 
accords allow for the inclusion of more specific terminology and 
greater operational strength than multilateral (and particularly 
universal) agreements, but their coverage of only two legal systems 
makes for easier accommodation of certain provisions, such as with the 
obligation to submit cases for actual prosecution. Also, haven states 
which refuse to accede to multilateral conventions may more readily be
in favour of entering negotiations in which they deal with only one
government. A key example of a workable and mutually beneficial 
agreement is the Memorandum of Understanding of 15 February 1973 
signed by the United States and C u b a , ’ ® the deterrent effect of which 
was to reduce hijackings from the former to the latter until President 
Fidel Castro denounced it in October 1976.”  Rather than succumb to
’*Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1989), o. 34; N . Gal-Or. 
International Coopérât ion to Suppress Terrorism (Beckenham: CroomHelm. 1985) pp. 175 - 337; McWhinney (1987). pp. 144 - 148: J.F.
Murphy. Puni shing Internat ional Terrorists The Legal Framework for 
Policy Initiatives (Totowa; Rowman and Allanheld. 1985) d o . 11 - 
15 and 33.
Clutterbuck in M.D. Sandbu and P. Nordbeck (eds.). International 
Terrorism Report from a Seminar Arranged by The European Law 
S t u d e n t s ’ Association in Lund. Sweden, 1 - 3 October 1987, (Lund: 
Juristfdrlaget i Lund, 1989), p. 51.
’ ®Cuba-United States: Memorandum of Understanding on the Hijacking of 
Aircraft and Vessels. Exchange of Notes at Washington and Havana, 
15 February 1973. Internat ional Legal Materials. Vol. 12 p. 370. 
See McWhinney (1987), pp. 62 - 66.
” R.A. Friedlander, "Terrorism and International Law : What is Being 
Done?" Rutgers Camden Law Journal 8 (1977). d . 390.
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the vagueness of the Hague formula. the accord made clear that any 
means of rendition would be acceptable and that prosecution in the 
state of capture was the only other alternative:
"Any person who hereafter seizes, removes. appropriates or 
diverts from its normal route or activities an aircraft or vessel 
... shall either be returned to the party of registration of the 
aircraft ... to be tried by the courts of that party in
conformity with its laws or be brought before the courts of the party whose territory he reached for trial
After 15 April 1977. when the agreement ceased operating. hijackings increased in frequency between the two states. though throughout the 
1980s they have been controlled according to an informal arrangement 
between the two states to return offenders to a hijacked f l i g h t ’s 
state of origin. As Cuba is the prime destination for American 
hijackers. successive US Administrations have been justifiably concerned to renew the Memorandum on its original, formal basis, 
illustrating the potential utility of this means of reaching
agreement on non-terrorist rendition. The development of a worldwide 
network of such treaties would be impractical. Their widespread 
adoption, however, should not be discounted, particularly since the 
United States has commenced a policy of negotiating bilateral air 
services agreements which include provisions on prosecution and 
extradition of offenders.
2.12, Bonn Declaration on Hijacking
While it was clear that in the absence of enforcement machinery the 
Hague and Montreal Conventions would always remain second rate 
standardisation instruments, equally it had become evident at the 1973 
Rome Conference that consensus was not to be found in a universal
forum. Particularly on the subject of universally agreed sanctions
imposition, there had emerged a declared annoyance on the part of 
several developing states with the true intentions of major powers.
Abramovsky has quoted the Kenyan delegate from the Conference in this 
regard :
... the idea of joint action was a very sensitive one for the 
Kenyan delegation and one they viewed with some skepticism, as it 
envisaged the imposition of sanctions against states, fsincel
they felt it was a weapon that powerful states might use to
oppress and subdue the weak. even when circumstances did not 
justify s a n c t i o n s . ””
Dissatisfied with the impasse reached in the various conferences 
convened by ICAO. and especially at the proven inability to generate 
global interest in any agreement premised on sanctions imposition. it 
is understandable that major civil aviation powers sought a solution 
to the problems of hijacking outwith the formal structure of
*»McWhinney (1987). p. 63.
’ ’Kenyan delegate to the ICAO Legal Committee. reported in ICAO Doc. 
9050~LC/169-1, pp. 47 - 48 (1973), quoted in Abramovsky (1975) Part III. pp. 462 - 463.
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international organisations. For this purpose, the Heads of State or 
Government of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany. Italy. 
Japan. the United Kingdom and the United States. while in economic 
summit at Bonn in July 1978. agreed on the unusually strong wording of 
a declaration on the suppression of hijacking:
"The Heads of State and Government, concerned about terrorism and 
the taking of hostages, declare that their governments will 
intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism. 
To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or 
prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not 
return such an aircraft, the Heads of State and Government are 
jointly resolved that their governments shall take immediate 
action to cease all flights to that country. At the same time, 
their governments will initiate to halt all incoming flights from 
that country. or from any country by the airlines of the country 
concerned. They urge other governments to join them in this 
commi t m e n t . "*®®
This novel approach to norm establishment took advantage of s t a t e s ’ 
international legal right, displayed in Article 1- of I C A O ’s 
constituent document. the Chicago Convention, 1944, to control 
activities in their sovereign airspace. The seven states displayed 
their contempt for the suggestion out forward at Rome that collective 
sanctions were inadmissible if imposed outwith the UN Security
Council. Instead they adopted an attitude similar to that expressed
in 1973 by US Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of State Charles
N. Brower:
"We simply take the position that states collectively may take 
any designated action not otherwise prohibited in law in the 
event another state fails to observe the principles set out in 
the Hague Convention."*®*
Unfortunately .for the summit states- the success of the Bonn 
Declaration has yet to be d e m o n s t r a t e d . The fear of political 
condemnation and diplomatic tribulation, as well as of unavoidable 
economic loss and of counter-sanctions, has resulted in the redundancy 
of the Bonn Declaration. Employed only once. against Afghanistan (a 
country with minimal interests in international civil aviation with 
which few Summit nations had regular scheduled s e r v i c e s ) * ® ’ it has
proved to be the opposite of its predecessors - a potent force with
little prospect of practical application. The Declaration. in being 
concluded outwith the auspices of ICAO, takes on the appearance of a 
powerful. unilaterally framed statement of intent by a cartel of 
dedicated and interested states committed to the suppression of
aviation hijacking. In reality, the unwillingness of each party to
risk economic loss and terrorist reprisal outlines the great
limitations of this overtly forceful type of international agreement.
*®®Joint declaration of western economic summit members. Bonn. 16 - 17 
July 1978.
*®*Brower (1973), p. 1031.
* ® ’Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1989), p . 47.
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Its provision on enforcement action should have marked a maior advance 
on the basic framework established by the Hague Convention. but its 
rhetoric alone is insufficient to influence the actions of hiiack 
havens. In view of this factor. it is fair to suggest that the Bonn 
D e c l a r a t i o n ’s primary achievement has been to highlight the hypocrisy 
of its framers, while air crime continues unaffected.
The entire international legal regime on air crime, established by 
lawyers and diplomats representing their s t a t e s ’ civil services. was 
based on the idea that a dogmatic, though at times broad and 
faltering, legislative opposition to the crimes dealt with would serve 
to outlaw and deter them. However, the political masters of these framers, while content to ratify and advocate the principles, 
nevertheless recognised that any operation of the norms required to be 
tempered with a broad reliance upon pragmatism, in the form of
judicious non-compliance when necessary or desirable. A case in point 
is to be identified in the British approach taken to resolving a 
hijacking in February 1982, involving five Tanzanian hijackers. The 
Home Secretary of the time, Mr William Whitelaw. announced that the 
hijackers would not "get any change out of Britain". In November 1985, however, it was reported that he had agreed to two hijackers 
being permitted temporary sanctuary on their release from prison. in 
accordance with a deal struck on their surrender.*** It is
significant that the Whitelaw deal did not contravene the terms of the 
Bonn Declaration. It nevertheless was not in full accord with its 
spirit of determination and represented an embarrassing setback for a 
government which had prided itself on its opposition to aviation
terrorism. This case does not suggest that all accommodations with
hijackers are iniquitous and should therefore be avoided at all costs, 
but rather demonstrates that the idealistic intentions and the 
absolutism of such documents as the Bonn Declaration will sometimes
impose an unrealistically high hurdle for politicians to clear
c o n v i n c i n g l y .
In economic summits subsequent to that of 1978, statements on 
terrorism cooperation and control were issued, though with little 
practical effect. In particular, in May 1986. the same seven n a t i o n s ’ 
leaders issued a revised statement of intent, following their summit 
at Tokyo, The D e c l a r a t i o n ’s opening clauses indicated that the zeal
which had characterised the terms of the Bonn statement had not 
diminished in the intervening eight years;
"We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies 
and the representatives of the European Community, assembled here 
in Tokyo, strongly reaffirm our condemnation of international 
terrorism in all forms, of its accomplices and of those, 
including governments, who sponsor or support it.
Recognising that the continuing fight against terrorism is a task 
which the international community as a whole has to undertake, we 
Pledge ourselves to make maximum efforts to fight against that
***D8WSon. (1986) II. p. 24.
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s c o u r g e ."*®*
Aimed primarily at Libya. but covering state soonsorshio generally, 
its drafters strongly reaffirmed their "condemnation of international 
terrorism in all forms" and. importantly. decided to apply certain 
measures against "any State which is clearly involved in sponsoring or 
supporting international terrorism".*®^ Predictably, the measures 
referred to were not innovative but if applied might have had a far- 
reaching influence upon states which support terrorism. Included in 
the declared responses were a refusal to export arms to any implicated 
state, limits on the size of its diplomatic and consular missions and 
denial of entry to any of its citizens who had been expelled from any 
other declaring state. The conditions of the Tokyo Declaration 
appeared to be straightforward in their application, yet following the 
trial of Nezar Hindawi (discussed below), the response of most states 
party to the Declaration was one of complacent inaction despite the 
weight of evidence of Syrian involvement in the 1985 El A 1 sabotage 
attempt. To compound matters. June 1987 witnessed the delivery by the 
Seven of the "Venice Annex" which specifically dealt with instances of 
state-sDonsored sabotage, but which predictably has never been 
used.*®®
The seven maior powers which framed the Bonn and Tokyo D eclarations 
enioy all the commanding influence of an oligopoly, both in terms of 
their economic strength and their significance in civil aviation 
markets. If they could agree upon and then implement a united policy 
of joint action to oppose terrorism or state sponsorship of it. their 
is little doubt that their influence alone could secure maior
concessions. However, if such measures are to have any effect. the
current extent of political cooperation between states must first 
improve. to develop meaningful agreements on a greater range of 
subjects and between a greater number of governments. Thereafter,
much greater willingness to engage in determined sanctions imposition 
would be required, if the Summit S e v e n ’s suppression regime were to be 
implemented.
Even with consensus reached at the highest level and with
unambiguously worded provisions, the existing Declarations
demonstrate the capricious attitude of major governments which
together control some eighty per cent of the western w o r l d ’s civil
aviation services.*®? While they sought to enforce previously
established standards. their downfall was guaranteed by their failure 
to include any means of self-enforcement. Designed to work in the 
totally decentralised environment of s t a t e s ’ own discretionary
decision-making procedures, it was inevitable that the powerful terms 
of the Declarations would be ignored by the very powers which framed 
them. The activities of the Summits demonstrated that nothing
*®*Ooening passage of joint declaration of western economic summit. 
Tokyo. 4 - 5 May. 1986.
*®Sfbid.
10 6 Presi dent ’ s Commission (1990), p. .37 . 
* ® ’Clutterbuck (1990) I, p. 77.
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precludes states from creating meaningful agreements on terrorism 
suppression. The problem which remains to he solved must be that of 
channelling s t a t e s ’ commitment to the task of implementing created 
agreement s .
2.13. International Courts
Since UN Secretary General U Thant suggested in 1970 that hi lacking 
trials could be conducted by a UN operated tribunal, various 
suggestions have been advanced on the questions of forming an 
international criminal court to deal specifically with acts of air crime.*** As the h i j a c k e r ’s offence can involve many different and 
varied jurisdictions, Samuels has claimed that reference of a case to 
a multipartite body would prevent disagreement over conflicting 
c l a i m s , * ® ’ A duty to submit all cases for prosecution would guarantee 
that the rationale of the Hague Convention, Article 7. would be 
recognised in international practice. as all cases "without exception 
whatsoever" would be considered judicially. Unfortunately, it is 
unlikely that harbouring states would view proposals for such a court 
favourably and would probably refuse to submit to its jurisdiction. 
A b r a m o v s k y ’s suggestion that the inclusion of hijack havens on the 
tribunal in an attempt to gain their support for it seems unlikely
ever to meet with approval either from the powerful civil aviation
states or from the sanctuaries themselves, which would be unwilling to 
abrogate their a s v 1um-seeking monopoly in such a selfless way.**®
Smith claimed that automatic extradition of prisoners to an
international prison, within twenty four hours of their apprehension, 
would free states from the risk of blackmail and reprisal by terrorist 
groups, by removing the object of interest from that s t a t e ’s 
territory.*** It could, conversely. be argued that such a system could result. not in the deterrence of blackmail, but rather in 
swifter attacks against the state of capture and its vulnerable 
targets, such as its diplomats abroad and its registered airline 
offices. These problems strike at the root of the olan but lesser 
organisational and procedural difficulties would also require
resolution before an international scheme of this order could be 
implemented. For instance, a neutral site for the court would be 
required, as well as for an international prison, if it were deemed 
n e c e s s a r y .
*® *Abramovsky Part (1975) III, p . 480: R.A. Friedlander. "Cooing with
Terrorism: What is to be Done?" Ohio Northern Uni versitv Law Review «
5 (1978). p. 434; A.I. Hirsch and D.O. Fuller Jr. "Aircraft Piracy 
and Extradition," New York Law Forum 16 (1970), pp. 403 - 405:
November, (1972) p p . 654 ~ 655: Samuels (1971), p. 170: C.L. Smith.
"The Probable Necessity of an International Prison in Solving 
Aircraft Hijacking", International Lawyer 5 (1971), p. 269:
Sundberg (1971), p. 419.
*®’Samuels (1971). o. 170.
**®Abramovsky (1975) Part III. p. 479.
***C.L. Smi th (1971), p. 274.
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The security risks involved. in addition to the probable animosity of 
states opposed to the scheme would make this task very difficult. 
Independent judges acceptable to all participating states would 
similarly be difficult to find. Furthermore. the drafting of the 
c o u r t ’s charter and its procedural code. if such proved politically 
possible. would take considerable time. Overall, the diplomatic and 
political problems requiring resolution and the reluctance of states 
to have their hands tied by international agreement of this type, 
currently make the introduction of an international criminal court an 
unrealistic option.**? It appears that until the disagreements and 
formalities involved in establishing such an institution are 
dispatched. there can be no real prospect for a workable c o u r t . A 
more realistic proposal would be for states to enter agreements over 
police and intelligence cooperation to enable better pre-emptive 
control of hijacking and interference.***
2.14. Conclusion
As has been demonstrated above, the international community's reliance 
upon purely legal approaches to the suppression of violent air crime 
has proved severely limited. Not merely have governments appeared to 
rely upon the doctrine aut dedere aut iudicare to deter all classes 
of offender. including the most fanatical and determined who will not 
easily be deterred,**® but they have adopted it as a railying-cry when 
new threats are perceived. Instead of seeking new and more practical 
means of deterrence and prevention and more determined forms of 
enforcement. ICAO members continue to resort to the Hague formula, 
even when it is unable to make a viable contribution to the cause of 
crime suppression, as in the case of the Montreal Protocol of 1988.
Notwithstanding the arguments which can be made to criticise the
w o r l d ’s use of legal mechanisms in the past. it is vital to stress 
that standardisation of extradition, prosecution and punishment 
practices remains very important. Recollection of the jurisdictional
lacunae of the 1950s prompts the conclusion that the global
initiatives which followed that era were truly valuable in
ascertaining common ground on which to build a vital framework for
future administrative cooperation. On no account should policy-makers 
discard international legislative measures as being worthless.
Equally. however, they must resist the temptation to elevate the ICAO
regime to unrealistically high levels of importance in all 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Its value lies in its administrative standardisation, 
rather than in any supposed suppressive qualities.
Unquestionably. the world would benefit from the continued evolution 
of the Hague formula. with continued emphasis being placed on the 
ultimate aim of economic enforcement against state sponsors of
terrorism. The changing political climate of the 1990s may prove more 
amenable to such cooperation than that which prevailed during the cold 
war years. Yet, irrespective of law-based progress, more is required
* * ^Friedlander (1977), p . 387.
***See Clutterbuck (1990) II. pp. 121 - 122. 
**®Dawson (1986) I. o. 736.
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if the suppression of air crime is to be taken seriously by states. 
The world aviation community should seek a multi-oronaed approach to 
this problem based. in large measure. upon much more practical and 
finacially expensive aspects of cooperation. The following Chapter 
comprises a case study of a particularly difficult form of aviation 
terrorism which simultaneously illustrates the potential poverty of 
IC A O ’s legal regime and highlights the pressing need for a new and 
aggressive approach to be taken to aviation security.
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"In bargaining with hijackers, governments pursue three 
potentially incompatible goals; securing release of all the 
hostages, deterring others from trying the same thing and 
punishing the hijacker. Release of the hostages and deterrence 
of potential future hijackers are far more Important than punishment. Except insofar as it affects deterrence, punishment probably matters very little to governments,"*
"Because international terrorism is a form of political violence 
and ultimately requires political solutions, an effective response must come to terms with its political dimensions. Steps 
for coping with terrorism will therefore need to include both 
measures of prevention and measures of deterrence. Only 
through a combination of the two, consciously pursued in parallel, can we hope to reduce and eventually eliminate this 
spreading epidemic."?
Having discussed the c haracteristics and manifold inadequacies of existing aviation norms on crime deterrence, a concrete example of the regime's shortcomings will serve to place the attractive, though
theoretical, academic problems discussed above into the aviation industry's frame of reference, where legal puzzles and political debate must give way to practical considerations which can strike at 
the very viability of airline travel. Of the many cases of aviation terrorism which could be used to Illustrate the difficulties of norm 
operation and enforcement, a recent example of political hijacking 
offers the greatest prospect of valuable analysis. The diversion of a 
Kuwait Airways Boeing 747 to Iran, Cyprus and Algeria presented 
considerable and widely varying dilemmas for several sets of authorities throughout the sixteen day period of the aircraft's illegal occupation in April 1988. In addition to the unbearable 
strain which was exerted upon international agreements, the domestic c ounter-terrorism policies of states involved were tested as rarely before, not least because of the unusually volatile mix of ideologies 
espoused by the concerned parties, some of which had been forced into 
the scenario against their will.
* Baldwin (1976), p. 406.
?A.J. Pierre, "The Politics of International Terrorism," Orbis 19 
(1975), p. 1262.
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While other instances of aviation terrorism have presented equally 
intractable problems of negotiation and resolution, few have involved 
such a broad range of participants and of practical difficulties to be 
overcome. More importantly, no comparable political hijacking 
involving one readily identifiable target government (in this case 
Kuwait) has taken place since the general ratification of the Tokyo 
and Hague Conventions, making the Flight 422 incident a vital b e n c h ­
mark by which to judge the suppression regime in the most difficult of 
international crises. Although the late 1980s witnessed few 
international terrorist hijackings of civil airliners and hardly any 
which could rival those of twenty years earlier, this incident proved 
that the threat of serious political hijacking can never be 
discounted. The case involved a Kuwait Airways Boeing 747 on a flight 
path from Bangkok, Thailand to the Emirate of Kuwait, the principle 
facts of which are reproduced in the chronological list, below.*
After the chronology, the following sections discuss the actions and 
intentions of the parties involved in the hijacking, in order to 
establish the motivation and bargaining approaches of each. In turn, 
this leads into a section which deals with the inability of the regime 
as It currently stands to deter, prevent or contain such complex 
incidents of aviation terrorism and an evaluation of the Hague 
C o n v e n t i o n ’s failure to keep pace with its targeted o f f e n c e ’s 
evolution. Finally, the Chapter concludes that theory and practice 
each demonstrates the Intractable complexities Involved in operating 
the current norm set. In view of these factors, therefore, the 
question of seeking new directions in international norm creation and 
implementation is raised for later discussion.
3 _2.,„.Chrpn ogicaL.List pf E v e n ts
Tuesday 5 April 1988:
At 3.51 am. local time, Kuwait Airways flight 422 left Bangkok 
airport, bound for Kuwait. The aircraft, a Boeing 747 containing 97 
passengers and 15 crew was hijacked over the Gulf of Oman by a team of 
eight® Arabic speaking males and diverted to Mashhad, Iran.® On 
landing, fuel was requested and a demand was made that the authorities 
in Kuwait should release 17 prisoners convicted of acts of terror 
violence. Threats were also issued to the effect that the aircraft
*The list was drawn from a more detailed (unpublished) chronology 
compiled by the current writer.
® A process of deduction arrives at this figure. With 112 persons 
embarking at Bangkok and, as shall be mentioned below, 102 of these 
being released and another two killed throughout the incident, 
eight persons on the initial passenger list remain unaccounted for. 
They are probably identifiable as active members of the original 
hijack group.
®Airports Authority of Thailand, Fact Finding Report on the Seizure 
of Kuwait Airways Flight KU 422, p. 1; The Sunday Times, 10 April 
1988, p. A3 ; The Guardian, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8,
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would be destroyed if approached.® A Jordanian passenger, later released, told of six or seven hijackers being armed with hand guns 
and grenades.? At night, a twelve hour deadline for demands to be met 
was made from the aircraft,® Also at night, a team of Kuwaiti 
officials left the Emirate, bound for Mashhad, at the request of the 
Iranian g o v e r n m e n t . ’
Wednesday 6 April 1988:
In the early hours of the morning, 24 women were released.*' Later,
the deadline of the previous night was renewed but was allowed to lapse.** During the day, threats were made specifically against three 
members of the Kuwaiti ruling family, held hostage on board.*?
Thursday 7 April 1988:
32 male passengers were released, leaving only persons of Middle 
Eastern origin on board. The hijackers claimed that the remaining 
hostages were in serious danger and voiced dissatisfaction with the 
Kuwaiti delegation at Mashhad.** Deadlines were set for the departure 
of the aircraft to an unspecified destination. A hijacker fired shots 
towards Iranian guards surrounding the aircraft.** By late afternoon, 
refuelling had taken place, although the runway remained blocked,*®
Friday 8 April 1988:
The departure deadline was renewed by the hijackers, who demanded
* The Glasgow Herald, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1; The Guardian, 
Monday 11 April 1986, p. 1; The Independent, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Hall Street Journal, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1 ; 
The Sunday Times, 10 April 1988, p. A3*, The Guardian, Thursday 21 
April 1988, p. 8; Lloyds^ List, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.
The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8; The Guardian, 
Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Times, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 
1.
The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 7 April 1988, p, 48; The Financial 
Times, Wednesday 6 April, p. 1.
’ The Guardian, Thursday 7 April 1988, p.l; The Times, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.
**86C Six O'clock News, Thursday 7 April 1988.
* * The Observer, Sunday 10 April 1988, P. 21
Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1.
**rhe Independent, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1.
* * The Glasgow Herald, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1.
* * The Glasgow Herald, Friday 8 April 1988,
Telegraph, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8.
The Glasgow Herald,
The Daily
*®The Scotsman, Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1; The Times, Friday 8
April 1988, p. 1; The Glasgow Herald, Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Guardian, Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1.
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runway obstacles to be removed.*® In the early afternoon, the
f l i g h t ’s Captain reported passengers being beaten. Shortly 
thereafter, a hostage was beaten on the a i r c r a f t ’s steps and a grenade 
was thrown from the aeroplane.*? Departure was permitted. Prolonged 
attempts to land at Beirut were prevented by Syrian troops.*® With 
fuel levels low, Cypriot authorities allowed an emergency landing at
Larnaca a i r p o r t . * ’ Fuel was immediately requested, with a small 
amount eventually being provided by Cypriot officials.?' Renewed
demands were made for the release of the 17 prisoners in Kuwait.?* A
Kuwaiti delegation left the Emirate bound for Cyprus.??
Saturday 9 April 1988:
Before dawn, threats were made to destroy the aircraft unless 
immediate departure was permitted.?* Hostage beatings were reported 
by the Captain.?* A refuelling deadline of 10.30 am. was set in 
place, but avoided by Cypriot authorities which continued to stall 
discussions with the hijackers.?® At 11.30 am., a Kuwaiti passenger 
was shot dead and thrown to the ramp.?® A Cypriot official 
(Herodotou) and a Palestine Liberation Organization representative 
(Abdo) later visited the aircraft on several occasions, speaking with
*®JfA/ Channel 4 News, Friday 8 April 1988.
* ? The Scotsman, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1; The Daily Telegraph,
Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8: The Guardian, Monday 11 April, p. 5; 
Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1.
*® The Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5; Saturday 9 April 1988, 
p. 1; The Times, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Scotsman,
Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1.
*’ The Guardian, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Daily Telegraph,
Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 ; ITN, News at Ten, Friday 8 April 1988.
? ' The Guardian, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1.
? * The Sunday Times, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. A12.
??The Times, Sunday 9 April 1988, p. 1.
? * The Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5.
? * Sunday Times, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. A3.
?®S8C Early Evening News, Saturday 9 April 1988; The Sunday Times,
Sunday 10 April p. Al; The Observer, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 1:
The Guardian, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8; The Sunday Telegraph,
Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 1.
?®The Sunday Times, Sunday 17 April 1988, pp. Al and A12.
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hooded gunmen,?? In the evening, a young hostage was released and 
fuel was ordered by the hijackers for noon the following day.?*
Sunday 10 April 1988:
At 7 am., a 25 minute statement was issued by the hijackers, warning 
against any military intervention being made against them. Fuel was 
again requested and the 17 releases once more d e m a n d e d . ? ’ The P L O ’s 
chief representative on Cyprus (Ghazaleh) spoke on board the aircraft 
with the hijackers. Following the broadcasting of a statement from 
Cypriot authorities and the PLO, the noon deadline was dropped.*® 
Abdo and Herodotou entered the aircraft in the afternoon for more 
talks, though these were immediately followed by a new fuel demand 
being made.** Perhaps fearing military action, several hooded gunmen 
removed the B o e i n g ’s inflatable escape chutes.*? Just before the 4.15 
pm. fuel deadline was due to expire, a passenger was beaten.** Abdo 
returned to the aircraft in the evening for a long discussion.**
Monday 11 April 1988:
In the morning, death threats against hostages were made, the 
hijackers having become uneasy at the failure of their bargaining. 
Abdo went to the aircraft, but was refused access. He spoke on the 
steps with a previously unseen hijacker who seemed to exercise greater 
authority than others previously encountered.*® Afterwards, more 
death threats were made, prompting Herodotou to visit the plane, later
*?The Independent, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 11; ITN, Afternoon News, 
Saturday 9 April 1988; The Sunday Telegraph, Sunday 10 April 1988, 
p. 1; The Observer, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. I; The Sunday Times,
Sunday 17 April 1988, P. A12; The Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988,
p. 5.
?*The International Herald Tribune, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5; The
Daily Telegraph, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1.
Independent, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988, pp. 1 and 5.
*®r/re International Herald Tribune, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5; The
Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, Monday 11
April 1988, p. 1; The Times, Monday 11 April 1986, p. 6.
**The Financial Times, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 34; The Daily 
Telegraph, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Guardian, Monday 11 
April 1988, p. 1.
* ? The International Herald Tribune, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5; ITN,
Early Evening News, Saturday 10 April 1988.
**The Daily Telegraph, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1; The Guardian,
Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5.
**rhe Times, Monday 11 April 1988, P. 1.
* ®The Guardian, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 9; The Financial Times, |
Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, Tuesday 12 April |1988, P. 1; The Sunday Times, Sunday 17 April 1988, pp. A12 - 13. I
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accompanied by Abdo.*® After several postponements won by the two 
officials, the hijackers carried out their threat, killing a second 
Kuwaiti hostage and throwing his body to the ground.*? More threats 
and demands for fuel were made, with the h i j a c k e r s ’ intention to 
depart to a " n e u t r a l ” country being noted,** More talks with Abdo 
took place in the e v e n i n g . * ’
Tuesday 12 April 1988:
In the early hours of the morning, a power generator malfunctioned, 
pumping poisonous fumes on board the 747. When the hijackers were 
explained the technical details of the problem, they accepted the 
situation.®' Paradoxically, at daybreak, the hijackers announced that 
they were preparing for death, yet also requested breakfast and later 
asked for fuel.®* Abdo visited the aircraft on several occasions (once 
with Ghazaleh) and reported in the afternoon that the team was wearing 
"death shrouds" made from sheets.®? Tension rose temporarily when a 
Greek Hercules aircraft was seen arriving by the hijackers, who 
announced that they were ready to blow up the 747.®* In the evening, 
more visits to the Boeing included, for the first time, one carried 
out by the airport manager and another involving both PLO men and a 
representative of the Algerian Interior Ministry.®* In the late 
evening, 100 tonnes of fuel were exchanged for 12 male passengers,
* ® The Independent, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1.
*?The Daily Telegraph, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, 
Tuesday 12 April 1988 p. 1; The Scotsman, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p.
1; The International Herald Tribune, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1.
* * r/?e Guardian, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1.
* ’ The Times, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1.
® ' The Observer, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. 21,
®*JTA/, Channel 4 News, Tuesday 12 April 1988; 88C, Six O'clock News,
Tuesday 12 and Wednesday 13 April 1988; The Guardian, Wednesday 13 
April 1988, pp. 1 and 10; The Financial Times, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Daily Telegraph, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1.
®?88C, Six O'clock News, Tuesday 12 April 1988; The International 
Herald Tribune, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 2; The Sunday Times,
Sunday 17 April 1988, p. A3.
* * The Scotsman, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Sunday Times,
Sunday 17 April 1988, p. A3.
®®The Guardian, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, 
Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 10; The Financial Times, Wednesday 13 
April 1988, p. 1; The Scotsman, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The 
Independent, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1.
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after which the aircraft was prepared for departure to Algeria.
Wednesday 13 April 1988:
At 1.17 am., the aircraft left Cypriot territory, arriving at Algiers 
airport later in the morning.** Even before dawn, it had been visited f
twice by A l g e r i a ’s Interior Minister (Khediri). During the meetings, 
the central demand concerning the 17 prisoners in Kuwait was reiterated.*? By midday, a high-ranking delegation of Kuwaiti 
officials had arrived, led by the E m i r a t e ’s Minister of State or 
Foreign Affairs ( a l - O s e i m i ).*® Meetings between Algerian officials 
and the hijackers took place on board the plane throughout the 
afternoon, with the hijackers complaining of rising temperatures and 1 
deteriorating conditions. Officials apologised that "technical 
problems" prevented remedial action being t a k e n . * ’
Thursday 14 April 1988:A plea for the release of the 17 in Kuwait was made by a passenger, 
who noted that the hijackers were continuing to threaten hostage killings.** Throughout the day, teams of workers, including a 
physician, visited the p l a n e . I n  the evening, an elderly male 
hostage was released, with the hijackers once more calling for the 
release of the convicted prisoners.**
Friday 15 April 1988:
In accordance with the h i j a c k e r s ’ request, Algerian radio broadcasts 
were made in which the government undertook to end the siege I
**fhe Independentf Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Guardian, 
Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Sunday Tifnes, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. A3 ; The Times, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Nali
Street Journal, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1 ; BBC, Unscheduled
Bulletin, Tuesday 12 April 1988.
**The Glasgow Herald, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Scotsman, 
Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 4.
*?The Scotsman, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 4; The Times, Thursday 14
April 1988, p. 1; XTN, Channel 4. Hews, Wednesday 13 April 1988;
BBC, Six 0*Clock News, Wednesday 13 April 1988; BBC, Breakfast 
Time, Wednesday 13 April 1988.
**The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 7,
The Times, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 22; The International Herald 
Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, pp. 1 and 7; The Glasgow Herald,
Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, Thursday 14 April1988, p. 1; The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1 ; The 
Guardian, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1.
The International Herald Tribune, Friday 15 April 1988, p. 1.
sifhe Times, Friday 15 April 1988, P. 1; The Scotsman, Friday 15
April 1988, p. 1 ; The Guardian, Friday 15 April 1988, p. 1.
* * The Times, Friday 15 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Glasgow Herald, Friday
15 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Scotsman, Saturday 16 April 1988, P. 1.
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peacefully.** In the afternoon, more passenger pleas were made calling for the freeing of the 17.** again
Saturday 16 April 1988:As little visible activity was taking place, the hijackers organised  an airside press briefing. Three journalists were brought to the aircraft and were read a prepared statement in which the central demand made of Kuwait and, for the first time in Algiers, a fuel request, were issued, both without deadlines. In response to the only question permitted, a hijacker stated that fuel would be required to facilitate escape following the resolution of the incident. Thinly- veiled threats were made against the three royal hostages on board.**
Sunday 17 April 1988:Around midday, the hijackers announced that they would give Algerian authorities time to resolve the crisis.** Later, another passenger called for the release of the prisoners in Kuwait and suggested that the passengers were still under serious threat. After this, Algerian officials entered the aircraft for several rounds of talks.*?
Monday 18 April 1988:Following a visit by Khediri at 2.30 am., early breakfast was requested, to conform with the daylight fasting rules of Ramadan, which commenced at dawn.** In the afternoon a senior negotiator ("Hadj") went to the plane for t a l k s . * ’ This was by another demand message being relayed from a passenger - occasion the Kuwaiti prince.**
Algerian f0 1 lowed on this
** The International Herald Tribune, Saturday-Sunday 16-17 April 1988, p . 5 .
**fhe Guardian, Saturday 16 April 1988, P. 1.
**rhe Guardian, Thursday 21 April 1988, P. 8; The International 
Herald Tribune, Monday 18 April 1988, p. 1; The Glasgow Herald,Monday 18 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Observer, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Times, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 7; The Financial Times, Monday 18 April 1988, p. 36.
* * The Glasgow Herald, Monday 18 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent,Monday 18 April 1988, p. 1.
*?The Glasgow Herald, Monday 18 April 1988, p. 1 ; The International
Herald Tribune, Monday 18 April 1988, p. 1; The Financial Times,Monday 18 April 1988, p. 1; The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 21 April 1988, P. 8; The Glasgow Herald, Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 6.
The Independent, Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 1; The Guardian, Tuesday19 April 1988, p. Ij The International Herald Tribune, Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 2; The Daily Telegraph, Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 1 ; 
The Sunday Times, Sunday 24 April 1968, p. A13.
The Glasgow Herald, Tuesday 19 April 1988, P. 6.
* * The Guardian, Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 1; The Times, Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 1.
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Tuesday 19 April 1988:In the afternoon, the hijackers were visited by A l g e r i a ’s Foreign Minister (Ibrahini) who had earlier in the day returned from a short visit to Tripoli for discussions with Libyan authorities. More trios to the hijacked plane followed by other officials.** Before evening fell, one of the two remaining female passengers (both of whom were Kuwaiti nobility) made a customary hostage statement.**
Wednesday 20 April 1988:Soon after midnight, police and civilian cars started shuttling between the airport terminal and the plane. Just after 3 am., the hijackers requested a visit from "Hadj".** After his visit, the hijackers issued a statement at 3.45 am., in which they announced that the incident would be brought to an end.** At 5.45 am., while Khediri addressed journalists at the terminal, the hijackers left the aircraft and were driven away.** 15 minutes later, the 31 remaining hostages were taken to the a i r p o r t ’s VIP lounge for medical examinations.** During the day, al-Oseimi thanked A l g e r i a ’s President Bendjedid and told the media that the releases had involved granting safe passage to the hijackers. The Kuwaiti news agency (KUNA) noted that they had been taken either to Beirut or Tehran. In Kuwait, the E m i r a t e ’s Cabinet extended its thanks to Algeria, the PLO and Yasser Arafat.*?
3 ^ . 3 , sis_ of M i i on,s o| ...Patile.t....ir> H i ja c k jm
3,3,1, The Hijackers
In analysing the significance of the KU 422 incident, it is crucial to appreciate what an exceptional challenge this type of hijack gang can pose to the states involved and to the international community. The g r o u p ’s skills and actions gave a public demonstration not merely of the practical limitations of treaty law but also of the inability of governments to act individually or concertedly for successful resolution of such problems. The h i j a c k e r s ’ clear aims, consistent
**The Sunday Times, Sunday 24 April 1988, p. A13; The International 
Herald Tribune, Wednesday 20 April 1988, p. 2; The Glasgow Herald, Wednesday 20 April 1988, p. 4; The Guardian, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 1.
*2 The Glasgow Herald, Wednesday 20 April 1988, p. 4; The
International Herald Tribune, Wednesday 20 April 1988, p. 2.
* * The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8.
**The Guardian, Thursday 21 Aoril 1988, pp. 1 and 8.
**The Scotsman, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8; The Independent,Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 10.
**The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 1 ; The 
Scotsman, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8,
*?The Guardian, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Independent,Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 10; The Financial Times, Thursday 21 A p r ! 1 1988, p. 1..
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control, tactical manoeuvring, media awareness, negotiating ability and general confidence were displayed throughout. This showed the extent to which terrorist hijacking has evolved in advance of response mechanisms, suggesting that similar future incidents could produce equal or greater difficulties for world powers and small nations alike.
Throughout the course of the siege, four principal aims of the hijackers became apparent. The first major objective was highly ambitious, though genuinely held by the team to be a practical goal. This involved the coercion of the Kuwaiti government into releasing the 17 convicted saboteurs from long terms of imprisonment or the prospect of capital punishment. Although exactly the same demands had been made unsuccessfully for several years by other terrorists opposed to Kuwait,** it became clear that the hijackers were determined and well-equipped to engineer a long siege. Faced with an Iranian government which the group hoped it could at least trust but which it later accused of c o llaborat ion with the E m i r a t e , * ’ the team left for Beirut in which a large measure of local support would have been assured from S h i ’ite militants in the c i t y ’s southern suburbs. In such a setting, added pressure could have been influenced upon Kuwait in the form of hostage dispersal from the aircraft, as had happened during the similar TWA hijacking in 1985.”
Refused access to the Lebanese capital and faced instead with Cypriot authorities, the hijackers continued to insist upon the release of the 17, even rejecting an offer of a "fuel for hostages" deal owing to their assertion that the prisoners required to be liberated before such negotiations could take p l a c e . T h e  hijackers continued to push for their principal demand to be met, irrespective of their location, enduring a week of discomfort at Algiers simply in order to continue their futile war of words. On surrendering to the Algerians, they positively stated that their "struggle" would continue, in so doing admitting defeat, yet showing defiance and emphasising the vital nature of their long-standing grievance. On so important a question the hijackers were not prepared to overlook or even disguise their failure in their closing statement, because the question of freeing
**For further information concerning the 17 convicted prisoners and the efforts to release them, see The Sunday Times, 10 April 1988, p. A3; The Scotsman, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 8.
* ’ The Giasgow Herald, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1; The Scotsman, Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1.
” In the hijacking of TWA flight 847, which took place between 14 and 30 June 1985, hostages were decanted from the aircraft and distributed around safe-houses in Beirut. For further details see media reports of the period, B. Hoffman, Shi^a Terrorism, the 
Conflict in Lebanon and the Hijacking of THA Flight 847 (Rand Paper N711685) (1985); J. Testrake and D. Wimbish, Triumph Over 
Terror (Eastbourne; Kingsway, 1987); and Clutterbuck (1987), pp. 193 - 194.
’ ifhe Sunday Times, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. A3.
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their comrades had been of such primary salience to their cause.?*
The second identifiable objective of the team was to destablise the power base of Kuwait by seeking to alienate its two major socio- theological groupings of Sunni and Shia Islam. It is significant that both of the t e a m ’s murder victims were Sunnis occupied in Kuwaiti public service,?* while of the twelve passengers released at Larnaca, no Sunni was included.?* The strategy of discrimination was accompanied by a series of attempts to discredit Kuwait from the cockpit by accusing the state of torture?® and incompetence in negotiations.?* These accusations were given support by the frequent use of passenger pleas in which vulnerable hostages, and commonly those of some considerable standing in Kuwaiti society, were forced to voice support for the t e r r o r i s t s ’ aims, openly blaming Kuwait for their continued torment.
This destablising objective was a predictable tactic for hijackers whose political inclination was towards Iranian ideology and the post- revolutionary doctrines of extremist S h i ’ite factions. Their desire to export the Iranian revolution to the Emirate, through alienation of the communities and incitement to violence, was successfully countered by Kuwaiti authorities. The Kuwaitis regularly issued statements encouraging national unity through clearly publicising the g o v e r n m e n t ’s dedication both to reach a peaceful solution and to avoid the very real dangers of political compromise in so doing. Hence, in the second aim of the hijackers, little or no success was found.
A third aim for the gang world's attention to it h i j a c k e r s ’ campaign was there was no effort made particular, releasing a the early stages made directed to the hijack briefing on the aircraf regain media interest in but it was not délibérât capture the headlines,
was to publicise its cause and so to draw the s demands and claims. From the start, the geared towards utilising the media, although to maximise publicity for its own sake. In 11 hostages other than the Arab passengers init unlikely that US media coverage would being in great measure. Equally, the press t steps at Algiers may have been Intended tothe case at a time of inactivity for the team ely employed, coordinated and manipulated toas had happened three years earlier in
?2f/>e Guardian, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8.
?*The first victim, Abdullah Mohammed Habaab Shabeeb al-Khalidi, was a 25-year-old border guard, while the second, Khaled Ayoub Bandar, was a 20-year-old clerk with the Kuwaiti fire service. The 
Scotsman, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1; and Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Guardian, Friday 15 April 1988, p. 1.
?*Tbe Times, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1.
?®The Sunday Times, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. A3.
?*The Daily Telegraph, Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1; and The Observer, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. 1.
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B e i r u t .? ?
Nevertheless, as a publicity-conscious operation the hijacking attracted public attention to the activities of the group, to the powerlessness of its adversaries in ending the siege and, perhaps most of all, to the continuing imprisonment of the 17 terrorists by Kuwait. The hijackers were strongly aware of the importance of favourable public opinion in their activities and employed a number of techniques to minimise the adverse news coverage which any terrorist hijacking is bound to attract. Soon after each landing, a statement was issued over the cockpit radio or via officials explaining in readily reportable and easily understood terms both the rationale for the incident and the demands being made.?* By such means the incident was made to appear to be an element in a broader, legitimate struggle for S h i ’ite liberation from western influenced rule, with the hijackers even lying about the identity of their two victims so as to suggest that the men were actively engaged in suppressing their c a u s e . ? ’ It is fair to observe that the goal of obtaining publicity, while not being reached in the most forceful of ways, was achieved by the hijackers in an impressive manner.
With the continuation of the incident, the h i j a c k e r s ’ instinctive concern for their personal safety grew more obvious, with Cypriot negotiators being informed that the aircraft should land at a "neutral" state,*® rather than being made to crash on the E m i r ’s palace in Kuwait, as had previously been suggested.** Furthermore, in both Iran and Cyprus there was concern shown for swift departure to new sites, perhaps encouraged by a feeling of unease at the possibility of military action being taken against the aircraft by Iranian troops at Mashhad or by Israeli or British forces arriving at Larnaca.** Once secure in Algiers, attitudes eventually moderated but the desire to evade punishment became predominant, with the hijackers opting at last for free passage in exchange for unconditional
??For information on the high profile hostage media briefing on board the hijacked aircraft during the 1985 TWA incident, see the writings of Captain John Testrake. Testrake (1987), pp. 129 - 133.
? * The Sunday Times, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. A3: The Times,Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 and Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1; The 
Independent, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1.
?’The first victim, a border guard, was incorrectly described by his killers as an airline security guard. BBC, Early Evening News, Saturday 9 April 1988. The second victim, a clerk, was alleged to have been a "Kuwaiti officer". The Guardian, Friday 15 April 1988, p. 1.
* ^ Associated Press, Monday 11 April 1988.
* * The Independent, Monday 11 April 1988, p. I; The Guardian, Monday11 April 1988, pp. 1 and 5.
*^The Ot>server, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 21. At Larnaca, the hijackers issued demands for fuel as early as their first night at the airport. The Guardian, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1,
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surrender. It is arguable that for a team which cited the only two possible conclusions of the incident acceptable to it as being martyrdom and victory, to have achieved neither represented resounding defeat, yet the hidden agenda of escape with life and limb may well have been an unstated, long term aim throughout. Irrespective of their actual intention, the fact that escape was achieved further enhances the professionalism of the team, the powers of which made realistic military opposition virtually impossible.
Organisationally, a command structure seemed to operate within the group, at least in terms of negotiating policy.** With explosives alleged to have been planted at Mashhad and with escape chutes removed at Larnaca,** they ensured that any military intervention would result in widespread fatality to hostages, captors and strike forces alike and so remained largely confident of their continuing safety. The competence and confidence of the hijackers were together another important factor in the longevity of the venture. Skills derived, most likely, from rigorous training were used with ruthlessness and efficiency when required and made it impossible for negotiators to win material concessions at times when lesser hijackers might have yielded to their efforts.*® Despite the high risks entailed in escalating the incident by murdering a hostage while on Cypriot territory, the gang did so, electing to follow up the first killing with another two days later. These activities on board were carried out very discreetly, to avoid causing panic among the remaining passengers. This emerged in interviews with subsequently released hostages, who knew nothing of the two murders.**
The gang remained sufficiently detached from the emotional implications of their violence to exercise relaxed but firm control over the remaining hostages and to continue bargaining with the Larnaca control tower in a rational and measured way. Similarly, the hijackers were equally able to exert sophisticated psychological techniques upon passengers and crew, maintaining order on board the cramped and unhygienic jet for over two weeks and, when desired, resorting to torture while presenting a public image of complete civility during most radio exchanges. The group consistently avoided hasty overreaction to potentially dangerous developments while on the ground, as with the landing of the Greek military aircraft and the infiltration on board of poisonous fumes, both noted above. The hijackers' high degree of confidence was also shown in their occasional appearances outside the passenger cabins, often in full
**rhe Sunday Times, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. A13.
**fhe Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5; The Internationai Herald 
Tribune, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5; ITN, Early Evening News, Saturday 10 April 1988.
•®Dr, James Thompson of the Middlesex Hospital debriefed some hostages and was later able to conclude from his investigations that special psychological training had probably been given to the hijack group, which he referred to as "a special operations squad". 
The International Herald Tribune, Friday 22 April 1988, p. 2.
* * The Guardian, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8.
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view of armed guards patrolling nearby, as well as in their readiness to cooperate with authorities in administrative matters such as the admission of hygiene crews and food consignments and the movement of their aircraft on at least two occasions.*?
Tactically, the hijackers used a wide array of measures to gain advantage over negotiators. The most effective of these were demand and mood variation in the conduct of negotiations together with a general deviousness, by which progress would seem to have been made towards settling the dispute, before priorities were changed, rendering previous discussions worthless. Yasser Arafat claimed that this approach was adopted in Cyprus, where the second murder came as a completely unexpected development within 24 hours of a deal almost having been struck and within minutes of what had seemed a constructive meeting with the PLO representatives.** This use of erratic demand and mood swings characterised the g a n g ’s approach to negotiations and passenger treatment.
On arrival at Mashhad its list of demands was first made known in unequivocal and disturbing terms but was followed only a few hours afterwards by the release of a sick hostage, with every indication being made that the hijackers were fair-minded and h umanitarian combatants, eager to provide negotiators with goodwill gestures. Soon almost half of those on board had been freed by the hijackers who were prepared to take the extraordinary risk of limiting the list of passengers on the aircraft to those of Arab nationalities, in order to concentrate its campaign on Kuwait and to discourage external interference from western governments. This had the triple effect of simultaneously implying that the hijackers were prepared to give signs of compassion to hostages not directly implicated in their struggle; focusing very real threats on a more select, and so more vulnerable, collection of individuals; and stepping up the level of conflict with Kuwait.
The t e a m ’s use of deadlines early in each negotiating setting placed pressure on states to respond either by attempting to satisfy requests immediately or by actively attempting to moderate the demands imposed. As deadlines were progressively extended and forgotten only to be reimposed and extended once more, negotiators were encouraged to believe that threatened violence would not be perpetrated on board. The ground violence at Mashhad and the killings at Larnaca served to emphasise the unpredictability of the team and its commitment to its cause. Only in Algeria were deadlines rarely imposed and never executed, although memories of such brutality as the murders at Larnaca would have kept Algerian negotiators alert to the dangers posed by the rational yet un predictable gang.
The operation carried out by the anonymous hijackers of Flight 422 was unusual in its length, its complexity and its ability to confound  international efforts to end it. Not only did it illustrate the
*?The Guardian, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1; The Times, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1; The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 48; The Scotsman, Friday 15 April 1988, p. 1.
**ITN, Channel 4 News, Tuesday 12 April 1988.
70
problems of g o v e r n m e n t s ’ most senior officials to combat aviation terrorism at its most professional but, as shall be demonstrated, it rendered ICAO’s air crime conventions inoperable.
3.3,2. Kuw aitLM tborltjes
If the hijackers genuinely believed that the Kuwaiti government would publicly announce substantive concessions on the issue of the 17 convicted terrorists, they were naïvely mistaken on a crucial element of their siege strategy. The E m i r a t e ’s experience of intimidatory action for their release over the preceding four years had resulted in its leaders concluding that the dangers entailed in giving its terrorist enemies so major a propaganda victory should be avoided. Hence, throughout the 16 day hijacking it became clear that the Kuwaitis would not be seen overtly yielding to pressure on the principal aim of the inci d e n t . * ’ This, combined with the government's policy of refusal to communicate directly with the g a n g ”  presented a unified and systematic operational framework on which to encourage the development of favourable public opinion with its own domestic supporters and with its political allies in the west. Yet behind the austere appearance of determined opposition to blackmail, it is evident that Kuwait was directly involved in the dynamics of negotiation with the firm objective of securing the safe release of its citizens.
In tandem with its requests to Iran, Cyprus and Algeria to keep the 747 grounded and to avoid granting concessions to the group, the Kuwaiti government was probably using its ministerial presence at each airport to coordinate the peaceful solution which it sought and even at times openly advocated. Although officials of Iran and Algeria complained of Kuwaiti d e l e g a t i o n s ’ resolute refusals to make any offer relating to the 17 p r i s o n e r s , ’ * the apparently powerless r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ’ presence was vital to the success of negotiating efforts. The twin competences of supervising and assisting resident negotiators amounted to a difficult and complex damage limitationexercise in which two potentially mutually exclusive goals required tobe satisfied. Simultaneously, it was negotiators directed the hijackers away demands were credible and capable of being the use of violence against hostages. Eventually Algerian involvement allowed both aims to be reached by presenting the terrorists with a compromise between the impossibility of a victory and theundesirability of a potentially bloody defeat. It is probable, however, that Algerian involvement in the case would have beenpromoted with the blessing of Kuwait which had been active in
necessary to from a belief granted, while
ensure that that their discouraging
* ’From the outset, the Emirate maintained that the issue of the 17 prisoners was not to be negotiable. The Financial Times, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.
”  The Observer, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 21.
’*The Times, Thursday 7 1988, P. 1
Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1 ; BBC, One O'clock News, April 1988; The Nall Street Journal, Thursday 14 April 
The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1.
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organising the flight from Larnaca to A l g i e r s . ’*
The E m i r a t e ’s considerable trust in Algerian n e g o t i a t o r s ’ powers to resolve the crisis was demonstrated when the leader of the Kuwaiti delegation at Algiers arrived at the airport and in an unprecedented display of optimism spoke of a "happy ending" at what he hoped would be the "last stage" of the h i j a c k i n g . ’ * Such uncharacteristic confidence and outspokenness would have been based on an informed knowledge of the progress made in the dealings with the terrorists by Cypriot and PLO intermediaries, whose actions and decisions were subject to Kuwaiti consultations and constant s c r u t i n y , ’ * This policy could easily account for the frequency of n e g o t i a t o r s ’ journeys between the airport terminal and the aircraft at times of important negotiating development.
As the hijacking progressed, K u w a i t ’s implacable unwillingness to be seen to be involved with negotiations began to waver and a readiness to cooperate with all parties (including, ultimately, the terrorists) became increasingly apparent. In the early stages, while the aircraft was situated at Mashhad, Kuwait was insistent that it should remain grounded, even suggesting that some unspecified norm of international law obligated the Iranians to prevent take off if departure was opposed by the state of registration of the aircraft (in this case, K u w a i t ) . ’ ® Once the flight had left the jurisdiction of the Iranians, whom Kuwait clearly did not trust to resolve the incident in an acceptable manner, and the hijacking had moved location to Cyprus, the official Kuwaiti view moderated on this issue, first because of the overtly cooperative stance of the Cypriot government and the PLO and latterly on account of the introduction to the scenario of Algeria. Instead of issuing public pronouncements on the illegality of departure, Kuwaiti officials initially stated that some form of deal with the terrorists might be conceived of in which the o f f e n d e r s ’ flight from Larnaca would take place. The prior condition for the supply of fuel and the granting of departure rights was said to be the release of all h o s t a g e s . ’ * In fact, the flight to Algiers was secured with only 12 hostages being liberated, leaving the way unimpeded for the compromise of one week later which ignored the articles of the Hague Convention and which was at least acquiesced to by both Cyprus and Kuwait, signatories to the agreement.
The Kuwaiti position on the bargaining which took place at Larnaca and Algiers may have been particularly ingenious as it guaranteed that
’ *Yasser Arafat remarked to journalists that the PLO and Kuwait had jointly approached Algeria with the proposal to relocate theaircraft at Algiers. UN, Channel 4 News, Tuesday 12 April 1988.
’*The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 7.
’ *See the remarks of Cypriot spokesman Akls Fantis. The Sunday
Times, Sunday 10 April 1988, p . A3.
’ ®The International Herald Tribune, Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1; The 
Times, Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1.
’ * T h e  Glasgow Herald, M o n d a y  11 April 1988, p. 1.
72
press coverage of its activities would emphasise the image it endeavoured to present of deliberate unyieldingness and almost unrealsitic opposition to compromise on the t e r r o r i s t s ’ demands, in turn leaving the impression that the Emirate was above reproach in its conduct of the hijacking. This assisted its officials in their efforts to supervise mediation and formulate the safe release of its citizens. While other states in the bargaining process received criticism for their activities from western governments or international organisations, Kuwait was showered with praise for its principled refusal to free the 17 prisoners in its jails, with lATA describing it as having behaved “i m p eccably."’ ? Kuwait seems to have allowed the incident to continue until the hijackers walked free and may have connived positively In the C y p r iot/Algerian plan to do so. Evidence of Kuwaiti bargaining for a peaceful outcome is to be found in a report published in 1989 which maintained that in Algiers:
"The 31 remaining passengers were freed after Kuwait pledged give "early release* to a handful of Shia Muslim p r i s o n e r s . “’ * to
Also note the jubilant reaction of Kuwaiti delegation members at Algiers after the liberation of the captives and captors. Al-Oseimi openly admitted that the conclusion had been engineered "in return for a safe conduct" and went further, implying that this did not constitute a concession to the ter r o r i s t s . ”  He also thanked President Bendjedid of Algeria for his efforts, while the Kuwaiti cabinet expressed gratitude to Algeria, Arafat and the PLO. Despite its clear involvement in and satisfaction with the outcome of the hijacking, the Emirate escaped the high level criticism (discussed below) which was meted out to Algeria for encouraging the release of murder suspects.
It is both necessary and appropriate to note that the E m i r a t e ’s approach to the problems of the hijacking reflected neither state support for the t e r r o r i s t s ’ cause nor any desire to placate those responsible for the incident in order to avoid future attacks. Rather, K u w a i t ’s u n d e r standing of its own vulnerability, its aim of avoiding conflict on board the large and well defended Boeing 747 - an aircraft never successfully stormed previously - and its general powerlessness to influence the hijackers into surrendering unconditionally, led to the s t a t e ’s limitations being made apparent. These factors combined with the other vexing difficulties of the international crisis to reduce K u w a i t ’s potential for successful resolution, forcing it to downgrade its expectations. In place of its original position on the granting of concessions, it joined forces with its negotiating partners and attempted merely to minimise the
’ ?The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 21 April 1988, p . 2.
’' E d i t o r ’s note contained in Carew-Jones, (1989) p. 51. Even during the course of the hijacking, a suggestion was made in the Abu Dhabi newspaper al-Itihad, that Kuwait and the PLO had agreed in Larnaca to a plan suggested by the hijackers that death sentences passed on three of the 17 prisoners should be commuted. The Independent, Friday 15 April 1988, p. 8 -
”  The Guardian, Thursda y 21 April 1988, p. 1
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propaganda aims of the hijackers by taking advantage of the i n c i d e n t ’s descent from intense media interest. The price acceptable to Kuwait for such negotiating success seems to have been the unavoidablefailure of the Hague formula to secure the prosecution of suspected o f f e n d e r s .
3 ^3., 3, Irani an A u  t hor i ties
It is understandable that the arrival at Mashhad of the hijackedaircraft was not met with enthusiasm by Iranian authorities which had at first refused to permit the flight to land.*** Not only was the Islamic Republic unwilling to become embroiled in a delicate and complex dispute between culpable radical S h i ’ites and the innocent Kuwaiti government with which it was suffering poor diplomatic relations, but the geographical locus and politically inappropriate timing of the events compounded their difficulties.
The t e a m ’s choice of Mashhad as a venue for the hijacking was ideal for its preparatory purposes of fomenting domestic Iranian support for its cause. As Shia Muslems and supporters of the radical S h i ’ ite terrorist groups of the Lebanon and Iraq, the hijackers would have been assured of large scale public support as well as the blessing of the large constituency of radical S h i ’ite clergy in Mashhad, many ofwhom had been exiled from Kuwait.*** In addition, the h i j a c k e r s ’cause would have found favour with many individuals within militant political groupings seeking new ways of exporting the revolution at a time when the more moderate power base in Tehran was seeking diplomatic initiatives in the event of stalemate in the Gulf war. Forthese reasons, the hijackers played upon the dilemma faced by theruling pragmatists in finding a solution which would simultaneously meet with domestic approbation and satisfy the demanding requirements  of the Emirate.
As noted above, a key objective of the hijacking was to intimidate the government of Kuwait, which had been allied with Iraq against the Iranians throughout the war, into releasing 17 terrorists. Iran may have been selected as a possible landing place in the ill-advised belief that its authorities would support the actions of the gang being directed against the enemy state of Kuwait- In any case theh i j a c k e r s ’ early-voiced intention to leave Iran**? and their subsequent determination to land at Beirut*** implies at least the possibility of a more sophisticated, longer term plan having been developed to deal with possible non-cooperation from the Islamic Republic. The Iranian government must have understood that theh i j a c k e r s ’ very cause placed it in a difficult political position domestically. Moreover, the aircraft landed at Mashhad within three days of elections to the flajlis, the Iranian parliament, at which
***The Daily Telegraph, We dnesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.
* * * The Times, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 5.
* * ? The Daily Telegraph, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 38.
***rhe Guardian, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Independent,Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1.
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extremists were viewed by many observers as standing to gain seats from the more moderate pragmatists who were losing credibility with the electorate following vital Iraqi advances in the war.*®* This suggests that the hijackers may have correctly identified that their actions could be made to exert considerable strain upon the ruling administration in Tehran and so catalyse a domestic crisis from which it would be difficult for the moderates to recover in the three days preceding polling.
In terms of crisis management there was little Iran could do either to foster meaningful levels of diplomatic cooperation between itself and the Emirate, which resolutely refused to become involved with Iranian bargaining,**® or to act against the hijackers. Not only would the use of force against overtly S h i ’ite hijackers have risked a new front of electoral support developing for militant candidates on the eve of national elections, but on a more practical level the 747 was almost universally regarded as being so near impossible to storm that any military action would have been virtually discounte d from the outset as a final option only to have been attempted in the most critical of circumstances.*** In addition to the team being large, with passenger evidence suggesting that it was also well armed, its professionalism and ruthlessness became apparent before long.
I r a n ’s negotiating efforts were highly successful in view of the short time space involved. Initially, the Iranian ministers involved attempted to support Kuwaiti orders for the aircraft to remaingrounded. Although a token amount of fuel was pumped aboard the jet to satisfy the h i j a c k e r s ’ opening demand, the aircraft was surrounded by armed guards and physically prevented from leaving for three days while Iranian negotiator s successfully deflected requests for departure. The involvement of Deputy Prime Minister Moayeri at the site of the incident further corroborated I r a n ’s claims that itopposed the hijacking**? and may have been instrumental in facilitating the two releases of 24 and 32 passengers and crew at Mashhad.*** When Iran realised its need for external assistance in the crisis it was swift to request Kuwait to dispatch a delegation, despite the inescapable diplomatic friction which such a development was bound to e n t a i l . * * ’ When a Kuwaiti presence was established, the authorities in Mashhad actively continued to refuse requests for fueland departure rights despite the intimidation exercised by the gangand the undoubted jurisdictional benefits in having the aircraft leave the country.
Only when violence became visible and was directed against both
***r/?e Independent, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1. 
**®The Times, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1.
*®*The Observer, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. 21.
**?Tbe Guardian, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.
* * * The Scotsman, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.
* * ’ The Guardian, T h u rsda y 7 April 1988, p. 1.
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hostages and Iranian personnel was the decision taken to allow take off. With crisis managers unable to solve the triangular dispute inwhich their government had been unwillingly placed, the Iraniansjustifiably elected to avoid bloodshed and to override the grounding demand of Kuwait. Crisis resolution virtually demanded that the hijackers be allowed to leave, if only because the extent of control able to be exercised over the hostages and the siege location could not be reduced by the Iranians without genuinely risking a great loss of life. Departure of the jet guaranteed an uncertain future but its continued presence would have threatened immediate and extreme violence on board the jet, which military force would not easily have contained and which could also have precipitated an electoral backlash in the polls of the day. Iranian authorities had few options but topermit departure, having endeavoured to seek a peaceful solution u p  tothe point at which violence had erupted.
The Iranians showed signs of internal disagreement over their policies on dealing with the case, both while the aircraft stood on the ramp at Mashhad and after it had departed. From the time of the jet's arrival Iranian policy on departure was unclear. The first official announcement had stated that the aircraft would be refuelled and permitted to leave but this was soon overturned by the official Iranian news agency, IRNA.**® While officials were supporting the Kuwaiti views on departure (limiting fuel supplies and blocking the runway) in Tehran P a rliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani said that failure in negotiations might ne cessitate allowing the hijackers to go elsewhere with their demands and hostages.*** Indeed, at one stage he suggested that stalemate in negotiations might result in Iranian a uthorities positively persuading the team to leave the territory.**? Once the incident had moved to Larnaca, the Speaker made a statement in which he claimed that any attempt by the hijacker s to seek asylum in Iran would be rejected, the offenders instead being put on trial.**? Later, however, Rafsanjani stated, in con tradiction to earlier assurances, that the hijackers might, in fact, be accorded political asylum were they to return to Iran.*** Other Iranian sources seemed equally uncertain. Note the press conference of Tuesday 12 April 1988 in the Iranian Embassy in London, at which Foreign Minister, Or Javid Larijani, categorically stated that Iran condemned the hijacking and would not permit the hijackers to return.**® Shortly before this, authorities in Tehran had announced that a complete release of hostages might enable the team to fly back to Iranian territory.***
***The Daily Telegraph, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 38.
* * * The Nall Street Journal, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 2. 
**?The Guardian, Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 23.
**?The Observer, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 21,
* * * The Independent, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p . 1.
**®The Financial Times, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1. 
**‘ The Times, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1.
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The uncertainty of Iranian policy was accompanied by suggestions ofpositive complicity in the conduct of the hijacking. After I r a n ’sinvolvement in the crisis had ended, accusations were made that its authorities had conspired with the hijackers to permit the infiltration of accomplices and explosives on board while the aircraft stood at Mashhad. Although impossible to prove these allegations, the Emirate claimed that passenger evidence demonstrated that active participation in the t e a m ’s activities increased during the Iranian stage of the siege and was matched by the substitution of heavier arms and explosives for those used throughout the initial stages of the hijacking.**? Had Iran permitted more open media activity at Mashhadit might have been able to have proved that no such passage of personsand equipment had taken place. With its strict limitation of journalistic output to I R N A ’s official press releases, suspicion lingers on the question and cannot fully be dispelled merely by Iranian claims of innocence, leaving the Iranian involvement in the hijacking uncertain in its nature and motivation.
Even if it is assumed, however, that the arms and r einforcements alleged to have entered the aircraft at Mashhad did so at the instigation of an extremist faction within Iran and not with the direct support of the pragm atists in power, Iranian authorities can certainly be criticised for operating appallingly pliable airside access security systems. In the absence of firmer evidence, it is impossible to conclude that Iran offered assistance to the hijackers. In any case, there is little doubt that the terrorists left Iranian airspace feeling that their grievances had not been addressed to their satisfaction. Equally, it Is reasonable to suggest that the power- wielding authorities were genuinely unable to solve the problem which they faced with the 747.
Had there been connivance at high levels to produce a three day p u blicity-seeking hijacking or else to engineer a conclusion beneficial to the h i j a c k e r s ’ cause, it is highly unlikely that the gang would have wished to culminate their performance by flying off empty handed and continuing their siege for almost another two weeks. A more mutually acceptable scenario would have involved a staged storming of the aircraft and a secret release of the hijackers. That such a managed climax to the episode failed to take place suggests not only that the terrorists were in earnest in their demands (a suggestion borne out by the events of Larnaca and the impasse of Algiers) but that Iranian negotiators, politicians and armed forces were truly powerless to bring an end to the hijacking on the ramp at Mashhad.
3,3,4, L e b a n e s e / S y r i a n .A u t h o r i H e s
The decision to close Beirut airport could not have been taken easily by the responsible authorities in the Lebanese capital, first because of the h i j a c k e r s ’ determination to land there and second on account of
* * ? The Independent, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1.
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other a i r o o r t s ’ unwillingness to accept the arrival.*** The policy decision to turn the flight away from Beirut was, nevertheless, the most appropriate course of action available to the s t a t e ’s officials. A very strong case could be made for suggesting that any state with a hijacked aircraft in its air space must grant assistance to enable a safe landing if desired by the p i l o t , * * ’ On the other hand, in this case, the norms of the international aviation community required to be ignored in favour of political factors relating to more than the short term safety of passengers and crew. The officials in Beirut would have known that a landing would have presented a new danger in the form of a separate hostage crisis.
Syrian forces controlling the airport correctly took many precautions to avoid the airliner becoming involved in the near anarchy of Beirut by making a landing impossible. In addition, however, the airport road leading to B e i r u t ’s southern suburbs was sealed off in an attempt to prevent any feared passage of militant S h i ’ites from the area.*?® Such measures guaranteed that Beirut would not be permitted to practise its twin roles of hijack haven and kidnap centre for the Kuwaiti incident.
Not only had S y r i a ’s President Hafez al-Assad decreed after his troops had re-entered the city in January 1987 that no hijacked airliner would land there,*?* but L e b a n o n ’s acting Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss and Interior Minister Abdallah Rassi were equally unenthusiastic about the prospect of a landing.*?? Each would have been aware of the many practical and diplomatic difficulties to be encountered were the aircraft to have touched down on Lebanese territory. In particular, the likelihood of S h i ’ite groups attempting to aid their ideological comrades on board was high, posing considerable tactical problems for the Syrian forces which were striving to keep control in an already taxing setting. Also, the Syrian government itself would have become embroiled in a dispute between the terrorists, supported by many factions close to home, and the Kuwaitis, who were politically and financially important to Assad,
The total lack of concern with which the control tower repeatedly rejected the pleas of crew, passengers and hijackers appeared cynical, if not positively inhumane, yet the authorities on the ground had a clear knowledge of their limitations as well as of the lawlessness which could reign in and around the aircraft if Beirut were to become
** * Initially, the airports of Lebanon, Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and Greece declared an u n will ingness to allow landing. The Financial 
Times, Weekend, 9/10 April 1988, p . 1.
**’ I A T A ’s view, as described in Jane's Airport Review, 1989, p. 40.
*?®SSC, Newsnight, Friday 8 April 1988; The Guardian, Saturday 9April 1988, p. 1.
*?*The Times, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 24.
* ? ? The Scotsman, Sa t u r d a y  9 April 1988, p. 1.
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involved.*?? For a peaceful and internationally acceptable resolution of the hijacking to be salvaged it was essential that the hostage crisis be limited to the confines of the aircraft. In naïvely countenancing a seemingly humanitarian landing, the Beirut control tower could unwittingly have escalated the dangers faced by passengers and crew and made the already intractable complexities of negotiation even worse for the government of Kuwait and - more importantly - for that of Syria.
3 : 5 .  C y p r i o t J & u t h o r l t les
Just as it had proved so important for Syria to withdraw Lebanese involvement from the hijacking, it became increasingly vital to ensure that the tension of the case was not compounded by tragedy in the form of a forced landing either at Beirut airport or on the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. The decision of Cypriot authorities, ratified by President Vassiiiou, to permit the landing served as a means of escape for the terrorists by which they could step back from their suicidal threats and as a form of emergency life support for the hostages.*** The offer of refuge was based upon considerations of urgency and true humanitarianism. Neither the gang nor the new host government had sought the liaison in advance and, once active negotiation had commenced, each looked for methods of ending mediation as quickly as possible and of transferring the incident to another site.
Throughout the four day residency of the aircraft at Larnaca the Cypriots displayed a willingness to conform to Kuwaiti requests and so kept the hijackers talking without granting them demands of any material nature. For a small, independent state, possibly tempted to refuel the aircraft and allow departure to take place, this high level of commitment to finding a genuine solution illustrates the Cypriot g o v e r n m e n t ’s concern to cooperate with Kuwait, an important trading partner and source of significant tourist revenue. In conjunction with local representatives of the PLO, Cyprus played a pivotal role in transforming crisis at Mashhad into resolution at Algiers, through the adoption and exercise of a high risk scheme of promises, delays and bargaining until such time as the efforts of negotiators sufficed to persuade the terrorists to leave.
While cultural compatibility may have assisted Iran in its negotiations with the S h i ’ite hijackers, any ideological ties with mediators were lost when the jet left Mashhad, The Cypriots faced |outbreaks of the most brutal violence, unseen in Iran, as the gang i grew increasingly exasperated with Kuwaiti refusals to become actively involved in negotiations and with what the hijackers viewed as Cypriot time wasting.**® Negotiators, however, doggedly refused to compromise upon these positions and so forced the terrorists to reconsider their
**?rhe Guardian, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Times, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1.
***rhe Guardian, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1.
**®rhe Sunday Times, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. A 1 ; The Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5.
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overall strategy and eventually agree willingly to take the Algerian escape route which had been promoted on Cyprus by all parties then involved. The high cost of Cyprus's infuriating delays and unfulfilled assurances was the killing of two hostages, encouraged by the h i j a c k e r s ’ fleeting fear of military intervention and the need to show determination to the government of Kuwait and the w o r l d ’s media.
The avowed goal of Cypriot negotiators (contrary to the aims of the Hague Convention) was to secure the safe release of hostages, if necessary in return for the h i j a c k e r s ’ freedom.*?* Cyprus apparently received and acted upon assurances from Algiers that transfer of the hijacking to Algeria would be undertaken with the liberation of the offenders as an intended c o n s e q u e n c e . * ? ? Cypriot support for the Algerian plan may have been the most effective means of observing the s t a t e ’s obligations under Article 9 of the Hague Convention (to ensure a resolution of the hijacking) but there can be no doubt surrounding the incompatibility of such a s c h e m e ’s results with the spirit of the agreement as a whole. As Cyprus had no other effective means of ending the crisis peacefully and effectively, this incompatibility must reflect the weaknesses of the norms more than those of the government.
Areas of Cypriot crisis management which are open to criticism include the inability of the authorities and officials involved to control press freedoms adequately, their self-inflicted communications problems with the aircraft and the worrying inaccuracy of official and semi-official news releases. Each of these factors requires a brief analysis.
Although media openness encouraged accurate reporting at Larnaca, the apparently uncontrolled freedom enjoyed by journalists to film the activities of the hijackers at close range and to monitor radio communications made it difficult to avoid transforming the incident from a political incident into a publicity stunt.*?* Whereas in Iran regular news releases had been issued exclusively via the media of the state news agency and radio station, raising doubts as to the accuracy and objectivity of reports, the laisseS'-faire stance of Cyprus may have encouraged the bravado of killings and the melodrama of shrouded threats before a gallery of inquisitive journalists. While landing circumstances and the geography of Larnaca airport made secrecy impossible, Cypriot authorities could have adopted the media policies of the Algerians (discussed below) in order to keep journalists informed of progress while imposing fair restrictions upon their freedom of movement.
Media interest in L a r n a c a ’s newsworthy images led to certain press speculation that military intervention would take place at the
*?*Note the comments of Cypriot Interior Minister, Christodouios Veniamin to the effect that the safe release of hostages was all that he cared about. BBC, Breakfast Time, Wednesday 13 April 1988.
*??The Times, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1,
*? * rhe Independent, Mon day 11 April 1988, p. 11.
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a i r p o r t . * ? ’ Whether through radio bulletins or newspapers readily supplied by the Cypriots, the hijackers seemed to have become aware ofthe widely held view that a detachment of the British Special AirService Regiment was nearby waiting to end the siege.*?® The hijackers were not sufficiently confident of Cypriot and PLO involvement in negotiations to trust even in their own securityagainst attack. Also, the unannounced arrival of the Herculesaircraft caused unnecessary concern which could easily have been avoided had communications been better.
The third inadequacy of Cypriot policy relates to the consistent inaccuracy of the g o v e r n m e n t ’s official spokesmen, in their dealings with journalists. Throughout the ordeal they openly speculated on such issues as refuelling and departure*?* and an early end to the hijacking.*?? Moreover, continual emphasis was placed by Cyprus on the need to adhere to the Kuwaiti demand to withhold fuel until all passengers were released.*?? On each of these occasions, the spokesmen were proved to have been factually inaccurate, raising a question mark over the general competence of the Cypriot negotiating and information policies at key points of the bargaining process.
In total, the Cypriots* policy of forcing the hijackers to reduce their expectations while reassuring them of their future welfare was perhaps the most effective solution available to a state of C y p r u s ’s size and diplomatic position encountering on the one hand violent and unpredictable terrorists equipped for a long siege and on the other a targeted government which unswervingly refused to address the central demands which it faced. As with the Iranians, the option of permitting take off was u n avoidable for Cyprus because, once again, authorities could not be confident of continuing to discourage the terrorists from turning to large scale violence. Unlike Iran, however, Cyprus had been actively engaged in cooperation with another state,*?* which had no direct involvement in the incident, and so was able to send the aircraft to a specific and mutually acceptable destination, Cyprus had succeeded in minimising violence, freeing hostages from the aircraft and releasing itself from what it would have regarded as the dreadful prospects of capturing and detaining S h i ’ite terrorists and of implementing the undertakings of the Hague Convention against them.
*?*Note the highly speculative articles in The Daily Mail, Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 and The Sunday Telegraph, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 1 which suggested that military action by British forces might take place imminently,
* ?®The Sunday Times, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. A13.
* ? * The Financial Times, Weekend, 9/10 April 1988, p. 1.
*??The Guardian, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1.
* ? ? The Independent, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Times,Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1 .
* ? ♦ The Scotsman, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1.
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3.3,A ,  P a l e s H n e  L i b e j r a t i m Æ ^anization
The P L O ’s purposes in involving itself in the hijacking can be divided into three categories: negotiation; publicity; and diplomacy. Itsnegotiating involvement, though supervised by Yasser Arafat from PLO offices in Kuwait and elsewhere, was carried out by the group's representatives on Cyprus (principally Ghazaleh and Abdo) and was effective in complementing official Cypriot activities by allowing the hijackers to deal not merely with servants of a western, liberalstate, but also with de legates of a respected national liberationmovement with which the team could readily identify. When Mallath Abdo, the assistant to the chief PLO representative on Cyprus, first entered the aircraft, his reason for doing so was reported as having been for interpretative purposes, the Cypriot negotiators being unable to speak Arabic.*?® Before long, however, it had become evident that the PLO representatives were engaged in much of the detailed discussions with the terrorists, sometimes entering the jetunaccompanied by Cypriot counterparts.
As the incident progressed it was further suggested by the media that Cypriot negotiators acted predominantly to facilitate agreement on the mechanics of departure while the PLO team handled the more onerous questions of politics and compromise.*?* Abdo soon became the negotiator favoured by the hijackers, his presence being requested on several occasions. While the Cypriot Director of Civil Aviation, Michael Herodotou, was made to communicate with the hijackers from a distance and with a megaphone, Abdo was received on board for more i intimate discussions, suggesting that matters of substance were being 4 dealt with, requiring a confidential meeting with a mediator in whom the gang could place its trust. Although the role of the Cypriot negotiators was important in the resolution of the hijacking, it was greatly enhanced by the activities of PLO representatives.
The command echelons of the PLO capitalised upon the work at Larnaca by using the negotiations as a source of badly needed publicity. In the same way as government ministers of Kuwait, Iran, Cyprus and Algeria were quoted and presented by the various news media, so Yasser Arafat was given a platform from which to show the world that his organisation was actively attempting to bring about a peaceful outcome to an important and difficult dispute from firmly within the limits of legitimate bargaining processes. This deliberate use of the media was important for the PLO because in the hijacking's monopolisation of news coverage, world attention was being turned away from the Palestinian intifada on the West Sank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. During this time, media interest in Israeli f o r c e s ’ brutality had served the PLO's cause well. By adopting a high media profile combined with active negotiations in the hijacking, Arafat gained in prestige while also promoting worldwide media continuity in Palestinian issues.
Diplomatically, the PLO was actively engaged in working on behalf of its Kuwaiti allies, through the efforts of negotiators in Larnaca and
*?®fhe Sunday Teiegraph, Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 1. 
*?*rhe Guardian, Tuesday 12 April 188, p . 12.
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of Arafat in the Emirate (for a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organisation).*?? The movement's growing political reputation and its revolutionary history meant that it could make contact both with governments concerned with the hijacking and with covert groupings in Beirut which Arafat alleged were responsible for organising the hijacking. His assertion (made after the killings had taken place) that PLO mediation would be withdrawn if the terrorists continued to employ violence was, he claimed, made to the Lebanese initiators and was intended to force the hijackers towards a negotiated  settlement.*?* Arafat also maintained that the PLO had made possible the transfer to Algeria by contacting the Algerian authorities to instigate action on the flight.*?* Once the departure had been mooted, PLO representatives worked in cooperation with an Algerian delegate present at Larnaca prior to departure for Algiers.***
An interesting aspect of the P L O ’s negotiating position is the g r o u p ’s claims, initially made unofficially*** then later openly declared by Arafat, that organisational involvement for the planning of the incident had come directly from the Iranian government**? - an uncorroborated but at least feasible scenario, bearing in mind the Iranian domestic power struggles which were developing throughout the late 1980s. It is conceivable that, for example, some politically influencial factions intent on destablising Rafsanjani's fragile power base might have been able to assist the S h i ’ite fanatics in planning their hijacking. A r a f a t ’s blatant and grave accusations against the Islamic Republic as a whole may have been based on high-level PLO intelligence or might have been made in order to distance the Palestinian movement from what was exclusively a militant S h i ’ite dispute with an Arab state. They might alternatively be viewed as having been primarily a PLO expression of solidarity with the friendly Kuwaiti government, which firmly believed that Iran was not innocent in the matter and which would have been grateful for any external support in this belief. As with the true position of official Iranian authorities and factions, the P L O ’s motivations and justifications for issuing its statement on Iranian involvement cannot be determined from available source material.
?..• .,„A  A u th or i t^ i e s
Where earlier efforts to negotiate a surrender had failed, Algeria succeeded in winning the confidence of the terrorists, partly because of the n a t i o n ’s revolutionary credentials, coupled with its recent
*??The Daily Telegraph, Monday 11 April 1988, p. 1.
*?*r/)e Guardian, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1.
*?*irw, Channel i News, Tuesday 12 April 1988.
***ir/l/, Channel 4 News, Tuesday 12 April 1988.
* * * The Scotsman, Tuesday 12 April 1988, p. 1; The International 
Herald Tribune, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 2.
**?The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, pp. 1 and 7.
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tradition in such hostage crises,**? and partly on account of Algeria's dogged refusal to be bound by any of the international agreements on judicial action which had been drafted by ICAO. In short, the state had acquired a well-founded reputation as a clearing house for similar terrorist hostage incidents in the past and was thus an obvious choice for all parties, as a suitable terminus for the hijacking.
The success of the Algerian policy rested on the condition that a peaceful solution would be found in which the terrorists would avoid the use of violence while high level diplomatic efforts took place to organise free passage from Algeria for the hijackers, in exchange for the release of the remaining hostages.*** Details of a provisionally agreed plan were revealed by Cypriot and PLO officials around the time of the flight from Larnaca,**® but the envisaged deal involving immediate hostage releases collapsed on arrival at Algiers when the hijackers decided to revert to siege tactics and demand once more the freedom of the 17 prisoners in Kuwait.*** It is impossible to determine from available information whether this apparent policy change was precipitated by external orders received by the hijackers, a deliberate attempt to try one final time to intimidate a host government into pressing for the release of the 17, mere caprice on the part of hijackers or some other factor.
At this point the proven negotiating skills of the Algerians entered the scenario. Instead of merely overseeing the releases and then channelling the hijackers out of the country in a secretive and unobtrusive manner, as could have been confidently predicted,**? officials were forced by the belligerent hijackers to bargain with them while hostages continued to suffer on board and media attention continued to be focussed on the case. From the time of Interior Minister K h e d i r i ’s first meeting on board the aircraft it was clear that the hijackers would endeavour to cooperate with their new hosts. While on the jet the minister received an undertaking that the gang
**?Algeria had previously been instrumental in negotiations to free US hostages in the Tehran siege of 1979 - 81, in the TWA hijacking of 1985 and (to a lesser extent) in western hostage crises in Beirut.
***See the statement of Algerian Ambassador to Kuwait, El-Hasnaoui Khaldi issued in the Emirate. The Financial Times, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1; The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 7.
**®rhe Scotsman, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1 ; The Guardian, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 8; The Financial Times, Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1 ; 
The Times, Thursday 14 April 188, p. 1.
**‘ rhe Independent, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1.
**?Note that by the time of the 74 7 ' s arrival at Algiers, local officials had prepared two aircraft and sufficient hotel rooms for the hostages, probably in anticipation of an early end to the siege. B8C, Breakfast Time, Wednesday 13 April 1988; ITN, Channel 
A News, Wednesday 13 April 1988.
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would "try to be very calm" and avoid violence,*** Then, on hisdeparture, he was seen shaking hands with a t e r r o r i s t , * * ’ as though some measure of basic understanding had been secured initially.
The most important concession granted by Algerian authorities to the hijackers was the press briefing which took place during a particularly uneventful time of negotiations. Although familiar demands and warnings were made in the ten minute statement, twocrucial errors were made by the hijackers, indicating that while they may have been dissatisfied with the pace of developments and their prospects of ultimate success, they remained largely content with the efforts of their hosts and were prepared to wait at the airport for their eventual release. First, the briefing spokesman failed to tie his demands to any time scale,*®® thus reducing his demands to mere rhetoric, and second, he indicated in reply to the only question asked by the journalists that fuel would only be required for departure once"a settlement* had been formulated.*®* For over three more days thehijackers waited for the Algerians to implement escape arrangements, never losing patience with officials despite their apparent lack of urgency.
One benefit to negotiators in prolonging the incident without granting concessions on the substantive demands was that the effects of heat, exhaustion, illness, poor sanitation and failure could be allowed to operate on the hijackers, occasionally being encouraged by the Algerians. Also, by allowing the hijackers to continue their siege into the festival of Ramadan, negotiators deployed external pressure upon the gang which had previously shown signs of religious devotion. For the group to continue the incident in already inhuman conditions and suffer the added restriction of a ban on eating and drinking during the hours of sunlight, would have required commitment and stoicism almost beyond endurance. When the Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahini returned from a secretive mission to Libya and met the hijackers,*®? it is most likely that they did not need to be convinced of the terms offered by him to end the siege a few hours later.
In contrast to Iran's strict filtering of news information and Cypriot authorities' openness to allow unfettered press activity, Algerian authorities were comparatively secretive about progress, with little regard being paid to the press presence at the airport. Often no statement was made to journalists following discussions on board, with no comment passed on matters of speculation. Whereas the identity of key negotiating participants had become known early in proceedings at Larnaca, Algerian negotiators followed the Iranian approach, maintaining a higher degree of anonymity, with few details of their official role becoming known. Most important 1y in this respect,
***The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 7. 
**’ TTW, Channel 4 News, Wednesday 13 April 1988.
*®®fhe Independent, Tuesday 19 April 1988, p. 1.
*®*7’(be Observer, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. 1.
*®? The Guardian, Thursda y 21 April 1988, p. 21.
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authorities were able to conceal the identity of a "very important person"*®* (Ibrahini) mentioned in communications with the hijackers until his responsibilities had been discharged. Even after the release, however, the nature and purposes of I b r a h i n i ’s visit to Tripoli, as well as the content of his discussions with the hijackers, were never disclosed. Such concern for secrecy was made known at the outset. From the time of K h e d i r i ’s first contact with journalists it became clear that information would not be supplied to the media which might "complicate and compromise" governmental efforts to reach a s o l u t i o n . * ®*
The A l g e r i a n s ’ success in ending the hijacking was remarkable in that the government knowingly risked widespread international condemnation from the start by ignoring respected international norms which it correctly viewed as inhibiting the achievement of its objectives - the saving of h o s t a g e s ’ lives and the defeat of the terrorists on their principal demands.*®®
3.3.8. Passengers and Crew
Central to the n e g o t i a t o r s ’ understanding of the h i j a c k e r s ’ strategy was the intelligence gathered from information received in debriefing sessions with liberated hostages.*®* Even on the first day authorities became aware of the condition and location of hostages, of the approximate number of hijackers active on board and of the fact that they were armed with handguns and explosives.*®? With the mass releases of Mashhad and the various debriefings which followed, information concerning the psychological techniques employed against passengers was obtained,*®* enabling crisis managers to assess the characteristics of the team and recommend responsible actions to those engaged in negotiations.
Only when passengers started reporting the appearance of new gang members and more effective armaments at M a s h h a d , * ® ’ did the validity and accuracy of their observations become issues of international political significance, for until that time intelligence retrieved had been used to confirm suspicions and beliefs framed in the minds of observers. The accusations from released hostages of Iranian involvement were unusual in that they could not be substantiated from
*®?rhe International Herald Tribune, Wednesday 20 April 1988, p. 2.
*®*r/?e Times, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 22.
*®®r/?e Financial Times, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 4.
*®*For an interesting account of life on board the aircraft during the early stages of the incident, see D. Carew-Jones, "The Hi jacking of KU 422: A H o s t a g e ’s Account," TVI Report 8(3) (1989), p. 47.
*®?The Guardian, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.
*®*TTW, Channel 4 News, Friday 8 April 1988.
*®’ The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1 ;
The Independent, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1,
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any other source and so could not easily be proved beyond reasonable doubt to have been accurate.**®
With an aircraft the size of a Boeing 747, it is impossible to state categorically that a second division of hijackers had not always been present, distributed throughout the large, sparsely-filled jet,*** although successful concealment of weaponry and equipment would have been somewhat more difficult to achieve. In any case, even if passenger evidence strongly suggested that accomplices and supplies had indeed been infiltrated at Mashhad, it would be difficult to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Iranian governmental or factional support was being exercised as opposed to a sectarian conspiracy existing involving, for example, assistance from groups of individual officials, members of the revolutionary guard or others able to provide support on the airside of the airport.
Information received from passengers strongly suggests that security measures at Mashhad were inadequate to prevent infiltrations of supplies to the hijackers. Notwithstanding this point, and even assuming that further firm evidence of collusion in Iran could be called upon, it remained most unlikely that governments would connect the tenuously linked strands of information supplied by passengers in order positively to punish the Iranian government, either for active complicity or for passive negligence. Hence, the value to the case of passenger information lay in its general, informative qualities rather than its practical, evidential uses.
3,4. Effect of International Standards on Conduct of Crisis
The complex facts of the hijacking and the demonstrably large range of crisis skills exhibited so proficiently by the hijackers made any peaceful ending to the hijacking a very difficult objective to pursue. When, however, it became certain that the Algerian government would become involved in negotiations, such resolution became more likely, though at the expense of the Hague Convention's implementation against the offenders. In such circumstances, it was not possible for the Hague C o n v e n t i o n ’s provisions to be invoked as this would have required the Algerian government to have resiled upon the agreed terms of its agreement struck with the gang. There are strong moral grounds for arguing that any such agreement (even when made in good faith) could have been renounced on account of outstanding crimes collateral to the principal offence of hijacking. For example, if prosecution for the act of hijacking itself had been deemed inappropriate or in any sense unfair, arrests of the entire team in order to investigate the two murders or the detention of the hostages could have been reasonably carried out after the surrender of the hijackers.
**’Although several sources point to infiltration of weapons, supplies and extra personnel at Mashhad, details remain uncertain. The 
Guardian, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 19; The International Herald 
Tribune, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1; The Independent, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1: The Glasgow Herald, Thursday 14 April 1988,p. 1.
* * * The International Herald Tribune, Friday 22 April 1988, p. 2.
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For the Algerians, however, it was essential that the agreement struck with the hijackers should be honoured, as conduct reflecting a lower standard of concern for the integrity of the bargain would have detracted from a record of impartial non-alignment in such hostage cases involving industrialised governments and radical Islamic groups. For such an important reputation to be sustained, non-conformity to multilateral standards on detention, extradition, prosecution and punishment was essential for fear of losing the trust of the terrorists with whom Algerian officials openly dealt. For this reason, the basic provisions of the Hague Convention (contained in Articles 2, 6 and 7) could not be applied by any Algerianadministration conscious of the need to preserve its unique role for future mediation efforts.
Article 9's exhortation to Contracting States (in the plural) to take "all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to Its lawful commander" was undoubtedly followed by the concerned governments (which displayed a genuine interest throughout to avoid violent destruction of the aircraft and its occupants) in ending the hi j a c k i n g . 1*2 The h i j a c k e r s ’ advanced control techniques and their bargaining successes required that the C o n v e n t i o n ’s aut dedere aut 
Judicare provisions would never be imposed subsequent to capture. Such flagrant neglect of promulgated standards was both foreseeable and justifiable when viewed in the working context of the international norms concerned.
Around the time of the Hague C o n v e n t i o n ’s creation, Algeria was regarded internationally as a pariah for its openly espoused policies of non-cooperation with aviation powers and its support for fleeing h i j a c k e r s . 1*3 Its isolationism totally undermined the rationale of the Hague formula, which p redicated its objectives of deterrence (and thence of suppression) entirely upon there being no hiding place for the guilty. It is obvious that total adherence to the norms involved in the Convention would, indeed, be essential were they ever to
i*2it is interesting to note in passing that the required policy of allowing departure at Mashhad and Larnaca met with a degree of disapproval internationally. Indeed, in June 1988, the ICAO Council adopted a policy statement to accompany the existing Assembly Resolution A26-7 (on refusal of landing rights to hijacked aircraft) which sought to dissuade states from facilitating hijack departures. Inevitably, however, the s t a t e m e n t ’s language was tainted with u n c e r t a i n t y , in recognition perhaps of the difficulties faced by Iran and Cyprus. In its fourth resolving clause, it stated that the ICAO Council:
"URGES each Contracting State to take measures, as it may find practicable, to ensure that an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure which has landed in its territory is detained on the ground unless its departure is necessitated by the 
overriding duty to protect human life." (Emphasis added). ICAO News Release, PIO 7/88.
3*3$ee the hijacking cases of : 23 July 1968 (El A1 B-707): 2 June 1972 (Western 8-727) in which Algeria failed to prosecute hijackers who landed in its territory. FAA statistics (listed in bibliography).
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discourage offenders from flying outwith its jurisdictional locus.Yet where a standard requires an unattainably high degree of statecommitment and action in order to facilitate its objectives, it isclear that such a standard must risk being unworkable in the most difficult - and thus the most important - cases with which it was designed to deal. Such a case can be identified in the inability of the Hague Convention to influence the actions of parties involved in the KU 422 hijacking.
It is indicative of governments' broad unwillingness to take seriously their so-called "obligations" that no effective enforcement measures have been employed to add commitment to intention in the framing of laws on the subject. In legislative terms, the failure of the 1973 Rome Conference endorsed the outer limits of multilateral cooperation  in the area of violent air crime. The folly of the Bonn Declaration and subsequent attempts to cooperate against states which fall short of the Hague standard lay in their palpable inoperability in the real world of diplomacy and compromise. It is difficult to determine on what basis such agreements might have been used in the Kuwaiti case, as no government involved can be identified as having both breached the norms concerned and, more importantly, as having done so in a way likely to incur the disapprobation of those states most predisposed to imposing sanctions.
The covert dealings of Kuwait, Iran, Cyprus, the PLO, Algeria, Libya and others on the fringes of the incident demonstrate the intricacies of "hijack diplomacy," making liability for collusion and support- difficult to establish and impossible to use for any punitive purpose. Throughout the hijacking, condemnation of Iran was commonplace yet no proof of complicity was ever presented by governments with a serious view to punishing the state. Only Algerian action in freeing the terrorists presented both an obvious set of circumstances indicating direct compromise and an easy opportunity for western governments to call for sanctions imposition. This simplistic and inequitable recommendation derived from these governments failure to recognise the importance of pragmatism in the operation of treaty law of this kind. With the legal norms of ICAO being challenged by the determined and practical opposition of the hi jack team, it should only have been expected that the standards would become embarrassing impediments to finding an acceptable solution. Of course, it is beyond doubt that the rule of law is made to suffer whenever a hijacker is set free in such circumstances, but it is necessary to concede that the rule of law's effectiveness must always be strictly constrained by the bounds of political feasibility.
The United Kingdom's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, remarked shortly after news of the h i j a c k e r s ’ escape had become known that such practices "would only lead to more hijacking and more hostage- taking,"^** while the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, David Mellor, noted "very great concern" at the r e l e a s e s . 1*5 For the United States, Secretary of State, George Schultz, said the h i j a c k e r s ’ liberation would breach international
i**r/?e Glasgow Heraldy Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 1.
1*5 The International Herald Tribune, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 2
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standards and would not be "a proper thing to d o ."i* * Such attitudes evade the fact that detention and punishment of the hijackers would not have been a viable option for the pragmatic Algerians whose objectives differed so markedly from those who criticised them. The eventual proof that A l g e r i a ’s actions had been vindicated came in the weeks following the incident, when no punitive measures were imposed on Algeria by members of the international community. Initial statements from Thatcher indicated that any diplomatic and economic action against Algeria would wait until the full facts of the case had become known.i*? On this point Mellor noted;
"I think i t ’s too early to say what we can do but obviously there will be a number of countries who are as dedicated as we are to the fight against international terrorism who will want to di scuss this."i**
He added that no-one "should underestimate the concern that I think many of us will have about this matter."i** Within one week, M e l l o r ’s superior, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, presented a plan to his Foreign Ministry counterparts on the European C o m m u n i t i e s ’ Council of Ministers. Among other proposals, the submission called for imposition of economic sanctions upon Iran, Cyprus and Algeria - a suggestion which received little support.*?* The plan failed to overcome the diplomatic apprehensions and economic concerns aired on such occasions by governments which fear either the response of their trading partners or simply the unknown.
As weeks passed, it became evident that world powers were content to allow the issue gradually to fade from the attention of the media and before long to lapse from the p u b l i c ’s short memory. No government was prepared to criticise the Algerians in the long term because it was impossible to escape the deduction that they had done what had been entirely required of them and had done so most effectively for the common good. In view of this reality, it would not only have been manifestly inequitable to have charged Algeria with engineering a dubious outcome of the hijacking, but it would also have been diplomatically and politically inadvisable, bearing in mind the pressing need for western states to maintain good relations with this pivot of dialogue in the Arab world and remembering also A l g e r i a ’s potential for use in future crisis management incidents, M c W h i n n e y ’s description of the machinations of governments is appropriate in this context :
... governments, weighing the nuisance, in terms both of national prestige and also the tranquil operation of national commercial airline service, constituted by hijackings, can always
***The Scotsman, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 8.
Glasgow Herald, Thursday 21 April 1988, p. 1.
Six O'clock News, Wednesday 20 April 1988.
*? ® rhe Daily Telegraph, Tue sday 26 April 1988, p. 10.
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trade off some potentially quite effective control measures directed against delinquent countries that harbour or protect or otherwise sponsor hijackers, against the need to maintainfriendly relations with those countries who may be useful orvital to them for military-strategic, diplomatic, or general commercial reasons."*?*
The best case that could be made against the Algerian practices is that they served to further the long term cause of global terrorism in all its forms by ridiculing established global standards, showing how weak the international order can be and encouraging further, possibly even more horrifying, incidents in future.*?? This argument could not, however, overcome the truth which underpins it, that physicalsymbols of the world order are incontrovertibly weak and positively open to attack by terrorist groups at any time. In thesecircumstances the part played in the hijacking by Algeria is analogous to a safety valve, acting to diffuse the unbearable increase in diplomatic pressures In order to return the machinery of which it is a part to its fragile equilibrium. The prospect of this component being brought into use is unattractive, yet an implicit recognition of the need fo„r its existence is absolutely essential if the mechanics of the apparatus are fully to be understood and applied. The otherwise unprotected machinery of law requires this form of support, at least until there exists another means by which it can be reinforced. In short, the intervention of the Algerian government proved essential for order to be retrieved from the chaotic legal, political and human ordeal brought about by the hijackers. As Clutterbuck remarked on the release of the hijackers following the conclusion of the incident:
"In a perfect world, of course, it would be far better if they h a d n ’t been released but I think that would have been too much to expect of the Algerians, who I think have done a fantastic job. T h e y ’ve achieved all that possibly could be achieved."*?s
Until governments admit that their universally agreed suppression regime cannot be sufficient to counter terrorist trends, there can be little hope of developing new and more effective norms to suppress aviation offences. In current practice, however, authorities seek only to continue their reliance on the outdated and failing structure of agreements. As Cheng has noted (see above),*?* the Hague formula has acquired a new and highly damaging purpose as a public relations tool with which states seek to prove their concern and demonstrate their commitment to action in the field of aviation terrorism. In fact, far from being concerned and committed, they remain largely apathetic to the changing needs of airlines and their passengers, as shall be demonstrated in forthcoming Chapters. An important lesson of the KU 422 incident must be that terrorism suppression will not derive from governments merely showing their outrage or declaring their
* ? *McMhinney (1987), p . 89.
*??7he Glasgow Herald, Thursday 21 April 1988, p . 1 
*?*BBC, Six O'clock News, Wednesday 20 April 1988. 
*?*Cheng in Cheng and Brown (1989), p. 45.
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opposition to the crimes concerned. Equally, the faltering and sporadic quest for the aut dedere aut Judicare ideal cannot alone be itrusted to provide any timely solutions. In addition, appropriatepractical measures must be developed.
3.5, Conclusion; The Need for New Directions in..Violent Air. CrimeSuppression
The KU 422 hijacking demonstrated the failures of the Hague formula and indicated that additional means of containing the incidence of air crimes must be sought by states, independently and in concert, and by the industry itself. One key purpose of the following Chapters is to introduce the discussion of global aviation security enhancement as an activity of principal importance in the search for new directions in air crime suppression. It is suggested that the terrorist ills of the industry, which have not been and will not be cured by resorting to administrative cooperation, might at least be more likely to be prevented at many sensitive locations with the imposition of adequate security measures.
As discussion of aviation security proceeds, it will become evident that even in this field many difficulties (such as those of technology, resources and cooperation) will require to be overcome, if the terrorist loopholes of the existing regime are to be filled with any degree of sufficiency. On the other hand, it is also correct at this stage to stress the great benefits which adequately formulated security could provide as a reward for swift and diligent action. Foremost of these benefits is the predictable decline in the number of cases of severe air crime which a progressive and on-going policy of global security enhancement could entail. Greater efficiency in the security techniques used could result in a higher percentage of attempted terrorist acts being intercepted prior to their implementation, recognising that terrorists often display both an ability to adapt their modes of attack to suit changing response conditions and that improvement of security in one venue or sector of the industry will often serve merely to reveal "softer* targets elsewhere, which can then become prime candidates for terrorist 
a t t a c k ,
Another possible advantage involved in improving security within aviation is the deterrent effect of visible, high quality preventive mechanisms- While the Hague formula is powerless to deflect the most determined of prospective offenders prepared to challenge its administrative provisions, it is undeniable that a practical improvement in security throughout the w o r l d ’s airports would provide a more difficult physical barrier for them to overcome than is currently being experienced, in turn forcing them to reconsider their means of attack. It is conceivable that in such circumstances an otherwise u n attained deterrent effect could be achieved, as a proportion of would-be air criminals would be likely to turn their attentions to different types of target displaying lower levels of security p r e p a r e d n e s s .
Before discussing in detail the issue of airport security, it is necessary to isolate certain recent factors which have prompted new passenger interest to be taken in the field, looking particularly at the media interest generated by the Lockerbie atrocity of December 
1988.
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Certain of the findings outlined in the official Thai Fact Finding
Report on the Seizure of Kuwait Airways Flight KU 422 leftconsiderable room for doubt that adequate investigation had been made. For example, the report openly admitted that "Flight KU 422 departed from 6 1 A for Kuwait. The aircraft was seized during its flight operation without any stopover..." but then conceded only that it was "believed that the hijackers enplaned at BIA." Also, the Report noted that in the sixteen hours of the a i r c r a f t ’s visit to Bangkok, it was handled by 22 cabin cleaners, two kitchen personnel, more than three maintenance officers and more than two luggage and cargo handlers.*?* Although these staff members were reported to have been physically  searched by security officers and to have been under the supervision of Kuwait Airways security personnel, the fact remains that a sufficiently large cache of arms and explosives might have been allowed to evade pre-boarding search procedures on the ramp at BIA, tohave been placed on board by one of the uncertain number of airports t a f f .
Whichever means were employed to Place the t e r r o r i s t s ’ first consignment of weaponry on board, the official report failed to note the possibilities which undoubtedly existed for BIA to have been atfault. Little of substance has emerged publicly since the breach topoint to the nature of the infiltration, although the US State Department has observed that it is possible "that because of the lateness of the hour, a thorough secondary inspection of passengers and hand-carried luggage had not taken place on boarding."*?? These allegations have been corroborated by passenger evidence on thecondition of passenger screening at Bangkok at the time of theincident. One traveller who was interviewed on British television described how he was able to pass through security processes without a piece of metallic photographic equipment, which very closely resembled a handgun in profile.,., being detected:
*?5US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988(Washington: US State Department, 1989), p . 41.
*?*Airports Authority of Thailand (1988), pp. 2 - 4 .
*??U.S. Dep ar t m e n t  of State (1989), p. 41.
3.5,1. Airport Security: The Forgotten Factor
Amid media analysis of the KU 422 hijacking, the vital question of how the incident had initially been allowed to commence was largely ignored, the defensive weakness at the root of the crisis - grievously ipoor airport security - going unchallenged by both journalistic îinvestigation and public de clarations from the major aviation powers.The Thai g o v e r n m e n t ’s official investigation which was initiated very shortly after the B o e i n g ’s seizure, revealed no security lapses to have taken place during the period between its arrival at Bangkok International Airport (BIA) at 1107 on Monday 4 April 1988 and its departure at 0351 the following morning. In total, three independent investigations took place, each commissioned by separate Thai Government agencies, yet no definite conclusions were reached by any
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"I flew out of Bangkok on the same day as the hijacking.Security was not good. The security screening was right by thegate where you go into the aeroplane rather than just afterpassport control. Now passengers d o n ’t go into a plane in a niceconvenient flow and when I got to the gate there [were] a hundredpeople all crowding round. The security girls all wanted to get us through very quickly and I took that with m e . . . I t ’s acollapsible tripod. I t ’s made of metal and it was in my handluggage and it was not picked up at all."*?*
At the time of the hijacking, the moderate degree of media attentionwhich had been engendered by the far distant hijacking was focussed on the newsworthy plight of the hostages and the uncertainties of the mediation processes, providing little coverage of the equallyimportant, though far less dramatic, security issue. By the time of its resolution, after over two weeks of predictably diminishing news attention, public interest was waning markedly in the tiresome and hackneyed predictions and commentaries. As a result of the combination of an information void suffered or engineered by the Thais and Kuwaitis and a need to find new and exciting pieces of world newselsewhere, the vital question of Bangkok's security was permitted tolapse from the public mind.
Had the flight involved a high proportion of US citizens or had it started at an airport of an economically developed state in, for example, Europe or North America, where a security breach might have sparked general public anger and media interest in the issue on its own account, attention might have been concentrated on the weaknesses rather than have declined. Evidence for this assertion is to be found in the Press activity during the TWA hijacking to Beirut in June 1985, when a very similar terrorist modus operandi resulted in much more Intensive US Press activity involving aviation security.
Also, following the terrorist attack of Pan Am Flight 103, which occurred only nine months after the Kuwaiti hijacking, the clearly visible western identity of the victim passengers, crew and airline resulted in prolonged media interest. The strong western demand for information on the atrocity, coupled with the sheer enormity of the criminal act perpetrated, led journalists and passengers to contemplate in detail the nature and extent of the risks facing European and North American travellers, in turn forcing them to investigate not only the tactics used by the unknown terrorists but, more directly, the shortcomings of industry and state p r e p a r e d n e s s .
In the months immediately following the Lockerbie disaster, the previously protected myths of security excellence were progressively dismantled first by journalists intent on disclosing the easily identified weaknesses in the global aviation security network, and then by security experts themselves, testifying to official public hearings or simply choosing to enter the general security debate which was inevitably bound to follow Flight 103's sabotage.
Hence, 1988 witnessed the transformation of security ineptitude and 
*?*#aIroy, BBC 1, Wednesday 13 April 1988.
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inadequacy from a badly understood and often ignored factor in aviation terrorism to a journalistic subject firmly rooted in the public domain. While governments continued to note their pride at the increasingly broad sweep of the aut dedere aut judicare doctrine in relation to crimes of air violence, aviation terrorists demonstrated the true extent of state concern for airline passengers by penetrating the very defences of the industry which government agencies sought to regulate and control. It is ironic that the year started with ICAO member states framing and applauding a largely token extension of the Hague formula, continued with an incident which negated its key principles and ended with terrorists proving the n o r m s ’ utter powerlessness to prevent sophisticated acts of terrorist outrage from being committed.
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Ç M P I I R J l
a i r p o r t  SECURIT Y : PRACTICES ANO„PROCEDURES
"In retrospect, the surprise must be why it took so very long until the beginning of 1973 - to institute such simple and (as was soon demonstrated) effective preventive controls over a e r 1al piracy. What combinat ion of governmental bureaucratic inertia or sheer lack of imagination and foresight, and of economic and other pressure group stalling tactics, was responsible for losing more than a decade in successful community problem-solving?"*
"The dilemma of terrorism is that although most governm ents and people recognise the dangers of terrorism, they are unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to control it,"?
 Introduction: J H i s t  A i r^prt_ Security in an Age of ViolentAir Crime
Following from previous C h a p t e r s ’ analyses of the weaknesses of the current international legal regime, this Chapter deals with practical means of violent air crime suppression through the adoption of airport security measures. It discusses the key issues of relevance to airline passengers, concentrating on the security methodstraditionally used to screen passengers and their baggage prior to flight, the problems faced in adapting these techniques to new forms of threat and the need to introduce the responsible employment of high technology into a i r p o r t s ’ security operations.
Aviation security in its totality must always comprise a broadportfolio of defensive techniques to accompany considerations of facilitation (operational efficiency in processing flights). The intention of this breadth of activity should be to provide an overlap of its various constituent elements, forming a strong but constantly evolving structure of operations, designed to promote absolute"security sterility" around otherwise vulnerable prime targets.Airport security activities involve processes which have developed as a result of passenger and industry concern and governmental intervention largely since the early 1970s, when aviation hijacking was first perceived as requiring a systematic approach to be taken in employing preventive measures for its suppression. The impetus for security activities to be introduced was also motivated by the rapid expansion in civil flight activities around that time, resulting in
*McWhinney (1987), p. 119.
?Y. Alexander and H.M. Levine, "Prepare for the Next Entebbe 
Chitty's Law Journal 25 (1977), p. 240.
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new passenger throughput pressures being experienced at large a i r p o r t s .
In the United States, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed an alarming increase in the number of US registered civil aircraft being hijacked, mostly to Cuba, with which no agreement on rendition of offenders had by that time been reached. Meanwhile, in Europe, the development of Palestinian aviation terrorism was causing concern among the governments of leading aviation states and among all international airlines. The politically significant and deeply embarrassing events surrounding the "Da w s o n ’s Field" multiple hijackings of September 1970 and the unexpected terrorist sabotage on 21 February 1970 against a Swiss Air Coronado in which 4 7 persons were killed, resulted in au thorities realising both the political significance and the vulnerability of aviation in a new age of terror v i o l e n c e .*
A subsidiary consideration was the advent in 1969 of the first operational Boeing 747 aircraft, heralding the general introduction of wide-bodied airliners, capable of carrying an unprecedented number of passengers and in danger of becoming a prime target both for h i j a c k e r s ’ sieges and for s a b o t e u r s ’ explosives. This development alone was described by Dorey as "a seemingly insoluble security handling problem,"* and served to focus the attention of policy makers and aviation authorities on the issue of terrorist capacities. Although the Hague and Montreal Conferences sought to deal with the problems on a political-legal level, there was also a growing realisation that some practical measures were required to cope with what appeared to be the progressive development of several related, though not yet properly identified, threats. By the late 1960s, the Israeli carrier, El Al, had introduced systems of passenger screening and was leading the market in an unenthusiastic race for new security techniques. &
Meanwhile in the United States, the richer carriers were voluntarily introducing passenger searches and elementary electronic screening of baggage on certain flights.* President Richard N i x o n ’s initial response to the problem was to introduce security into American airports on an optional basis at first, in the latter half of 1969,? then on a mandatory basis for all passengers under a rule promulgated
3pAA statistics (listed in bibliography).
*Dorey (1983), p. 220.
^Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 68.
*McWhinney (1987), p. 82. For a useful description of early, voluntary measures con templated or introduced by carriers, see Pick, Gordon and Patterson (1969), pp. 80 - 83. The development of the US federal security system is charted in Moore (1976), pp. 8 - 18. See also R. Clutterbuck, Guerrilias and Terrorists (London; Faber and Faber, 1977), pp. 103 - 105.
?Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 68.
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on 5 December 1972 and brought into effect on 5 January 1973.* For him, the precipitating factor which necessitated activity by airports and carriers was a pair of unusually violent hijackings to Cuba by fugitives in October and November of 1 9 69.’
In September 1970, following the D a w s o n ’s Field hijacking incident, a decision was taken by the US Administration to order the introduction by the US Customs Service of 1,500 Customs Security Officers - trained guards, known as "sky marshals" - whose role would be to accompany passengers on board high risk flights, partly to deter would-be hijackers and partly to counter the threat of diversion if it was presented,** Although carriers of some states (most notably Israel, Pakistan and Egypt) still employ such staff for certain flights, their impact has not been regarded as having been decisive against hijackings.** Michael J. Fenello, a Vice President of Eastern Airlines stated in 1973 that in addition to having been "unbelievably expensive" the US pioneering sky marshal programme did not result in any in-flight arrests being made.*?
Dudley has noted that many experts within the industry were worried by the trend of introducing armed staff and were "relieved to watch it gradually fizzle out."** Even the Soviet airline and prime target for refugee hijackers, Aeroflot, has decided to revise its policy of arming its flight personnel to conform with new regulations to be contained in the U S S R ’s Air Traffic Code.** Experience has taught airlines that armed sky marsha 1 s can themselves pose a serious risk to aircraft, crew and passengers. Evidence suggests that an in-flight gun battle between guards and Lebanese hijackers may have been responsible for the destruction of an Iraqi Airways aircraft over
*B,0. Davis Jr, "Skyjacking: Problems and Potential Solutions - ASymposium - The G o v e r n m e n t ’s Response to Hijacking," Villanova Law 
Review 18 (1973), p. 1014; McWhinney (1987), p. 82; J.J.O ’Donnell, "Skyjacking; Problems and Potential Solutions - A Symposium - Air Crimes - Perspective from the Cockpit," Villanova 
Law Review 18 (1973), p. 992 - 993.
’Davis (1973), p. 1012 - 1013 and p. 1015.
**8ell (1975), p. 1332; Dawson (1986) II, pp. 33 - 34.
**E. O ’Ballance, Terrorism in the 1980s (London; Arms and Armour Press, 1989), p. 117.
*?M.J, Fenello, "Skyjacking: Problems and Potential Solutions - ASymposium - Individual Rights v. Skyjack Deterrence: An AirlineM a n ’s V i e w , " Villanova Law Review 18 (1973), p. 999.
**Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 68. The US scheme was phased out in July1972. Dawson (1986) II, p. 34.
 ^* Xzvestia, 25 July 1990, reprinted in Novosti Press Agency press release, July 1990, p. 3,
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Arar, Saudi Arabia on 25 December 1986.*® Although the United S t a t e s ’ official civil aviation agency, the Federal Aviation Administration ( F A A ) re-introduced the concept of Federal Air Marshals in 1980, the role of the staff was markedly more specialised than before, with much greater integration of activities with the industry.**
Also in the late 1960s, the option of searching passengers and their hand baggage to detect weapons and other devices which might have been used in hijackings was taken by some carriers, but proved to be impractical on a general basis because of the amount of time needed to frisk each individual and check each bag manually. An important step towards the international introduction of security technology came at the Seventeenth Session (Extraordinary) of the ICAO Assembly, in June 1970, when Member States adopted Assembly Resolution A17-15, requesting the Council;
"...to cause a further examination to be made, in consultation with States; the World Health Organisation, the International Commission on Radiological Protection and other interested bodies, of the possible use of radiological techniques for identifying weapons on passengers or in their baggage..."*?
In a short period, technological apparatus was adapted for aviation security purposes and installed at major international airports. While invasive radiological techniques were employed in the X-ray processes for baggage, benign metal detection methods were used for screening humans. Despite the fallibility of the devices and their lack of technical sophistication (see below), the first generation of security machinery was able to detect many weapons which might have been used in hijackings and proved that the advances being made in aircraft manufacture did not, after all, present any insoluble difficulties.
X-ray screening of baggage was introduced as a time-saving alternative to thorough physical examination. It soon demonstrated its capacities as a reasonable mode of metallic weapons detection when operated by a trained security officer, being approximately four times faster than manual techniques.** The upsurge in hijacking Incidents in the US, coupled with the burgeoning of new technology, prompted President Nixon to instigate in 1973 mandatory security screening throughout US c a r r i e r s . * ’ While this decision was opposed vehemently by many civil liberties campaigners, who regarded mandatory searching of passengers
*5por a discussion of the merits of using sky marshals, see McWhinney (1987), pp. 87 - 88.
**Dawson (1986) II, p. 34.
*?Dorey (1983), p. 219.
*«Jbid., p. 220.
*’U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil 
Aviation Security Program July 1 - December 31 1986, p. 6.
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and their baggage as worthy of being ruled unconstitutional,?* there were strong legal grounds for supporting the measure.
The airlines themselves were reluctant to see their self-regulated, deterrent-based, discretionary modes of screening being replaced by an expensive system imposed and regulated by government.?* Perhaps for this reaon, the FAA considered ending mandatory security screening only five months after its inauguration, but finally relented when faced with public support for the new security.?? The methods soon became well established, serving as an example to other states of the importance and applicability of adequate preventive t e c h n i q u e s ,? ? The Nixon i n i t i a t i v e ’s success was based, in large measure, upon the enterprising approach of Lieutenant General Benjamin 0. Davis, the US Assistant Secretary of Transportation and the P r e s i d e n t ’s Director of Security, who had been appointed to introduce airport security systems at US airports. As Wilkinson has noted, Davis astutely recognised one of the most important factors in making rigorous security compatible with swift facilitation:
"The queue had to be at the ticket counter rather than at the search barrier. This was the secret of making the scheme acceptable to the travelling public. And the scheme has been fully Justified by its success."?*
Gutteridge has correctly noted that the effect of precautions imposed to prevent and deter terrorist activities can never be accurately
Gora, B.C. "Skyjacking: Problems and Potential Solutions - A Symposium - The Fourth Amendment at the Airport: Arriving,Departing or Cancelled," Villanova Law Review 18 (1973) 1056; C.J, Nau Jr, "The Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search - or Seizure," 
Notre Dame Lawyer 48 (1973), p. 1261.
?*Fenello (1973), p. 1000; McWhinney (1987), pp. 82 - 83.
??Rosenfield (1973), p. 82.
??The adoption of US techniques in other major aviation powers was not rapid. Note that even in the mid 1970s, it was common for security teams at major European airports to apply security checks on high risk flights to the Middle East. Trelles (1978), pp. 122 - 123.
?*P. Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan. 1986), p. 252. See also R, Clutterbuck, Living with Terror!sm (London; Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 118; Clutterbuck (1977), p. 104.
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measured.?* As a probable indication of the success of the US initiatives, however, it is interesting to note that between 1973 and 1986 security points at US airports screened almost eight billion passengers and inspected over nine billion pieces of carry-on baggage, with more than 38,000 firearms being detected and almost 16,000 arrests made. The FAA estimates that 117 hijackings or related crimes may have been prevented by security measures,?* although this should be compared with the figure of 104 hijackings which took place despitethe measures, in the same time frame.??
Although any analysis of airport security must conclude that the activities involved should be directed in total towards preventing abroad selection of offences, including fraud and theft, the principalgroup of crimes of interest in the contexts both of academicexamination and practical significance is that which comprises the ICAO conventional schemer hijacking, sabotage of aircraft and airport attack. In the case of the former two categories of crime, protecting the perimeter of the ramp on which aircraft sit, is, or should be, thecentral feature of activities, for if weapons and explosive orincendiary devices can be stopped from reaching their targets the crimes themselves will often, though not always, be prevented.?* Because the importance of these two offence groupings has been realised by most international airports of the developed world, security systems have been developed in order to protect thelandside/airside boundary from hijackers and, to a much smaller extent, from saboteurs. Very often, however, little has been achieved to prevent attacks taking place within the landside areas of terminals away from aircraft.
The simultaneous assault in December 1985 by Abu Nidal terrorist teams
?*W. Gutteridge in Brenchley (1986), p. i. See also Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 73; Flight Safety Foundation, "An Update of World Aviation Security System," Flight Safety Digest (November 1989) p. 9. A reason for the general lack of statistical evidence is not difficult to find:
"The deterrent value of security at airports is obviously considerable, but unfo rtunately not easily measurable. Detection successes are seldom widely reported as they usually do not make good media copy; and some airports prefer not to publicize such incidents as they tend to unsettle passengers," O ’Ballsnce (1989) II, p. 112.
?*FAA, Semiannual Report, July 1 - December 31 1986, exhibit 6. A revised estimate to the end of 1988 is that 119 US hijackings may have been prevented by the measures. International Security 
Review, January/February 1990, p. 7.
??FAA, Semiannual Report, July 1 - December 1986, p. 6.
?*B.H. Vincent, Statement of tfr Billie H. Vincent Before a 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of 
Representatives, September 25/2$, 1989. Submission to a S u b ­committee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington P.O., 25 - 26 September 1989, p. 31.
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on V i e n n a ’s Schwechat airport and R o m e ’s Leonardo da Vinci airport demonstrated that although security may operate sufficiently well at key international sites to prevent and deter potential aircraft- related offenders, a wide range of worthwhile targets can still be identified in the less well-protected areas of airports which will attract a high degree of public interest and a low level of defensive activity. The positioning of armed guards and surveillance cameras in visible positions may act as a deterrent to some terrorists and certainly achieves a very useful and necessary containment purpose in reducing the capabilities of attackers to maximise destructive  possibilities. Nevertheless, in busy airports in which commercial, egalitarian and throughput considerations have to be weighed against the needs of securing vulnerable passengers and staff, a clear preventive dilemma still exists which cannot easily be resolved. After turning to discussion of the nature of passenger-related security activities and their role in a changing aviation market, this important point will be dealt with in terms of improving upon airport design features.
4_. 2^„The Nature J3f A v i a M o n
Airline travel is rightly famed for the versatility which it offers its passengers. Such versatility has long been recognised also by those people who seek to disrupt civil aviation by means of violence, for it is true that no other industry offers as large a range of targets and options for terrorists, whether in the form of hijackings, acts of sabotage or armed attack. The industry falls victim to terrorists because it represents an indirect extension of national identity in a global arena. If a small group of terrorists or its state sponsors wish to convey a vivid and clear message of aggression to an "enemy" state, it will always be easier to attack, for example, an unguarded and unprepared airport check-in desk in some far distant location than to engage the government of the state in first-hand conflict on a more conventional form of battlefield. Moreover, the capacity of many airports to prevent adept terrorists from committing their most violent acts remains low, making aviation yet more attractive. These circumstances were recognised by the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Transport, which reported on airport security in 1989;
"(Tlerrorists are not attacking on a form of transport which they happen to dislike: the attacks are on the state itself, withcivil aviation having been selected as a soft t a r g e t . " ? ’
Equally, any dramatic act of aviation terrorism is certain to acquire considerable political and media attention. A well-organised hijacking or, better still, an anonymous act of mass murder in the form of bomb or rocket attack will occupy the minds of Prime Ministers and Presidents and will place doubts in the minds of the travelling public. In truth, aviation terrorism is a low cost, low risk means of waging war, in a global battlefield where defence is not easily achieved and where violent counter-attack is outlawed internationally and, in most cases, is almost impossible in practice. Moreover, the threat of aviation terrorism is faced primarily not by governments and
? ’House of Com mons C o m m i t t e e  on Transport (1989), p. 7
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their armed forces, but by civilian agencies and ultimately by defenceless airline passengers. It is vital, therefore, to assess the means by which those vulnerable passengers can better be defended, in turn requiring a review of the development of aviation security techniques.
4.^3, Passenger Updating F a l s e . Assumptions
Since the inception of aviation security processes, excessive emphasis has been placed on the prevention of hijackings, classically at the expense of other means of suppression. Indeed, traditionally and typically, airport security, in its operations upon passengers and their baggage, has been geared towards the active removal from the aviation system of hijackers and the inactive control of baggage hold bombers. In practice, the distinction between the active and the inactive approaches has meant that while screening for metallic weapons and for explosive and incendiary devices on p a s s e n g e r s ’ persons and in their hand baggage has become a standard feature for the purpose of preventing hijackings, no such positive screening role has been developed by most airports and carriers to deal with the ever-present threat of sabotage from within hold baggage.?* The principal reason for this omission has been one of logistics. The rarity of sabotage incidents and the expense and trouble which would be entailed in screening hold baggage have resulted in so-called cost- effectiveness calculations being made to differentiate between “high risk" and "low risk" flight routes. Even the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) established in its security manual of September 1988 a typically pragmatic norm that under usual operating conditions, no extraordinary action need be taken to prevent sabotage via the hold:
"In normal circumstances there is no requirement to search checked-in baggage, but checked-in baggage should be reasonably protected from interference between the point of check-in and the a i r c r a f t . "? *
In September 1989 this provision was adapted to take account of a newly-perceived threat posed by electrical and electronic devices - a classically reactive approach when viewed in light of the previous twelve months' terrorist activity. The manual was also updated to contain the following:
"In any event, not less than 5% of checked-in baggage should be checked by X-ray, other technical means or manually to determine to the greatest feasible extent that the baggage does not contain an explosive device."??
A similar proportion was specified for on-line and inter-line transfer
?*It has been reported, however, that at least three airlines,India, Pan Am and TWA, employ 100 per cent hold baggage screening on trans-Atlantic departures, using both physical searches and ray techniques. The Sunday Telegraph, Sunday 1 July 1990,
?*ECAC, (1988), paragraph 2,3.3.1.
, paragraph 2.3.3.2 d).
n s Air X-p . 1
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baggage screening.?? E C A C ’s promotion of a minimum percentage of only five per cent indicates the practical difficulties involved in changing the habits of a lifetime for an industry unacquainted with hold-baggage screening. Finding the time, space, manpower and finance to introduce the new form of screening is a very difficult problem to solve and is one which can only he compounded by future growth trends in the industry (discussed below).
Nevertheless, leaving as many as 19 in every 20 bags unscreened in the hold of an aircraft cannot be viewed as an effective problem-solving mechanism for the industry and can come as no comfort to worried passengers. It leaves almost unaffected the scope of terrorists to target innocent travellers and so raises questions as to its intended purpose. If a promulgated minimum baggage search figure had been directed towards isolating terrorists' devices and discouraging their targeting of aviation, that figure would have required to be considerably higher than five per cent. Alternatively, as a safe, easy and unambitious means of showing that some form of action had been taken, the five per cent level would be much more effective and would require minimal disruption to the i n d u s t r y ’s expansion and profit-making plans. Once more, the desire to be seen to do anything which appeared to be a positive contribution towards security enhancement was allowed to override what little desire may have existed to do something more difficult but potentially more effective.
It is only fair to note that any screening level for hold baggage can carry with it dangers of one type or another, if that screening is not implemented in a responsible way. When, for example, in 1990 one major European state increased its average hold baggage search figure from ten per cent to 33 per cent, one independent security expert privately voiced fears that the overall quality of physical screening would fall. Where previously sorters had been able to take time to identify pieces of baggage which appeared suspicious or more likely than others to require a full inspection, under the new regime the newly over-worked staff merely picked every third bag at random and gave it a less thorough inspection. The expert's assessment of the new scheme was that it failed to address any question of security, that it was a politically appropriate measure designed to convince the public that standards were being improved and that it would not provide any statistically valid probability of protection against baggage b o m b e r s . ? *
Neither the frequency of incident occurrence nor the structural upheaval required to bring about improvements can be viewed as valid justifications for inactivity in the field of security reform, because terrorist targeting of aviation can affect any sector of the industry
??Ibi</., paragraph 2.3.3.3. "On-line" transfer baggage may be defined as items taken from one aircraft to another of the same carrier, while "inter-line" transfer baggage may be defined as items taken from one c a r r i e r ’s aircraft to another c a r r i e r ’s aircraft. In contrast, the term "transit" implies an aircraft landing at an airport, only to depart without transfers being made.
? * Interview with British aviation security expert, Paris, France, June 1990.
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at any time. These criteria, however, excuses for inactivity which the industr calls for radical change within aviati should no longer be viewed as a discret term. In practice, only those routes wh particular danger at any given time wi baggage screening. In the United States noted that standards of screening are low executive with a firm which has developed (TNA) described, in February 1990, the follows :
are likely to remain the weak y employs to fend off public on security - change which ionary option for the long ich have been deemed to be in 11 be protected by proper , in particular, it has been Dr Had! Bozorgmanesh, an a very promising technology extent of the US crisis as
... [We have] discovered that there is an enormous misperception by most international travellers. Passengers are screened and, of course, see carry-on baggage Inspected. That appears to lead many to the false impression that all luggage is inspected for weapons and explosives as well. This is clearly not the case.With the exception of international luggage that is cleared through TWA's TNA facility at Kennedy airport, there is no routine inspection of passenger baggage for bombs."?*
For one airline, the Israeli carrier El Al, a long-standing danger from radical Palestinian or Islamic terrorist groups has led to a policy decision to adopt human-oriented, defensive tactics on all flights, and so to treat every passenger and every object entering the airport terminal with caution. Some other airlines which have had experience of sabotage, may routinely select certain airports at which to carry out stringent checks on all or a proportion of hold baggage.?* Most airlines and airports, however, continue to hold an identical view to ECAC, avoiding the general use of hold baggage screening as a principal security technique, if only because customary airport design and facilitation pressures make it largely impracticable. This harsh fact was realised by the British House of Commons Select Committee on Transport in the period between its two reports of 1986 and 1989. In the former report it stated the following :
"[It] may only be a matter of time before all hold baggage be screened or searched."?? must
Two and a half years later, after the practicalities of the "post- Lockerbie" security crisis had been assessed in the context of
?*H. Bozorgmanesh, Concerning the Successes of Thermal Neutron 
Analysis as an Explosive Detection System, paper presented to the P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 2 February, 1990, p. 3.
? * Interview with Richard Myers, freelance television journalist specialising in conflict and security, Glasgow, UK, 21 November 1989.
??House of C om mons C o m m i t t e e  on Transport, (1986], p . 7
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existing security infrastructure and airport capacity, the Committee modified its recommendation radically:
"A percentage of hold baggage is x-rayed and searched on certain flights by British airlines. The purpose, according to the Secretary of State is to deny certainty to the terrorist. Whilst not wanting to disclose the exact percentage, it must be clear to any traveller that it falls far short of 100%. We have already commented on the temptation by Governments to let it be seen that "something is being done" and that temptation is by no means restricted to the British Government. Following the Lockerbie tragedy, the FAA advised that all hold baggage on all US carriers be screened. It was an impractical suggestion which caused US airlines not only at Heathrow and Gatwick but around the world to seek waivers.The Secretary of State was in no doubt as to the seriousness of the capacity problem when it came to screening hold luggage. If all major world airlines brought in such a requirement, 'world aviation would come to a halt'."?*
In response to this observation, it is reasonable to note that while a screening crisis currently exists, problem-solving techniques can besought through research and development efforts - and should bewithout delay - so as to enable the industry which now labours under the pressures of time and work to gain a more effective hold baggage screening ability. As technological advances are made and new generations of screening apparatus are brought into service, it is to be hoped that the Secretary of State's assumption will losecredibility.
For the moment, remedial action has been sought by aviationauthorities in the form of inadequate compromises. For example, inthe wake of the Lockerbie atrocity, the FAA introduced a regulationrequiring all flights under its jurisdiction to Involve screening of transit baggage by X-ray and other means?* - an obviously reactive and piecemeal approach to a specific problem. Despite such "patchwork" efforts, two key problems remain. First is the inability of most operational screening devices to isolate the most potent explosive substances, such as plastic explosives (discussed below). Second is the location problem faced by many airports of introducing any extraform of screening for hold baggage - a time-consuming, troublesome andexpensive option for most sites. This difficulty is posed, in part, because of pressures exerted on carriers and airports to process a growing number of passengers and their baggage in a space of time which is either fixed or unable to grow at an appropriately swift rate. These two factors are central to understanding the crisis of security which must be addressed.
?*House of Commons Committee on Transport, (1989), p. 5. In contrast to this information, it is interesting to observe that the Department of Transport announced in the following year that it had set an objective to screen all hold baggage. Department of Transport press release, September 1990.
?*r be Independent, T h u rsda y 1 March 1990, p. 1.
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Even in some developed nat in civil aviation and wh aviation terrorists, th machinery which must ope incapable of meeting the d September 1989 hearing Subcommittee of the Commit the condition of civil avi Billie H. Vincent, a fo Aviation Security, noted security system is serious
ions which hold important economic interests ich can be viewed as political targets of e security infrastructure and regulatory rate together are now being recognised asemands of an industry under threat. At thes of the US House of Representativestee on Government Operations, concerned with ation security after the Lockerbie disaster, rmer Director of the US FAA Office of Civil that "the current U.S. civil aviationly deficient."**
Also presenting a statement to the Subcommittee was Isaac Yeffet. a former Director General of Security for El Al airlines, who described visits which he and a journalist had made in January 1989 (immediatelyafter the sabotage of Pan Am Flight 103) to seven major US airports.Referring to the quality of security at La Guardia, New York: O ’Hare, Chicago; Stapleton, Denver; Miami International; San FranciscoInternational: Los Angeles International; and John F . Kennedy, NewYork,*? he made the following comment:
"We found that, while vast sums are spent on guards, machines and equipment, there is virtually no security provided fat] any of these airports. They are open targets, waiting, unprotected, for any lunatic or terrorist who wants to capture the d a y ’sheadlines. American airline security does very little well."*?
A principal organisational problem which has not yet been addressed by many authorities concerned with security deals with the issue of procedural stagnation. In the two decades since screening of passengers and their hand baggage was introduced on a general scale, terrorist tactics and abilities have developed while detection capacities and procedures have remained largely static. It is remarkable that authorities and the industry can continue to permit outdated and obsolescent processes to be employed, when they should be aware that radically new threats require a radical reappraissal of security capacities. Explanations for this complacency are not easily found, with several possibilities existing. Perhaps policy makers and managers have permitted their attitudes and activities to adapt to the techniques of the past and have become entrenched in rigid policy frameworks or stultifying routines, perceiving no increased threat to the security procedures which have in previous years proved successful at finding metallic guns and identifiable bombs.
It is possible that persons in authority have actually recognised that threats are changing but have either calculated that their airports are a low risk venue for attack or are prepared to increase the
**Vincent (1989), p. 1.
*?I. Yeffet and E . Barnes, "No Airport Security in the U.S. is Safe." 
Life March 1989, pp. 133 - 136.
* 2 1. Yeffet, Untitled submission to a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, WashingtonD.C., 25 S e p t e m b e r  1989 1
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magnitude of security without introducing expensive and inconvenient advances in quality which may be required. Alternatively, at a timewhen swift passenger faci litation is becoming increasingly importantand even short delays in terminal procedures can render timetables and schedules useless, it is not unlikely that some airport managers are avoiding the introduction of new and slower techniques, reiving instead on what might be termed a "philosophy of Russian roulette,"*?
Instead of employing hold baggage screening, procedural techniqueshave sometimes been used to reduce the chances of baggage hold bombersreaching their targets. Unfortunately, their effectiveness has, in recent years, been placed in question by the progress of and success achieved by aviation saboteurs. The practices, analysed below, can be simple in operation, relying on observation skills and adherence to standard facilitation procedures.
4,4. Security Techniques
4.4.1. Baggage R e c q n c i 1 iation
It is universally recognised that passengers and their hold baggage should not normally be separated from their jointly allocated aircraft at any stage of a journey,** as such a situation could be capitalised upon by saboteurs who could plant explosive devices in hold items and then leave the flight at some stage prior to the explosion. By adopting and enforcing ticketing and check-in procedures which remove the possibility of hold baggage travelling unaccompanied, these situations can be made less likely.
In addition to establishing such procedures, it is vital to ensure that they are complied with as intended, as the use of discretion by check-in agents can offer opportunities to terrorists of circumventing  norms. It has been alleged that the Air India incident of June 1985 was allowed to take place because an argumentative passenger insisted on his luggage (which is thought to have contained a powerful bomb) being interlined from a CP Air flight from Vancouver to Toronto onto New Delhi via Montreal, while his ticket was confirmed only as far as Toronto. Faced with the c u s t o m e r ’s growing anger and the increasing length of the check-in queue, the agent elected to submit to his unreasonable demands, in the interests of facilitation, and wrongly relied on the good will of the passenger to declare that the operation had been permitted by Vancouver on his arrival at Toronto, In fact, the saboteur failed to board the aircraft at all,**
Following the Air India disaster, the aviation community started
*?The current w r i t e r ’s description in The Glasgow Herald. Tuesday 11 January 1989, p. 9.
**Certain exceptions to this rule may safely be made, as where previously lost baggage is sent to its true destination on a later flight and where a "standby" passenger is refused access to an aircraft onto which accompanying baggage has been loaded.
**S. Jiwa, The Death of Air India Flight 182 (London: W.H. Allen.1986), pp. 78 - 86.
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placing greater emphasis on baggage reconciliation,** that is, the pre-flight verification that passenger and baggage lists entirely correspond with each other,*? Unsophisticated forms of passenger checks have been used in recent years, including a simple head count on board, prior to departure. Also employed are more detailed methods,** as where check-in agents append a unique identification number to each p a s s e n g e r ’s boarding pass, to be cross-referenced with a control sheet held at the boarding point. If carried out properly, this ensures that all passengers who have checked in for a particular flight are on board that aircraft prior to take-off. In the absence of one or more individuals at the boarding point, the correct Sprocedure should be to remove from the aircraft any hold baggage which the passenger may have checked in, often necessitating all passengers and hold baggage being deplaned and matched physically. The technique can be refined by appending a number sticker to hold baggage so that u;in the absence of a passenger the bag may quickly be identified and withdrawn from its aircraft.
A difficulty presented by this form of reconciliation concerns the task of quickly locating the suspect item, which could be in any one of several hold compartments. Another problem is that while the simple reconciliation technique reveals if a passenger has failed to appear for a flight at the boarding point, it cannot readily disclose whether or not a hold item has been placed on board which was not intended for that departure. Although these factors are difficult to overcome, both can now be implemented by the use of simple computerised techniques, adapted for use in reconciliation processes.If boarding passes and hold baggage tags were to include a machine- readable section, a central computer in each airport would be able to coordinate records of the baggage and passenger flows. In addition to boarding passes being read in computer terminals at boarding points, baggage handlers would be expected to make a computer scan of the tags prior to loading them in a specific container. As well as providing boarding points with accurate, automatically accessed information concerning the presence of passengers and the precise location of their baggage in the hold areas, the computerised system should reject at the baggage handling stage any hold items which do not have an appropriate tag, specific to a ticketed passenger.
Unless different computerised baggage handling and reconciliation systems are made compatible with each other and are employed globally, a particular problem would be posed by the arrival from other airports of transfer baggage and passengers bound for ongoing departures. In such cases, a time-consuming reticketing of passengers and their baggage would be required for computerised reconciliation to be
**R. Wallis, Beaumont Memorial Lecture, Royal Aeronautical Society, Wednesday 18 October 1989.
*?In 1985, ICAO revised its Annex 17 to include a new section, then known as section 5.1.4., which ultimately acquired the status of a "mandatory" standard. In October 1989, Annex 17 was revised, resulting in this standard becoming section 4.3.1. See Annex 17, fourth edition, October 1989.
**Jiwa (1986), p. 93.
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effected. Eventually, the intervention of international agencies such as the International Air Transport Association flATAl may provide for an integrated, technologically based system for major hub airports. The A s s o c i a t i o n ’s Rodney Wallis, has remarked that standardising reconciliation procedures would be a cost-effective means of improving security and facilitation:
"lATA estimates that mishandled baggage costs the airlines about $400 million a year; the same figure ICAO estimates for introducing a standardised worldwide s y s t e m , " * ’
Any reconciliation system rests for its success upon the correct procedures being followed prior to departure and, more importantly, upon the cooperation of carrier managers to ensure that tight schedules are disrupted and passengers delayed in order to make the time-consuming and irritating search of the aircraft for suspect hold items. Arik Arad, a former chief of security for El Al, has voiced concern that many western states and airlines place excessive emphasis on the technique, without ensuring that it is being implemented properly. Using it irresponsibly could be highly counter-productive to the interests of security.*®
Indeed, a senior executive with responsibility for security and safety at a large international airline told the current writer that rather than follow reconciliation procedures to their logical conclusion, airline managers were often pressed by circumstances into honouring their timetables and permitting take-off, instead of recognising the threat being encountered.*? This was confirmed by the writings of security expert, Yeffet;
"If Lockerbie tells us anything, it is that airlines must match luggage to passengers. If, for any reason, a piece gets on an airplane without its owner, it should be taken off immediately, no matter what the delay or inconvenience to passengers. But airport managers, more worried about on-time statistics, routinely let planes fly with unaccompanied bags."*?
In support of this statement, it is both useful and interesting to recall that in 1990 a Pan American internal company memorandum was revealed to have been written in the spring of 1988, indicating that the carrier decided, for reasons of speeding throughput rates from feeder flights, to ignore FAA regulations which prohibited the loading of unaccounted baggage. Instead of removing such articles, as would have been correct, the memorandum suggested that Pan American elected to gamble with the safety of their flights by merely searching such bags or screening them with X-ray equipment, which would be unable to
* ’ Jane's Airport Review, February/March 1989, p . 40.
*®Conde Nast Traveler, March 1989, p. 32.
* ? Interview with British airport security expert, Aberdeen, UK, March 1989.
* 2 Yeffet and Barnes (1989), p. 132,
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detect plastic explosives,*? Such scant regard for security processes may have been a major contributory factor in the targeting of the airline later in 1988, It illustrates the dimensions of the problems being faced in trying to give security a higher priority than profit in the minds of managers and policy-makers. Only by issuing clearly worded regulatory norms and then by monitoring their absolute enforcement can aviation authorities such as the FAA be confident that the corporations involved in security are carrying out their activities as intended. Tolerating any needless and destructive abandonment of fundamental security principles does not serve the aviation community and its users well.
Nevertheless, it is correct to remember that no security technique can be foolproof in isolation. Assuming that hold baggage reconciliation processes are followed to the letter, no guarantee can be made on that basis alone that a flight is free from the threat of sabotage, for example, in the form of a hand baggage device. The destruction on 29 November 1987 of a Korean Air Boeing 707, for example, occurred because two terrorists planted a binary high explosive device (composed of two harmless liquids which become explosive only onmixing)** in an overhead baggage compartment in the a i r c r a f t ’spassenger cabin, then left the flight at Abu Dhabi before it departed for Bangkok.
Some airlines undertake hand baggage reconciliation in an effort to minimise risks of such attacks. Though less scientific than certain hold baggage verification  techniques. the clearing of overheadcompartments and floor space around passengers at each stopover point at least allows cabin staff to make a cursory inspection of more obvious concealment areas. Ideally, aircraft cabins should be given a full inspection on arrival at an airport, to determine whether or not devices have been placed in less noticeable places. Such aninspection might have prevented the attack on a TWA Boeing 727 on 2 April 1986, when a bomb was placed under a passenger seat.** Practically, however, such a proposal would be very difficult to put into operation because the present-day airliners are complex vehicles, with an almost infinite range of potential hiding places for small, but lethal devices. Security consultant Fred Dorey has estimated that a viable search of a Boeing 747 could take as long as ten hours** - an economically unacceptable length of time under current flying conditions.
One possible compromise on this rigorous standard which at least provides some guidance to cabin crews is to reconcile the number of passengers present on board before each departure with the number indicated on the manifest. As tickets of passengers terminating their flights at a stopover point are rarely inspected. it follows that a
*?7he Independent, Thursday 1 March 1990, p. 1.
**F.6. McGuire, "Explosive Detection Producing Explosive Controversy," Airoort Operations 15 November/December 1989, p. 3,
**Vincent (1989), p. 9.
**8BC Radio 4, Cali Nick Ross, Tuesday 19 April 1988.
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terrorist ticketed for a more distant destination can probably leave the aircraft and clear customs and immigration, while the bomb remains on board, in the cabin or a hold. A simple head count would, of course, be grossly inferior to the international standardisation of ticket inspection at all immigration points, at which any terrorist attempting to deplane prematurely would be apprehended.*? Both the extra delays and the international agreement required for such a system would make it an unlikely option in the short term, although it should be borne in mind for future reference in the event of emergency prevention tactics being required.
Another equally important limitation to the powers of reconciliation  is the threat posed by suicidal saboteurs and innocent "dupe" carriers of bombs. In a situation where an individual is prepared to lose his own life,** or where for personal, financial or political reasons s/he can mislead an unwitting accomplice into taking an unidentified  explosive device aboard an aircraft, verifying passenger manifests and matching passengers to their possessions must be insufficient. Such weaknesses, however, should not detract from the strengths of any security technique, because no single measure can be adequate to solve the security problems being faced by the industry. Only when combined into a systematic scheme of security activities can the individual component be made to operate effectively. For that reason, it is unfortunate that ECAC was prepared to promulgate a standard which sought to compromise the excellence which could be achieved through a policy of process integration between reconciliation and baggage screening :
"When in special cases due to risk assessment or because of special circumstances at an airport, checked-in baggage is subjected to other security control measures which can prevent the introduction of weapons or articles likely to be utilised to commit an act of unlawful interference, a further reconciliation of boarding passengers with their checked-in baggage is not r e q u i r e d . "*’
In addition to the procedures outlined above, which seek by means of arithmetical calculations simply to disclose information of dubious quality on possible inconsistencies arising from facilitation activities, some other means are required of determining positively whether or not a passenger is at least likely to be conveying an explosive device onto an aircraft.
4 .4 ,2 . Passenger Profiling
A very useful technique for reinforcing other security operations
*?House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 7.
**See the case of Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 1771, 7 December1987, in which a former employee of the company which owned the airline involved committed suicide by causing an aircraft in flight to crash, killing 43 people on board. FAA statistics (listed in b i b l i o g r a p h y ) .
*’ECAC (1988) p a r a g r a p h  2.3.4.3,
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which has been used by several airlines in recent years is known as "passenger profiling" and involves the observation and interrogation of passengers prior to boarding their aircraft of departure.Developed in the early 1970s by Dr E.W. Pickrel as a means of isolating certain key characteristics of persons most likely to hi lack aircraft, it was soon adopted by the FAA to enable their security select candidates for random screening (in the era before screening).** Observational and interviewing skills were by trained security staff, with such factors as ethnic age, nationality, ticketing information and length of in the USA being coupled by the operative with the individual's degree of nervousness, response to questions and motivation for making the journey. Depending on security personnelm e m b e r s ’ analysis of the various interrelated factors involved, the would either be refused access to the aircraft or would be to a rigorous screening programme*^ and, if found to be would normally be permitted to travel, though perhaps seated an unidentified sky marshal or in a position which allowed staff to monitor his activities during the course of the By 1973 it had been determined that a profiling package to the needs of individual airports could be expected to99.5 per cent of passengers as a low risk, prior to theirpassing through metal detection processes. When combined with these and with interview processes and voluntary searches a very reliable form of security was achieved for low risk s i t u a t i o n s . * *
staff tomandatoryemployedorigin,residency
passenger subjected unarmed, near to airline f l i g h t . tailored classify
This profiling method required no special training or skills from the security staff whose role was merely to identify possible hijackers. A major thrust of activity was directed towards stopping the escape of fugitives, the transportation of mentally unstable hijack "adventurers" and the return to Cuba of disenchanted Hispanic refugees, each of whom could often be identified by their nervousness or appearance. The job of selecting candidates for intensive security screening was, therefore, less difficult than in many airports facing a less specific threat from other forms of aviation offender. Theeasily identifiable form of threat being faced by airports along the eastern seaboard of the United States at that time allowed profiling to take the form of simple questions and observations aimed at finding hijackers whose principal objective was not political and so wereunable to be classified within the parameters of terrorism. In 1972Abramovsky described the early passenger profiling methods in the following terms:
"Under the current program, certain airline personnel are in charge of screening out potential perpetrators. Selected airline employees are made privy to the contents of the "hijacker behavioral profile," which consists of a set of behavioral characteristics believed to be common to all potential hijackers. These characteristics, which were first compiled by a special task force instituted by the Federal Aviation Administration in
**W.A. Crenshaw (1987), pp. 85 - 86, 
(iDawson (1986) II, p. 32.
**Dailey (1973), p . 1009 - 1011.
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1969, are updated periodically as new information, concerningmore recent hijackings, becomes available."**
These techniques were used to good effect by the FAA in the early 1980s in order to identify likely hijackers of US aircraft who would divert them to Cuba, Around that period airliners were successfully being hijacked by unarmed offenders who achieved their goal merely by using threats of violence or allegations that they were carrying bombs.** While security screening could not be used against such offenders, profiling techniques pinpointed which passengers were most likely to be potential hijackers. The original American approach to profiling was directed initially towards the specific problem of Cuban hijackings. The same basic principles of observation and interrogation can be and, in some cases, are applied to much more complex security scenarios, such as the identification of “dupes" (innocent carriers of s a b o t e u r s ’ devices),** with the necessary proviso that added complexity will always require an added time factor and more highly skilled operatives to carry out the techniques,** At its simplest, the questioning techniques must firmly attempt to establish the p a s s e n g e r ’s true identity, nationality and reasons for travel. It is then important to determine whether any passenger has allowed his or her baggage to be packed by another person, whether it has been unaccompanied at any stage since being packed and whether the passenger is completely aware of the b a g s ’ contents.
Passenger numbers frequently prevent detailed questioning from taking place, and so subsidiary profiling can be implemented prior to the actual questioning procedures, in order to select suspects for interrogation. The task of determining the types of passenger most likely to be carrying a bomb, either deliberately or unwittingly, can be made easier with the ap plication of psychological factors in the profiling processes, which may provide evidence relating to a c a n d i d a t e ’s potential susceptibility to terrorist persuasion. Once key characteristics have been isolated so as to set prime suspects apart from other travellers, security staff can be trained to identify those passengers whose personal attributes and travel arrangements make them candidates for rigorous questioning and search procedures.
Although the range of factors considered in such detailed analyses is bound to change with developing circumstances*? and is understandably protected from public scrutiny by the authorities which rely on it, considerations which may attract investigation are bound to include those which relate to personal identity and recent travel history.
*3Abramovsky (1972/73). p. 131.
**Vincent (1989), p. 51.
**House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p . 8,
**Vincent (1989), pp. 31 - 32.
*?Note, however, that after the Pan Am flight 103 incident, the US FAA took seven months to introduce a profiling question on the carriage of electrical and electronic devices. P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990), p. 30.
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Hence, in addition to national and ethnic origins, it is vital to discern the age of the traveller and to know from where the individual has arrived, if s/he is a transfer passenger (that is a passenger using the airport as a point at which to change aircraft). Young, single women and impecunious men travelling alone from Middle Eastern states and destined for west European or north American states might be viewed, for different reasons, as being particularly easy dupe targets for terrorist groups. In the case of young women, there is a danger (albeit a very small one) of close friendships developing with |a terrorist who asks as a favour for an apparently innocent bag or 1package to be taken to the woman&s destination on his behalf. The Nezar Hindawi case illustrates ideally the difficulties to be met in such instances.** With poor male travellers, there is an equal risk of deals being made in which the traveller is paid and/or provided with a free ticket in return for transporting, for example, a suitcasewhich he is told contains drugs of abuse, money or other valuablecommodities, but in fact holds an explosive device.
In terms of their capacity to reveal possible carriers of terrorist devices, these considerations are reasonable and practicable, although as unscientific and sexist assumptions they cannot be relied upon inorder to identify all dupes ~ not least because of the large number ofyoung men and women who would require to be given special scrutiny at airports. When combined with intelligence information or with additional profiling factors, however, these coarse criteria gain in sophistication and so in value. Nevertheless, they only become first iclass instruments of security when incorporated into a dedicated and ?integrated approach to offence prevention, drawing on intelligence information and combining with other screening operations.
While US carriers were developing and applying very simple tests of passenger identity and behaviour, Israeli systems were being framed for El A1 which would be directed towards filtering out not merely hijackers but also potential saboteurs and innocent dupes. These uniquely detailed, labour-intensive and painstaking methods, discussed below, reflect the Israeli a i r l i n e ’s inimitable stance on security, although other, less complex, anti-sabotage profiling techniques have been employed by other carriers. A key difference between the systems currently being implemented by most major carriers and those used by El A1 is that with the former, questions are often asked in a cursory manner, or in some cases are simply displayed graphically forpassengers to read while waiting in check-in queues, while with thelatter, they are asked in order to extract vital information and toprovide involuntary behavioural reactions from the passenger.**According to the El A1 approach, the passengers' involuntary physiological response to questions must be viewed as being of at least equal importance to their voluntary, verbal answers.
**In this incident, which took place at London Heathrow airport on 17 April 1986, Hindawi attempted to destroy an El A1 Boeing 747 aircraft in flight by pe rsuading his pregnant girlfriend to carry a piece of baggage which, unbeknown to her, contained an improvised explosive device,
^^Condé Nast Traveler, March 1989, p. 32.
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The least sophisticated forms of profiling are those which are operated by check-in agents rather than by security staff. on account of the inability of properly trained personnel to analyse the nuances of “body language" required to make profiling fully meaningful in the surroundings of an airport vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. Additionally, it is misguided for airlines to allocate such functions to their facilitation teams, whose purpose it is to promote efficient and timely processing of travellers, when the very purpose of profiling techniques must always be to extract suspects from passenger flows after often detailed analysis of personality, behaviour andidentity.?* Alternatively, however, if profiling activities are madethe responsibility of security - rather than facilitation - staff, it is vital that all baggage be made available for inspection at the point of questioning, which should be as early as is practicable in the facilitation process, in order that suspect passengers may beidentified and withdrawn from the flow of travellers as soon and as inconspicuously as possible. More important 1 y , facilitation-related, ticketing information must be provided for the security team and used by it. An obvious misalignment between responsibility and capability exists wherever this weakness is to be found. The British experience of such difficulties is of interest in this respect:
"The person checking in a passenger possesses two items ofinformation which are of considerable help to staff trained in passenger profiling: the passport and the airline ticket.Airlines which rely heavily on passenger profiling are able to deduce from the nature of the ticket those passengers who may require further security checks at this stage. Check-in staff can and do select passengers for extra security screening. But it is regrettable that the airport security staff who routinely search passengers and their belongings have no information as to the p a s s e n g e r ’s nationality, origin or destination. BAA claim that their security staff are given "informal".training in body language. Such skills can be extremely effective, but only if combined with some basic knowledge about the passenger.
This type of facilitation information could easily be provided to a check-in staff member for the purposes of facilitation and also independently to security personnel for assistance in profiling. Any justifications for the above-noted weakness must instead be based upon considerations of economy and convenience, because of the extra security staffing levels required and the additional process through which passengers would be forced to pass.
Wilkinson has noted that the w o r l d ’s use of passports is now ludicrously outdated, affording terrorists unnecessary opportunities to travel incognito. He has suggested that advances could be made in the use of travel passes without undue difficulty:
"Over 90 per cent of aviation terrorism involves the use of false passports. Governments have done nothing about it. The w o r l d ’s airlines should go ahead and introduce a new high-technology
?*Yeffet (1989), p p . 4 - 5.
?*House of C om mons C o m m i t t e e  on Transport (1989), p. 5,
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identity document. A computerised air trave 1 permit the size of a credit card could carry a fingerprint code which could be checked against the bearer, thus preventing the use of forged or stolen permits. The check would take only a matter of seconds for each passenger, and it would circumvent the outdated and unreliable passport document. ... Immigration and security officials could then devote more time to checking out those passengers from the few countries refusing to join the scheme probably a small number of pro-terrorist states."?*
Such an ambitious scheme could be expected to take several years to introduce internationally. In the interim, other methods of passport enhancement should be contemplated, such as that of "advance immigration", introduced in 1988 by the US Immigration and Naturalisation Service at I r e l a n d ’s Shannon airport and suggested the following year for flights from the UK to the USA.?* In essence, the proposed scheme involves an immigration check in the country of departure by officials of the country of arrival. A central feature of the system is the use of sophisticated computers containing intelligence information which could be cross-referenced against passports and other information being presented. As Robert J Aaronsonof the (American) Air Transport Association remarked:
"The mere fact that passengers, baggage and travel documentswould have to run the gauntlet of clearance by seasonedgovernment experts with immediate access to the entire U.S. intelligence c o m m u n i t y ’s look-out list would make a real contribution to this part of our war against terrorism."?*
Although profiling can be a useful security component when carried out properly, it is often viewed by carriers as a requirement which can be satisfied without undue di fficulty but which is both unnecessary and undesirable on most flights. For that reason, if any overt use of the method is employed, it is the cursory approach to profiling which is most normally to be found with airlines operating on low risk routes.Nevertheless, at least one carrier, El Al, bases its securityphilosophy in large measure on advanced passenger profiling techniqueswhich are designed to detect potential threats in the form of persons, rather than in the form of objects of destruction, although it should be stressed that the procedure is carried out. while passengers arestill in possession of both hand and hold baggage, which is subjected to detailed s c r e e n i n g . ?& Yeffet has even described its detailedquestioning and observation of passengers as "the most effective way
?*P. Wilkinson, The Lessons of Lockerbie (London: ResearchInstitute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1989), p. 28; Clutterbuck (1990) II, pp. 140 - 141.
?*The Independent, Tuesday 9 May 1989 (photocopy).
?*The International Herald Tribune, Monday 8 May 1989 (photocopy).
?*House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 8; Condé Nast 
Traveler, March 1989, p. 32.
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to stop a terrorist."?*
Rather than ask a fixed set of short questions which require one word, positive or negative responses, El A l ’s highly motivated security operatives are trained to promote more informative dialogue at greaterlength and to determine from the information received whether therespondent is being both truthful and sufficiently knowledgable about the matters in question.?? Such a detailed and conversational approach to profiling is necessarily time-consuming and can be resented by passengers who find it unpleasant to undergo interrogation by uniformed officers. These factors may influence a i r l i n e s ’ attitudes towards the technique and may result in their avoidance of the method or in reliance upon less scrupulous modes of questioning, as outlined above. In any case, El A l ’s peculiarly complex profiling activities and its unique position in the aviation community, discussed below, make it difficult to regard “all their methods as necessarily applicable to situations vastly different to their own."?*
Instead, other means of reinforcement may be sought to strengthen the capacity of profiling techniques for utilisation in different situations. On the regulatory level, it is pointless to compel passengers to undergo questioning if they know that nothing prevents them from giving a false answer to avoid further questioning or search procedures. Were the provision of false information to security officers regarding the contents and packing of baggage to be made a criminal offence,'-- as in the British Aviation and Maritime Security Act, 1990,?* airports and carriers would be armed with a very powerful tool with which to punish any travellers who claim in response to a question that they know the exact identity of their b a g s ’ contents but who are then unable, for example, to describe accurately the contents of any wrapped object found inside.
Such a proposition, if pub 1 ic i sed widely and if accompanied by proportionate fines and the possibility of ticket cancellation, would guarantee that greater care would be taken by travellers in packing and accompanying their baggage prior to a flight. As with all matters of security breach, only negligent and reckless passengers would need to fear such a rule, as travellers who had taken due care in packing and accompanying their baggage would be able to answer any question asked about it. In time, the public might assimilate such an offence type with customs declaration laws which are both accepted and respected by the majority of travellers.**
In the United States. a new FAA policy was established in 1989 bv
?*Yeffet (1989), p. 4,
? ? Ibid., p. 8.
?*House of Commons Transport Committee (1989). p. 8.
?*Department of Transport Press Release, September 1990.
**See House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 9. for a similar suggestion concerning the regulation of couriers.
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which civil fines of between $1,000 and $10,000 fUS) could be imposed upon persons attempting to transport firearms through airport security points. This stringent approach, coupled with a greater use ofadditional prosecutions, replaced a previous policy in which lowerfines or simple warnings could be applied to first time offenders.*^
In the security regulations of certain countries, such as the UnitedStates, there exists a positive obligation upon carriers tocommunicate to passengers a series of simple profiling questions,asked verbally or conveyed through a printed medium. It is unfortunate that such a requirement should exist without being enforced adequately, as airlines are able to circumvent it withremarkable ease. It is simple to display signs asking passengers to ensure that hold baggage contains no potentially dangerous items, such as electrical objects. It is far more difficult to enforce such an exhortation without imposing time-consuming and universally unpopular s e a r c h e s .
More worrying even than such cases of unenforced recommendations to passengers is the deliberate use of pointless and void techniques. With one airline flying to the United States from the Federal Republic of Germany, badly paid - and so badly qualified - profiling staff were recruited who could speak only German. As many passengers were US citizens who spoke only English, a means of asking the questions in their native language required to be found and was identified in the practical - if entirely inappropriate - means of teaching the German personnel questions in a language which they could not understand, without any expectation on the part of the airline that they would be capable of responding in an informed way to the answers which they r e c e i v e d .* *
This instance of managerial failure to provide adequate solutions to security problems highlights two related difficulties which will be referred to at later stages of this thesis;- first, the problem of unenforced regulations being made by authorities in order to indicate that action is being taken by an organ of state, rather than with any intention of making effective improvements in security; and second, the issue of carriers taking inadequate levels of action on the basis of the promulgated rules so as merely to satisfy the requirement made of them and thus evade accusations of inactivity.
On a more practical level, the example detailed above of linguistic difficulties to be faced by security staff illustrates the problems of c ommunication with passengers which will become more complex as international routes diversify, liberalisation of travel restrictions comes into effect and a larger range of uncommon languages {particularly eastern European ones) become more prevalent within the travelling pub lie. One compromise which would constitute an incomplete solution to these complexities, would be for a book containing security questions which have been translated into all major languages to be made available at all security check points.
*1 Jane's Airport Review, June/July 1989, p. 9,
* * Interview with Richard Myers, Glasgow, UK, Saturday 25 November, 1989. Channel 4 Dispatches, 20 December 1989.
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The questions could be simole, concerning the contents of baggage, and requiring only positive and negative answers to be made by pointing to an appropriate column on the question sheet, for the benefit of observing security personnel. Although this suggestion would not permit any detailed approach to profiling to be made, it would at least raise levels of understanding to a more tolerable state and would be more practical than hiring multi-lingual staff members with a collective working knowledge of the w o r l d ’s languages.
Such limitations of complex profiling provide that it must always be difficult for carriers to operate the technique effectively in the context of an expanding, diversifying and fast-moving aviation community, while its detailed nature makes it much more appropriate for the special circumstances of high risk o p e r a t i o n s . If its strengths could better be accommodated into a demanding and testing marketplace environment, progress might be made in preventing and deterring aviation violence.
Nevertheless, as with baggage reconciliation, even the best passenger profiling systems suffer from considerable operational limitations, making it another incomplete form of security in which it would be foolish to Place complete trust. Any passenger of any age, gender, background and identity can be made to become a d u p e , Determining, for example, whether or not travellers packed their own baggage, accompanied it at all times, were aware of the full contents of it and could identify those contents, would assist in the overall security process but would be inadequate to provide anything like a full guarantee of innocence. It would be quite possible for a terrorist to disguise a bomb as an article commonly carried by travellers or to secrete a device in the most ordinary of objects, such as a suitcase and then, for instance, to exchange it for that of the dupe, while it lies unattended in a hotel room.
More disturbing than this is the problem of being unable to apply profiling techniques to the best trained and equipped of terrorists, notwithstanding Y e f f e t ’s comments (noted above) on the special utility of profiling for identifying terrorist suspects. The sabotage on 29 November 1987 of a Korean Airlines Boeing 707 with 115 persons on board was carried out by two North Korean intelligence agents, holding realistic, though forged, Japanese passports which identified them as Shinichi Hachiya, a 69 year old man, and his daughter of 23 years, Mayumi. The quality of their spoken Japanese was excellent and nothing suggested that they were anything other than innocent, private passengers of benign nationality, seeking to fly from Baghdad to Seoul via Abu Dhabi. As well as these considerations, it appears that the agents were highly disciplined, having been systematically educated in bomb production, deception techniques and Japanese culture. The couple, Kim Sung-Il and Kim Hyon-Hui, had been coached together for over three years as a sabotage team with the younger member later confessing to South Korean officials that she had been recruited in and trained from 1980.** After such intensive preparation, the agents were well prepared, not simply to place their bomb on hoard the flight prior to disembarking at Abu Dhabi, but also to evade all security checks at Baghdad and to promote their false nationality and
* * d r a b  News, Sat urda y 16 Jan uary 1988 (photocopy).
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father/daughter relationship convincingly so as to nullify profiling techniques which might have been used against them at B a g h d a d ’s highsecurity airport.
The conclusion to be drawn from this incident, and from similar cases in which hijackers and saboteurs have successfully disguised theiridentities and their nervousness, is that the valuable and necessarytool represented by passenger profiling cannot be trusted to defeat terrorists who have been trained comprehensively in the art ofpersonation.** Indeed, neither the industry nor governments canafford to regard any technique or process as being a watertiahtrepellent to t e r r o r i s t s ’ threats, because of the evolutionary natureof offensive capacities and the demonstrable defensive weaknesseswhich continue to threaten the integrity of aviation.
4.4.3. Access Control
The imposition of security posts for the screening of passengers and their baggage at airports constitutes, of itself, a type of access control. Efficient screening points act both as filters for arms and explosives and as valves for the prevention of passenger regressionfrom security-sensitive zones. In this way they can become important mechanisms for establishing a vital and reliable landside/airsideboundary in terminals and are literally in the “front line" of security activities. In addition to formal screening points, however, it is necessary to deploy other means of access control at airports. The purpose of this is simply to provide a ring of uninterrupted protection for sensitive areas - most notably the airside region where aircraft are situated.
It is pointless to impose labour-intensive, expensive, high security screening barriers within passenger terminals if no reasonable degree of protection is accorded to servicing bases, cargo, courier and mail terminals, vehicle entry points and other sectors within easy reach of vulnerable targets. On several occasions, offenders have demonstrated the ease with which they can find points of entry into airports for placing persons, weapons and explosive devices on board aircraft. The experiences of the TWA hijacking of June 1985, in which arms were smuggled onto the aircraft via servicing crews, and the Pan Am attempted seizure of September 1986 in Karachi, Pakistan. where terrorists gained entry to their target after posing as security guards in an apparently official vehicle, both demonstrate the need to maintain vigilance throughout a i r p o r t s ’ access points at all times.
Of course, busy airports require complex series of corridors, carriageways, doors and gates to be included in airport designs, linking the outside world to sensitive areas and facilitating the work of the thousands of employees with access to the airside. This does not i m p l y , however, that any lowering of security levels should be tolerated. Instead, as E C A C ’s security manual describes;
"Boundaries should be established between landside and airside
**For a very useful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of passenger profiling techniques see L. Zoucker and M . Bachrach in Lewis and Kaplan (1990), p p . 165 - 175.
121
areas. Passages through such boundaries should be protected byguarded gates and/or locked or guarded doors which should beinspected at irregular intervals."**
Only when airports are regarded as centres of vulnerability which require constantly high standards of security by those who manage and operate them can they acquire their true status - akin to that ofmilitary establi shment s or prisons. The practical problem for authorities is that airports are, by definition, public places, involving a much higher turnover of transitory persons and vehiclesthan forces bases or penitentiaries. H e n c e , it is necessary for a certain ease of public access to permissible areas of airports to c o ­exist with a policy of rigorous access control wherever required. Defining the limitations of public access can be difficult at somehigh security venues, as will be demonstrated below. Common to all airports, however, is a need for high quality perimeter control m e a s u r e s .
4,4,3.1. Perimeter Control
Although it should be evident to airport managers that peripheralaccess control is of equal importance to any other form of boundary protection, it is not uncommon to hear reports from those within the industry of badly maintained or non-existent fencing at the edge of some airports, particularly those with perimeters several miles long. Gaps in fencing or inadequately erected systems allow would-be intruders to pass undetected and unimpeded from landside to airside,literally, in one easy step. It should be a key priority of airport designers to include in their plans - particularly for major sites adequate perimeter protection, perhaps even of the kind so often found at military establishments. Anything less than this fails to take account of the importance of aviation protection.**
Fencing should be constructed of strong and dense material, such as close chain link, to prevent easy destruction. In order that it can be monitored at night with infrared night-sights, the chain link should be coated with durable white PVC - an innovation introduced by Dorey into at least one high security airport, allowing Immediate determination of infiltration locations at night.*? Adequate vertical coverage of the fence, both above and below ground level should be accompanied by the employment of copious quantities of coiled razor wire or barbed wire, as a visible indication of security protection, and by the use of robust concrete post foundations to prevent fencing being uprooted.
In addition to these structural considerations, excellent reinforcement can be achieved by incorporating a second barrier of fencing within the first, a monitoring carriageway for vehicular
**ECAC (1988), paragraph 2.2.1.
**For an interesting description of poor airport perimeter protection and its consequences see Clutterbuck (1987), p . 76.
*?F.C. Dorey, Untitled conference paper presented at "Scotsec ’87" conference, Renfrew, U K , 11 November 1987.
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security patrols separating the two. These features would not only act as a first class deterrent to anyone anticipating a quick entry, but would provide a second physical barrier to breach, should the first be crossed. The incorporation of warning signs, sirens and flood lighting also enhances security and increases deterrent qualities.
Modern security fencing systems need not be passive forms of protection. By using electronic perimeter control systems, taut wire fencing can be monitored by staff and/or computer from a central command and control location. The placement of electro-mechanical intrusion detector sensors along a fence can provide a warning in the event of attempts to cut, spread or scale it, allowing swift response from staff informed of the precise location of the breach. Additionally, CCTV cameras can be set to start recording any form of activity in locations which should be deserted, such as the ‘no m a n ’s land" sector between fencing layers. False alarms could, in theory, be caused by animal or climatic interference, although sensitivity can be altered with ease to filter out virtually all but genuine breach attempts.
It need hardly be remarked that security fencing systems such as those described in the foregoing paragraphs can cost a very great deal to install, monitor and patrol, at least when compared with the simplest types of fencing. It must be for airport authorities to determine which of their sites require the more complex forms of boundary, although it should be clear that any prominent airport covering a large geographical area can be at risk from the dangers of unnoticed penetration.
4.4.3.2. Entry Point Security
At points of high vulnerability, such as entrances to airside regions, it is necessary to utilise security points which complement perimeter boundary controls and passenger screening points, so maintaining a unified protective shield around sensitive areas. As an absolute minimum form of deterrence, all such points of entry should be protected, by being locked fast when not in use and otherwise manned by security guards who can monitor the flow of persons, vehicles and other objects, and carry out occasional security spot checks.
A major difficulty in securing all entry points is encountered at the largest international airports which feature a multitude of landside/airside crossing points. Even after unnecessary access points have been closed or blocked in the interests of security, there must still be a large number of vulnerable areas left to secure, such as servicing entry points, cargo cross-over sectors and aircraft crew entrances. In these and similar circumstances, it is vital to ensure that only those persons entitled to gain access can do so.
Such simple apparatus as unidirectional ful1-height turnstiles can ensure the existence of a one way system, making it difficult for an unauthorised person to make a brief visit to the airside. When combined with an electronic card reader or personal identification number decoder, security is increased slightly because of the need for users to possess a perso nalised pass or code number. Absolute security cannot be guaranteed using such systems because nothing prevents an unauthorised intruder from coercing a card or number
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holder into giving over the unique, but not user-specific, pass or number. The use of photographs on passes does little to improvesecurity when used alone, as reports of bored security personnelfailing to verify the validity of the tiny images are legion. Onesuccessful security evader told the current writer that he gainedaccess to a very sensitive British passenger aircraft by showing his charge card (without a photograph) to a guard.**
A variety of technologically advanced, automated access control systems have been developed to enhance basic access controlf e a t u r e s . * ’ For example, the West German firm Gallenschutz lietallbau GmbH has combined into its turnstile systems mechanisms forautomatically verifying entrants' identities and for ensuring that only one person per security pass can enter or exit a secure zone. "Anti-passback" protection can be incorporated to prevent one pass being used to permit two consecutive movements in the same direction through one access p o i n t . ’ * It is also possible to differentiatebetween high and low security passes by making it possible only for holders of certain passes to gain access to the most secure zones and by using an alarm method to alert security personnel of any attempt to gain unauthorised a c c e s s . W h e n  linked to a computer database, accurate records can be kept of i n d i v i d u a l s ’ movements around an a i r p o r t .
For the most sensitive areas of airports, enclosed cylindrical doors can be used. To enter the system a form of identification must be presented. If accepted by the system, the pass will open the first door, permitting entry to the cylinder, then close, momentarily trapping the person. At this point, confirmatory checks can be made to determine that the pass holder is entitled to transfer into the secure zone. This can be done in the form of a personal code number, a weight sensor (which also guards against more than one person being in the cylinder) or a finger-print reader or similar device, to isolate a unique characteristic of the person being checked. Once the system is satisfied that the person is entitled to enter the zone, the second, forward door is activated, allowing the transfer to be c o m p l e t e d .
For computer controlled access systems to be of use in the largest airports, it will be vital to maximise the speed with which a computerised system can identify a person from the pass signal being presented. In particular, weight confirmation can take several seconds. Gallenschutz has remarked that his f i r m ’s devices allow a bidirectional throughput rate of between twenty and twenty-five
* * Informal interview with British intelligence consultant, Geneva, Switzerland, February 1987,
* ’For an excellent assessment of modern access control systems, see 
Airports Internationai, January 1990, pp. 22 - 27.
’*T. Gallenschutz, "Access Security within Terminal Buildings," 
Airport Technology International (1988), p. 243.
’ iJ.R. Norville, "Airports - Protecting the Airside," Airport 
Technology International (1988), p. 247.
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persons per minute - a rate which would be more impressive but for the inefficiency of the card reader e m p l o y e d . ’ ?
Of course, the practical difficulties involved in curbing unauthorised access to vulnerable airport locations must be noted when assessing the theoretical benefits of control systems. Furthermore, the large number of firms with commercial reasons for entering airports or for making consignment deliveries must also be considered. Catering, maintenance, hygiene, cargo and other services all involve the transfer of goods and persons from the landside to the airside. One aspect of this problem which must be considered by airport managers is the particular inadequacy of trusting that airside staff at an airport are sufficiently reliable and honest as to require no on-site security inspections or monitoring. In any low paid, high turnover work role, including many servicing jobs, it should be remembered that bribery, blackmail and terrorist infiltration can each result in workers being tempted, forced or else choosing to carry firearms, explosives and related objects on board aircraft being serviced on the airside. In 1989, GOnter Eser. Secretary General of lATA, alluded to the scope of this problem for the biggest international airports when he noted that Frankfurt Main licenses approximately 30,000 workers with airside passes, while London Heathrow and Gatwick each issues about 50,000 airside ID c a r d s , ’ *
The great difficulties involved in vetting large numbers of workers were highlighted in the months after the Lockerbie bombing, when several journalists in separate incidents gained access to vulnerable airside zones simply by taking up cleaners posts which offered immediate entry to wide-bodied jets.’ * No check was made of their falsified application details and no landside probation period was imposed on them. As a response to this inadequacy, the British Secretary of State for Transport, Paul Channon, imposed certain regulations on servicing firms, requiring the verification of a p p l i c a n t s ’ particulars, the taking u p  of references and a six month probation period before work on the airside could be allowed. More notably, in early April 1989, he ordered the introduction, within a year, of reliable access control systems at a total of nineteen British a i r p o r t s . T h e s e  systems would be computerised to facilitate the automatic reading of staff passes for entry to restricted zones, with passes being issued sparingly. In addition, it was announced that restricted areas would be patrolled and aircraft would be searched prior to flights and then protected from unauthorised
’ ^Gallenschutz (1988), p . 243.
’ *rhe International Herald Tribune, Monday 15 May 1989, p. 2.
’ *G. Norris, "Security Concerns Across the Atlantic," Interavia 
Aerospace Review 7 (1989), p . 693.
’ ^Aberdeen, Belfast Harbour (Sydenham), Belfast International(A l d e r g r o v e ) . Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff/Wales. East Midlands, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds-Bradford, Londonderry (Eglinton), London (Heathrow), London (Gatwick), Luton, Manchester, Newcastle,Norwich, Prestwick and Stansted.
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a c c e s s . ’ * Most importantly, the new regulation made clear that entry to restricted areas by any authorised staff would be subject to a standard of search equal to that imposed on p a s s e n g e r s , ”
In the United States, regulation of computerised access control measures was made by an FAA final rule of 8 February 1 9 89,’ * which applied to all airports used by aircraft with more than 60 s e a t s . ”  This was imposed in spite of doubts concerning calculations of expense, the estimated provision requirements of terminals and the state of advancement of the technology i n v o l v e d . ” * In particular, Tom Browne of the Airport O p e r a t o r s ’ Council International fAOCIl voiced the following concern:
"There are a lot more doors and access points on airports than the FAA have estimated. T h e y ’ve calculated between 10 and 130 at any given airport - we have recently conducted a survey which found this figure to be between 30 and 5 0 0 . " ” *
Another major difficulty which must be addressed in relation to access control concerns the need for standardisation of systems from one airport to another. In the absence of such coordination, multiple passes would be required by crew travelling from site to site,, presenting the possibility of passes being lost or stolen and of the inefficient systems causing congestion problems for staff.**?
In situations in which tens of thousands of personnel have access to an a i r p o r t ’s sensitive areas, the best form of offence prevention mechanism will be to screen as many staff as possible (ideally all) as they pass from the landside onto the ramp and to monitor their work. If one hundred per cent screening is unfeasible, reliable access control systems should be set in place to permit entry only to legitimate workers with valid passes, who should be made subject to the possibility of random security searching at access control points and at their work places by roving security teams.
4.5. The Role of Airport Security Personnel
The significance of the human element in the operation of airport
’ * flight International, 6 May 1989, p. 12.
’ ’Norris (1989), p. 693.
’ *14CFR Part 107.
” 0. Nelms. "USA Plans Tighter Security," Interavia Aerospace Review 7 (1989), p. 690.
***Wallis, Beaumont Memorial Lecture (1989); Jane*s Airport Review. February/March 1989. p. 2; Airports International. January 1990, p. 25.
** * Jane's Airport Review 1989, February/March 1989, o. 2.
**?Nelms (1989), p. 691.
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security should not be underrated.*** Although writers on the subject of airport security may differ in their attitudes towards the changing role of security personnel in an age of high technology, all seem to be agreed that the strength of screening and access control equipment is utterly dependent upon the utilisation of it by skilled, rational staff. In discussing this very important topic, four categories of interest are able to be recognised as being of particular concern: staff recruitment ; training; operations; and employment conditions.
4.5.1. Staff Recruitment
In 1986, the British House of Commons Transport Select Committeerecommended that action should be taken to permit security employers to question job applicants about certain criminal convictions. Itnoted that domestic legislation should be amended to permit applications to be vetted outwith the complex restrictions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1924. and related laws.*** This legislation creates a legal fiction, recognising that for most tvpes of employment it should not be necessary for a job applicant to admit the existence of a limited criminal record after the passage of acertain period of time. In essence, the law can permit the deliberate promulgation of a lie (that is, that a criminal record does not exist) and can restrict the legal ability of a prospective employer todetermine the truth (that is, that a criminal record exists). Medialaw experts Robertson and Nicol have described the application of the Act in the following terms;
"The Act applies only to convictions which have resulted in asentence of no more than thirty months' imprisonment, and whichhave been 'spent* - ie a certain period of time has elapsed sincethe passing of sentence. The length of that period depends on the seriousness of the punishment; where there has been any period of imprisonment between six months and thirty months, the conviction becomes 'spent' after ten years have elapsed, Seven years is the rehabilitation period for prison sentences of six months or under; five years for all other sentences which fallshort of imprisonment, save for an absolute discharge which is'spent' ... after a bare six months."**^
Hence, only ten years after a person had been sentenced to two-and-a- half years imprisonment for a serious offence, s/he would be able to apply for a security job at a British airport with no duty to reveal the existence of the conviction and the severity of the punishment imposed. Despite the C o m m i t t e e ’s suggestion that aviation security activities should be exempted from the Act, the British Government refused to issue an Exceptions Order for the industry, claiming that little of benefit would be expected to be gained by such a course of
**3Brenchley (1986), p . 2.
***House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 10.
**^G. Robertson and A.G.L. Nicol, Media Law (London; Sage. 1985) d. 47.
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act i o n .* * *
It is clear that major difficulties exist in vetting applicants for 
airport security posts if full knowledge of their previous activities 
cannot be gained. This fact alone should cause authorities to 
formulate procedures for screening prospective e m p l o y e e s ’ 
applications, such that it is impossible for any individual convicted 
of a serious offence (determined by, for example, the existence of any 
form of prison sentence) to be employed in the field of airport 
s e c u r i t y .
On a more positive note. staff who are employed should be intelligent 
and able to communicate well with members of the public. It would be 
beneficial to the industry for minimum educational qualifications to 
be established as a threshhold level for entry to security posts, to 
attempt to ensure a degree of ability in the workforce. This would, 
of course, require to be accompanied by improvements in pay and 
conditions to encourage able workers to apply for security vacancies.
4.5.2. Training
Security training is a subject of relevance to all personnel engaged 
in aviation-related activities and must be included as a key element 
of training for managerial and general staff, as well as for those who 
are engaged in security as their principal form of work.**? In 
formulating an appropriate syllabus for each type of employee, 
reference must be made to security priorities of each. As a general 
guide, Dorey has proposed sixteen subject headings for which material 
could be prepared: history of aviation security; international control 
of civil aviation - security aspects; airport services' view of
security; role of law enforcement officers; terrorist organisations;
recognition of explosive and incendiary devices; airline security : 
perimeter protection; terminal buildings; identification of people: 
identification of vehicles and mobile equipment; security surveying; 
bomb search; report writing; law subjects; and duties of the security 
gu a r d . * * ®
Organisations such as lATA and IFAPA have drawn attention to the broad 
national and international variations found in levels of security 
t r a i n i n g . * * ’ For many states, no systematic approach is taken towards 
the subject, with staff education being given a very low priority. In 
the UK - supposedly an advanced aviation power with a key interest in
promoting security - the official security training situation was
reported as follows in 1986 by the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee :
***British Government (1986), pp. 8 - 9 .
**?See N . Freeman, "Aviation Security Training is a Necessity." ICAO 
Bulletin 34 (November 1979), p. 33.
***Dorey (1985), pp. 244 - 246.
**’ Information drawn from communications with Rodney Wallis and 
Geoffrey Lipman,
128
“The Department of Transport training course for ordinary 
security staff (ie those who undertake passenger/baggage search, 
access control duties, aircraft guarding etc) lasts five days. 
The course objective is defined thus; “On completion of 
training, participants will be able to perform security duties". Perhaps "defined" is the wrong word. This training does not 
compare well with that given to fire and other emergency 
services.
Training for employees of private security firms appears to be virtually non-existent."***
The gross inadequacy of many s t a t e s ’ training programmes for screening 
staff was summed up by Vincent in his comparison of US and Israeli 
rules on the matter:
"Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in the current U.S. 
civil aviation security system is the lack of required security 
training. Only the security training for flight crews and the 
Ground Security C o o r d i n a t o r ’s position is required to have 
specific hours of security training. Others involved in the 
security system, e.g. X-ray screeners, etc., are not required to 
have any specific amounts of training to perform a security 
function. Subject matter is also loosely defined, so loosely as 
to be totally ineffective.
By contrast, the Israeli security system invests four to 
five weeks in each individual involved in the application of 
their security system before allowing the individual to apply 
their security measures. ... Two U.S. air carriers operating in 
Europe, and now a third following the Pan Am 103 tragedy, have 
implemented portions of the Israeli security system. 
Regrettably, these airlines still only provide approximately 
eight to ten days of initial security training."***
Yeffet has been more scathing about US attitudes towards security 
training:
"The level of training given by American sir carriers to 
their security agents is extremely low, insufficient and not 
effective. The training period is too short--iust eight to 
ten hours for each security agent. That training usually 
consists of teaching an agent what a revolver, hand grenade, 
dynamite and pipe bomb look like on a x-ray machine and how 
to operate the machine,"**?
It should be obvious to the industry, as well as to the authorities 
which regulate it, that the detailed specification and enforcement of 
security training courses is now required for the purposes of 
improving basic abilities and guaranteeing some degree of efficiency
***House of Commons Committee on Transport (1986), p. 10 
***Vincent (1989), p. 30.
**?Yeffet (1989), p. 1.
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within the industry.*** This subject will be considered in relation 
to international coordination of security improvements (see below).
4.5.3. Operations
The role of airport security operatives can be boring, repetitive and 
lacking in promotion prospects. Perhaps it is partly for this reason 
that the quality of staff employed is often very low. Yeffet 
described as "shocking" the extent to which US security staff- 
questioned by him at ten American airports in 1989 gave no 
consideration to their jobs' enormous public importance.*** Such an 
observation bears no comparison with the true needs of the industry 
because there should always be strong demand for well-motivated, alert 
and resourceful staff.
This dichotomy between the actual and the ideal is made even more 
significant by the fact that security staff are not simply the 
ultimate safety net for the industry, but are also often the only 
point of contact between law-related authorities and aviation 
offenders. Vincent has estimated that as many as fourteen incidents 
of aviation sabotage or attempts at it have taken place since 1982 
without advance warning being made and without security and 
intelligence agencies being aware of the existence of a specific 
threat.**® In such cases, the industry must pin its hopes of 
interception on security workers, many of whom seem to regard their» 
work as being little more than a mindless sinecure.
Responsibility for this dangerous state must, in large measure. rest 
with those airports and carriers which offer badly paid, boring and 
directionless secur ity posts. It is not impossible to create 
imaginative, advanced security roles for skilled and semi-skilled 
labour, involving activity variation, periodic retraining schemes and 
a structure for self-improvement and employment promotion, but these 
posts require greater managerial initiative and activity plus more 
resources than are presently invested by many carriers and airports. 
Greater use of financial incentive to reward the most alert security 
team members might assist efforts to motivate staff to higher 
performance levels. Motivation can also be encouraged on the highest 
risk routes by requiring security staff to fly on board the flights 
which they have serviced - another high cost but very effective 
opt ion.
One reason for security posts being perceived as boring by personnel 
may be the lack of excitement and challenge in many-aspects of the 
work. In most airports around the world, security employees might 
expect to work for a period of years without being faced with a 
hijacking, sabotage or airport attack attempt. Only very rarely will 
staff have to cope with serious incidents of security breach
***Note that on 26 July 1989, US carriers introduced the i n d u s t r y ’ s 
first employment and training standards for screening personnel. 
McGuire (1989), p. 6.
***Yeffet (1989), p. 2.
**®Vincent (1989), p. 29.
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occasioned, for example, by attempted infiltration of knives, replica 
guns or fake explosive devices. For the majority of operatives'
working lives the most serious security lapses routinely encountered
will most likely be those involving unaccompanied and unreconciled 
baggage, innocent access control breaches and other incidents which 
might be classified as honest mistakes.
Despite the low statistical chance of an airport witnessing a serious 
attempt at violent air crime, it should never be assumed that any site 
can be free from risk. Because of this, security personnel should be 
monitored periodically by management in the conduct of their duties 
and tested with terrorist infiltration simulations on a regular basis. ! 
In addition, the use of staff testing and attractive reward schemes 
can help to promote workplace satisfaction and improvements in 
results.*** In these ways, staff can be kept alert in their day-to- 
day work and be ready to cope with a real crisis, should it arise. It 
is not surprising that El Al operatives are regulary tested by staff 
members posing as terrorists, carrying fake devices.**? This example î 
should be followed by more carriers and airport authorities.
6.5,4. Employment Conditions
Because security screening is so often regarded as an expensive and 
inconvenient encumbrance for airports and carriers, the pay and 
employment conditions of security staff are frequently poor, 
discouraging job applicants of high quality from applying for the 
work. Also, the terms of employment are frequently laid out in short
term contracts, further detracting from job security.**? In the USA.
where most security staff are employed by sub-contracted agencies. it 
is not uncommon for hourly rates to be very low - $3.60 fUS) per hour 
was one example presented in 1989 for a security guard in Stapleton 
airport, Denver, C o l o r a d o . * * ’ Promotion schemes can also be far from 
inviting. At O ’Hare airport, Chicago, an employee of a sub-contracted 
security firm stated in 1989 that she earned $3,35 (US) per hour and 
would receive only a 10 cent per hour pay rise after her first year of 
service,*?* If staff are hired at a low wage, not only will a poor 
quality team of security personnel be recruited, but also staff will 
constantly be looking for better employment elsewhere. Furthermore, 
there must even be a higher risk of bribes from prospective offenders 
being accepted by less scrupulous staff, keen to earn extra money. In 
addition to reasonable pay 'levels being offered to security workers, 
reward schemes should be employed to encourage staff to provide 
airport managers with information which might lead to arrests and to 
promote loyalty from personnel.*?*
** * Jane's Airport Review, February/March 1989, p. 40.
**’House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 1. 
**®House of Commons Committee on Transport (1986). p. 16, 
**’ Yeffet and Barnes (1989), p. 133.
* ? * Condé Nast Traveler, March 1989, p. 33.
*?*H, Degeneste in Lewis and Kaplan (eds.) (1990), p, 57
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At one independent British airport which the current writer toured in 
1989, the security director remarked that efficiency was promoted bv 
offering a very attractive pay scale for security staff, encouraging 
keen young people to apply for available posts. It was not uncommon 
for the team to employ persons who had narrowly failed Police entry 
examinations. These candidates displayed a genuine interest in law 
enforcement and often held good educational qualifications. The 
security team was viewed with respect by other groups within the 
airport because it comprised intelligent, well-disciplined and able 
people who understood the importance of their work and who were 
courteous but firm in the execution of their screening duties.
At the managerial level, it was recognised that variety in security 
work dispelled boredom and promoted continuity of service from the 
staff as a whole. For this reason, team members were trained to carry 
out a broad variety of roles. It was also made known to security 
personnel that t h eir good pay and conditions brought with them genuine 
responsibilities. If, for example, an act of negligence resulted in a 
security lapse occurring, the accepted practice was to issue a formal, 
written warning to the staff memberfs) involved, intimating that a 
further error within the subsequent six month period wouId result in 
certain dismissal.
Such a reasonable combination of incentive and threat resulted in a 
dedicated and industrious team being formed which had proved efficient 
in filtering conventional objects of air crime from the airport 
environment. If human effort is viewed as a key resource in the 
security industry and appropriate investment is made in the training 
and running of high quality teams, real progress can be made in 
security enhancement.*??
4.6. Conclusion
The short history of airport security reveals that the practices and 
procedures most common 1 y undertaken can never be sufficient to prevent 
and deter all types of violent air crime. As useful components, 
conventional search systems, baggage reconciliation, passenger 
profiling, access control and manpower each play a vital role. yet 
more is required to expand the competences of security teams at 
airports. As shall be seen in the following Chapter, the employment 
of current screening techniques cannot hope to present even a moderate 
challenge to advanced terrorists of the future. Moreover, it will be 
established that technological capacities of most a i r p o r t s ’ security 
apparatus of the early 1990s cannot be trusted and must be superseded 
with more suitable systems.
* ? ? International Security Review, Ja nuary/February 1990. p. 8
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CHAPTER 5
NEW THREATS FROM VIOLENT AIR CRIMINALS
"The oast regime has exported a thousand tons to Libya and
vet two hundred grammes of Semtex is enough to blow uo an
aircraft. This means that world terrorism has supplies of Semtex 
to last one hundred and fifty years. The present democratic 
regime in Czechoslo vakia is unable to make Libya return the 
S e m t e x ."*
"The number of things that a terrorist can do is far greater than 
can ever be defended against."?
5.1. Introduction: T e r r o r i s t s ’ Weaponry and Devices
Weaponry and devices of destruction which have been used by terrorists 
to attack aviation targets require to be distinguished from those 
commonly used by aviation offenders with no political motivation. In 
"common" crimes of aircraft diversion undertaken by refugees, mentally 
unstable offenders, fugitives and trsnsportational hijackers it is
typically weapons which are freely available which are used. such as
commercially marketed firearms, hunting and combat knives and sharp 
domestic objects. For potential hijackers who do not wish to be 
detected by conventional screening methods, the use of or threat from 
liquid hydrocarbons, such as petroleum and butane have proved 
sufficient to facilitate a desired rerouting. More ingenious 
improvisation has resulted in spirit alcohol and broken bottles being 
transformed into objects for intimidation, adding a security argument 
to the commercial and safety justifications for restricting pre-flight 
duty free franchises.
politically motivated activities, scrupulous 
need for maximum effectiveness and the benefits of 
can combine to ensure that weaponry and armaments 
s ophisticated and efficient nature. Although 
rightly drawn attention to t e r r o r i s t s ’ use of 
improvised explosive devices and a wide range of firing mechanisms, 
the most serious incidents of aviation violence often involve 
sophisticated weaponry.*
With terrorists 
preparation, the 
state-sponsorship 
are of a more 
Clutterbuck has
*Czech President Vaclav Havel. speaking in London, 22 March 1990. 
BBC Radio 1, Newsbeat, Thursday 22 March 1990.
? P. Robinson, former associate director of national security at the 
US National Laboratory, Los Alamos. Discover June 1986, p. 24.
^Clutterbuck (1990) I, p p . 53 - 54
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In complex acts of hijacking it is important for terrorists to have 
confidence in the devices which will be used and so it is not uncommon 
for military firearms, grenades and high explosives to be infiltrated 
on board an aircraft, either through passenger screening points, if 
able to be concealed, or via the ramp, possibly with airport staff 
cooperation. Evidence given in a German court by Hamadi in his 1988 
trial revealed that prior to the inception of the TWA incident of 
1985, weapons had been placed on board the aircraft to await the 
arrival of the hijacking team.* In this way, the employment of 
advanced technology to detect metal was rendered redundant, allowing 
the traditional weaponry, which screening was supposed to prevent 
reaching aircraft, to evade all controls. This demonstrates the 
importance of adopting a comprehensive overview of security defences, 
because terrorists have shown on several occasions (detailed 
throughout this thesis) that they are prepared to seek out weak points 
in a i r p o r t s ’ security methods rather than risk ruining their carefully 
planned schemes by providing authorities with any needless opportunity 
to apprehend them.
There can be no doubt that the combination of existing technology and 
ramp security processes have failed to prevent metallic weaponry and 
explosive devices from reaching target aircraft and allowing 
hijacking and sabotage attacks to take place. Additional to this 
consideration is the development of non-metal lie devices such as 
plastic firearms and explosives (both considered below) which are very 
difficult to detect with most security apparatus currently in 
operation.
5.1.1. High Explosives
The essential fragility of civil aircraft has always proved a 
vulnerability to ruthless saboteurs who realise that a very small 
amount of explosives can be necessary to destroy and kill.® In 
particular, the ease of availability and use of some high explosives 
(also known as detonating and secondary explosives) in sabotage 
devices has facilitated the tasks by providing a very potent, yet
♦Wallis, Beaumont Memorial Lecture (1989).
®For a description of e x p l o s i v e s ’ characteristics see T.6. Brodie. 
Bombs and Bombings - A Handbook to Detection, Disposal and 
Investigation for Police and Fire Departments (Springfield:
Thomas, 1972), pp. 30 - 42.
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compact and frequently concealable anti-aircraft bomb.* Combined with 
sophisticated activating systems. such as non-metallic fuses.? 
altitude switches and long delay digital timers, advanced explosive 
devices can be made to detonate at a predetermined location or time.*
Since the early 1980s several attempts have been made to destroy 
aircraft by using plastic high explosives (which are notably potent 
substances, the qualities of which will be discussed below) and many 
hundreds of deaths have resulted from successful acts of s a b o t a g e . ’ 
The Lockerbie disaster illustrated the destructive powers of plastic 
explosives, traces of which were found in the wreckage of the Boeing 
74 7. There can be no doubt that the employment of plastic explosives 
by terrorists poses enormous new threats to travellers which were not 
faced when rudimentary improvisation was t e r r o r i s t s ’ only available 
line of attack. Home-made bombs were often easily detectable, even by 
simple screening processes, because they required to be large to 
contain sufficient explosives to inflict damage upon a target and 
because they often needed to be packed in robust, metallic containers 
such as steel pipes, which could withstand the necessary build-up of 
explosive pressure from within.**
Plastic explosives incorporate such agents as oils, synthetic rubbers 
or plasticised nitrocell ulose (itself an explosive substance) to 
obtain a mouldable consistency and to promote stability,** The 
resultant substances can be over twice as explosively potent as equal 
masses of dynamite and can have a detonation velocity 15% faster than 
TNT, offering terrorists an ideal destructive medium which can be
♦Fordham defines high explosives as:
"Literally any explosive which detonates. fie. undergoes an 
explosion process of high speed involving a sustained shock 
wsve.l In practice, the term is usually confined to explosives 
which do not normally burn to detonation but which require a 
detonator for use." S. Fordham, High Explosives and Propellants 
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1966), p. 215. Parenthetic sentence added
from p. 214,
W . Powell, The Anarchist Cookbook (New Jersey; Lyle Stuart.
1971), p. 113 provides practical instructions on the processes 
required to produce TNT.
’Clutterbuck (1990) II, p. 11.
*Dobson and Payne (1979), pp. 113 - 118 and 124 - 125; G . Knowles. 
Bomb Security Guide (Los Angeles: Security World Publishing,
1976). pp. 40 - 41 and 109 - 110. For an analysis of sophisticated 
firing mechanisms see Clutterbuck (1987), pp. 11 - 12.
’Statistics can be found in P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990). pp. 160 - 
169.
Aviation Heek and Space Technology, 16 January 1989 (reprint).
**Fordham (1966), p. 36. See B.L. Stewart in Lewis and Kaplan (eds.) 
(1990), p. 65. The explosives themselves can function without such 
agents, often being found in powder form.
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concealed in comparatively small consignments yet which are 
nevertheless formidably powerful.*? Tn particular, a property of 
Plastic explosives which appeals to terrorists is their capacity to 
shear metals through the generation of massive waves of pressure, 
causing virtually instantaneous and irrecoverable destruction of the 
target being attacked.** Legitimate and intended uses of many high 
explosives are often very different to the illicit purposes of 
terrorist groups. In industry and engineering, for example, they can 
be employed as explosive welders and metal formers,**
The potency of plastic explosives, which were developed at the 
beginning of the twentieth century as a light military compound,*® is 
derived from their nitrogenous character. As Roger Highfield, the 
science editor of The Daily Telegraph pointed out after it had become 
apparent that the Lockerbie explosion had probably been caused by a 
high explosive:
"The bomb was probably made of high-performance plastic 
explosives.
This category. also known as shock-wave detonating 
explosives, includes many explosive chemicals.
But the chemical composition of the most compact and thus 
the most ideal for terrorist use includes a chemical group called 
a nitro group, consisting of nitrogen and oxygen atoms (NO 2 ).
It is a key to the e x p l o s i v e ’s high performance, ensuring 
that the explosive molecule has enough oxygen to burn fast enough 
to make a b a n g .“* *
The Czech family of explosives known as Semtex fa brand name owned by 
its producer Synthesia, though often used incorrectly to describe the 
generic grouping to which it belongs) is, in fact, composed mostly of 
two high explosive substances, cyclotrimethyl trinitramine (also known 
as ROX and cvclonite) and pentaerythryte tetranitrate fPETN). When 
these nitrogen-based compounds are mixed, typically in equal amount 
(44.5 per cent each) with a plasticising agent, such as a mineral oil. 
they form a malleable and much more thermally stable substance. which
Science, 13 January 1989 (reprint); Time, 
Wilkinson (1989) IV, p. 4.
January 1989 (reprint)
Discover June 1986, p. 26, For a discussion of the effects of 
explosive devices on aircraft see E . Newton, "Investigating 
Explosive Sabotage in Aircraft," International Journal of Aviation 
Safety 1985, p. 43.
Science 13 January 1989 (reprint).
Discover June 1986, p. 26.
* * The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 29 December 1988 (reprint). For a
concise discussion of high e x p l o s i v e s ’ characteristics and
individual qualities see T.C, Tompkins, "The Terrorist Arsenal Part 2," TVI Report 6(4) (1986).
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may be flattened and moulded for purposes of concealment.*?
Once constituted, plastic explosives retain their potency for many 
years, enabling terrorist g r o u p s ’ supplies to be transported in safety 
and stored for long periods.** This is further promoted by the 
e x p l o s i v e s ’ remarkable stability and often relatively low 
s e n s i t i v i t y . * ’ In certain circumstances, they can be handled roughly 
and subjected to extremes of heat in near total safety, because a 
specialised initiating charge, such as mercury fulminate or lead 
azide, is required to ignite the s u b s t a n c e s . ”  So safe are many 
Plastic explosives that US military supplies were even used as 
emergency camp fuel by US Green Beret soldiers who were supplied with
it on account of its excellent shattering quality (brisance).?* If
buried for twenty years, Semtex would allegedly remain elastic and 
maintain its awesome destructive powers.?? Certain brands of plastic 
explosive, such as Du F o n t ’s "Datasheet" are fully waterproof, being 
able to be employed in a wide range of conditions.?*
The feature of plastic explosives which must be most attractive to 
aviation terrorists is their ability to evade detection by most
currently employed security screening equipment and by animal
searching techniques, as a result of their low vapour pressure (that 
is, their tendency to evaporate in air) and their odourless quality. 
As an example of the difficulties involved in detecting clastic
*?Wew Scientist, 7 January 1989, p.. 23. Adams has charted the short
history of the product;
"The explosive is manufactured by the Czechoslovakian 
government at Pardubice, sixty miles east of Prague. The factory 
first produced the explosive for military and civilian use at the 
end of the 1960s, and by the beginning of the 1970s it was being 
sold outside the Warsaw Pact," J . Adams, Trading in Death: 
Weapons, Warfare and the Modern Arms Race (London: Century
Hutchinson, 1990), p. 28.
While Semtex products have been available only since the late
1960s, the two explosive components involved in its production were
both discovered in the mid to late 1890s and have been widely used
since. Fordham (1966), p. 36.
**Dobson and Payne (1979). p. 113.
*’J. Stoffel, Explosives and Homemade Bombs (Springfield: Thomas.
1972), p. 36.
'^^Unconventional Uarfare Devices and Technigues : Department of the
Army Technical Manual TM 31-200-1 (Washington D.C.; Department of 
the Army, 1966), p. 42.
?*The Boston Globe, Friday 23 December 1988 (reprint); Time. 
January 1989 (reprint); Knowles (1976), p. 39.
??The Daily Telegraph, Friday 23 March 1990, p . 1.
?*Stoffel (1972). p. 56.
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explosives, it has been estimated that dynamite is typically 50 
million times easier to locate by its emitted vapours than pure 
cyclonite.2* One beneficial consequence of this is that if plastic 
explosives are produced or stored in close proximity to more easily 
detectable compounds, they can accidentally become adulterated and so 
lose a measure of detectability. On the other hand, some unscrupulous 
screening equipment manufacturers have taken advantage of this fact to 
claim that their equipment can detect plastic explosives, without 
revealing their inadequacies in terms of identifying them in their 
pure f o r m s . 2s
Together, plastic e x p l o s i v e s ’ longevity, stability and low vapour 
pressure pose major cou nter-terrorist problems for authorities, 
because once in the control of terrorist groups the compounds can be 
transported in bulk and stored for long periods with ease and without 
risk of detonation. The dimensions of the problem were highlighted in 
October 1987 when more than two tons of Semtex were intercepted by 
French customs officials en route to Irish terrorist organisations.** 
Had the Eksund (the vessel which was carrying the consignment) 
reached its destination, the explosives could easily have been divided 
into small, concealed batches and distributed to assembly points 
without detection.**
On 27 March 1990. Vaclav Havel, President of the newly democratised 
Czechoslovakia, revealed the extent of the previous r e g i m e ’s 
willingness to supply unscrupulous states with large amounts of 
Semtex.** Wilkinson has been quoted as claiming that production of 
Semtex alone could have totalled as much as 40,000 tons since the 
early 1 9 7 0 ’s, despite previous Czech communist party insistence that 
only half that amount had been made. Irrespective of H a v e l ’s 
assurances that production had ceased after the Lockerbie atrocity and 
of doubt concerning the precise amounts in circulation, it is clear 
that a serious security crisis has been presented with the upsurge of 
threat throughout the 1 9 8 0 ’s from t e r r o r i s t s ’ use of plastic 
e x p l o s i v e s . * *
Although it is true that all risks cannot be guarded against at all 
times, it is evident that currently very few are being addressed by 
authorities with any significant degree of dedication. In order fully 
to explain the reasons for this maior security problem and so as to 
illustrate the response dilemma for the future, attention must turn to 
the three principal traditional forms of screening which have become
Daily Teleciraoh. Thursday 29 December 1988 (reprint); F .
O ’Ballance, "Aviation and Airport Security," Gulf Reoort 2/21 
(1989), p. 18.
*®McGuire (1989), pp. 3 - 4 .
* * 0 ’Ballance (1989) I, pp. 18 - 19.
* ^Information received from Professor Paul Wilkinson, March 1990. 
**See quote at start of Chapter.
* ’ rbe Daily Telectraah, Friday 23 March 1990, p. 1.
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established as standard features at most international airports: hand
searching, metal detection and X - r a d i o g r a p h v , First, however, it is 
necessary to consider the possibilities offered by cooperative 
measures to outlaw the production of certain types of plastic 
e x p l o s i v e .
5.2. Tagging Plastic Explosives
In addition to the need for security technology to improve the 
detection of currently elusive explosives and handguns, action can be 
taken on the supply side to tag, or mark, the offending articles to 
make detection and identification easier. The amount of plastic 
explosives in illicit, but open, circulation worldwide cannot 
accurately be determined, but is bound to be extremely large, with as 
much as one thousand tons of Semtex having been provided by 
Czechoslovakia to Libya alone. As the shelf-life of the substance is 
very long this means that, even if production were immediately to be 
curtailed. its future as a terrorist weapon would be secure for 
centuries - a scenario envisaged by President Havel,** This problem 
does not, however, relieve governments of their responsibility to 
investigate means of stemming the flow of Semtex and other similar 
compounds into the hands of terrorists in future. Indeed. it should 
also compel them to find ways by which such undetectable substances 
can be made less likely to succeed against aviation and other maior 
civilian targets.
There is no practical reason why currently undetectable firearms and 
explosives, including detonators, detonating cord and primers, should 
not be produced with traces of detectable material to make security 
processes more certain of success and/or with an added chemical "tag" 
which could be sought in order to determine their origin.** 
Politically, however, each of these options poses problems which, 
though not insurmountable, would involve long and detailed 
intergovernmental bargaining to resolve.
First. in the case of adding substances detectable by conventional 
screening equipment. as the explosives and firearms have a military 
use, such an ingredient might be unacceptable to armed forces which 
value the evasive property. As evidence for this, it was reported in 
1989 that a major gun manufacturer told the US Airline Pilots 
Association that despite the ease with which adulterating chips could 
be lodged in plastic weapons to make them detectable, the f i r m ’s main 
customer was the US military, which would not countenance such a 
proposal.** This stance highlights the difference of outlook which so 
often exists between different branches of state on issues of national 
defence and terrorism suppression. Nevertheless, despite the military 
considerations involved for many states, the democratic Czech 
a u t h o r i t i e s ’ decision to end lucrative exportation of Semtex until a 
screening taggant can be found and added to the manu facturing process 
is one which should be followed by other plastic explosives producers,
**BBC Radio 4, The t^orld at One, Thursday 22 March 1990 
**Clutterbuck (1990) I, p. 59.
**The Independent, Wednesday 26 April 1969.
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whether commercial or under the control of armed forces,**
It could be argued that if governments heed the interests of their 
military forces and continue to permit the production of weaponry and 
substances which are of such great benefit to politically-motivated 
offenders, then they have a moral obligation to ensure that such 
production is stringently controlled, that stock-piles of existing 
explosives are kept secured or are progressively destroyed and that 
only legitimate, state-controlled agencies have access to remaining, 
unadulterated products. Alternatively, if, as seems likely, 
production continues unabated in many countries, the international 
community should at least admit that it shouId provide the aviation 
industry with whatever support is needed to introduce appropriate 
detection capacities at airports.
Second, for each state to agree to tag its production. even with 
chemicals which would be undetectable to screening systems but which 
would allow c o n s i g n m e n t s ’ origins to be traced, would require well 
Planned. administered and monitored p r o c e s s e s , which might in 
themselves be expensive, very time-consuming and problematic in terms 
of gaining general support. In such circumstances, the international 
community might be faced with the same type of political dilemma over 
action against recalcitrant states which plagued I C A O ’s air crime 
conventions. On the other hand, fear of sanctions by non-cooperating 
states might coerce many of them into an international regime.** 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of any internationalised tagging system 
would be dependent upon the familiar factor of conforming states' 
willingness to act against recalcitrants - a factor which has caused 
the d o w n f a l 1 of more than a few counter-terrorism policies.
Irrespective of the military and economic arguments which might be 
forwarded concerning explosives a du Iteration, the use of chemical 
taggants should be promoted by responsible governments. In the case 
of facilitating detection, there can be no valid reason for 
industrial, or even military consumers of plastic explosives to object 
to the compounds being adulterated with, for example. a substance 
readily detectable by simple screening methods, such as X-ray 
inspection, metal detection or gas c h r o m a t o g r a p h y . Metal filings and 
chemical vapour taggants can each help in this respect, though it 
would be vital to determine accurately the effects of including 
additives to high explosives. Identification tagging can also be 
achieved by adding non-explosive substances to consignments before 
leaving their factories. Clutterbuck has described one method as 
follows;
"The method - developed by 3M in Minnesota and manufactured by 
the Microtrace Corporation - comprised the incorporation of 
’m i c r o t a g g a n t s ’ in explosives during manufacture, consisting of 
particles of colour-coded melamine plastic, A large number of 
colours can be used and these are easily changed, so the number 
of permutations and combinations is almost infinite. This would 
enable the manufacturer to use a different combination of colour
**Daily Telegraph, Friday 23 March 1990. p. 1 
**Clutterbuck (1990) I . p. 56.
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codes for every batch of explosives manufactured and the system 
would require this coding to he recorded each time any of this 
batch is sold to a wholesaler, retailer and user, anywhere in the 
w o r l d , "*s
Legitimate military consignments of plastic explosives supposedly 
destined for armed forces or exported under that pretext to 
governments which sponsor terrorist groups can and often do reach 
organisations which should have no channel of supply. If progress is 
to be made, east-west discussion and agreement will be required with a 
view to reaching consensus on which states should be refused sales of 
the explosives on security grounds. This would encourage the 
isolation of the governments concerned, although its ultimate 
effectiveness would depend entirely upon the forlorn hope that state 
sponsors of terrorism would not then seek to initiate or step up their 
own domestic production of Semtex surrogates.
5.2,1. Towards an International Tagging Convention
Precipitated by the international outcry following the Lockerbie 
bombing, the ICAO Council decided on 30 January 1989 to establish an 
Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on the Detection of Explosives. 
Furthermore, it adopted on 16 February 1989 a Resolution calling, 
among others things, for "an international regime for the marking of 
explosives for the purposes of detection," Accordingly, a meeting of 
the Ad Hoc Group took place between 6 and 10 March 1989, reporting to 
the ICAO Council, which referred the report to the O r g a n i z a t i o n ’s 
Committee on Unlawful Interference. By July the support and mandate 
of the UN Security Council had been received by ICAO and a decision 
had been taken to commence work on a new legal instrument on the 
subject. Encouraged by the unanimous support of the ICAO Assembly, 
meeting between September and October, and by the UN General 
A s s e m b l y ’s December Resolution on the matter. a special Sub-Committee 
of the Legal Committee convened in Montreal, with eighteen states as 
members and with thirteen observers, from 9 to 19 January 1990 to 
commence work on the question of marking explosives for purposes of 
d e t e c t i o n .* *
It is curious and unfortunate that the concomitant aspect of marking
for identification was avoided by states, although it is predictable
that any attempt to introduce a system which could allow for supplies 
of explosives to be traced might meet with opposition from states 
concerned that the international community should not adopt the role 
of policing sovereign powers. Furthermore. at a time when the
production of undetectable handguns and other dangerous but non- 
explosive items is increasing, it is regrettable that no mention was 
made of any broader threat. Nevertheless, even without any references 
to identification tagging and plastic firearms, the Sub-Committee was 
aware that it could introduce sweeping reforms in at least one
* 5 Ibid.
**ICAO Legal Committee, l<lorking Paper LC/27-14P/3, 22/1/90. pp. 1 -
2: ICAO Legal Committee Sub-Committee for the Preparation of a New
Legal Instrument Regarding the Marking of Explosives for 
Detectability, LC/$C~MEX~REPOPT, 19/1/90. p. 1.
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important area - detection marking. The importance to the group of 
the work in hand was emphasised in its report in the following terms;
"All Members and Observers agreed that there was need for 
the preparation of a new instrument which should be effective and 
capable of entering into force on a wide basis as early as 
p r a c t i c a b l e . "* *
Inherent in this desire. however, is a failure to grasp that 
effectiveness, swift entry into force and wide membership are rarely 
compatible elements on issues which are potentially divisive. It is 
true that the impetus for progress came from nothing less than 
unanimous resolutions from the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly and from similar calls from I C A O ’s bodies, yet the g r o u p ’s 
aims may be less easily won in the political forum of a diplomatic 
conference convened for the purpose of settling upon a final draft. 
This is due to take place early in 1991.
At its meetings, the Sub-Committee had before it a report submitted by 
the eminent British air law expert. Arnold Kean.*® The document 
proved to be vital in the formulation of the S u b - C o m m i t t e e ’s 
proposals, although not all of K e a n ’s suggestions met with support. 
In essence, he proposed that an international regime should be set in 
Place to organise and oversee the chemical tagging of new stocks of 
undetectable explosives, to outlaw the manufacturing, preparation,
packing, transfer and use of undetectable explosives and to oblige 
states to confiscate any batches of said explosives found within their 
territories.** He successfully submitted that rather than tie the 
i n s t r u m e n t ’s application to any existent air law (such as I C A O ’s
constituent agreement, the Chicago Convention 1944, or either of the 
air crime conventions of 1970 and 1971) the Sub-Committee should 
produce a free-standing convention of general application and with no 
particular emphasis on aviation, so that any organisations with an 
interest in the matter should not feel alienated.** Hence, Kean
proposed that for the first time, ICAO should formulate standards 
competent across a field of application broader than its traditional remit.
The most important innovation introduced before the Sub-Committee and 
accepted by it was a proposal for an Explosives Technical Commission 
(ETC) to be established and empowered to specify (or at least to 
recommend) which explosives should be covered by the agreement and 
what action should be taken to make them detectable to standard
*7 4C/3C~Wfy-#&P4fr, 19/1/90, Z b f d . . P. 7.
*®Kean, Report of the Rapporteur on the Subject of the Preparation of 
a New Legal Instrument Regarding the Narking of Explosives for 
Detectability, in LC/$C~NEX-REPORT, 19/1/90, Ibid., pp. 23 - 36.
**Kean. Rough Draft of Proposed Convent ion, in LC/SC-NEX-REPORT, 
19/1/90, Ibid., Articles 2(1) and 8; Draft Convention. Articles I 
- III.
^HC/SC-NEX-REPORT, 19/1/90. Ibid., p . 23.
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security screening equipment.** The ETC would comprise experts in the 
fields of explosives manufacture and detection. It was suggested that 
fifteen members serving for a period of three years would be 
appropriate for the body and that regional representation should be 
e n c o u r a g e d .* * Tf real decision-making powers were to be granted to a 
new Commission by ICAO members, an important step towards regulation 
of security-related matters would be achieved. Hence. as with the 
application of the instrument, so the notion of a purpose-speci f i c 
Commission would represent an intriguing new departure for ICAO in its 
activities concerning crime suppression. Together they would form a 
concrete recognition on the part of the Organization that the issues 
involved in aviation terrorism impact upon other areas of interest, 
and that the rapidly evolving criminal threats faced need the 
attention of an organic authority, rather than merely the coverage of 
a fixed legal document.
Combined with the creation of a Commission, it was agreed by the S u b ­
committee that the proposed c o n v e n t i o n ’s Annexes, which would contain 
details of explosives covered and appropriate action to be taken in 
respect of them. should command a legislative position higher than 
existing ICAO Standards by being subject to uniform and universal 
application by all states accepting them,** Once more, this decision 
to present a diplomatic conference with a provision of high quality 
marks an unusual level of commitment on the part of an ICAO group and
is, therefore, to be praised. As with the other above-noted
innovations, however, it is hoped that the climate of goodwill and
cooperation which characterised the preliminary stages of the d r a f t ’s 
development will continue into the final diplomatic phase, when 
political questions of state sovereignty and suspicion will almost 
certainly need to be answered and overcome. In the atmosphere of a 
global, plenary forum, it would be easy for considerations of
competence, expense and domestic jurisdiction to militate against the 
creation of a broadly based convention, the establishment of an ETC 
and the formation of firm regulations. It is even conceivable that, 
faced with a robustly worded and clear-sighted draft, some delegations 
might take f r i g h t , argue for continuing municipal control and either 
dilute the proposed provisions or else reject the whole.
In terms of wordage, K e a n ’s most lengthy proposal in his draft 
Convention was a collection of articles attempting to extend the aut 
dedere aut judicare doctrine to the acts involved in manufacturing, 
d istributing and using unmarked plastic explosives,** In common with 
the Montreal Protocol 1988. the draft sought to impose an 
internationalised criminal justice system based on the Hague and 
Montreal Conventions. To their great credit, the majority of states
**Kean, Rough Draft, in LC/SC-NEX-REPORT, Î9/1/90, Ibid., o. 29. 
Article 1; Draft Convention, Article IV - VI.
LC/SC-NEX~REPORT, 19/1/90. Ibid., p. 15; Draft Convention. 
Article IV.
LC/SC-^MEX-REPORT, 19/1/90. Ibid., p. 9.
**Kean, Rough Draft. Articles 2 - 7 ,  in LC/SC-NEX-REPORT. 19/1/90. 
Ibid.
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represented on the Sub-Committee rejected this idea as being
unnecessary and undesirable. Recognising that existing criminal laws 
would almost always be sufficient to secure convictions if states were 
willing to prosecute and perhaps even considering that the Hague 
formula on detention, extradition, prosecution and possible puni shment 
contained too many loopholes to make it reliable as a vehicle for 
standardisation, the way of previous deliberations on air crime was 
avoided. Above all it was noted that attempts to gain state support 
for a criminal provision would dissuade some governments from acceding 
to the more important norms concerning "regulatory prevention" (such 
as the role of the ETC and the question of tagging) thus postponing 
the a g r e e m e n t ’s entry into force. In the interests of simplicity, the 
inclusion was not made.**
Another two of K e a n ’s suggestions which met with little support were 
the idea that, in common with previous ICAO agreements,** special
concessions should be given to s t a t e s ’ military. police and customs 
authorities in their possession and use of unmarked concealable 
explosives*? and the related notion that states should be allowed to 
file a difference against recommendations of the ETC.*® Rather 
ambitiously, the Sub-Committee confidently declared its contrary view;
" ... all explosives manufactured, imported or exported must be 
subject to the marking requirement without any exception 
whatsoever, since otherwise the very purpose of the new 
instrument would be seriously je o p a r d i s e d . "*’
It seems possible that certain s t a t e s ’ military forces would be 
unwilling to see their powers to produce undetectable explosives 
vanish, despite the fact that the unmarked compounds' principal
association has been with the internationally unlawful bombing of
civilian targets. The question which remains is whether states will 
share the S u b - C o m m i t t e e ’s attitude towards the instrument and opt to 
restrict their armed f o r c e s ’ freedoms, or whether the concession will 
be restored in the conference. On the other hand, military policy 
makers can take solace from the inability of the Sub-Committee to find 
any reliable means of marking the huge existing stock-piles of 
explosives and from its un willingness to advocate the phased reduction 
of available surpluses. The argument in favour of allowing the 
cont i nuat ion of current 1 y available supplies seemed to be a purely 
economic one revolving around the need to encourage broad and early 
application of the agreement with poorer nations as well as richer.** 
A more effective (though also more adventurous) solution might have 
been to proceed with the elimination of all unmarked explosives over
LC/SC-NEX-REPORT, 19/1/90, Ibid., pp. 10 - 11.
**Chicago Convention 1944, Article 3(a) and (b),
*?Kean, Rough Draft, Article 9, in LC/SC-NEX-REPORT, 19/1/90. 
* * Ibid. f Article 1(8).
LC/SC-NEX-REPORT, 19/1/90, Ibid., p. 11.
Ibid., pp. 11 - 12.
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three to five years, as had been suggested in the Sub-Committee, in the hope that major nations might offer trading partners a "new for 
old" exchange. monitored by an international agency. Such an option 
is still available and should be considered at the drafting conference 
in preference to the more vague obligation to "exercise strict 
control" over unmarked stock.**
5 . 2 ,2. Questioning th e . Va lue of Global Regulation
Although a strong case can be made for regulating the production and use of plastic explosives on a global scale, and despite the benefits 
which a stronger regime than that proposed by ICAO would have tooffer, it is essential to note that no legislative response could be
expected to provide anything approaching a viable solution to the difficulties posed by terrorists' possession of the substances.** As has already been emphasised, the supply of totally unmarked explosives 
in the control of some terrorist groups and their state sponsors is enormous and could provide for several thousand attacks for decades to come. In view of this, it is tempting once again to regard this 
latest ICAO initiative as being too little, too late. Nevertheless,
the plan should be examined in terms of its objectives and means of
operation before any firm conclusion is reached.
On the issue of specifying the C o n v e n t i o n ’s coverage of explosives, it 
is going to be difficult, if not impossible, to pin down the entirerange of substances available at any given time and to know which new
chemical compounds have been developed.** Equally, while some effort
may be made to seek information from states concerning their
production, it will not be possible to force governments to reveal all 
their production data, to stop clandestine manufacturing or to take steps against private producers operating without state permission. 
On a more fundamental point, if explosives of the type covered by the 
convention are difficult to identify through normal screening systems, 
their international carriage will continue irrespective of supposed global regulation. Hence, at best the agreement will be completely 
unenforceable until such time as practical measures are taken by 
states to Introduce new technologies which can find the compounds 
and so give the convention some meaning.
An unfortunate but entirely predictable outcome of early drafting 
activity has been the total exclusion of any provision governing 
sanctions in the event of breach of the promulgated standards. 
Without any undertaking to impose punishment the convention must 
remain one of I C A O ’s g e n t l e m a n ’s agreements. Of course, there can be 
no way in which states could be expected to subscribe to a dedicated standardisation regime and still expect swift and maximum implementation, but the inevitable cost of tolerating such weakness 
must be that the unregulated, decentralised and totally inefficient
*1 Draff Convention, Article III, in IC/SC-MFY-fFPDRr, 19/1/90, Ibid. 
S'McGuire (1989), p. 3.
*3 Also, it is likely that certain terrorist groups enjoy the capacity 
to produce very powerful explosives, irrespective of the vagaries of state sponsorship. H . Ribak in Lewis and Kaplan (1990). p. 164.
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methods of imposing communal sanctions on recalcitrant states will 
continue, placing abusers of explosives technology in a very strong
position in which they can afford to continue their anti-social 
activities. It remains to be seen how western states will react when 
faced with breaches of an explosives convention committed by 
economically-important trading partners (and particularly those with 
oil trading or joint venture interests).
Another basic problem is noted in the restrictive scope of the 
agreement. Plastic explosives have been identified as requiring a 
regulatory framework simply because it is these substances which have 
been perceived as having caused a great many deaths in a short and 
recent time period. This correct observation fails to recognise that 
many other dangerous compounds cannot be located with conventional X- 
ray and metal detection techniques and require to be given similar 
attention. Among these items can be listed simple but deadly
incendiary' devices which are perfectly capable of causing fatal fires
on board aircraft. poisons which could achieve the same end result in
less violent ways, non-fissile nuclear materials which could be lodged 
in aircraft and made to exude radiation on passengers and crew over 
long periods and even nuclear bombs (a highly unlikely, but 
increasingly possible option which should not be discounted in future 
years). Although it should never be denied that it would be
impossible to guard against all dangerous substances being developed 
and used by terrorists, it should also be stressed that a grave danger 
exists of states concentrating on one high-publicity threat at the 
expense of many others.
An inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the 
formation of a new regime can only acquire meaning if it is 
accompanied by enforcement action by concerned major states (ideally 
the Summit Seven and the democratising powers of eastern Europe) and 
is deliberately linked with progressive efforts to develop and install 
new technologies and to improve security techniques of all types at 
locations where preventive activities are required. Having decided 
that a new regime on explosive tagging may still have some positive 
contribution to make in a much broader struggle against political 
violence, it is necessary to consider the options remaining to be
decided upon for any future agreement.
5.2.3. Continuing Difficulties and,Drafting^Opt ions
Although the proposals arrived at by the Sub-Committee contain several 
useful elements, there are other problems yet to be resolved in their 
later stages of development. Chief among these is the need to
formulate agreement on the question of amending the c o n v e n t i o n ’s 
Annexes which would contain necessary information on the explosives 
and taggants covered in the main text. Inevitably, advances in
technology will require a flexible means by which changes to the 
Annexes can be incorporated swiftly and completely, such that the 
document retains its currency and is sufficient to meet the threat
posed by newly-produced plastic explosives. In discussions, three 
possible means of amendment were presented for consideration:
1. amendments would be prepared by the ETC and adopted by the
ICAO Council, thus binding all parties;
2. a conference would be convened, deciding by a two thirds
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majority and requiring individual state ratification of 
decisions to protect s t a t e s ’ sovereignty;
3. the ETC would draft proposals for change which would be sent
to states for their comments; in the absence of objections
the proposals would become operative; otherwise a diplomatic
conference would be called to consider the matter.**
There is no doubt that, taken equally at face value, option one would 
represent the most efficient and clear proposal, but would pose the 
most obvious threat to s t a t e s ’ closely guarded freedom of action. 
Option two is a politically realistic suggestion, but one which is 
cumbersome and unlikely to allow for swift implementation of reform. 
Only option three combines the elements of realism and potential 
" : ' V. nesg to produce a compromise which might still allow for
moderately efficient reform. It is perhaps an indication of the 
difficulty entailed in balancing the factors involved that none of the 
three options (plus a more complex compromise presented by the United 
K i n g d o m ’s member) gained sufficient support to be adopted by the S u b ­
committee.** After referral to a Drafting Group composed of six 
states,** the question was addressed once more and it was decided 
along the lines of option three, above - that amendments proposed by 
the ETC and circulated to States Parties would enter force unless
rejected by a number of States Parties (the number to be decided). 
Objectors would consult with the Commission and, if the disagreement 
remained, could maintain the objection and force the convening of a 
diplomatic conference.*? It was suggested by some Members of the S u b ­
committee that in the interests of "stability and uniformity" even one 
dissenting voice should be enough to call a diplomatic conference.*® 
Although the consequences of this could include a grievous o v e r ­
reliance upon resort to major problem-solving methods for minor
disagreements, it is hard to deny that the maintenance of universal 
consensus on the issue calls for nothing less. Above all, a new 
regime on marking should aim to provide certainty and to prevent 
splintering of opinion on the questions of explosives and taggants. 
Whether such aims are too ambitious will be determined by the states 
themselves, first in the drafting conference and later in the 
operation of the convention.
On a related matter, the Sub-Commit tee was unable to reach agreement 
on the procedural code to be followed by the Commission and decided 
(by its only indicative vote - twelve to six) that the Draft
Convention should contain no guidance on the E T C ’s Rules of Procedure, 
which it noted could be formulated after the agreement had come into
fo r c e . * ’ In the absence of such a provision, it would be impossible
J9/j/90, pp. 9 - 10.
* * I b i d .
, p. 13.
*? Draft Convention, Article VI, in LC/5C~MEX-REF0RT, 19/1/90, Ibid.
j9/j/9D, fbfd., p. 17.
, p. 15.
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to predict how the Commission might take its decisions and, in 
particular, what voting procedures it might adopt. This would not 
constitute a significant problem for a body empowered only to produce 
recommendations of no binding force, but it could lead to embarrassing 
disagreements and delay if the Commission were given the capacity to 
formulate more concrete, and thus more politically-divisive standards. 
For this reaon it would be wiser for the drafting conference to settle 
upon a firm set of Rules of Procedure in advance of the formation of 
the ETC.
Another issue still to be decided upon is the location in the 
convention of definitions of such key terms as "explosives", "marking 
of explosives" and "detection agent". One option presented by the 
Sub-Committee is to place definitions in the Annex section, thus 
allowing changes to be accommodated with ease, provided a streamlined 
mechanism could be arrived at for producing necessary changes when 
needed. Another is to include a definitions section in the first 
article of the document, so as to become a concretised and less easily 
amended piece of international legislation. A useful compromise,
<Luigesl i'd in the 5 u b • ,i‘ ' be to include fun'i . n,. ? ' i 1 y
important aspects of definitions in Article 1 but to leave the
potentially changable details for the more pliable Annexes.*®
One worrying feature of the Sub-Committee's draft "Alternative A" 
which should not be permitted to be retained at the diplomatic
conference is its reliance upon one means of security screening and a 
single mode of tagging. According to this wording, the marking of 
explosives would cover only the introduction of "an additional
component which vaporizes, rendering the explosive detectable by gas 
analysis methods." By the same rationale, detection agents would 
constitute nothing more than "a substance having sufficient vapour 
pressure, which is introduced into an explosive as an additional 
component to render it detectable by gas analysis methods."**
It is unreasonable and unwise to place too much confidence in any one 
detection system - and particularly in gas analysis. At present, the 
use of the technique is hampered by the low success rates and/or the 
high false alarm rates of some models, plus the lengthy process of 
analysis and the high costs of others. Instead, the inclusion of a 
variety of taggants would make detection more predictable. If, for 
example, metal filings could be added. X-ray and metal detection 
systems (both of which are much more commonly used than gas analysis 
at airports) could be employed for the purpose. To overcome the 
problem the diplomatic conference could follow drafting “Alternative 
B" by leaving the convention silent on the details of explosives, 
taggants and detection possibilities, only to place them in detailed 
Annexes, which could be amended as required.
It was agreed by the Sub-Committee that an important feature of the 
new regime of explosives standardisation should be a continued
* ® 7 b J c / . p p .  13 - 14; Draft Convention, Alternatives A and 8.
Article 1, in LC/$C~NEX~REPORT, Ibid.
** Draft Convention, Alternative A, Article 1(2) and (3), in LC~$C~
148
reliance upon existing security apparatus in use at places of 
sensitivity, such as airports.*? This decision reflects a common
contemporary inability to predict future trends in security 
technology. At a time when new generations of security apparatus are 
promised, it is difficult - if not impossible - to guage to
effectiveness of these infant systems. It also signifies an awareness 
that different nations will always use different levels of security 
dependent upon factors such as wealth, threats faced and passenger 
throughput. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the Sub-Committee 
gave current technology such high priority without also stating the 
necessary accompanying fact that in future the detection of plastic 
explosives will require faster, more efficient equipment. This issue 
will be discussed below in the context of apparatus currently being 
refined and introduced into operation.
5.3. The Inadequacies of Traditional Security Screening
5,3,1, Manual Searching
It has already been noted above that the original techniques used in 
passenger screening prior to the development of technical means of
security were those which depended upon labour-intensive and time- 
consuming physical examination of the baggage and persons of
travellers. Even after the introduction of advanced systems, however, 
the physical approach continues to play a significant role in all 
security strategies, because it is regarded as the ultimate 
determinant of innocence with any suspicious object or person. Also, 
there is a deterrent effect in hand searching a proportion of baggage 
irrespective of prior screening indicators, as this can add a 
potential tier of possible security activity for a terrorist to 
consider when planning an attack.
Whenever technical devices have indicated that a danger may exist in 
the form of an unidentified object, it is the responsibility of 
security personnel to undertake a full inspection to ensure that the 
passenger in question cannot enter an aircraft with suspicious 
articles. For that reason it is crucial that staff be able to make a 
swift search in a dignified yet rigorous way and know what objects 
might be capable of concealing weapons and explosives. Unfortunately, 
not all terrorists use as their locus of concealment the more obvious 
hiding places, such as hollowed-out books and soft toys. Instead, the 
malleable properties of plastic explosives allow potent bombs to be 
constructed and placed, for example, behind the lining of a suitcase, 
with the compound rolled to minute thicknesses and attached to the 
walls of the case.
The security dilemma which is presented by this development is of 
special interest because it effectively renders unworkable as an 
operational absolute the use of baggage hand searching, traditionally 
viewed as the only foolproof method of back-up to fallable technical 
means. The piece of baggage which Nezar Hindawi packed with plastic 
explosives in an attempt to sabotage an El A 1 Boeing 747 on 17 April 
1986 was passed by BAA security staff because the b a g ’s false bottom, 
which concealed a compartment containing approximately three pounds of
I9/j/9D, Ibid., P. 7.
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plastic explosive in sheet form, was not discovered. A pocket 
calculator which held a small quantity of plastic explosive, a timer 
and an initiating blasting cap, was adjusted in such a way as to make 
it fully functioning, were it to be investigated.*®
Plastic explosive devices concealed within electrical and electronic 
articles were uncovered by police in the Federal Republic of Germany 
in October 1988, during a raid on premises known to be used by the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP- 
6C). Some of the devices, including a Toshiba "Bombeat 4 5 3 “ radio- 
recorder, contained altitude switches, as used in more advanced 
aircraft bombs (although PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril insisted that 
they were intended for attacks on road vehicles in mountainous areas).** Within the Bombeat was hidden a piece of plastic explosive 
measuring 180 mm x 60 mm x 22 mm and weighing 300 grammes, yet this 
block was itself disguised by a paper covering bearing a realistic 
Toshiba trade mark and the description, "SX 225 BW 3 - W e g - K o m p a k t - B o x ." 
Elsewhere in the electrical parts an electronic timing device was 
found, covered with another Toshiba label, making it appear to be a 
legitimate component.**
In the investigation of the bomb discovery, various electrical goods 
were removed from the PFLP-GC base to police offices. While one of 
these, containing a bomb which had not been recognised, was being 
examined by a trained police officer it exploded, killing him and injuring a colleague. Difficulties of recognition are not unique to 
police departments: it would have been completely understandable for
comparatively poorly trained security staff working to a tight 
screening schedule to have given the Bombeat or a similar explosive 
device security clearance.
Even allowing two major assumptions to be made, first that a terrorist 
was to attempt to infiltrate such a device in hand baggage and second 
that time was to permit a security officer to dismantle it for a 
detailed physical inspection, it is unlikely that anyone without reasonable proficiency in the electronic sciences would be in a 
position to identify the disguised bomb components. With a bomb 
concealed in the dense circuitry of personal computers or even simply 
following the specifications of the Bombeat device and dispatched by terrorists to the safety of hold baggage, it is also unlikely that it 
would be prevented from reaching one of an a i r c r a f t ’s baggage sections. Only trained eyes and informed minds would be likely to 
find the Bombeat features which Wilkinson has identified as being 
suspicious:
"[Security personnel] might have been able to spot the clue that
when x-rayed the radio-cassette player bomb appeared to contain
more wiring than normal. But only careful manual inspection
* ®Vincent (1989), p . 7.
**For a detailed description of the bomb see S. Emerson and B. Duffy 
The Fail of Pan Am Î03 (London: Futura, 1990), pp. 193 - 194.
**Bundesk.riminalamt, Getarnte Sprengvorrichtung, eingebaut in einem 
Padiorecorder. (Wiesbaden: BKA, 1988), pp. 2 - 4.
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would have been able to detect the more obvious clues notified by 
the West Germans: the aerial jack plug was taped to the side of
the radio and there was no wire attached to the jack plug;
additional batteries and explosive material were not secured 
inside the radio-cassette player, and these loose items rattled 
inside the set if it was rotated. There is only one airline in
the world operating the rigorous search methods that would have
been likely to spot such a device without any prior warning and 
briefing as to what to look for and that is El A 1. The rest of 
the w o r l d ’s civil aviation security systems simply do not have 
the technology or the human skills and knowledge to prevent
another Lockerbie from happening tomorrow."**
Perhaps of even greater concern is the fact that radio equipment had 
been used to house lethal bombs on more than one previous occasion. 
On 21 February 1970, the casing of a radio was used to conceal a bomb
which destroyed an Austrian Airlines Caravelle.*? Fifteen years
later, an Air India Boeing 747 broke up in flight after a radio bomb 
detonated in one of its baggage holds.*® Because little progress 
appears to have been made in detecting concealed explosive devices, 
analysis must now be made of the problems encountered by technical 
security apparatus in locating threatening plastic items.
5.3,2. Metal Detection
It is axiomatic to note that any means of detection which is based
specifically on identifying metallic compounds will find no 
application in the search for suspicious non-metal lie substances. 
Metal detection was introduced instead as an entirely safe and 
uncontroversial method of verifying that passengers are not concealing 
undesirable objects about their persons prior to boarding an aircraft. 
In the early 1970s. when technologically-based screening was first
being introduced systematically, the length of time required to frisk
**Wilkinson (1989) IV, pp. 5 - 6 .  W i l k i n s o n ’s suspicions were 
confirmed when Mr Alan Feraday, a leading British explosives 
expert, testified to the Fatal Accident Inquiry concerning the 
Lockerbie incident that standard physical inspection and X-ray 
screening of the device used could have been expected to have found 
no indication of the presence of an improvised explosive device. 
The Glasgow Herald, Tuesday 23 October 1990. p. 7. Note also that 
in June 1990, a British Airways security staff member cleared the 
baggage of Or Jim Swire despite it containing a device modelled on 
the widely publicised bomb design believed to have been used in the 
Pan Am flight 103 atrocity. At the time of the i n f i l t r a t i o n ’s 
disclosure, the carrier claimed that the employee responsible had 
taken pity on Dr Swire (whose daughter had been killed in the 
Lockerbie blast) and hence had not initiated a full scale search of 
his belongings. Whether this was the case, or else security 
systems simply failed to detect the replica, the example served as 
an indictment of the search philosophy utilised. The Sunday 
Telegraph, Sunday 1 July 1990, p. 1.
*?Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 69.
* ®Jiwa ( 1986), pp 38 - 41.
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and Inspect each individual was deemed to be too great for the flow of 
passengers which was then developing.
For this reason, "walk through" archway metal detectors (AMDs) were 
introduced which used a magnetic field to detect metals. Brian 
Prosser, General Manager of the UK based security technology firm 
Aviation Engineering International Aeradio, has described the very 
basic technology involved in this first generation of devices:
"The early metal detection gateways utilized continuous-wave techniques in which the amount of metal passing through them was 
detected by the size of the disturbance induced in the field, set UP between transmitting and receiving colls. This method 
demanded some skill from the operator in the setting up and interpretation of the readings, and also tended to respond more 
to ferrous metals than non-ferrous obje c t s . " * ’
If the field were to be disturbed by the passage through it of ferrous 
compounds, a detector would notify security operatives with a sound- based and/or a visual alarm signal, indicating that the passenger 
should be given closer inspection. In time, this first generation of 
device was superseded by more advanced technology which Identified 
many more types of metallic compound present around and within the 
bodies of passengers, rather than merely those which contained magnetic iron compounds. Also, much smaller amounts of metal were 
able to be found (sometimes less than 10 grammes) by the more advanced systems.?* Pulse techniques came to be recognised as a useful means 
by which metal detection could be achieved because of their active 
determination of metal types and sizes through monitoring the response 
of the matter being screened to the electro-magnetic pulse field 
c r e a t e d .? ^
A difficulty with AMD techniques is the danger of "blind spots" and 
sensitivity variations within the field of the device. Recent reports 
of security agents being able to pass undetected through AMDs with 
handguns affixed to their ankles illustrates the need for magnetic 
fields to operate from floor level to well above average head
height.?? The thoroughness with which passengers are screened using 
hand held detectors is equally vital to ensure, by educating and
monitoring security personnel in their utilisation. Although a 
portable device must be of a high sensitivity to be able to locate 
small amounts of metal quickly in a secondary search - an ability to locate as little as five grams of metal at five centimeters is areasonable specification?® - it must also be used discretely, so as
not to embarrass or offend passengers being subjected to its scan.
**B. Prosser, "Aviation Security Systems have Grown to Match the 
Threat," JC4D Bulletin October 1985, p. 25.
’’Publicity material for Graseby Security Ltd., 1990.
?iProsser (1985), p. 25.
?*Interview with Canadian security expert, London, UK, 1 April 1989. 
?®ECAC (1988), paragraph 3.2.2 a).
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Metal detection is a low cost means of screening passengers, with one 
brand of AMDs costing only £3,200 and hand-held units being priced at 
between £100 and £200.?* The simplicity of metal detection has much 
to commend it, requiring neither special skills from nor detailed 
analysis by security staff, who need only act upon the alarm of the 
detector. The sensitivity of AMDs can be adjusted, so as to prevent 
staff from being forced to hand search each passenger carrying 
coinage, cosmetics packaging and other common metallic objects of low 
mass. As Dorey has noted:
"The level of the range of sensitivity can usually be adjusted to 
ignore small objects of a pre-determined size, but to produce an 
alarm when a larger metal item, such as a weapon. is moved 
through the magnetic field.
Another variable factor is the frequency of the field. Hi oh 
frequencies are able to provide greater signals from small
objects made from copper, brass, aluminium and silver which have 
high conductivity, than from larger weights of metal such as iron 
and steel, which have low conductivity. Some walk through 
detectors operate on a low frequency to detect the higher
metallic masses, whilst high frequency hand-held units are used 
subsequently to locate the suspect item with greater precision. 
One airport type detector operates within the range of 100 Hz 
800Hz, thus covering both the low and high frequency range...The 
latest walk-through machines using pulse techniques are capable 
of detecting the smallest quantity of ferrous and non-ferrous 
m e t a l .
When calibrated to alert staff of the presence of metallic matter 
larger than small objects which might normally be expected to be found
in pockets, such as keys and coins, a throughput rate of up to 1,200
passengers per hour is reasonable to expect from an advanced AMD.?* 
This figure would, however, require the addition of several staff to 
facilitate on-site physical searches and body frisks, with a personnel 
member exclusively overseeing the AMD,
A problem which applies to metal detection is, of course, the 
inability of the devices to detect non-metal lie compounds such as 
plastic explosives. Most bombs require some form of built-in 
detonation, which in the majority of cases will require some metallic 
components to be present, either in the form of wires, tubes for 
containing an initiating charge, metal striking mechanisms, timers, 
batteries or springs.?? Although it is certainly possible to 
calibrate the most advanced metal detectors in such a way as to detect 
even tiny amounts of metal in, for example, paper clips or staples, it 
would be inevitable that such a calibration would result in virtually 
every passenger requiring to undergo further types of screening.
’^Publicity material for Graseby Security Ltd., 1990. 
?*Dorey (1983), pp. 233 - 234.
?*ECAC (1988), paragraph 3.2.1 b) 8).
??Dorey (1983), p. 238.
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Any significant reduction in sensitivity of screening devices would 
redefine their purpose from being largely preventive to being largely 
deterrent, because practical effectiveness would be subordinated to a 
lesser power merely to intimidate. This must imply that badly
equipped prospective offenders will be likely to find the very
presence of an AMD of indeterminate calibration a daunting test of 
their d e v i c e s ’ construction and their nerve, but that, conversely, 
those confident of their d e v i c e s ’ powers of evasion will not he 
diverted from their intended course of action.
As efforts to desensitise an AMD will, by definition, result in a 
lowering of its capacity to find small metallic objects, it is the 
entirely impossible task of security managers to determine an 
efficient level of operation which also provides sufficient 
sensitivity for the discovery of detonation devices, the minimum size 
of which can never be predicted in advance. The question of
sensitivity and the problem of false alarms will be dicussed below in 
the context of new security technologies.
As an alternative scenario, terrorists could confound metal detectors 
with ease, simply by placing their advanced explosive devices in small 
personal stereo cassette tape players or other such metallic objects 
carried in clothing. If an alarm were to sound on passing through the 
archway, security staff might either retain the object (while the
person carrying it made a second passage through the field)
subsequently to return it, unaware of its identity, or else they might 
feed the object into an X-ray unit, which might be unable to form an 
image of the plastic explosives. Only a detailed and overly time- 
consuming physical search of such objects or an outright ban on 
carrying electrical and electronic items could come close to reducing 
this form of danger. Clearly, metal detection alone cannot be 
expected to provide a solution to the problem of terrorist technology 
a d v a n c e s .
Another worrying innovation which strikes at the effectiveness of 
metal detection processes concerns the threat from would-be hijackers 
who seek to evade detection of arms. Original screening devices have 
proved to be powerless to counter the development of low density arms 
and ammunition which have been used in a limited number of hijack
attempts. An early, though highly advanced, example of this
phenomenon is to be identified in the hijacking by Patrick Arguello 
and Leila Khaled of an El A 1 Boeing 707 on 6 September 1970. First
generation metal detection equipment was already in use by the airline
at the time of the incident, though it failed to detect the customised 
weaponry with which the terrorists had been supplied:
"Arguello was armed with one hand grenade and a revolver, all 
made from non-ferrous metals. Weapons without steel in their 
construction need a special machine to detect them. Leila was
armed with two grenades.
The grenades looked like cans; cylindrical, smooth and
straight-sided. They were packed with high explosives. S.ix 
inches long and one-and-a-half inches in diameter. The firing 
mechanism was similar to a Mills bomb: a handle locked into a
plunger on the top by a pin. The plunger was connected to a 
detonator on a four-second fuse by a spring.
A r g u e l l o ’s revolver had started life as an Italian starting
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pistol, made to fire blanks. Now it could fire ,22 revolver 
cartridges. Someone, somewhere had drilled out the barrel and 
the twelve chambers and replaced all the steel parts. even the 
screws, with plastic. The gun was also of small calibre and low 
velocity to minimize damage to the structure of an aircraft."?®
In the years subsequent to the D a w s o n ’s Field crisis, which was 
sparked by the El A 1 hijacking, research and development schemes were 
carried out by arms producers in West Europe and the United States to 
develop lightweight but effective handguns which would be largely or 
totally composed of synthetic materials and so would be immune from 
conventional detection screening processes, would be easily cleaned 
and would be resistant to corrosion. By the early 1980s western 
military forces had taken delivery of the new firearms. which were 
prized for their low weight and for the ease with which they could be 
c o n c e a l e d . ? ’ In 1986 tests of some of these weapons, proved that arms 
technology had exceeded that of detection, when plastic handguns 
failed to be identified in typical screening p r o c e s s e s . ® ’ By 1990, 
more than one producer had developed a handgun which features no 
metallic components whatsoever, relying instead on an undetectable 
super-hardened polymer.®* In addition to plastic handguns, research 
is also being undertaken by Japanese scientists into the possibility 
of using low density ceramics as a medium for weapons production.®?
The particular danger of hijackers using non-metal lie weapons was 
highlighted on 17 March 1986, when a Soviet-born prospective passenger 
carried an Austrian "Glock 1 7 “ nine millimetre handgun and 126 rounds 
of ammunition through a US National Airport security checkpoint 
without their being detected, in an attempt to take them on board a 
People Express aircraft.®? This security failure is of particular 
concern as the weapon contained (in addition to its light, plastic 
body) several dense, metallic components - its barrel, slide and 
spring - which, in theory, could have been detected. It is immaterial 
that the Glock contains "a great big chunk of steel", as one FAA 
official described it, if that steel is sufficiently discrete as to
?®P. Snow and D. Phillips, Leîîa^s Hijack Har (London: Pan, 1970), 
P. 10.
?’M. Biaggi, Testimony in Support of H.R. 4 223 Dealing with Nonmetal 
Firearms Presented Before the House Subcommittee on Crime bv the 
Honorable Mario Biaggi of New York, May 15 1986, P. 2, issued as 
part of a press release received by the International Foundation of 
Airline Passengers Associations, Spring 1987.
® ’Press release from Representative Mario Biaggi, 16 April 1987, d. 
30.
®*Clutterbuck (1990) I, p, 53 : Goodoaster (1986), p. 25.
®?/ir Travel Journal, 23 January - 5 February 1987, p. 7.
®?Biaggi, open letter to US Congressmen: Tools of Terrorism: Plastic
Handguns, 30 January 1987, contained in press release received by
IFAPA; Biaggi, 15 May 1986, p. 2.
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pass undetected through screening checks.®* Even if the barrel, slide 
or spring had triggered an alarm, it is foreseeable that a poorly
trained security operative simply might not have the ability to 
recognise that the isolated components of a disassembled Glock were 
actually part of a weapon.
In 1986, US journalist, Jack Anderson reported that Col. Muammar a 1 
Qadhafi of Libya had ordered several hundred of the polymer-based 
Glock 17s, a 9 mm weapon which can fire 17 rounds of ammunition and 
which retails at $440 (US),®® By that time, over 10,000 Glocks had 
been imported legally into the United States, to the dismay of US 
Congressman Mario Biaggi, who had previously co-authored legislation 
outlawing armour-piercing ammunition in the United States,®* against 
opposition from arms lobbyists. Biaggi gained publicity when, in
February 1986, he obtained a Glock and infiltrated it through both X- 
ray and metal detection apparatus at the US Capitol, despite the 
weapon containing some 19 ounces of metallic components.®? As he 
later noted in the House of Representatives, when promoting his 
ultimately unsuccessful Bill for a production, importation and sales
ban on undetectable firearms in the commercial market:
"Simply put, firearms technology has far surpassed the limits of 
our weapon detection systems and unless that gap is closed, law 
enforcement will be waging a losing battle against terrorism."®®
Biaggi's observation of firearms technology could justifiably be 
extended to cover all areas of arms and explosives development. 
Moreover, the screening predicament which he correctly identified 
concerns more than merely metal detection processes.
The adaptation of medical X-ray techniques for aviation security 
purposes was an important advance for passenger security, as it 
permitted a well-established and simple mode of screening to be 
introduced to the problematic airport environment. In principle, if 
X-ray beams are passed through objects, the a r t i c l e s ’ constituent 
compounds of different densities will attenuate - that is, absorb 
proportions of - the beams in different ways. If the residual 
radiation traces are then measured by a bank of diodes, a photographic 
or electronically generated "shadow" image of the o b j e c t s ’ contents 
can be produced, providing that the compounds involved are not so 
dense as to have absorbed the entire beam or, conversely, are so 
molecularly light as to scatter the rays, producing an indistinct
Aviation I4eek and Space Technology, 16 January 1989 (reprint). 
®®4ir Travel Journal, 23 January - 5 February 1987, p. 1.
' ’Biaggi, 15 May 1986, p. 1.
®?W.A. Crenshaw (1987), p. 90.
®®M. Biaggi, Congressional Record - House, 25 March 1987, p. H 1594 
contained in press release to IFAPA.
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shado w g r a p h . * ’ Although such a weakness severely limits the 
effectiveness of traditional X-ray systems, these units remain popular 
with airports and carriers partly because, like metal detection 
apparatus, they are inexpensive to purchase and o p e r a t e . ’ ’
Since the early 1 9 7 0 ’s when X-ray detection was first introduced to
airports on a large scale, research and development efforts have been 
on-going with the intention of refining the technique, making it more
effective and extending its scope of ability. As Dorey has observed,
three types of X-ray technology came to be used as screening equipment 
at airports:
"1. Pulse X-ray
A low dose pulse of X-rays impinges upon the article being 
placed in the path of the beam and this shot is transferred 
to an image retention panel, from which it is electronically 
retrieved and transmitted to a television monitor for 
viewing.
2. Flying spot X-ray
A low dose, vertically moving ’flying s p o t ’ of x-ray 
radiation about 3 mm wide scans baggage placed on a moving
belt or conveyor as it passes a predetermined point. An
image is sequentially built u p  on an image retention panel, 
and when the object has wholly passed the panel, the complete 
picture is transmitted to a television monitor for viewing.
3. Constant potential X-ray
These machines may be of the high dose variety or have an 
adjustable range typically between 50 Kv and 200 Kv at a tube 
current of 5 mA. The article under surveillance is subjected 
to radiation for the whole of the period it is held in a 
cabinet, where the generator is operated by the closure of a 
door. Otherwise, the continuous X-ray beam is switched on 
when the photo-electric detector senses the presence of an 
article on a moving conveyor. The X-ray image can be viewed 
directly through the fluorescent screen or from a television 
monitor on to which the picture is projected. ... A constant- 
potential machine producing a real time image is essential to 
detect liquids such as alcohol and petrol b o m b s . " ’ *
The first generation of apparatus relied on "direct viewing" of 
objects by staff via a fluorescent screen. The addition of a 
television camera focussed on the screen relieved operatives of the 
hazards of direct viewing, by allowing them to watch a monitor located 
at a safe distance from any source of radiation. Unfortunately, at 
least one manufacturer decided that by locating the monitor be side the
*’ A/ew Scient 1 st, 7 January 1989, p. 23; Aviation Neek and Space 
Technology, 28 April 1986, p. 31.
’’One manufacturer advertised in 1990 a conventional X-ray system of 
high specification for £5,595. Publicity material for Graseby 
Security L t d . , 1990.
’ *Dorey (1983), pp. 223 - 224.
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c h a m b e r ’s entry point a useful feature could be incorporated which 
would "allow the operator also to control the loading of bags into the 
m a c h i n e . " ’ ? While this certainly provided a cost-saving benefit for 
airports and carriers, it also encouraged over-reliance on one member 
of staff who could not reasonably be expected simultaneously to 
monitor the X-ray readings and the baggage flow. This form of 
managerially-inspired negligence remains one of the most frequently 
observed security flaws at airports.
Computer-driven digital storage and adaptation of X-ray images soon 
replaced televised imaging as the state of the art means of displaying 
scanning information. This resulted in a higher contrast p i c t u r e , 
accompanied by a decrease in the amount of electronic noise. Overall 
quality over previously used analog storage systems was thus improved. 
Another advantage of using digital means of information supply is that 
the array of linear X-ray sensors can be aligned around the screening 
chamber to produce a complete image, unobtainable with ordinary 
c a m e r a s . ’ ?
The aforementioned conventional and familiar systems operate according 
to the same physical principles and produce monochrome images of low 
quality which require operators to study their viewing screens closely 
for suspicious signs. This level of technology is i n a d e q u a t e , being 
unable to reveal sophisticated devices and relying too greatly on the 
questionable skills of security staff. A feature often rated by 
manufacturers as being invaluable to screening staff is the ability of 
modern apparatus to produce "zoomed" close-up images of a section of 
baggage as well as of the entire object. Although definite 
theoretical benefits accrue from this, in practice the utility of the 
feature must be questioned. As screening staff have only two to three 
seconds to look at each shadowgraph, there is doubt that they can 
first scan each image visually, detect a possibly suspicious object, 
increase the magnification and examine the image more closely without 
drastically reducing efficiency.
The effectiveness of X-ray techniques can be described in terms of two 
factors: penetration, or the ability of a unit to present a useful
image of dense matter when lesser systems would show it only as a 
black mark; and resolution, the capacity to display thin objects 
c l e a r l y . ’ * ECAC specifications for X-ray equipment suggest that the 
ability to penetrate six millimetres of steel and to resolve as little 
as 0.16 millimetres of solid copper wire should be viewed as minimum 
acceptable performance lev e l s . ’ ® In practice, X-ray systems able to 
resolve 0.10 millimetres of solid copper wire and penetrate twelve 
millimetres of steel can easily be i d e n t ified.’*
’ ?Prosser (1985), p. 25.
’?A. Kotowski, IC/jD Bulletin, October 1986, p. 23.
, p. 22.
’ ®ECAC (1988), paragraphs 3.3 a) 4) and b) 5). 
’ ^Publicity material for Heimann, 1990.
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Even assuming that the object being screened is of a density which can 
be displayed for the security officer to observe, the task of 
identifying suspicious articles can still be daunting. The often 
ambitious aim of officers watching shadow images of baggage being 
passed through X-ray machines is to discern differences in shading 
(normally over a range of grey) which might reveal dense, metallic 
objects, such as arms, wires and det o n a t o r s , ’ ? Advances in arms and 
explosives technology and the increasing availability of modern bomb 
components have further compounded screening problems.
With traditional X-ray t e c h n i q u e s , ’ ® low density compounds, such as 
plastics and nitrogen-based explosives, do not normally absorb beams 
of electromagnetic radiation sufficiently well to be traced by the 
appartus and displayed in shadow form for observing security staff to 
note. Even if they were to be displayed, in the rush of processing 
many bags, most security staff would probably find their images to be 
indistinguishable from those of ordinary articles around them.
The aim of security staff.to locate suspect materials by using X-ray 
technology has always been complicated by the tendency of terrorists 
to disguise the objects which they desire to transfer through security 
points (such as when concealing explosive devices inside electrical, 
electronic or battery operated equipment, or when packing handguns so 
that they will be screened along an unrecognisable axis). Problems in 
screening are also caused by the presence in the majority of bags of 
metallic objects which produce unwanted electronic "noise", confusing 
the information instantaneously being received and analysed by staff. 
In turn this can lead to physical searches requiring to be undertaken, 
if security teams operate diligently, or else for suspect baggage to 
be permitted to pass by, in the interests of swift facilitation.
During the period before concealable, solid state electronics and advanced explosives, a reasonable objective behind X-ray screening was 
to reduce dependency upon lengthy and possibly cursory hand searches. Even under such comparatively favourable circumstances, It was still deemed necessary by aviation authorities to corroborate the findings 
of X-ray screening staff by mandating the additional hand-searching of 
a proportion of baggage (typically around 1 0 % ) . ’ ’ Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the widespread adoption of X-ray technology, the 
problems of time consumption and effectiveness were not completely 
avoided, because as with physical Inspection, the role of the 
apparatus operator was still one of active observation and 
intervention, rather than one merely of response only to a warning 
signal from the machine (as with metal detection techniques):
"The limiting factor is the number of bags which can be
efficiently scrutinised by a trained guard in twenty minutes.
This is the longest period in any hour that a guard should be
required to gaze at the viewing screen. A 'cosmetic' type
’?Dorey (1983), p. 221.
**For a full description of the first three generations of X-ray 
devices see Dorey (1983), pp. 223 - 232.
’ ’ECAC (1988); par a g r a p h  2.3.1.5. b).
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security screening is quite easy to achieve in allowing baggage
to pass through a conveyorised machine at the rate of 1000-1400 bags per hour (3.6 - 2.6 sec each) claimed by some manufacturers. 
It is doubtful whether a guard can view the picture of the baggage contents, interpret what he sees and make a decision in 
less than five seconds, which equates to 720 bags per hour. This 
is the standard viewing time stipulated by the British Department 
of Trade. The faster the speed of the belt, the higher will be 
the rejection rate by a conscientious guard - who should stop the 
flow, have the bags opened, and identify the opaque objects. 
Thus a rejection rate of 30 per cent, which is not unknown, 
effectively reduces the overall speed from a claimed 1000 bags per hour to 700 per h o u r . ”*®*
At least one producer, Astrophysics (the market leader in airport security X-ray units, with 92 per cent of US sales*®*) has publicised 
a processing speed of 2,000 items per hour for one of its X-ray products, the Linescan System Eight device. The quoted rate equates to an exceptionally rapid screening time of 1.8 seconds per item, 
which must cause concern that screening staff operating the machinery 
at that optimal rate would be unable to make a reasonable risk assessment from images received.*®? Instead of advertising with pride 
the maximum conveyor speed of equipment, manufacturers would be well advised to consider promoting a speed which can permit practical human judgements to be made. Otherwise, such devices are in danger of being treated by managers and operatives alike as tools of swift facilitation, rather than of painstaking security. In such 
situations, the screening equipment becomes a tool merely of deterrence and public relations, with the devices serving to discourage less able potential attackers and to build confidence in 
the travelling public. Both of these purposes can be discounted once an act of air crime takes place despite the equipment having been used.
In addition to human constraints, advances of technology have caused
difficulties for conventional X-ray machinery. Since terrorists have realised that effective bombs can be constructed from simple, easily accessible components and concealed, for example, amid the electronic 
and electrical contents of radio and recording equipment, the aim of 
finding suspicious objects at all has ceased to be so nearly viable.
*®®Dorey (1983), p. 225. Despite a proven need for staff to be rotated around different duties, observation of security teams at airports often reveals a tendency for one person to operatescreening apparatus for very long periods of time. In 1989, a US
security employee disclosed that at least one company operated a
policy of retaining personnel on X-ray machines, without any form 
of rotation. Condê Na$t Traveler, March 1989, p. 36. Other evidence suggests that some airports merely rotate staff from one screening machine to another without an intervening break. E.
Morris and A. Hoe with J. Potter, Terrorism - Threat and Response 
(London; Macmillan, 1987), p. 70.
*®*W.A. Crenshaw (1987), p. 140, f. 36,
*®’Publicity material for Astrophysics, 1990.
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Instead of looking for the shadow images of such components as
conspicuous wiring and large, dense batteries, operatives are nowunrealistically expected to be able to identify such articles as tiny 
detonators, inconspicuous power cells and explosive compounds which
under certain circumstances will be almost, or totally, undetectable using most existing security techniques.
It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the existing security screening technology and techniques of physical searching by se m i ­skilled or unskilled staff, metal detection and conventional X-radiography, are each insufficient to guarantee an appropriate level of security for airline passengers. Technological and other possible 
advances which might improve the in d u s t r y ’s capacity to detect modern, state of the art weaponry will be dealt with below, in conjunction with a discussion of the unfounded presuppositions which inhibit politicians and security administrators from better promoting the true 
interests of security. One such presupposition which typifies the lack of understanding of many within the industry states that current security systems - if operated diligently - would be sufficient to prevent terrorist attack. This found expression after the February 
1989 ICAO Council meeting on security, in the form of a statement from 
UK Transport Secretary Paul Channon:
"Let us agree that as much checked baggage as possible will now 
be screened at the check in and when transferred between flights 
by X-rays, supplemented by a specified minimum level of hand s e a r c h i n g . "* * ?
As terrorists had ably demonstrated to the Secretary of State their ability to conceal devices from X-ray and hand searching, Shannon's sentiments must have been designed to allay the p u b l i c ’s genuine fears of attack, rather than realistically to promote higher short term standards of screening accuracy. They can only be dismissed as an irresponsible public relations exercise which disguised the true nature of the crisis being faced and which sought to avoid addressing 
the obvious problems of aviation security.
In a later section, the development of X-ray security techniques will 
be discussed further, in the context of new technology which has revolutionised the method.
5.4, C o nolu s ion
There is no doubt that conventional security screening devices found at most airports are obsolescent. If, however, further evidence of failure by security teams in major aviation powers is required, the findings of the US General Accounting Office in its report of July to 
US Secretary of Transportation, Elizabeth Dole, should be 
consulted.*** In assessing the F A A ’s rules on security screening, the GAO noted that the A dministration's tests (using metal-based weapons
Aviation Neek and Space Technology, 20 February 1989, p. 117.
***U,S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: FAA Needs
Preboard Screening Performance Standards. July 1987. GAO/RCED-87- 182.
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and devices) produced widely varying results and were based on 
procedures of dubious quality;
"In tests conducted by FAA from September through December 
1986, screening personnel detected approximately 79 percent of 
the test weapons for x-ray tests, 82 percent for metal detector tests, and 81 percent for physical search tests. Detection rates 
varied significantly among FAA regions, ranging from a low of 63 
percent to a high of 99 percent. For major airports, thedetection rate ranged from a low of 34 percent to a high of 99 percent.Moreover, our analysis shows that FAA test results may
overstate the screening process' success in detecting weapons for 
at least two reasons: First, FAA test procedures are designed to
favor detection of test weapons. For example, FAA inspectors are allowed to place only two or three objects such as a sweater,
book, and shirt with a test weapon in the carry-on bag to be
tested in an x-ray device. The tester cannot hide the test
object among other objects in the carry-on bag or place othermetal objects in the bag, as a saboteur might.Second, screening personnel may be aware they are being tested. This is because FAA inspectors in some locations are 
well known to screening station personnel."**®
The post-Lockerbie public outcry over plastic explosives has turned 
public attention yet further to the weaknesses of airport security 
techno 1ogy. It is reasonable to suggest that very many terrorist
groups are aware of the weaknesses inherent in the global system and
will take advantage of them until such time as authorities can successfully introduce more viable technologies and techniques to replace them. The question must arise, therefore, as to the nature of advances which are required throughout the w o r l d ’s aviation networks. The following Chapter shall show that, although weaknesses must always 
remain, a great deal could be achieved by introducing new generations 
of technology as they become available and as they prove their worth. Moreover, affordable security equipment must be made available for 
small airports and carriers as well as large, if terrorist groups are 
to be diverted away from the uniquely vulnerable aviation industry, instead of merely r edistributed throughout it.
**®U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: FAA Needs
Preboard Passenger Performance Standards GAO/RCED-87-182, 1987, p . 
10. For a detailed outline of the test results quoted, see U.S. 
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security : FAA Preboard
Passenger Screening Test Resuits GA0/RCED-87-125FS, 1987, pp. 8 - 18.
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CH APTER 6 
T Q W M D S .  AN AUTOM A T ED INT E GRATED EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEM
"The major threat to civil aviation today is from sabotage bombing using plastic explosives, such as Semtex. Yet our 
airports do not have equipment installed which is capable of 
detecting plastic explosives. This is not because the technology 
to do this is not available. There are some excellent thermal neutron activation systems in prototype for example. It is 
because no country or group of countries has yet provided a mass 
produced machine for all its airports."^
"The development of the TNA brings nearer the day when machines 
will be able to show whether or not a bag contains an explosive 
device. Whilst we await the outcome of the TNA experiment with 
interest, we do not consider that technology alone will solve the 
security p r o b l e m . "^
6, 1. Intro due tion
Previous discussion of the weaknesses inherent in security screening 
methods which rely on human intervention prompt the conclusion that 
technological progress should be sought to assist in improving 
capacities and to overcome the unavoidable weaknesses of staff. Such 
a suggestion is supported by the findings of the Ergonomics Society 
which in the late 1980s carried out studies of screening activities 
and found that the accuracy of existing X-ray techniques in disclosing 
the presence of explosives could be as low as 30 per cent and would be 
unlikely to exceed 70 per cent.^ While the Society correctly 
maintains that much could be achieved through improving the work 
procedures and conditions of screening staff, it is equally true to 
suggest that a new direction is called for in the capacity of 
detection processes automatically to pinpoint suspicious substances 
passing through airport terminals and to do so in an efficient manner 
by which false alarms can be minimised and passengers screened swiftly.
W i l k i n s o n ’s reference in the above quote to "countries" is highly
 ^P . Wilkinson, Designing Effective Naticnal Aviation Security 
Systems: The Building Blocks for an Enhanced Global Response,
conference paper (unpublished) presented at ISA / BISA Conference, 
London. 31 March 1989, p. 5.
^House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 6.
^Airports International, January 1990, p. 21.
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appropriate in discussion of research financing for advanced screening 
equipment, because of the great expense involved in attaining new 
standards of detection. C l u t t e r b u c k , too, has drawn attention to the 
increasing need for state involvement in contemporary research and 
development of new technology;
"Most of the research is financed by private firms and potential customers are reluctant to place advance orders or provide money until they are confident that the system is going 
to succeed; the manufacturers will continue research or launch production only if they are confident that they can sell the 
product. In view of the urgency of the need to find new means of 
detecting explosives there is a strong case for governments to 
finance the research and possibly also to provide incentives in 
the form of guaranteed orders dependent on the s y s t e m ’s achieving certain defined levels of performance.'*
A broad range of publicly funded and supported research and 
development schemes is now urgently required in order to create a wide range of low cost, high speed security apparatus which will be 
sufficiently cost-effective in production and operation as to be suited to general introduction. Details of possible joint 
public/private sector funding mechanisms will be discussed below. Several corporations are actively attempting to develop viable new technology in conjunction with government agencies, because it has 
become apparent to marketing executives that the evolution of a new terrorist mode of attack has brought with it a potentially huge market 
for devices intended to counter these dangers. Estimates by analysts Paine-Webber of a market in excess of $ 1 billion (US) have been made 
on account of the number of airports and carriers worldwide which 
might be expected to be equipped with advanced security systems. In 
the United States alone some 1,400 airports could stand to benefit 
from successful development of new technology. According to estimates 
issued by the American Air Transport Association (ATAl, US carriers' expenditure on conventional (inadequate) screening equipment in 1988 
stood at approximately $500 million (US), indicating the scope for 
commercial success for any firm able to augment X-ray and metal detection apparatus with a cost-effective new generation of security devices.*
The issue of escalating costs in equipping airports with highly 
advanced, computer-controlled equipment is one which is bound to cause concern with the industry and with aviation users because of the necessary costs involved. Undoubtedly, a high financial price must be 
paid in order to develop and deploy a new generation of equipment with 
exciting new detection capacities. On the other hand, it must be 
noted that the expense involved can be low when taken as a proportion 
of aviation development costs as a whole or even when compared with certain simple costs.* One major high technology manufacturer has estimated that an airport could equip itself with an advanced neutron
*Clutterbuck (1990) I, p. 59.
The Christian Science Monitor, Thursday 16 February 1989. p. 9 
* Wilkinson (1990) IV, pp. 19 - 20.
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analysis machine for less than the total costs incurred in handling 
one serious aviation bomb threat.?
6. 2 Adyanced Security. E.guipment
6. 2, ,1, Research^Prpblems
It is always difficult to offer an objective assessment of new
te c h n o l o g i e s ’ qualities and to compare the abilities of each with 
others and with existing equipment. One reason for this problem is 
the serious lack of information available to academic researchers. 
Publicity material and press cuttings provided by responding technology firms (used as a source below, though with great caution) provide incomplete information and occasionally biased views, which 
must be treated with a degree of healthy scepticism at all times. The following sections on new technologies are intended simply to present 
the strengths and weaknesses of new security methods.
It should be made clear that no system - however advanced - can
provide perfection in preventing or deterring violent attacks against aviation interests. Commentators and producers can be slow to 
remember this point, sometimes propounding the apparently unbounded virtues of certain new processes or the wholesale failure of others. 
With the former fault, the over-ambitious success claims from manufacturers and the hasty implementation decisions of aviation 
authorities cannot be tolerated if they are incapable of being substantiated by referring to test results or common reason. Equally,
in the case of the latter fault, there is a risk of overlooking thepossibilities of long term advances being made and concentrating instead on current, temporary shortcomings.
Two Idyajic,edEx.p_lo.sives_ D e t e ction Systems
In conjunction with the private s e c t o r ’s commercial interests, the 
public sector of some major aviation states has at least paid lip- service to the needs of aviation security and in a few cases has 
become fully integrated into the research and development quest. Of particular interest is the long-standing and well-resourced programme 
conducted by the FAA to investigate with US corporations new high 
technology approaches to detecting nitrogen-based explosive compounds.* Its somewhat reactive history was succinctly described in January 1989 by scientific journalist, M. Mitchell Waldrop:
"[Tlhe challenge of explosives detection has been well recognised 
for nearly two decades now, during which time the F A A ’s efforts have grown in rough proportion to the perceived magnitude of the 
threat. In 1975, for example, the FAA was designated as the federal g o v e r n m e n t ’s lead agency for explosives detection research in the wake of a bombing at La Guardia Airport. And in 
1985, the FAA greatly accelerated its efforts when the
’Publicity material for SAIC. 1990.
*Most explosives contain a high proportion of nitrogen in their chemical composition, making the element an ideal target for screening systems. McGuire (1989), p. 3.
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destruction of an Air India flight off the coast of Ireland made it apparent that the threat was escalating rapidly. Starting 
from about $1 million per year in the early 1 9 8 0 ' s, funding forthe explosives program peaked at $13.5 million in 1987 as the 
agency went into a prototype demonstration phase for the most 
promising technologies, and now stands at lust over $8 million 
dollars per year."?
6,3_.,1. Thermal Neutron A c t i v a t ion
Since the 1970s, aviation and defence authorities have been aware of 
the need to develop automated detection systems with a specific 
capacity for locating and, if possible, identifying the most elusive Plastic explosives in two distinct locations: inanimate objects; and
around living tissue. The F A A ’s active interest in this quest led it 
to invest its explosives detection budget in the research and 
development of two independent systems - neutron activation and 
c h e m i l u m i n e s c e n c e . Each of these rely on physical, atomic properties 
of the component elements of nitrogen-based compounds, which include 
virtually all industrial and military explosives currently used by 
aviation terrorists.
The former, and more readily advanced of these techniques, originally 
named Thermal Neutron Analysis and now known as Thermal Neutron Activation (TNA), employs low energy neutrons to achieve a much better penetration of baggage than can be found with X-rays.** In the late 
1 9 7 0 ’s and early 1980's, the F A A ’s project in this field was conducted 
by the Westinghouse Corporation. As the scheme advanced. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) of Sunnyvale, California, was involved, partly because of its Industrial experience 
in developing the technique to measure sulphur presence in coal samples. In 1985, after the Air India incident of that year had 
focussed security planners' attention on the urgent need for progress, SAIC was contracted by the FAA to produce prototype test models of TNA security equipment.**
By 1988, a plan had been formulated to produce and install five TNA 
machines in airports for field tests by the FAA in conjunction with US carriers. These machines alone were expected to cost $8.4 million 
(us) to be financed by the FAA.*% In the aftermath of the Lockerbie Incident, a decision was taken by the F A A ’s A d m i n i s t r a t o r , Allan 
McArtor to accelerate the development of the project by six months and 
to increase the number of field test models to be ordered from five to 
six, in so doing raising the initial production bill to $10 million 
(US). In total, at least $60 million (US) and possibly as much as 
$100 million (US) will have been spent on the entire programme by the
^Science, 15 January 1989 (reprint).
 ^^ Avzation Meek and Space Technology, 3 August 1987, p. 43.
Science, 13 January 1989 (reprint): Bozorgmanesh (1990), p. 1 
**The Neu York Times, Sunday 25 December 1988 (reprint),
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time of its c o m p l e t i o n . *3 In terms of pricing, initial estimates placed TNA at a figure of $1 million (US) although by 1990 this had 
fallen to $750,000 (US), SAIC intends eventually to be able to offer 
the system at $500,000 (US).**
The principles underlying the TNA technique are complex and highly scientific, but can be summarised in the following terms. When 
baggage is placed in the apparatus's exposure chamber, it is surrounded by a field or "cloud" of low energy, thermalised neutrons (generated by a sample of the radioactive isotope, californium-252,** 
and emitted in pulsed fluxes) which "showers" the baggage, resulting 
in the neutrons colliding with molecules contained in the matter being screened. Some of the neutrons enter the n u c H i  of the molecules, 
causing certain of the various chemical elements encountered to react 
in different and specific ways. Very high energy gamma rays are 
emitted, varying in character according to the substances' chemical 
composition. Hence, each chemical element presents its own unique 
"signature" which can be identified by analysis. Nitrogen exhibits 
the most energetic of elements' responses to neutron activation and so 
is an ideal chemical to seek to isolate using this screening process. 
Other elements are also sought in an attempt to identify explosive 
compounds more accurately.**
After the rays have escaped. a ring of detectors receives them for analysis, so as to determine the atomic content of the materials
present in the chamber. With the assistance of a built-in computerused for very advanced data processing, a detailed and accurate 
comparison is made between the information received and the system's electronic memory of information on known explosives' composition. Capable of being programmed to identify an explosive's type and itsmass, the TNA system compares the physical density of a sample with
its nitrogen concentration.*? A key feature of the system is the 
computer's "learning ability" in that it can progressively store 
information about sample types as it is increasingly employed. This 
feature was described by Dr. Had! Bozorgmanesh, Corporate Vice 
President of SAIC, in his statement to the President's Commission on 
Aviation Security and Terrorism:
"The introduction of artificial intelligence, or A I , is a way of saying that the TNA system that we've developed gets smarter the longer it is on the lob. Because of its software,the machine learns and remembers -- over the course of scanning
^^International Herald Tribune, 28 April 1989 (reprint); Aviation 
Meek and Space Technology, 2 January 1989, p. 43; J.R. Wilson,
"Why a Hint of Red Rings Alarm Bells," Jane’s Airport Review, 
June/July 1989, p. 18.
**McGuire (1989), p . 5; Publicity material for SAIC. 1990.
**In newer models, the more reliable and long-lived d e uter ion- 
deuteri on (DO) isotopes are being used. McGuire (1989), p . 4.
**Publicity material for SAIC, 1990. 
*’Wilson (1989), p . 16.
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thousands of bags -- what bags and their contents look like, and 
what various types of planted explosives look like as well. This 
contributes to lowering the "false positive" signals even further 
and allows the experience of one machine to be shared with another TNA machine."**
If the b a g ’s signatures do not approximate to those of the memorised 
explosives, it is deemed to be clear and allowed to continue its 
passage unstopped. If, on the other hand, a signature corresponds 
even roughly to any records of suspect compounds in the computer, the 
bag is diverted for further searches and staff are alerted to the 
identified risk.
Security operatives need make little judgement concerning the nature 
of the t h r e a t , as rejection is automatic, with television screens 
displaying information which shows the likelihood of the nitrogen 
being an explosive component. The system classifies each bag as being 
either "clear" or "unclear", implying that further investigation 
should be undertaken to determine whether or not a threat exists.*? 
Staff are also told whether the compound is in bulk or in sheet form, to facilitate more informed manual investigation, and, on S A I C ’s 
"XENIS" model, can be assisted by the inclusion in the apparatus of X- ray detectors, which are particularly useful for secondary screening 
of "unclear" baggage, so reducing false alarm rates.** Although high contrast, colour imaging of the X-ray picture can be used to illustrate the location of explosives, the m a c h i n e ’s ability 
automatically to reject suspect baggage is, in itself, a more 
important advance. The use of this technique to relieve operatives of 
the often onerous responsibility of initiating action against a 
suspicious object was deliberately decided upon by the FAA as a means 
of removing dangerous discretionary powers from an activity which need 
not always rely on them.?* Automation also permits a reduction in 
staff numbers over conventional screening modes, though wages costs need not necessarily be lowered as personnel teams require quite 
highly skilled labour to utilise the apparatus to its fullest 
potent ial.**
The development of neutrons as a penetrative medium of radiation,**
while being effective, also guarantees safe screening with no risk of any damaging levels of residual radiation being present in baggage.
The s y s t e m ’s radiation dosage rate is approximately 100 times lower
**Bozorgmanesh (1990), p. 2.
*?E.E. Murphy (1989), p. 34.
**Wilson (1989), p. 16. It has been claimed that the addition of
XENIS capabilities has reduced the need for manual inspection by half. Airports International, January 1990, p. 18.
**TAe New York Times, Sunday 25 December 1988 (reprint).
 ^ Airports International January 1990, p. 18.
* * Wilson (1989), p. 17.
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than that of currently available X-ray security devices.** Although 
reports were made of TNA leaving gold jewellery and some salted foods very slightly radioactive, it was evident to the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission that no health risk is posed by the s y s t e m . i n  addition, 
no impairment of photographic film or electromagnetic media takes Place in the scanning process.** Nevertheless, the fact that the new 
airport technology involves a hitherto unencountered mode of invasive screening has meant that TNA systems have yet to be given official US 
federal clearance to screen hand b a g g a g e . * ’ SAIC plans to produce a 
certified carry-on baggage screening TNA machine of about the same size as conventional X-ray systems, though priced at between $400,000 and $600,000 (US).**
Another problem identified by Wilson concerns the inability of TNA to be used on living tissue (despite the very low levels of radiation 
involved). Presenting an interesting variation on the theme of 
unwitting dupe carriers, he has suggested that terrorists could surgically implant bombs into living animals which, as live cargo, 
would not be screened.*? Although an unlikely scenario, Wilson's observation demonstrates the need to view any piece of new technology 
as a possible additional tool, rather than a complete cure, for ail security screening problems.
SAIC claims that optimum screening rates of around 600 pieces of holdbaggage per hour can be achieved, which, if accurate, would make TNAroughly half as efficient as existing metal detection systems.** It 
would also rank behind optimum X-ray rates, which can easily be as
high as 900 pieces per hour.** This performance figure is planned by
SAIC and may be achieved in time,** to the advantage of the industry 
which in the expanding market of the future will inevitably place greater emphasis on efficient facilitation of baggage, as well as passengers, through security points.
*“Bozorgmanesh (1990). p. 9.
* ® 4/54 Today, 30 June 1989 (photocopy).
*“Publicity material for SAIC, 1990.
*’E.E. Murphy (1989), p. 35.
*:Wilson (1989), p. 17.
*?Z6jd.
**SAIC's claim has been described by one expert as "optimistic". McGuire (1989), p . 4.
Aviation Meek and Space Technology, 16 January 1989 (reprint).
:*Wilson (1989), p. 17.
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Benefits of the system include T N A ’s ability to identify the nitro- 
signatLires of elements contained in drugs of abuse and its possiblefuture applicability to screening freight as well as smaller
baggage.** One practical drawback of the technique concerns its use of an expensive, but wasting neutron source. As the californium - 252 isotopes in question would require occasional renewal, at a cost of up 
to $ 1 5 , 0 0 0  fus) every three years,** it has been suggested that research be intensified to develop an alternative, non-wasting neutron producer which would operate on electronic, rather than radioactive, p r i n c i p l e s . *^
In addition to US research into TNA technology, other states. most 
notably France through its Direction Générale de l ’Aviation Civile 
(DGAC) and its atomic energy commission fCEA). are engaged in advanced 
work on the technique. The French Société d ’Etudes et Réalisations 
Nucléaires (SODERN) has been actively involved in the programme since 1985 and is developing an integrated approach to secondary test 
methods for baggage, which causes its TNA system to issue an alarm.**
Positive testing of a piece of baggage in S O D E R N ’s EDEN (Equipment de 
Détection d'Explosifs par Neutrons) apparatus results in the article being transferred to a second chamber for a more rigorous backup test 
by Fast Neutron Activation, discussed below, to confirm the initialf i n d i n g . * ’ In this way greater certainty could be achieved, byreducing reliance upon manual searches and, hopefully, by maintaining 
efficiency in detection while minimising false positives. It is the 
intention of SODERN to achieve a failure rate of 0.01 per cent and a false alarm rate of 0.5 per cent by means of its backup checks.** If 
it were possible to maintain this performance in its operational environment, it would compare very favourably with S A I C ’s failure rate 
of 5 per cent and its false positive result of 4 per cent over a sample of 40,000 pieces of baggage with its prototype model.*?
Another benefit claimed over US competition is the extended tube life 
of the neutron generator employed by SODERN, which can produce as many as 100 billion neutrons per second.** An impressive processing rate 
of 700 bags per hour has been predicted for EDEN by its developers,
**Flight International, 6 May 1989, p . 13.
*“McGuire (1989), p . 6 .
* ’^ Vincent (1989) , p. 34,
*“ Airport Support, June 1989 (reprint).
*’Flight International, 6 May 1989. p. 13 ; Jane’s Airport Review, 
February/March 1989. p. 3 ; Norris (1989). p. 693.
**J a n e ’s Airport Review, February/March 1989, p. 3 .
*?Fhe New York Times, Sunday 25 December. 1988 (reprint): Jane’s
Airport Review, February/March 1989, p. 3.
Airport Support, June 1989 (reprint); International Security
Review, January/February 1990, p. 7.
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with that rate doubling through the introduction of twin, conveyor 
belts. While running costs will be low. early estimates of a $1.6 
million (US) price tag would place it well above even S A I C ’s TNA price range.** It is planned, nevertheless, to have eleven French airports using EDEN by the end of 1993.*?
In the United Kingdom. researchers at the Atomic Energy A u t h o r i t y ’s 
base at Harwell have also been developing prototype neutron analysis 
technology. although no short term operational benefits are expected 
from this project.** Ultimately, however, it is hoped that neutron 
bombardment equipment may be marketed at a much lower price than 
S A I C ’s product, offering higher screening performance levels.** In 
1989 it was reported that the prototype British technology was unable 
to offer adequately low false alarm rates, with alarms occasionally being triggered by such common substances as wool, leather and scents. Sadly, funding problems have inhibited explosives detection research 
to proceed at a reasonable rate in the UK. In the summer of 1989. the 
Ministry of Defence invited tendering applications for work on different systems of explosives detection. By the y e a r ’s end. however, the plan had been abandoned due, it seems. to a lack of funds.** This indictment of UK public policy on research and development is characteristic of the British G o v e r n m e n t ’s half-hearted and vascilating approach to security technology and is an important factor in explaining why those US corporations which benefit from the
steady commitment of the FAA are leading their British counterparts in
the race to produce workable explosives detection equipment for a lucrative market.**
At present, the latest prototype TNA models suffer from various practical inadequacies which must be overcome if demand for technology 
is properly to be satisfied. For example, in addition to the 
comparatively high costs of S A I C ’s neutron activation machines. which 
retail at around $750,000 (US),*? much extra expense can beincurred in housing the units, perhaps in a crowded airport in which 
free space is difficult to liberate. When, on 14 August 1989. TWA 
took possession of its test model at its international terminal in 
John F . Kennedy airport. New York, a separate, specially constructed 
building measuring 19 feet x 4 0 feet required to be used for its
* * Jane's Airport Review, February/March 1989, p. 3.
Flight International. 6 May 1989, p. 13.
* * Ibid.. p . 12.
**Fhe Times, Thursday 22 March 1990. p. 13.
**Wew Scientist, 7 January 1989, p. 23.
““Note that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
decided in the summer of 1990 that it would engage in new and comprehensive joint ventures with its private sector to develop 
neutron detection technology. Information received from West 
German aviation security expert, Paris, France. June 1990.
*?Publicity material for SAIC. 1990.
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housing, costing a further $125,000 fUS).** SAIC believes that these 
machines can be very cost-effective because, it claims, they can clear 
a workload of three million bags per year. Based on this figure, a 
TNA unit, working at the limits of its potential, could be paid for 
within a year at a rate of $0.34 (US) per bag.*?
In prototype field tests conducted between June 1987 and March 1988 by 
the FAA at Los Angeles and San Francisco airports, S A I C ’s system 
exhibited a 95 per cent success rate over the 40,000 bag sample, which 
could and should be improved with further development.** If production 
models were to be installed with this present success rate, the system 
could be expected to fail to detect approximately one in twenty of 
devices with the sophistication of the FAA models used. If it is assumed that in future terrorist bombs might be less prone to 
detection than those currently used by the FAA (by, for example, using smaller amounts of explosives) this ratio would require to be changed 
to one in fewer than twenty.
Early production models of TNA units are unreliable in their attempts 
to detect less than 2.5 pounds of plastic explosives. One reason for 
the failure of TNA to detect such small packages of explosives can be traced back to the early 1980s when the FAA specifications which were being used by developers of explosives detection systems (EDSs) called for it to be able to detect bombs which were of a sufficient size to threaten the flight of an airliner. It seems likely that the 2.5 pounds minimum feasible weight which had been used by the FAA as a 
benchmark for research was grossly inaccurate and that a much lower level, perhaps of less than 11 ounces of Semtex, would have been a 
more appropriate figure to specify.
If this suspicion were to be confirmed, the F A A ’s error would 
constitute an elementary, though major administrative failing, because 
properly assessed engineering specifications for a protect of this nature are crucial to its long term success. Although absolute 
certainty on the critical amount of explosives could not be stated 
with confidence, forensic evidence of small, yet effective, plastic explosives devices has existed since the early 1980s. Had specifications been continually monitored and adjusted as required, 
the F A A ’s embarrassing mistake in promoting a partially unworkable machine might have been avoided. Instead, as Professor Lee Grodzins 
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has pointed out:
"We d o n ’t know whether the present TNA machine would meet the
requirements we would set down now."*?
Aviation Meek and Space Technology, 20 February 1989. p. 118: 
McGuire (1989), p. 5 ; E.E. Murphy (1989), p . 34 ; Publicity material for SAIC, 1990.
*?Bozorgmanesh (1990), p . 1; Publicity material for SAIC. 1990.
The New York Times, Sunday 25 December 1988 (reprint).
Vincent (1989). p . 34.
*?E.E. Murphy (1989), p. 34.
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In response to this, SAIC has argued that current TNA technology can 
be expected to detect:
"95 percent of bombs of the smallest size believed to have been
used in the Pan Am flight 103 incident."*?
Advocates of the system have also noted that calibration of TNA 
machines is feasible to reduce the threshold below the 2.5 pound level, though with the concomitant effect of increasing false alarm 
rates.** Still, it is perplexing to consider that no reputable civil aviation authority in the world can know with certainty how much 
explosives are needed for successful in-flight sabotage (simply 
because none has ever tried to blow up a let airliner) but that 
certain terrorist groups have access to this critically important figure, as a result of their practical experience of evading security 
systems and sabotaging aircraft with their tiny, yet lethal packages. 
Note also that since the démocratisation of Czechoslovakia in 1989. it
has become apparent that tests using Semtex plastic explosives werecarried out on civilian airliner fuselages bv the previous regime, 
most likely with the intention of passing the test results to sponsored terrorist organisations.**
As TNA screening normally permeates all matter within the chamber. it 
is usually immaterial whether or not explosives are packed. concealed 
or even hermetically sealed. This does not. however, preclude the 
possibility of TNA apparatus being foiled by ingenious terrorists. 
John Plinn, an explosives detection consultant of Stafford, Virginia. 
USA, has claimed that a bomb could evade detection if its explosives 
were to be encased in a cadmium wrapper, which would effectively conceal its contents from T N A ’s screening process.** Such an allegation has been countered by S A I C ’s Dr Patrick M Shea, who has suggested that as shielding materials are rare in passenger baggage, 
it is possible to incorporate a feature designed to identify them.*?
As mentioned above. first generation SAIC TNA machines have an unacceptably high false alarm rate of 4 per cent. If this percentage 
were to be applied to a wide-bodied j e t ’s baggage payload of 700 bags 
in the hold alone. the rate would result in 28 bags needing some 
additional means of examination which in turn could require perhaps 
more than an extra hour of a s e a r c h e r ’s time.**® In December 1989 it
*?Publicity material for SAIC, 1990.
* *Airports International, January 1990, d. IS.
ry Eye, Thursday 28 June 1990, 9 pm.
**The Christian Science Monitor, Thursday 16 February 1989. p . 9.Similar claims have been made in connection with the element boron. McGuire (1989). p. 6.
*?Wil5on (1989), p. 17.
* ® i/-S4 Today. 30 June 1989 (reprint); AT A baggage figure quoted in E.E. Murphy (1989), p. 34.
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was reported by Wilkinson that S A I C ’s scientists had reduced TNA's 
false alarm rate to only 2 per cent, although with this lower figure» 
inefficiencies could still prove problematic for screening staff 
working to a tight schedule.*? In defence of TNA. it is necessary to 
point out that a false alarm rate of 2 per cent is lower than would be 
expected to be found with conventional screening devices used with 
passengers and their band baggage.
Nevertheless. in the case of hold baggage, a low false alarm rate is 
desirable because of the greater length of time required to search 
bulky items featuring a large surface area and many contents. This is 
most likely to be achieved in the short term by uniting TNA technology 
with other systems, such as advanced X-ray.*? Ultimately. it may 
prove impossible to reduce false positives from screening devices 
below certain critical levels, in which case this fact would need to 
be recognised. This could result in requiring other means of 
screening to be developed or else in the scheduling of flights and 
timings of passenger searches to be adapted accordingly.
Until greater technical sophistication produces a machine which can be 
much more certain in its differentiation between explosives and other nitrogen-based substances such as wool, silk, nylon and leather, adjustments in sensitivity may also be needed to reduce the number of 
incorrect positives.*? If, however, calibration of the apparatus 
were to be altered to phase out the false alarms almost entirely,*? then, as with conventional screening technology (described above) sensitivity to smaller samples of explosives would be reduced, so 
increasing susceptibility to screening failure.
Equally, of course, a desire to isolate a bomb of the type and size 
found in the 1988 police raids in West Germany could necessitate a crucial loss of efficiency, resulting in false positives increasing in 
frequency and, paradoxically, returning screening staff to their 
traditional and uncertain role of physical searchers. This scenario 
would entail additional dangers of carelessness, apathy and mistrust of the technology by its overworked operating staff.*? In respect of 
T N A ’s inevitable trade-off between sensitivity and efficiency. Grodzins has made the following assertion which, if verified, would have severe consequences for the prospects of T N A ’s practical success:
"The percentage of uncleared bags might rise to 25 percent or
h i g h e r  if the m a c h i n e  is set to Pick u p  a b o m b  like the Pan Am
103 bomb."**
Wilkinson (1989) IV, p . 19. See also Nelms (1989), p . 690.
* ? The Times, Thursday 22 March 1990, p. 13.
*?McGuire (1989). p. 6. 
*:Vincent (1989), p. 33.
* ? Ibid.
**E.E. Murphy (1989). p. 34.
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Once again, it is important to remember that a success rate of
approximately 95 per cent can be achieved without needing to adjust 
calibration at all. Hence, a very high quality of screening - higher 
than could be expected from X-ray and metal detection equipment in 
their search even for metallic compounds - can be achieved for all but 
the smallest devices.** With the difficult category of bombs
containing a low level of high explosives, however, problems of 
calibration remain, A responsible balance between the goals of 
minimisino false positives and maximising detection powers is 
currently difficult to find, because of the threat from lethal bombs, 
the size of which is beneath the F A A ’s outdated 2.5 pound mass 
specification. The only means by which this crisis of technology can 
be resolved to the satisfaction of the aviation Industry is for
further research and development to take place, so as to push the 
frontiers of technology outwards and permit production of TNAapparatus of higher sensitivity and efficiency.
Even assuming that S A I C ’s screening rate estimates of six seconds per 
piece of baggage were to be proven accurate in commercial operation 
and that no extra examination was required of any screened article, 
further difficulties in the operation of the system would need 
consideration before widespread implementation could be considered. 
For example, practical problems of congestion would still require to 
be addressed. If governments or aviation authorities were to enforce a requirement that carriers screen all hold contents then, as Vincent 
has observed, TNA would be far too slow for the apparently simple 
task :
"The TNA detectors are inefficient because a single unit will still be needed just to service one B-747 at its current 
processing rate. The first TNAs can examine an article every six seconds under ideal conditions. TNA examination of a 350 seat B- 
747, with two checked bags for each passenger will require a 
minimum of 70 minutes under ideal conditions. Add to this the 
other mass of parcel, cargo. etc., carried on each commercial airliner and you arrive at an almost hopeless situation."**
In the period from 18 September 1989 to 25 January 1990, 37.183 items
of baggage were run through T W A ’s operational machine, with approximately 490 of the 7,558 bags which contained explosives 
simulant failing to be detected. This resulted in a detection 
probability of 93.51 per cent - or a failure probability in practice 
of 6.49 per cent.
Bozorgmanesh has claimed that S A I C ’s TNA technology can operate 
without adversely affecting throughput rates. SAIC recommends a Phased introduction of TNA machines over several years, so as to 
enable logistical adjustments to be made in baggage handling practices
“ ^Publicity material for SAIC, 1990.
**Vincent fl989), p. 33. It has been reported that TWA estimated 
that effective, economic use of the technology would require the 
carrier to instal as many as 35 TNA machines in John F . Kennedy airport alone. McGuire (1989). p. 4.
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on 8 gradual basis,*? In the case of the recently installed apparatus, the company reported that T W A ’s machine has caused nodelays to the scheduled flights or passengers.*? This statement
should, however, be viewed in the context of the TWA m o d e l ’s 
operations thus far. In the first 128 days of its employment, the apparatus was used to screen an average of only 290,49 items per day, 
which would equate with an annual rate of 106,030 items per year only one twenty-eighth of its potential capacity. While this 
indication of T N A ’s high success rate in practice is to be welcomed, a 
truer indication of the d e v i c e ’s usefulness for screening hold baggage in tight schedules will only be guaged once it has been subjected to 
the same type of operating pressures as X-ray and metal detectionprocesses currently undergo.
abilities of TNA and any other 
upon a store of electronically 
the risk posed by the advances 
terrorists continue to employ 
key ingredient of their bombs.
Another problem which might limit the 
security equipment which is dependent memorised explosive characteristics is 
of arms technology. For as long as familiar nitro-grouo compounds as the 
such detection mechanisms will have practical utility. If and when new, possibly more potent, substances are created which do not present recognisable nitrogen signatures, TNA machines will require to be adapted to accommodate the new threat, or else will become obsolescent. More ominously, if terrorists are ever able to rely on 
high explosives which do not contain nitrogen at all, T N A ’s detection 
powers would risk being superseded entirely by the evolution of explosives technology.
Measuring six feet x eight feet x thirteen feet and weighing around 18,000 pounds, currently available neutron activation machines for 
hold baggage screening purposes would not be physically suited to 
multiple employment at many airports.*? These specifications compare 
unfavourably with those of standard X-ray screening units. For 
example, A s t r o p h y s i c s ’s System Seven device, designed for the passage 
of very large items, including crates, measures approximately four 
feet X six feet x fourteen-and-a-half feet, and weighs 2,948 pounds.?* It is predicted that before long, neutron bombardment machines will be produced which will be only slightly larger than conventional airport 
X-ray units, while special efforts are being made to develop a compact 
model for use with hand baggage (plus a larger unit for cargo 
scanning).?? Irrespective of size, however, location problems may 
still require to be addressed by airports reaching the limits of their capacity, because if TNA is to be fully employed to the best of its 
potential and used on hold baggage, sites will need to be made available for security staff and passengers together to open and
*?Bozorgmanesh (1990). pp. 3 - 4: Publicity material for SAIC, 1990. 
**Tbjd.
“'Publicity material for SAIC, 1990: U3A Today, 30 June 1989(repr i n t ) .
?“Publicity material for Astrophysics, 1990, 
??Publicity material for SAIC, 1990.
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search suspect cases and packages. Moreover, as new technology stands 
to supplement rather than to replace existing techniques, floor soace 
will still require to be retained for accommodating other types of security screening, if only in the form of existing hand baggage X-ray 
and metal detection modes.
One possible screening compromise which might overcome critical foyer 
floorspace problems could be to use TNA for specific purposes in less important areas, such as for screening cargo, unaccompanied baggage or 
objects which have failed reconciliation tests.?? Alternatively, the 
ATA has suggested that TNA could be used as a security tool to screen 
the baggage of passengers rated as being of a high risk in profiling tests.?? On the other hand, some such restricted uses of TNA might depend too greatly upon the existence of watertight back-up 
procedures (including first class profiling activities) and would, in 
any case, undermine the purpose of introducing the technology, as they 
would leave the majority of passengers' hold baggage insufficiently screened in the absence of other techniques.
An important factor in advocating the use of efficient forms of TNA screening on a high proportion of baggage in future is its possible 
deterrent effect. If employed merely as a hidden extra for a small proportion of articles that effect would be largely lost. Incorporated instead in a high profile screening role, the technique 
could serve to persuade some potential terrorists to target less well prepared sites or else to discourage attack. If new technologies, 
such as TNA are to enjoy significantly more than a redistributive effect, pushing terrorists towards softer targets. it is clear that 
they should first be made fully workable and then installed by a wide range of airports and carriers. Public and international encouragement of this by offering assistance, subsidies and 
enducements (such as "seed money") to the industry would be a useful, 
if not necessary, option for states to consider.
The US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s faith in TNA was demonstrated on 29 December 19R8, w':' -i i week oP the Lockerbie disaster, when it issued a
prominent announcement to the w o r l d ’s news media that TNA would be 
deployed at its airports.?* Then. on 4 April 1989, the day after President George Bush had met with family members of the victims of 
Pan Am Flight 103, a further publicity-conscious declaration was made.?* Transportation Secretary Skinner announced that US airlines 
would be made to introduce TNA technology at the most important 
airports at home and abroad, "at the earliest feasible date", once the 
machines were in commercial production.
On 5 August this policy was concretised, at Congressional request, 
into an official FAA final rule. requiring US airlines to introduce 
means of explosive detection within a five year period. A rule was
??House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 6. 
??E.E. Murphy (1989). p. 35,
?“Vincent (1989). d . 32,
?*The Economist, 8 April 1989. p. 47.
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also published on 5 October requiring approximately 50 FAA endorsed 
EDS systems to be in place at certain airports bv 1990 and 150 by the 
end of 1991 with 100 per cent inspection of hold baggage to be taking 
place by 1999.?* In effect, this ruling currently requires the 
employment of TNA technology, as it remains the only means of 
automatic explosives detection deemed by the FAA to be sufficiently 
quick, safe and reliable.?? The measure is intended to be implemented first with international f l i g h t s ’ hold baggage at 40 high risk airports worldwide (15 in the USA and 25 abroad) - a purpose which Vincent has suggested is entirely inappropriate for the processing 
rates of available technology (see above). Ambitious FAA predictions suggest that by the end of 1991 about 150 TNA systems could be operating. It had earlier been suggested that as many as one hundred of the machines would be ordered by the FAA.?*
These decisions were taken despite the many totally valid doubts which 
lingered in the minds of security experts as to the true cost-effectiveness and operational capacities of the first TNA test models.
Even an FAA consultant, testifying before a US Congressional 
Committee, aired doubts as to the adequacy of TNA testing.?* In the 
ioint submission of the Airport Operators Council International and 
the American Association of Airport Executives to the P r e s i d e n t ’s
Commission in 1989, the bodies stated their concern that there were significant problems with:
... the manner in which the industry has had to accelerate the implementation of untried hardware and unproven procedures and m e t h o d o l o g i e s ."*“
In response to such criticism, the FAA reacted swiftly, giving the 
impression that they viewed the urgent need for introduction of new 
technology as a key priority. In the words of Lyle Malotky, who 
manages the F A A ’s aviation security technical branch:
"The fundamental issue is that the technology works, and that the decision was made that something was better than nothing."*?
This attitude was mirrored by that of Skinner:
"Ten years from now I ’m hopeful the technology will have evolved 
to the point where i t ’s absolutely foolproof. Now i t ’s the best
?*Flight Saftey Foundation (1989). p. 12: International Security
Review. January/February 1990, p. 8; Murphy (1989). p. 34.
??Bozorgmanesh (1990), o. 2: Flight Saftey Foundation (1989), p. 12.
Flight International, 15 April 1989, p. 10.
'^'^International Security Review, January/February 1990, p . 8.
Airports Internationa1. January 1990, p. 25.
*?E.E. Murphy (1989). p. 36.
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technology available".*?
In stark contrast to these views. the P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission was 
adamant in its Report that TNA technology was inadequate for 
operational use and required considerable refining. Describing a test 
carried out on the TWA machine in New York's Kennedy airport, in which three amounts of Semtex were used (one equal to the F A A ’s 
u n r e a l i s t i c a 11 y high specification, another at a more reasonable 60 
per cent of that mass and another at a taxing, but feasible, 30 per 
cent), the Commission noted that performance was poor:
"Although calibrated to detect the EDS specification set out 
by the FAA, the TNA machine failed to detect the explosive in two 
out of ten passes; it failed to detect the amount equal to 60 percent of the EDS specification seven out of eight passes; and 
it failed to detect 30 percent of the EDS specification on any of 
the eight passes."*?
The conclusion of the Commission was that deployment of the current 
TNA technology would "mislead the flying public by offering a false sense of protection." Rather than urge immediate adoption, the FAA 
should, it claimed, continue to refine techniques.** Grodzins also believes with justification that instead of lumping headlong into a 
long term commitment to the technology which it helped to produce but 
which has not yet realised its full developmental potential. the FAA would be better advised to assess the in-service strengths and weaknesses of the machinery in a limited number of test sites over at 
least a one year period. After tests had been completed, results 
would probably help planners to improve upon existing technology and 
to produce cheaper, more advanced equipment, more suitable for the 
practical airport environment than that which currently exists and 
which, if forced upon the industry, would needlessly consume a i r p o r t s ’ and carriers' limited security budgets but would provide a standard of 
security which would fail far short of being unusually excellent.** 
AOCI has also petitioned the US Congress, the Department of State and the Department of Transportation, urging that further developmental work be undertaken before implementation takes place:
"The agency should devote the resources necessary to bring these 
infant technologies to rapid maturity - and then use them."**
Although the US Administration is to be commended for taking the
initiative to commence research work on explosives detection and for Investing millions of dollars in it while other governments remained 
inactive. it can be criticised for seeking to force the industry to
* ? 4/54 Today, 30 June 1989 (photocopy). 
*?P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990), p. 65.
* * Ibid.. p , 66.
**E.E. Murphy (1989), pp. 35 - 36.
* “Nelms (1989). p. 692.
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invest in machinery which is, as yet, unable to provide an adequately 
high level of detection performance.*? It would be unfortunate if the 
long term well-being of security systems were to be jeopardised by misplaced faith in a technique which had not fully demonstrated its
maturity. More considered scepticism and less unfounded certainty 
about the state of T N A ’s advancement might eventually save political 
embarrassment for the FAA, prevent terrorist tragedy for passengers 
and avoid economic hardship for the industry.
The House of Commons Select Committee on Transport was sufficiently wise to realise that, in the broad context of security activity, TNA 
still requires to be treated with a degree of caution.** This caution was matched bv that of the British Department of Transport and BAA 
which together opted to install TNA at Gatwick airport for a twelve 
month test period. The F AA-sponsored machine commenced operation in mid-1990, being used in a limited capacity on the hold baggage of passengers of all carriers diverted bv facilitation staff at check-in 
desks for extraordinary screening m e a s u r e s . O n l y  after the test 
period is complete and results are assessed might a decision on the technology's role in the UK's international airports be taken.?* It 
has been reported that other states are even more reluctant than the 
UK to introduce TNA technology in the short term.??
Although the first six machines ordered by the FAA are planned to be 
donated to the airlines carrying out the initial tests. thereafter responsibility for purchasing TNA will fall to required carriers, with 
the bill for the new devices ultimately being met by profit reduction or. more likely. by fare increases.*? The expense of the proposed 
s t a n d a r d ’s early implementation, combined with doubt about T N A ’s effectiveness, led to u nwillingness within the industry to comply with the ruling and precipitated calls for federal "seed money" to be made available for carriers to finance at least the introduction of the 
first machines. This would mirror the funding which was provided in 
the early 1970s for airlines to install the first operational metal detection equipment.,?? In addition, US airports might be entitled to 
grants under the federal Airport Improvement Program to assist with 
the i n d u s t r y ’s attempts to conform with the imposed requirements.
*?It has been estimated that the eventual costs to the industry of 
implementing the F A A ’s EDS programme could be as much as $4.$ 
billion (US). International Security Review. January/February 1990, p. 8.
**See quote at start of Chapter.
* “Experience of current writer, October 1990.
““ The Times. Thursday 22 March 1990. p. 13.
“ ?McGuire (1989), p. 1.
Science, 13 January 1989 (reprint).
? ? 0 ’Ballance (1989) I, p . 1 9 : Aviation Meek and Space Technology. 20 
February 1989, p. 118.
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Such awards would not. however, be made to foreign a u t h o r i t i e s . “ “
Government resources might be freed for this purpose if wide-ranging 
and dedicated industry lobbying were to be imposed by manufacturers, carriers and airports. As passengers become progressively more aware 
of the w o r l d ’s security crisis, with the occurrence of more terrorist atrocities against aviation, and as the potential strengths of adequately advanced TNA equipment are publicised. it is possible that pressure for the technique's i mplementation from the travelling public 
might also add a valuable impetus to such campaigning.
By the end of 1989, the experimental installation of the first six
operational TNA machines had been planned by the FAA in conjunction 
with the six US airlines flying international flights and with 
airports in a variety of states,?* but only one was actually working, having been introduced by TWA to New Y o r k ’s John F. Kennedy airport on 18 September 1989. By February 1990 a second model had been delivered 
to Miami International, but was not vet operational, while projected shipping dates of no later than May 1990 were being quoted for 
machines destined for Gatwick. Washington (Dulles), Frankfurt and one 
other s i t e . ’ * The initial aim to equip forty high risk airports was Placed under pressure as a result of this administrative difficulty. 
It seems that for many airports the difficulty of freeing necessarily large amounts of valuable floor space and the upheaval entailed in 
siting the TNA machinery in a specially constructed room, delayed 
plans or discouraged them from cooperating with the FAA in its 
ambitious proposals. This further illustrates the inflexibility of an 
industry geared to maximising profit and either unable or unwilling to adapt to face changing security demands.
There is little doubt that the development of neutron bombardment technology has presented the aviation security community with new hope 
that detection capacities may soon be raised at airports of the rich, 
developed world. The shortcomings of the systems should be able to be 
overcome with further research, making TNA and its competitors 
worthwhile additions to existing airport technology. With 
improvements in screening efficiency and a decrease in false alarm rates, it may prove feasible and economically wise to use neutron 
bombardment techniques on pallets of baggage, rather than on 
individual items, as the rarity of explosives in bags might not merit 
the possibly needless waste of single screening. Also. once 
commercial production is underway, economies of scale should make the technology more attractive to airport authorities and carriers.
6.3.2. Chemiluminescence Detection
The other explosives system investigated by F AA-funcled research was 
popularly known as vapour (or particulant) detection but could more accurately be termed chemiluminescence detection. This technique
’ “Airport Support. June 1989 (reprint).
Flight International, 6 May 1989, p. 12.
’“ Bozorgmanesh (1990), p p . 2 - 3. By September 1990, the systems at
Miami and Gatwick were operational.
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interested US authorities because, unlike T N A ’s active and invasive 
approach to screening via radiative means, it relied on collection and 
analysis of atmospheric samples. This distinction is significant 
because c h e m i l u m i n e s c e n c e ’s passive, non-invasive methods were 
developed with a view to achieving the safe and effective screening of 
persons and other animal life in addition to the inspection of 
inanimate articles.
While it has been noted above that the most dangerous and potent of 
explosives have a very low vapour pressure and so cannot be detected 
even by the trained olfactory processes of dogs and gerbils, 
scientists have long recognised that machinery might be developed with 
the requisite powers, as a more reliable alternative. In conjunction 
with the US State D e p a r t m e n t ’s Office for Counter-Terrorism, which sought detection devices which might screen persons and vehicles entering US embassies and consular premises abroad, the FAA engaged the services of a private corporation.
Thermedics. Inc. of Woburn. Massachusetts (a subsidiary of Thermo Electron Corporation) was contracted in the mid-1980s to develop 
workable detection systems partly because of its record of researching into medical techniques for quantifying amounts of nitroglycerin in 
human blood. The company believed correctly that adaptation of its 
medical technology might also provide useful security screening 
t e c h n i q u e s . ? ?
The system developed by Thermedics employs the physical characteristic 
of "c h e m i l u m i n e s c e n c e " . The method is based on the property of molecules to emit light waves during certain chemical reactions.** 
When adapted as an explosives screening technique, it results in 
nitrogen components in the substance fluorescing at detectable and 
recognisable wavelengths when exposed to ozone (Os) contained within 
the s y s t e m ’s analysis unit.** The development programme, which 
involved at least $6 million (US) of federal funding, was accelerated 
with the parallel TNA project immediately after the Lockerbie 
incident, which added urgency to its research schedule.
As with TNA techniques, the process is used to isolate and identify explosive, nitro-group signatures. Unlike TNA, however, vapour 
detection identifies entire molecular structures, rather than simply a nitrogen component within explosive compounds.?*? The technique developed by Thermedics for its SecurScan equipment is classified by
*?The Boston Globe, 19 October 1988 (reprint): The International
Herald Tribune, Wednesday 23 July 1986 (reprint).
 ^Science, 13 January 1989 (reprint).
**Wilkinson (1989) IV, p. 19 ; The Mall Street Journal, Tuesday 1 
April 1986 (reprint): R. Jackson and E.E.A. Bromberg. Development
of a Portable Explosives Detection System unpublished, undated article, p . 14.
?“ “ The Boston Herald. Friday 30 December 1988 (reprint). 
Airport Support. June 1989 (reprint).
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both the FAA and FBI. however some details of its operation are known.?*? Warm lets of air are gently blown for an approximate period 
of five seconds around the subject being screened in a six feet x
eight feet booth. This encourages vapours to be released from any 
explosives present, which are then sucked into an analysis unit where 
a catalyst breaks down trace amounts of the sample for six different 
chemical tests to be made, each being controlled by computer.
If the test result is found to correspond with an explosive type known 
to the system's internal computer bank, a signal is issued by thesystem, although the strength of the signal does not necessarily implyany correlating strength of explosives.?®? As the particular 
chemiluminescent signature being sought is common to the TNT, dynamite 
and Plastic explosives groups, the SecurScan technique can be used to 
identify automatically all maior explosive types,?®* Greater 
efficiency can be achieved by incorporating a metal detection archway
into the sniffing unit.?®® As with TNA, human intervention in the
process is only required when the screening equipment issues an 
alarm.?®®
Ideally, vapour detection techniques should be applied to situations 
in which items to be screened are of a low volume and closed, toenable vapours to accumulate within.?®? A notable advantage ofc hemiluminescence over TNA techniques is that the mass of explosives 
being screened is not a significant factor in determining the
t e c h n i q u e ’s success. As noted by Rudy Jackson (of the US State 
D e p a r t m e n t ’s Diplomatic Securities Division) and Edward E.A. Bromberg 
fof Thermedics ) :
"Assuming that enough explosive is present, a realistic scenario.
to reach equilibrium, the vapor pressure is not affected by the 
amount of explosive present. The rate at which equilibrium is 
reached is a function of surface area, and other secondaryeffects. Thus, from a purely vapor pressure point of view, a 0.1 kilogram explosive device and a 10 kilogram explosive device, of 
the same explosive. would have equal probability of being 
f o u n d ."? ® *
The sophistication of the e q u i p m e n t ’s "sniffing" capacity is shown in its m a n u f a c t u r e r ’s claim that it can detect as little as one part of
?®?Jackson and Bromberg, p. 2, 
?®:fbfd., p. 14.
?® “ The Internationa} Herald Tribune. (repr i n t ) . Wednesday 23 July 1986
?®*Wllkinson (1989) IV, p. 19.
?®“ Time, January 1988 (reprint): Aviation Meek and Space Technology 
16 January 1989 (reprint).
?®?W.A. Crenshaw (1987). p. 95.
?®BJackson and Bromberg, pp. 4 - 6,
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TNT or Plastic explosives vapours in 100 million million parts of 
other oases. This level of sensitivity would detect not only the 
presence of explosives in block, powder and sheet forms, but also the merest residual traces of them on the person of anyone who had handled 
detectable substances even several days p r e v i o u s l y . ? ® ’ Although few 
individuals have cause to come in contact with explosives, such 
sensitivity could, nevertheless, prove problematic in registering what 
would amount to false positive readings for passengers who work, for 
example, in certain industrial, engineering, security or military settings. On the other hand. its inventor. Dr David Fine, maintains 
that a maior attraction of the system is its sensitivity, which allows 
it to detect bombs more than fifty feet away from it, with loaded 
revolvers possibly being found at a distance of fifteen feet.??®
As has been demonstrated above, a screening d e v i c e ’s sensitivity alone 
is no adequate gauge of its overall efficiency. In addition, high selectivity is vital, in order that the system does not register time- 
consuming false positives. In the Thermedics research tests, various 
vaporous compounds which display non-explosive signatures. similar to those of explosive nitro-group substances, were passed through the apparatus in isolation and in the presence of explosives vapours. 
This was done so as to determine the susceptibility of chemiluminscence techniques to false alarms from innocent compounds 
and to discover whether or not those compounds might confuse the screening system or reduce its capacity to detect explosives. 
Although precise details of the test conditions and results remain 
classified, it seems that a broad range of compounds including the 
nitro-musks (found in perfumes and with the same vapour patterns as Plastic explosives) did not trigger alarms or reduce performance.???
October 1988 saw a prototype Thermedics detection booth being 
installed at the USAir terminal at B o s t o n ’s Logan Airport for FAA 
field tests to take place. During the five days of testing, 2,000 
passengers were screened by the $235,000 (US) unit with all fifty test samples used being identified correctly and with only one false alarm 
being recorded.??? Unlike TNA and X-ray techniques. vapour detection was demonstrated to be safe and effective against both baggage and 
humans, making it a truly multifunctional approach to security which 
could offer both versatility and cost-effectiveness to airports with 
security budgets which could not permit Investment to be made in more expensive technology.
In addition to the SecurScan booth technique. Thermedics has developed a portable, 300-pound vapour detector, known as EGIS, which operates 
according to the same principles as its larger equivalent but which 
costs only $135,000 (US) per unit. US State Department funding was received for this development project, because it seemed to provide a
? ® ’ The Daily Telegraph. Thursday 29 December 1988 (reprint).
? ?®The Mail Street Journal, Tuesday 1 April 1986 (reprint).
???Jackson and Bromberg, pp. 15 - 16.
? ? ? The New York Times. Sunday 25 December 1988 (reprint): Time,
January 1989 (reprint).
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method, being sought by the Department in the early-to-mid-1980s. of 
screening vehicles for explosives in order to protect US embassies 
from the genuine threat of car and truck bombs. In July 1986, the 
first prototype EGIS detectors were delivered to the State 
D e p a r t m e n t .? ? ?
A maior advantage of EGIS is its compact dimensions which. Thermedics 
has claimed, would make it ideally suited to installation at airline 
check-in desks for baggage screening prior to dispatch. As early as 
April 1989, the firm told the British Home Office and BAA that it 
could equip all maior British airports in this way within eighteen 
months.??* According to EGIS publicity material, the portable u n i t ’s 
analysis time can be as low as fifteen seconds, with an upper limit of 
twenty seconds per sample. It should be noted in passing that this 
figure is much higher than most metal detection. X-ray and neutron 
analysis systems. Unless employed in a novel way (considered below) 
this fact would pose potentially catastrophic delay and throughout 
difficulties for operators.
In order to promote efficiency. Thermedics has allowed for more than 
one sampling unit to operate with each analysis unit, should this 
facility be required. As with its larger counterpart. no operator 
interpretation of test results is required as a clear indication of 
the screened object's security status is conveyed automatically, in 
terms of both explosive type and relative quantity. Another benefit 
accrues from EGIS requiring little maintenance, with automatic self­
monitoring of performance being provided. Additionally, the system's 
only consumable is water.??®
The technique of chemiluminescence has also been adapted for the US 
Customs Service so that sniffing can take place to detect drugs of abuse.??® Eventually, vapour detection might also be employed in a conveyorised method of baggage screening.???
The classified nature of the technique makes difficult anv reasoned 
analysis and fair comparison with others. An instance of this difficulty is the inability to know what sizes and types of explosives were used in the field tests and what explosive mass specifications 
were provided by the state backers of the project. If the technique 
genuinely does not rely on the mass of the screened explosive above a very low trace level. then it would appear that chemiluminescence 
offers a workable alternative to existing methods. Equally, however, test results certainly indicate that detection rates are not unable to be improved if extra time and effort are spent in the screening
??*Jackson and Bromberg, p . 7.
? ?“ The Daily Telegraph. Tuesday 11 April 1989. p . 2.
??“Publicity material for Thermedics. 1989.
? ?“ The Christian Science Monitor. Thursday 16 February 1989. p. 9. 
??“ Airport Support, June 1989 (reprint).
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process, suggesting in turn that practical efficiency may not vet have 
been maximised:
"Experience has shown that if the package or luggage is opened.
with a sample also being taken from the inside. the probability
of finding any hidden device increases."??*
One British security expert has gone further, voicing grave doubts concerning chemiluminescent techniques' ability to screen closed suitcases. It is feared that to create a successful system for daily airport applications. the devices would positively require to be 
employed upon opened cases to permit vapours and particles of explosives to circulate near to the sampling unit.??* Certainly, 
although the systems currently being developed may be very efficient 
in identifying traces of explosives, samples sealed in vacuum packs 
pose theoretical problems in that they are thus unable to exude any vapours.??® Thermedics claims, however, that in practice, even the 
merest traces of an explosive deposited by mistake outside the sealed area should be detectable. although this need not preclude the possibility of multiple layers of sealing being used, even so as to encapsulate an entire explosive device. Moreover. Grodzins maintains 
that plastic explosives' low vapour pressure will make vapour detection at best an unreliable technique when used on and in cold 
inanimate obiects.???
Another central difficulty concerns the excessive length of time 
required to complete a screening cycle. Test versions of the Thermedics system performed at a rate of only two passengers per 
minute, with analysis taking as long as 25 seconds,??? although the 
c o m p a n y ’s President, John Wood, has claimed that an FAA target of ten passengers per minute should be achieved in the short term. with o n ­
site implementation following some six months later.??* Thermedics has estimated that by 1995 appropriately fast production models should 
be operating in airports.??*
The current screening rate would preclude the t e c h n i q u e ’s operation at areas of fast throughout, such as at check-in desks. However, even if a target rate of ten passengers per minute cannot be achieved. the 
chemiluminescence apparatus may still be suitable for airport uses, because it could still be employed for emergency spot-checks of small 
numbers of passengers. Furthermore, assuming that the sniffing
??*Jackson and Bromberg, p . 17.
??“ Interview with Scottish aviation security expert. Paris. France. June 1990.
??®The Christian Science Monitor, Thursday 16 February 1989. p. 9 . 
???E.E. Murphy (1989), p. 36.
???Time, January 1988 (reprint).
??*.Science. 13 January 1989 (reprint),
? ? “ The New York Times, Sunday 25 D ecember 1988 (reprint).
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technique is almost entirely accurate in its selectivity with large 
and small samples alike, as its 1988 test results suggest it to be. 
then it might be possible to accommodate a long analysis time, provided that two conditions could be met. First, it would be essential that the screening time (that is, the first part of the 
procedure which does not include analysis time) would not be 
intolerably long for either passengers or operators. Indications from 
Thermedics on this matter are reasonable, showing that the SecurScan 
technique currently takes approximately six seconds.??* (In the 
busiest times of operation, efficiency could be promoted by taking samples from several passengers and processing the consolidated sample 
for a single analysis.) A second condition would be that once 
screened, a passenger could be traced with sufficient ease to locate 
him or her for secondary search procedures to take place.
A key to the potential success of chemiluminescence and other explosives detection techniques is their aim of isolating an unusual and rarely carried compound - explosives. In the cases of metal 
detection and X-ray methods. delay and inefficiency are very often 
caused simply because the obiect types traditionally sought (metallic 
and dense compounds) are commonly carried on the person of travellers 
and in their baggage. Hence, these established devices simply 
identify the presence of a category of material which requires 
Physical investigation to determine whether or not the substance located belongs to a sub-group of suspicious compounds. With any operable explosives detection system, near absolute elimination of false positives would effectively mean that the machinery would only register in the unlikely event of explosives or a loaded weapon being conveyed. As it is reasonable to expect that few such instances would ever take place, the screening process would be unlikely to trigger 
any alarm, so reducing the need for human intervention and increasing passenger throughput.
All that would be required of security zones would be a reliable means 
of holding passengers immediately after the screening point, which
would often h 
holding lounge. found in any case in the form of the departure gate If a positive reading were to be registered, it would 
not be unduly difficult to recall passengers, particularly if the
a i r p o r t ’s post-screening zone were to incorporate a long. narrow 
would take the individuals longer than thirty seconds 
or if CCTV cameras were to monitor the screeningwhichalong,corridor to passprocess. In the worst case, in which the offending individual could 
not immediately be identified, all passengers in the holding area 
would simply require to be brought back for the process to be repeated 
or for other means of screening to take place. Although such an arrangement would be far from ideal, it would at least accommodate a 
useful and cost-effective security technique without excessive 
difficulty, expense or inconvenience.
Many technologies other than TNA and vapour detection have shown signs 
of being useful to airport security screening activities. A number of 
these entail strictly classified techniques, details of which are unavailable, while others represent modifications to existing methods. 
A brief listing is offered below.
* ? “Pub licity material for Thermedics, 1990.
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6.4. Advanced X-Radîography
Instead of continuing their attempts to refine the traditional radiographic methods which had already reached their developmental 
zenith in the 1 9 7 0 ’s but which were demonstrably incapable of meeting 
the demands of a new security era, many manufacturers of security X- 
ray equipment came to realise that a radically new system should be developed which could detect plastic obiects with much greater efficiency. While advances in simple X-ray technology had resulted 
in. for example, clearer imaging of dense matter, the technique's 
overall capacity to isolate plastic weapons and explosives remained 
low until the mid-to-late 1980s when new production models became available offering interesting new features at a price which was 
readily affordable to many carriers and airports.
6.4.1. Dual Energy X-Radiography
Rather than employing only one source of X-rays emitting at a
particular velocity. some systems can use two. releasing high and low 
energy waves respectively Tho high energy waves interact with light, organic compounds, to leave little or no observable screening trace. 
In this respect, the system would suffer from the same inadequacy as earlier generations of machines, but for the second source. Those waves of a lower energy are more likely to be absorbed by lightmatter, indicating the presence of any suspicious non-metal lie obiect.12* By combining the two types of ray into one apparatus, 
therefore, a much more effective and accurate screening of both high 
and low density objects can be achieved. The data received from the
twin scanning can be passed into an in-built computer to locate
objects of a given atomic mass.**? Observing staff can view the two- 
dimensional high and low density images on two television monitors 
which serve to reduce image "clutter".
It has been noted that dual energy techniques can suffer from an
inability to differentiate between benign low density compounds and 
Plastic explosives, because of their close chemical and physical 
similarities.**® However, such systems can be made more effective if combined with other methods of X-ray performance enhancement. As shall 
be noted below, a means of simplifying the task of screening staff was 
identified in several methods of image enhancement, the aim of which 
is to provide electronic means of differentiating between varying
matter types. The problem which required to be solved was described 
in the following terms by A. Kotowski. a Vice President of the US-based Astrophysics Research Corporation;
"Just as light shadows may merge. X-ray shadows may also merge
and two objects, one behind the other, may not be distinguishableexcept by the familiarity of each individual shadow. If too much
material is present, the image may simply be black in some areas.Very fine wires or extremely small objects may not be
**4#ew Scientist, 7 January 1989, p. 23.
Popular Science. May 1986. p . 38 f reprint). 
***ECAC. Doc. 30. appendix 10.
T  :___:__ :_i _______ :_____ :______ :_______________ i-.
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distinguishable. Too many individual items may produce such acluttered image that none are r e c o g n i z a b l e . " * * ’
Monochrome images are particularly vulnerable to this type of problem 
because although many different levels of shading are able to be noted 
by X-ray technology, the human eye is unable to distinguish between 
more than a few of them. Hence. there is great difficulty in even 
identifying the differences in shading between obiects of a similar 
d e n s i t y . *30 The eye is much more likely to observe differences in 
colour than variations in grey shading. For this reason, research and 
development of colour-coded X-ray imaging was carried out. resulting 
in the production of a new generation of devices using "pseudo-colour" 
techniques. such as Astrophysics' S-Scan system. These methods 
involve the computer-driven assignment of certain colours to different 
densities of material encountered in screening. As the criteria by 
which colour is assigned are density and thickness rather than density 
and chemical composition, it is normal for totally different colours 
to represent a single substance featuring varying degrees of thickness. Similarly, totally different chemical compounds which 
exhibit similar combinations of thickness and density can be portrayed 
by psuedo-colour equipment in similar colours.*®*
Some of the early colour-coding units were criticised because. in 
exchanging shades of grey for different colours. they failed to 
account for the possibility of some objects acquiring several colours 
at once and blending together with those of other items. occasionally 
concealing their true identity.*®* The employment of synthesised 
colours can also cause problems with resolution of fine material.*®* 
The evolution of more advanced colouring systems and of image 
enhancement techniques, however, has alleviated these situations.
With one advanced. colour-coded, dual energy system produced by the 
German company Heimann Systems Corporation fa subsidiary of Siemens 
Components based in Wiesbaden), the X-ray unit, named the Hi-Mat, is 
able to represent inorganic, non-metal lie compounds of high atomic 
weights in blue and metallic substances or mixtures of densities ingreen. Particularly dense matter, such as steel of 2 cm thickness iscoded black or grey. Most importantly, however, is the Hi-Mat's ability to isolate compounds which are unambiguously organic. such asPlastics. in orange, providing a highly contrasting spectral range to
ease the task of screening staff.*®*
In addition to the provision of colour, u p  to twenty different levels
* *’Kotowski fl986). p. 23.
Airport Supoort. June 1989 freorint),
*®*Publicity material for Astrophysics, 1990.
*®*Kotowski fl986), p. 22,
*®®ECAC (1988), paragraph 3.3 c) 4 ).
*®*E.E. Murphy (1989). p. 35; Airport Support. June 1989 (reprint)
Aviation Week and Space Technology. 16 January 1989 (reprint).
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of shading are provided, more fully to take advantage of X-ray 
t e c h n o l o g y ’s valuable ability to measure the differing densities of 
matter.**^ As plastic explosives contain nitrogen in very closely 
packed form and most ordinary organic compounds do not. critical 
differences in shading of the organic orange colour will be presented 
for each.*®* Hence, it is at least theoretically possible for an alert 
and well-trained guard to note the darker orange shading of clastic 
explosives. particularly if s/he can compare it with the lighter hue of ordinary clastic substances.
The Astrophysics Research Corporation of Long Beach. California, USA. 
has developed a system similar to that of Heimann. which is sensitive 
to X-ray attenuation rates, using only three colours. The c o m p a n y ’s E-Scan system is designed to measure atomic weights of compounds being 
screened by employing two X-ray systems to produce a single image, 
colour-coded according to chemical composition and shaded according to 
density and thickness. Its low density sensor produces images of 
material of an atomic mass lower than 10 amu (including plastics,
cocaine. etc.) in varying shades of orange. Heavier compounds
(including metals) are picked u p  by its other sensor, producing images 
coloured blue or (if too dense to be screened) bright green.*®? This 
combination of reliable, chemistry-specific colouring and secondary 
shading makes E-Scan superior to pseudo-colour techniques in 
attempting to present useful images for security personnel to 
interpret. The transparency of the colours used means that lowdensity matter concealed behind a sheet of metal would still be
observable in image form. However, as the colours would blend with 
each other, it might be difficult to identify with certainty the exact 
compositional structure of the lower density material.
Also. because shading of a colour will he dependent upon the density 
and thickness of the material being screened, it will be impossible to 
specify any particular colour/shading combination which could be guaranteed as being unique to plastic explosives. Hence. while
advanced X-ray apparatus are useful tools in the control of well
trained. observant staff. their reliance uPon human intervention 
coupled with their inability clearly to isolate explosives. must 
relegate them to a lower order of effectiveness than neutron
bombardment and chemiluminescence techniques. Until its
differentiation is developed to be more informative than a simple 
organic/inorganic demarkation, such technology will enioy only limited 
practical usefulness.
By April 1989, Astrophysics Research of Windsor. UK, a subsidiary of
the Californian corporation, had reported 90 sales of its colour X-raydevices, costing $70,000 (US) each, with British Home Office tests 
having been undertaken on the system.*®® In the same year O ’Bailance
*®^4v2at3on Week and Space Technolociy. 16 January 1989 (reprint). 
*®*Vincent (1989), p . 37.
*®’Publicity material for Astrophysics, 1990: Dorey (1987).
* ® ® r/?e Times. 13 April 1989 (reprint); Airports International.
January 1990, p . 19.
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suggested that British investment in colour-coded X-ray apparatus had 
been precluded by familiar British considerations of finance:
"It is thought that one of these types of machines was 
recommended for UK airports in 1985, but never purchased, the 
official excuse then being fthat it] " lacked proven efficiency", 
but the real reason was the c o s t . " * ® ’
A possible indication of E-Scan's perceived value within the industry 
was given when. in 1989. Pan Am announced that it had introduced the 
system to its European departure points.**® It should he clear that 
any form of dual energy X-ray system will be unable to provide adequate security cover in isolation. If combined with other 
technologies and with skilled staff. however. it could be a very 
useful tool in the struggle to prevent and deter acts of aviation 
t e r r o r i s m .
In order to temper reports of colour-coded X-ray t e c h n o l o g y ’s 
strengths with some lust criticism of its inescapable weaknesses in practice, it is useful to include at this point a short anecdote from Yeffet about an interview he conducted with a US security operative, 
describing succinctly the extent to which any security t o o l ’s success 
must be dependent upon high quality personnel. good operational 
training, recognition of the s y s t e m ’s purposes and the implementation 
of well-formulated regulatory and managerial policies:
"The man said his training consisted of one eight hour session on how to operate the X-ray machine. From this 
instruction, all he remembered was that he was supposed to look 
for the color green on the monitor. indicating metal. Dark 
spots, he said, are usually books but could be bombs. If he saw 
something suspicious. he said his instructions were to ask the passenger what it was. and if the passenger told him what the 
object was. he was to trust the passenger and let the luggage go 
through. This clearly contradicts FAA rules. I asked him what 
would happen if he made a mistake and then a plane blew u p . He 
said he would have to go back for retraining. If it happened twice, he could be fired."***
Just as SAIC introduced its XENIS system to offer the proven benefits 
of X-radiography with the innovation of TNA, so Astrophysics announced 
in January 1990 its intention to manufacture an E-Scan system combined 
with neutron technology and other techniques. The new combined apparatus, known as T-Scan. is intended to meet the F A A ’s EDS specifications but also to offer a faster baggage processing rate than 
TNA at a substantially lower price,**? This development towards 
producing multiple technique systems is to be welcomed because. as 
shall be seen below, the need for a broadly based. combined approach
*3’O ’Bailance (1989) I. p . 18.
** * Flight International, 22 April 1989, p. 11.
***Yeffet and Barnes (1989), p, 133.
**’Publicity material for Astrophysics. 1990.
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to security screening deserves to be addressed by the security 
industry,
6.4.2. Backscatter X-Radiographv
In the late 1980s, a maior screening apparatus producer. American 
Science and Engineering Incorporated (AS&E). of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. USA. developed a new type of X-ray security screening 
as a variation of the dual energy technique, in which only one X-ray 
source is used. The physical property of light-weight atomic material 
to scatter X-rays towards the source is harnessed in this technique. 
As with other security advances, the research on the subject was
prompted by medical r e q u i r e m e n t s . * * ® The AS&E method employs two
distinct types of X-ray detection in one unit. In addition to
familiar absorbed X-rays. which are collected in transmission
detectors placed behind the baggage being screened, AS&E's "2 System"
and "ZZ System" employ a "backscatter" technique in which detectors 
are placed between the baggage and the source, so as to retrieve those rays which have been reflected back from matter of a low atomic number 
(described by the company as "low-Z").
The X-rays are produced in a fan-shaped beam of low dosage, which is 
passed through a perforated wheel which rotates at a rate of 1.800
rom. In this way, the X-ray is cut into individual "pencil beams" or
flying spots which are directed to specific points in the baggage. 
The rays are scattered in different directions and are retrieved by 
the banks of detectors. By virtue of the double detector facility, 
the system is able to present two different image types which together 
cover the entire range of material densities. with dense material producing a dark image and light matter conversely glowing brightly on 
their respective viewing screens. Because back scatter technology is 
effective only with matter of low atomic weight, plastic explosives or 
weapons can usually be placed anywhere in relation to metallic matter. 
Hence, the technology will locate objects shielded behind dense metal 
which would be hidden from less advanced X-ray systems. Conversely, however. it must be possible for some degree of shielding still to 
take place between compounds of a similar density.
The technology involved in the backscatter system relies on its thin, 
"flying spot" beam of X-rays, the principle of which was described by scientific journalist. Steven Ashley, thus;
" ... AS&E's patented low-dose flyino-spot technology for X-rays 
- a pencil beam of radiation that rapidly scans an object - would allow an X-ray detector to form a video image of the X-rays that are scattered off-line by low-Z atoms. Creating an image of the scattered radiation would be impossible with a conventional X-ray 
machine ... because the fanlike spray of X-rays emitted by these devices would result in a fogged image. With a fan beam, scattered radiation comes from all points on the object at once, 
making a mess of the backscatter image. When the flying-soot
beam illuminates an object, the scattered X-rays that are
detected at any time are known to have originated from the
particular region of the object the device is soot-lighting. The
Aviation Oeek and Space Technology. 28 April 1986, p. 31.
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Model Z ’s processor can then collect these spot samples to form a 
video-imacie mosaic in the same wav the beam flying across a TV 
screen creates the picture."***
Unfortunately, in order to present the two types of data to screening 
staff. the 2 and ZZ Systems use two monitors, one to display a normal 
transmission X-ray shadow image and the other for the more unusual 
pictures of low density materials (the “Z-images"). With the ZZ 
System, the second monitor provides two low-Z images on a split
screen, showing the baggage pictured from each s i d e . **5 This means
that extra manpower and/or effort can be required to view and assess 
no fewer than three different images simultaneously, which might 
result in attention spans being shorter or in interest being focussed 
on one screen at the expense of the other.
It is difficult to imagine that A S & E ’s claim of an effective
throughput capability of 1.500 parcels per hour could properly be sustained in a high risk airport environment. as such a rate would 
require each piece to be screened in an average of only 2.4
seconds.*** In an attempt to promote efficiency. however, a very 
unusual optional alarm system is included in the ZZ System. If the 
screening of an area of baggage results in the rays being attenuated 
so as to indicate the presence of a possibly suspicious low density 
material (displayed, for example, as a solid block on the system's low-Z monitor) an audible alarm will sound and the suspicious section of the shadow image will turn blank and alternate in shade between 
black and white. thus immediately Indicating the c o m p o u n d ’s exact l o c a t i o n .
The alarm mode can be set to issue a warning according to certain
intensities of backscatter activity, in so doing lowering the
likelihood of false positives being issued from non-explosive
compounds of densities similar to those of explosives.**? Such X-ray 
alarm systems illustrate the advances which have been made in the two 
decades since X-ray technology was introduced to civil aviation and 
suggest that, even in this field. the role of human operators may be 
diminishing. On the other hand, the use of primitive and 
unsophisticated alarms in X-ray technology has been criticised bvK o t o w s k i ;
"Automatic threat alert devices have been mainly limited to
alarming on detection of very dense areas in an image. In 
general, these areas are easy to see and alarming on these areas tends to produce a false sense of security in images that do not contain them. However, in certain special screening situations, these devices have been used successfully."***
* * * Popular Science. May 1986. o, 38.
Aviation Oeek and Soace Technolooy. 28 April 1986, d . 31. 
***Publicity material for AS&E. 6 January 1989.
**?darport Suooort, June 1989 (reprint).
* * «Kotowski (1986). p . 23.
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Misgivings about the AS&E system include doubts about its selectivity. 
The corporation claims that in addition to finding plastic explosives, guns and knives, the system can also be used to isolate anv matter of
low atomic mass. such as ceramics, currency, drugs of abuse, gems,
fruit and s a u s a g e s . * * ’ As it differentiates between materials according to atomic mass rather than, for example. to a specific nitro-group signature, it must follow that the manual system will only 
provide a shadow image which must still be interpreted by staff. AS&E's marketing manager. Richard W Sesnewicz. described the required procedure in the following way:
"We tell the observer that if you see something in the Z-imaoe 
that glows white, it means that the object backscatters X-rays and is therefore a low-Z material. ... The observer then has to say to himself: Do I recognise that white shape as being usual or unusual when compared with visual information provided by theconventional X-ray image? For instance, if I notice a white blob
in what the conventional X-ray tells me is a radio. I have todetermine whether that's normal."*®®
If the image contains many low density obiects, including plastic explosives. or many high density obiects. including a metallic 
handgun, problems of clutter may still exist. Alternatively, if the 
automatic alarm is employed, there must be a very real risk of false alarms being generated by innocent items of low density which resemble explosives. False positives are dealt with in the Model ZZ which
incorporates an image enhancement facility to highlight the edge ofrecognisably harmless materials whose image signal would otherwise be 
too weak to be passed with confidence by screening staff. In 
addition. it is possible to create the illusion of expanded image 
density, once more to assist observing screening staff.*®*
Also, as with all X-ray technology, the alignment of the explosives or 
gun being screened will have a maior bearing on the effectiveness of the s y s t e m ’s non-automated visual mode. While. for example. a very 
thin layer of plastic explosives will appear white wherever and however it may be located, it is clear that if placed in the lining of 
a case such that its largest surface area is made to face the pencil- beam of X-rays. a more immediately obvious image will be presented 
than if the sheet were to be located around the seam of the case in such a way that the beam would be presented with a tiny surface area. Despite the system's presentation of a narrow, white line for such an 
alignment. only a well trained and alert security screener could be 
expected to find the bag suspicious. Similar identification problems are imaginable with the alignment of plastic guns, particularly if 
stored in component form. One means of solving this problem would be
* * * Popular Science. January 1989. May 1986 p. 38: Publicity material for AS&E
Popular Science. May 1986. d. 39. 
*®*Publicity material for AS&E, 6 January 1989.
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to adopt the technique employed by SAIC in their XENIS described as follows by Wilson: TNA device.
"XENIS uses a two-view X-ray that looks down from the top 
the normal airport X-ray approach - and across from the side. 
The second view is mandatory in looking for plastic explosives 
which have been moulded into the luggage in a sheet. With the 
combination system, the specific object registered as a possible 
threat is Identified in red on the scr e e n . " * ® ’
Furthermore, with the original Z System, the second monitor provides abackscatter view from only one side of the baggage being screened.
Because it lacks the ZZ System's extra bank of detectors which 
provides all-round coverage of the case, it is necessary to scan each
bag twice, turning the bag after the first scan. Otherwise, thebackscatter image might not provide a sufficiently accurateshadowgraph of the whole object, risking the possibility of an
explosive wall lining being missed entirely.*®*
Costing approximately $70,000 (US'). the Z System is at least twice as 
expensive as conventional X-ray apparatus, though priced below either 
TNA or chemiluminescence devices.*** It is able to penetrate 3/4" stainless steel and can display single tinned wiring of 36 AWG thickness. This degree of resolution is very impressive, even in
modern machines.*®* Other useful features of Z technology are its
portability. with one backscatter system being able to be transported 
in the back of a small van, and its capacity to screen objects of any 
length, u p  to 42" in height and 32.5" in width.*®*
In 1990. AS&E announced the launch of a fully automated X-ray system 
designed to compete with TNA screening systems, but costing only 
$200,000 (US). The firm claimed that their new device would be able 
to detect explosives in packages as small as that used against Pan Am Flight 103 and that its false alarm rate would be comparable with that 
of TNA. at around five per cent. Relying on fewer staff members than 
unautomated systems and using simpler technology than TNA, theapparatus would be cost-efficient in terms of current labour levels. 
In addition, personnel would be assisted by the provision of high 
quality X-ray images. hence aiding subsequent physical search 
p r o c e d u r e s . * * ?
**:Wilson (1989), p. 16.
*®*Publicity material for AS&E, 6 January 1989.
*®*Popular Science, May 1986. p . 38 : Aviation Oeek and Soace 
Technology, 28 April 1986. p. 31.
*®*Dorey (1983), p, 226.
*®*Publicity material for AS&E. 6 January 1989.
^ A i r p o r t s  International, January 1990, p. 19.
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6.4.3. Image Enhancement and Processing
In addition to producing colour and/or shading differentials. some X-
rav systems such as A S & E ’s Model ZZ can produce electronical 1v generated enhancements to the picture being viewed by staff. The examples of televisual and digital zoom facilities might be classified as early precursors of these processing forms because their aim was to 
permit closer examination of the X-ray data. with the intention of 
providing greater detection opportunities for security personnel. 
More sophisticated systems of the late 1980s have produced images of a quality unimaginable until very recently. The advanced technique of X-ray computed tomography (known as CT scanning) involves the multiple scanning of baggage to produce a two-dimensional image which gives the 
impression of possessing a third dimension, showing relative densities 
of the articles within the bag.*** Breakthroughs in computer 
technology have further broadened the scope for image enhancement to be made.
With H e i m a n n ’s Hi-Cat system, for example, obiects of critical density levels can automatically be made clearer in their X-ray images by using its processing facility to trace around their image contours, 
illuminating their shape in higher con t r a s t . * * ’ This increase in 
contrast improves the general visibility of both brighter and darker patches and makes easier the discovery of otherwise badly defined features, such as wiring.***
Other methods include a multi-functional computer enhancement 
technique which provides staff with u p  to ten image processing options 
to help clear suspect baggage without requiring to resort to time- 
consuming physical searches. By. for example, lightening an image, 
compounds of higher densities can be examined closely, while darkening 
the picture enables detailed inspection of subtle variations in low density shades.*** Although this may provide a useful tool in the 
hands of experienced staff working without pressure of time. it is to 
be expected that the options would quickly be forgotten during instances of high passenger throughput at airports. Instead, a more direct and immediate form of warning would offer greater benefits for 
high pressure screening work.
Another aid to efficiency for X-ray systems is computer pattern-
recognition. which can be used to automate detection by filtering out 
familiar shapes from the image being v i e w e d . * * ’ A variation of the shape recognition idea is the notion of memorised shape descriptions 
which are compared with the shapes of obiects being screened in
***ECAC. (1988) appendix 10: Airoorts Internationa}. January 1990. o. 
19.
**’Airport Support. June 1989 (reprint).
** «Kotowski (1986), p. 23.
* * * f b i d . : Airport Support. June 1989 (reprint).
 ^  ^Popular Science. May 1986. p . 39.
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b a g g a g e . **3 This addition to apparatus would be of little use in 
countering the threat of plastic explosives which can be moulded into 
any shape. but may have a role in detecting familiar handguns and other hazardous objects of recognisable shape, including dangerous items placed innocently in baggage.
1
Perhaps the most difficult problem currently to be overcome in 
developing new X-ray devices is the low level of personnel ability to 
isolate plastic explosives by using the equipment. Meaningful 
improvements in atomic mass recognition. colour coding and automateddistant goals. but they are.
an effort to improve detectionalarm efficiency might constitutenevertheless. worth pursuing. in capacities. Equally. it must be borne in mind that any security advance is likely to be mirrored by t e r r o r i s t s ’ efforts to overcome 
i t .
If airports were, in future, to be equipped with X-ray systems capable 
of presenting plastic explosives as a clearly identifiable image, 
terrorists might be forced to adapt their modes of attack as they 
could no longer be confident of concealing the organic compound in an inorganic environment such as a radio. They would thus be compelled 
to locate the substance in the midst of other matter of similar atomic 
weight. once again making X-ray screening more difficult to achieve effectively. In such circumstances. it is foreseeable that the 
spiralling progression of advances between security developers and 
terrorists could be continued ad nauseam. I f . instead, advanced X-ray 
units were to be viewed merely as one component which could be used by 
carriers and airports in conjunction with other sophisticated media, 
such as TIMA and chemi luminescence, then the t e r r o r i s t s ’ prospects of evading security controls might be reduced markedly, even in the long 
term.
6.5. Other Technologies
6.5.1. Fast Neutron Activation
Employing T N A ’s gamma ray detection rings and its software. Fast 
Neutron Activation (FNA) is similar to its technological stable-mate. 
Instead of a cloud of low energy neutrons being used. FNA employs high energy neutron pulses which cause considerable gamma ray activity not 
merely in chemical structures containing nitrogen. but in those which 
also contain carbon and oxygen. This activity produces a much more 
accurate indication of nitrogenous substances' composition, allowing 
more detailed comparisons to be made between samples and memorised data. As explosives typically contain high concentrations of nitrogen 
and oxygen but a low concentration of carbon. the FNA explosives signature is readily identifiable, making the system likely to be both more accurate and less prone to false positives than TNA. The development of FNA suffered a setback in February 1989 when FAA funding from which scientists researching it fat the advanced nuclear 
technology group of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico) 
might have benefited was diverted to another system. The benficiary 
was another research programme involving generated by a particle accelerator, which fast. pulsed neutrons promised even greater
**3 Airports International. January 1990, 19
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accuracy. The drawback of the latter venture is the cost 
accelerator involved - currently over $1 million (US).***
of the
Another variation of neutron technology is a technique called 
hydrogenous explosive detection (HED) which employs neutron 
bombardment from a cobalt source to identify water-based compounds, 
including most explosives. As with TNA systems, the different forms 
of scatter from the materials being screened provides evidence of the 
s u b s t a n c e ’s chemical composition.**® Although priced at a competitive 
£7000, current HED methods suffer from high false alarm rates.***
6.5.2. Gas Chromatography
Another version of vapour "sniffing" involves gas chromatography. in 
which a process known as "electron capture" is used. Either w a l k ­
through or hand-held systems can be produced using the technique, 
which relies upon explosive v a p o u r s ’ propensity to attract electrons. 
If the vapours in question are subjected to an electrical c u r r e n t . 
some of the electron flow will be captured by the sample, resulting in 
a measurable decline in the total current,
A.I. Security of Cambridge. UK. has developed a system based on this 
technique which, the firm claims, is sensitive to one part of
explosives vapour per hundred billion parts of air. The f i r m ’s 
portable device. known as Model 97. is specified as being able to
detect commercial and "most known military explosives" and to do so
with a typical response time of two seconds. It comprises a sampling 
unit which is passed around the outside of the object being screened 
and an analysis unit which is located in a large attaché case. Air 
samples are sucked into the device and separated through the 
implementation of the physical process of gas c h r o m a t o g r a p h y . If 
chromatographic indicators suggest that explosive vapours might be 
present. the gas sample containing the vapour in question is passed 
through a chamber containing a stream of the inert gas. argon. With 
two independent flow oaths then being used to provide one "c o n t r o l ” 
flow by which to judge activity in the other, half of the gas sample 
is passed over a specially coated surface. designed to slow the 
progress of explosive vapours. The two mixtures then enter B-oarticle 
clouds. at which point measurements of electron capture are taken. 
Decrease in current and time differences in the flow of the two 
samples can indicate the presence of explosive compounds. If 
explosives are confirmed as being present, a visual alarm is activated 
(with the option of an audible one also being triggered if set to do 
so) alerting staff of some unspecified threatening substance being 
p r e s e n t .* * ?
The sampling problems of any vapour detection system apply to this
***E.E. Murphy (1989). p. 35. 
**sciutterbuck (1990) I. p. 59.
**«Clutterbuck (1990) II. p . 14 5.
**’Publicity material for A.I. Security. 1989: Discover 26. June 1986. d .
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technique, making it less than 100% reliable. Nevertheless. it
exhibits potential for great practical utility, as it is both swift in
its operation and highly portable. Although interference and
resultant false positives may be suffered from non-explosive vapours 
which resemble those of known explosives, the Model 97 includes a 
useful warning mechanism. which alerts staff of the interference, 
allowing them to decide on the need for other modes of screening to 
take Place.**® In this way. the worst effects of false alarms can be 
avoided, the non-explosive response facility providing useful
additional information which a simple blanket alarm could not. Viewed 
from a more critical standpoint. the apparatus would be better suited 
to high turnover airport applications if it could provide more 
accurate vapour analysis which might remove entirely the need for such 
a non-exDlosive response facility. The Model 97 hand-held system is 
in operation in a number of aviation locations and. most notably, was 
installed at Seoul Airport. South Korea fa high risk venue), prior to 
the .1988 O l y m p i a d . * * ’
A Canadian firm. Scintrex, has utilised highly advanced gas 
chromatography in the production of a nine feet long passenger tunnel 
system designed to screen passengers at security points. The persons 
walk the length of the tunnel, in which they are exposed to streams of 
warm air. intended to promote the release of explosives vapours. Any 
such vapours present are sensed by detectors built into the tunnel, causing alarms automatically to be issued.*?® It is also worth noting 
that Canadian research has produced a screening system based on 
nitrogen ion vapour detection, which Canadian authorities hope will be 
able accurately to identify trace levels of explosives in as little as 
three seconds - a remarkable combination of attributes.*?* Two common 
failings of many less sophisiticated gas techniques based on similar 
principles are their inability to detect explosives with particularly 
low vapour pressures and their reliance upon long analysis times.*??
6.5.3. Mass Spectrometry
Air sampling also takes place to enable mass spectrometry to be used
for detection purposes. As with the process's more familiar 
laboratory operation. security versions of the technique analyse 
samples so as to isolate an unmistakable chemical "fingerprint" of the substance. Once the sample's constituent elements have been separated. the molecular mixture can be charged from a radioactive source. enabling the process of mass determination to take place by 
accelerating the resultant ions through magnetic fields which bring 
about e lement-specific oath deflections. As a result of this. the 
presence and relative preponderance of each substance is discovered.
** «Publicity material for A.I. Security, 1989.
**’ TAe Daily Teleoraph. Thursday 29 December 1988 freorint); New 
Scientist. 7 January 1989. p. 23.
*?®The Times. Thursday 22 March 1990, p. 33.
*?*J. Rodocanachi in Lewis and Kaplan fl990), d p . 284 ~ 285.
*?? Idl'd, and Discover. June 1986. o. 29.
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If suspicious compositions are identified. an alarm 
alerting staff of the need for further inspection.*?®
is triggered
British Aerospace of Bracknell. UK. has developed a mass spectrometry device (the "Condor" system) which was produced initially to assist 
Japanese customs authorities in their searches for drugs of abuse and 
e x p l o s i v e s . * ? *
6.5.4. Infrared Sensing
Another interesting technology which might be utilised for aviation 
security purposes and which could be used safely with humans is infrared sensing. in which a video image of an individual is created 
from body heat measurements. Infrared sensors would differentiate 
between typical body heat of passengers and "cold spots" caused by 
inanimate obiects of lower temperatures which absorb and block even 
minute amounts of body heat. In this way a shadow image of the suspicious object would be available for staff to assess. making subsequent physical search selection of passengers more reliable.*?®
The principal use of such equipment (which might be incorporated into metal detection archways) would be to overcome the threats Posed by 
plastic handguns and explosives carried on or around a t e r r o r i s t ’s person. Drawbacks include the fact that most plastic handguns are 
readily disassembled into their component parts, making recognition very difficult and the reliance which such a technique would involve 
upon human involvement. observation and discretion. Also, at present the imaging capacity of infrared sensing is very poor. making 
recognition of shapes very difficult, although the development of 
image enhancement should improve the technique significantly.*?* If a 
fast processing speed could be achieved. infrared screening might be 
an attractive proposition for certain higher risk airports and 
airlines, with the technique being combined with others to increase efficiency further. William Crenshaw has observed that infrared or 
sonic imaging might in future be employed in conjunction with "anomaly 
detectors" designed to identify the presence of an unusual density or 
mass not normally found at a certain point. such as on a p e r s o n ’s 
b o d y .* ? ?
6.5.5. Dielectric Measurement
This system utilises the physical feature of capacitance (the varying 
ability of substances to hold a charge) to identify explosives. It 
was developed as early as the 1970s and was used to identify letter
*?:Wilkinson (1989) IV. P. 19: Clutterbuck (1990) II. p. 144 - 145.
*?*rhe Daily Telegraph, Thursday 29 December 1988 (reprint).
*?®Ihe New York Times. Sunday 25 December 1988 (reprint).
*?*Clutterbuck (1990) I. o. 60. See also Clutterbuck (1990) 11. p. 146.
*??W,A. Crenshaw (1987). p. 136
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bombs at that time,*?® Desoite promising field test results, the 
screening method was not developed for aviation security p u r p o s e s . * ? ’
Other new techniques of explosives detection are currently being 
developed, about which little aviation-related information is
available. Included in this category are systems using plasma
c h r o m a t o g r a p h y . bioluminescence. enzymatic activity. nitrobenzene 
vapour detection (thought to he unsuitable for airport applications) 
and laseroptoacoustic s p e c t r o s c o p y ,*®® In addition. Clutterbuck has 
drawn attention to the possibility of developing electronic device 
detection techniques and advanced human sense aids.*®*
6.6. Conclusion: Assessment of Security T e c h n o l o g y ’s Role
The above analysis of current research and development p r o j e c t s ’ most 
recently publicised innovations clearly indicates that a diverse range 
of advanced technology may soon be available to the aviation industry. 
Unfortunately, it is also evident that each apparatus exhibits 
weaknesses as well as strengths in its detection capacities,
necessitating the conclusion that security loopholes are bound to 
remain if excessive trust is placed in too restricted a range of 
t e c h n o l o g i e s .
Shortcomings in new methods, however. can only add extra momentum to 
the push for further development, because once relevant technologies 
have been raised to an employable level, resultant devices will be 
able to provide essential support for the security sector of the 
industry. On a more positive note. the Therrnedics president, John 
Wood. observed in 1988 that great progress in the technology involved 
in explosives detection had been made since 1985, at which time no 
system had yet proved capable of operating to suitably high levels of screening efficiency.*®? It is reasonable to predict that a 
continuation of FAA support in the detection programmes which it 
helped to initiate would guarantee the commercial availability of 
highly advanced, portable and efficient apparatus based on the above 
noted principles before the end of the 1990s.
Despite the demonstrable weaknesses of the new generation of devices, 
some aviation authorites have introduced new technology while others 
are set to do so in the near future at certain key airoorts.*®® More 
widespread acceptance of essential new technology can only be brought about after screening efficiency and cost-effectiveness have been 
moroved. yet with t e r r o r i s t s ’ offensive capabilities advancing daily.
?®Wilkinson (1989). p. 19.
’’Clutterbuck (1990) I. p p . 59 - 60; Clutterbuck (1990) II. p. 146.
Airport Support, June 1990 (reprint); Clutterbuck (1990) II. d .
145.
«*Clutterbuck (1990) I, p . 190.
® ? The Boston Globe, Friday 23 December 1988 (reprint).
® 3 Flight International, 6 May 1989, p. 13.
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it is now no longer .acceptable for aviation authorities to look for 
long term solutions. Progress in security technology cannot be 
delayed for another decade and should not be delayed at all. Neither 
should there be any doubt that adequate security coverage can only be 
achieved through the adoption of a multi-layered approach to 
technology utilisation. As S A I C ’s Bozorgmanesh honestly noted with 
respect to the f i r m ’s own TNA systems:
" rOne cannotl claim that installation of the TNA by itself 
will provide 100% secure flights. In fact, no single piece of
security equipment or security procedure by itself can provide 
such a guarantee."***
Properly administered security demands a wide selection of processes, 
operating together to preclude all possibilities of attack. In terms 
of landside/airside security screening this must mean that no one 
technology should be trusted as though an instant panacea. Instead, 
only through the imaginative adoption of effective technology 
combinations will protection against terrorist attack be maximised. 
At present. it is possible to combine TNA with X-ray and 
chemiluminescence vapour sniffing with metal detection in two 
efficient units. to assist in the isolation of suspicious obiects. 
Only a small technological step would be required to combine these and 
other screening techniques in a labour-efficient continuous flow 
system.**®
In future. the possibility of more fully integrating advanced 
technological methods into one unified "multimode approach" to baggage 
screening, handling and reconciliation should be investigated.*®* 
Were it to prove feasible. computerised processing of baggage and 
passenger screening results would enable security staff to use a form 
of high technology physical profiling which is currently impossible to 
achieve but which, if sufficiently efficient. could be invaluable in 
the quest for hidden explosives.*®?
An advance which might be facilitated by integrating several 
techniques is that of overcoming the sensitivity/selectivity problem, 
described above with reference to several technologies. If a variety 
of different techniques was made to "overlap" and produce adequatescreening results in concert, then a concomitant benefit might be that
the margin of screening "overlap" would accommodate an overall 
reduction in device sensitivity. T h u s , if standard metal detection 
techniques were used on the person of a passenger in conjunction with 
advanced vapour detection and infrared sensing, it could be expected 
that the sensitivity of the metal detector could reasonably be reduced 
within responsible bounds fto promote faster throughout) without
*® *Bozorgmanesh (1990). p. 6.
*®^Clutterbuck (1990) I. p p . 185 - 186,
* ® « T . Szekely and F.T. Fox, “Airport Security: an Automated andIntegrated System". Airport Technology International 1989. d.
183.
*®?Scfer?ce, 13 January 1989 (reprint)
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jeopardising the performance of the entire process. This is the case 
because any device evading the metal detector would display different 
characteristics which would be observable with the other screening 
techniques. Hence, the prudent combination of security screening 
methods could be expected to reduce false positives by comparison and 
mutual verification techniques. Instead of slowing passenger flow, therefore, appropriate multiple screening carried out simultaneously 
could. in future, be a vital means of increasing efficiency andeffectiveness ~ actually reducing delays. It is a positive sign that 
the FAA has now turned its research efforts to finding workable 
security screening combinations to be integrated into a unified sys t e m . *®®
Another advantage offered by the combined approach concerns the increased capacity of airport technology to find elusive, "low-technology" improvised explosive and incendiary subst a n c e s . * * ’ While 
individual means of screening can locate several of these "h o m e m a d e " compounds, there can be little doubt that an integrated screening system would maximise detection probabilities. Clutterbuck has
remarked :
"Improvised explosives present a particular problem because 
there are so many innocent pairs of materials which become explosive when brought together. Well-known mixtures include
f e r t i l i z e r  and fuel oil. and the s o - c a l l e d  " C o - o p ’ mixture of nitro-benzine and s o d i u m  chlor a t e .  Most such mixtures do.however, c o n t a i n  considerable q u a n t i t i e s  of n i t r o g e n  c o m p o u n d s  
and it is these w h i c h  c u r r e n t l y  p r o v i d e  the c o m m o n e s t
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  for d e t e c t i o n  e i t h e r  by v a p o u r  or by n e u t r o n  
b o m b a r d m e n t . " * ”
Moreover. as Dudley has pointed out, there must always exist a danger 
of air offenders attempting to infiltrate innocuous materials through a security point, only to combine them on board an aircraft to form an
explosive or incendiary device which can be left concealed in thepassenger cabin at a stop-over disembarkation point:
"The major problem lies in the fact that it is possible to
construct bombs from the simplest and most harmless substances 
and if these bombs are in fact put together on the aircraft. it becomes impossible to soot the terrorist before he has 
b o a r d e d . "*’ *
Some easily obtained substances can cause problems, even in isolation.
**«McGuire (1989), p. 3.
* *’ I b i d . . p , 4 .
*’ «Clutterbuck (1990) I. p. 53
* ’ *Oudiev (1976 - 77). p . 72. Consider the case (described above) of 
the Korean aircraft destroyed in November 1987 by a binary explosive, which could have been taken on board the target aircraft 
in its component form. to be combined on board prior to the offenders disembarking.
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McGuire has described an incident in South Africa in which only 200 ml 
of concentrated sulphuric acid was released within a Fokker F-27 
aircraft :
"Fortunately. the acid spilled while the aircraft was on the 
ground and evacuation of 43 passengers was possible. It took the 
fire department three hours of spraying with bicarbonate of soda 
to neutralize the small amount of acid, which nonetheless 
destroyed the baggage of nine other p a s s e n g e r s . " * ’ ?
This episode illustrates the difficulty involved in predicting the
source of sabotage threats. While authorities meet to decide on 
tactics to deal with the obvious and demonstrated risks posed bv 
plastic explosives, it is possible that terrorist groups are realising 
the ease with which more simple explosive and incendiary devices could 
serve their causes. Eventually. it is conceivable that non-fissile 
for possibly fissile) nuclear materials. chemical and biological
weapons and advanced guided missiles could be targeted on a v i a t i o n . ’’ ® 
The reactive tendencies of states in dealing with issues of security
suggest that the world will not be adequately equipped to counter
these difficulties when they appear.
By definition. incomplete security affords complete vulnerability,
because a terrorist will always be interested in how lax security 
actually is as a whole rather than in how impressive it can be at 
specific points. Indeed, the hard lesson for security must be that as 
terrorist skills are constantly being forwarded by the necessity of 
diversity. even total vigilance cannot permit total confidence for 
airports. justifying further the use of multiple security safeguards 
as integrated components of a unified, yet constantly developing, 
defence system. The ultimate success or failure of airport security
will continue to depend upon the quality of infrastructure,
technology. techniques and, above all. human ability in securing the 
aviation environment. Particularly in future, when unprecedented 
pressures will be exerted on the civil aviation industry, it will
prove necessary to impose structures of security which permit 
timetables and screening systems to operate in tandem.
*’ 2McGuire (1989). p. 7.
*’ ®MacKenzie-Orr. (1988) p p . 2 - 3
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Ç H A P I E R 7
iPfLEmKTIN^jmPROVED SCg|^NING_INLJHE AIRPOgJ^ EMJRQNMENJ
"Five or six years ago, the present increase in traffic was not 
being f o r e c a s t ,"*
"With passenger numbers expected to double by the turn of the century and intensified public debate on airport congestion, 
strengthened security procedures should not impede passenger 
f l o w . "?
7 J L _  I n t r o d M c U m i  Thg puÿMCg a t J @ @ r K e %  ,..jnd its
IteLlPations„ fo r . M c u r ltx
The changing nature of air transport and its regulatory structures in 
the late twentieth century has revolutionised the role of the aviation 
community. In addition to rich travellers and influential executives, 
the world's larger international airports now witness the passage of 
persons from all social and economic groupings in huge numbers and in 
search of a vast range of flights. Where once airports were little 
more than points of embarkation, recent years have shown them to have 
become centres of frenetic activity and intense competition, 
increasingly regimented by the growing needs of punctuality and 
governed by the unwavering rules of the market place.
In future years, as laws of survival become progressively applied to 
the financing of aviation, the healthy members of the community will 
increasingly reap the benefits of a swelling market freed from 
governmental controls and so enabled to grow, while unfit operators 
will wither with the evolution of deregulatory measures.® Already, 
financially leaner times for many have made airports and airlines 
alike conscious of the need to conserve resources. As a result, much- 
needed spending now sometimes fails to be made in such vital areas as 
fleet replacement and maintenance, while carriers' quality control 
activities often fail to be enforced by state regulation and 
monitoring, to the detriment of the fare-paying passenger. As has 
been noted in the Press;
*G.O. Eser, International Herald Tribunef Monday 15 May 1989, P. 2. 
?G.H. Lipman, Plane Facts, January 1989, p. 1.
®Note that since the introduction of deregulatory policies in the 
United States in the late 1970s, the number of major civil airlines 
operating within the country has shrunk from a pproximately 20 to 
eight. The Guardian, Friday 2 November 1990, p. 13.
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"What is worrying the industry (and particularly the manufacturers, which bear the brunt of bad publicity when one of 
their jets cracks up) is that the boom in air travel and deregulation have created a climate in which the aviation 
industry is courting disaster; some airlines are systematically flouting safety regulations and ignoring routine maintenance 
procedures, while the regulatory authorities are an increasingly 
inadequate police force."*
Even more important than these factors, however, is the state of the 
world's aviation security provisions. As Noel Koch, President Ronald 
Reagan's counter-terrorism adviser in the Pentagon, remarked 1989: 1?
ve has
1ized byity isled to intensive cost-cutting ... [The savings are] r an absolutely minimal approach to spending where se 
c o n c e r n e d , "®
In future, the prevailing economic conditions which have led some 
groups within the industry to restrict spending on vital areas of 
safety could increasingly be applied as justification for cost 
minimisation in the equally "invisible" sector of security, in which 
much of the expense involved concerns activities which passengers 
never see and so cannot easily assess. The problem of economising on 
security can be particularly acute where the activities are carried 
out by airports rather than by airlines because, as was observed in 1989;
"Passenger concern over safety, and by analogy, security, places a commercial pressure on airlines not to cut corners. No such 
pressure applies to an airport operator unless air travel itself 
is seen to be so dangerous that passengers switch to other modes 
of travel. For the airport operator commercial pressures work in 
the opposite direction."*
Indeed, regulatory changes coupled with resultant commercial pressures 
were alleged in 1986 to have caused a British airport to have had its 
police presence reduced and certain police functions to have been 
transferred to lower paid, less skilled security staff.? Contrary to 
this indicator, if the terrorist experiences of the 1980s can teach 
the aviation industry and its users anything, it must be that 
despite the costs, the i n d u s t r y ’s tendencies towards cost reduction 
and the increased workload required - rigorous, effective and 
adequately funded aviation security is now a more vital requirement 
than ever before, as the ingenuity and ruthlessness of terrorist 
groups cannot lightly be forgotten.
In the age of the radio bomb and the concealed detonator, airports
 ^The Sunday Times, Sunday 5 March 1989, p. A17,
^International Herald Tribune, Tuesday 4 April 1989 (photocopy) 
«House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 2.
?House of Commons Co m m i t t e e  on Transport (1986), p. 6.
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must play a crucial role, not simply as airline hubs and passenger 
processors, but as filters of arms and explosives for the 
international civil aviation community. As the principal points of 
entry into the world's air system, airports occupy a position of key 
strategic significance in foiling the schemes of violence which 
threaten so many innocent lives. In turn, the many agencies and 
authorities which together facilitate the operation of these airports 
jointly hold a central res ponsibility in ensuring that the necessary 
filtration processes of aviation security are allowed to act to their 
fullest potential.
Historically, the overall record of airport security has been 
reasonably high with the techniques of the early 1970s originally 
operating well for the benefit of airport users.* However, the new 
dynamics of civil aviation are bringing with them new dangers to 
accustomed standards and assumptions. In future years, with passenger 
throughput at major international airports expanding at an alarming rate, the already pressurised security system will be forced to face 
new threats of overload.
Already in the United States, a security crisis exists because 
screening for most domestic flights was not upgraded in tandem with 
the regulatory c h a n g e s . The liberalisation allowed the domestic 
market to expand at such a rate that by 1985 over one million 
passengers boarded approximately 15,000 flights offered by US carriers 
each d a y . ’ As a result of managerial negligence, security is lax on 
many routes and may now be unable to be realistically increased to a 
sufficient level without requiring almost unbearable extension of 
check-in times and passenger queues. This was admitted in 1989 by Ray 
Salazar, then the F A A ’s head of security operations, who noted that an 
obligation to screen all domestic baggage would "affect travel 
d r a m a t i c a l l y . " * ’ As the US domestic security philosophy has been 
based in large measure upon the ill-conceived criterion of low risk 
flights requiring only low priority security, any sudden development 
of a new and brutal terrorist threat to airline passengers could pose 
major screening problems for the US aviation industry - currently 
processing over four times the population of the United States through 
1,500 security points each year** - as well as for the political 
bodies which regulate it.
Internationally, the problem of market growth also requires to be 
analysed and solved rapidly. Presently, for example, the crowded 
routes of the industrialised western states are expanding at a rate of
«Vincent (1989), p. 31.
’Air Transport Association data quoted in W.A. Crenshaw (1987), p. 64.
**Yeffet and Barnes (1989), p. 137.
**T. Strentz, "Radical Right Terrorists vs. Radical Left Terrorists: 
Their Theory and Threat," Flight Safety Digest (April 1990), p. 3. 
Strentz also quotes information provided by Salazar in 1990 
suggesting that US carriers offer more daily departures than all 
others combined.
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approximately eight per cent per year.*? Although percentage annual increases in passenger throughput declined in the late 1980s, the 
global rate of growth continues to present worrying indications of 
airport congestion problems being compounded in the 21st century, with 
key areas of growth being located in zones where security has 
traditionally suffered from a low priority. Statistics published by 
the International Labour Organisation in August 1989 illustrate the 
nature of the difficulties involved ;
"World airline passenger 
between 1970 and 1986 in 
Annual passenger growth 
through the year 2000 al 
as 57 per cent in the wor 
Yet the pattern of e 
Asian and trans-Pacific 
annually whereas it wi 
European, US and North At 
At the same time 
policies are in motion, 
and privatisation."*®
traffic rose an average of 7.1 per cent 
spite of the recession and oil shocks, 
of around 5.3 per cent is forecast 
ong with an overall increase by as much 
Id's fleet of civilian jet aircraft, 
xpansion will not be uniform world-wide, 
traffic is expected to climb 7 per cent 
11 average less than 5 per cent for 
lantic routes combined.
fundamental changes in air transport spearheaded by escalating deregulation
If a total throughput figure of 1,075,927,000 passengers on scheduled 
international and domestic flights is adopted for 1988** and an 
average annual increase in world passenger traffic of 5.3 per cent is taken to apply from 1988 "through the year 2 0 0 0 “ and just beyond it, 
then by the year 2002 global passenger flow would exceed twice the
* ? "What is the Role of a Consultant in Civil Aviation 
ICAO Bulletin, September 1989, p. 39.
Development?"
*®flO Information, 25/3 (August 1989), p. 8. The ÏLO has also
suggested that the expansion of the civil aviation 
result in making aircraft production the w o r l d ’s 
lucrative manufacturing sector. liO Information, 
1990), P. 8.
industry may 
single most 
26/3 (August
**ICAO data in ICAO, Civil Aviation Statistics of the 
(Montreal: ICAO, 1989), p. 34.
Nor let, I
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original total. The cumulative effect of the 5.3 per cent multiplier 
is illustrated in the table below:
P J R O IE C IID , M O W IH „ 0 £ .  . Ç I v i l  . & Y I A I l # _ W K U c _ . 1 9 . 8 9 _  -.MQZ 
ÏIAR..............   (fRPlKG lgDl GLOBAL PAÆSfNMR , F.LPM_
1989 1,132,951,1001990 1,192,997,500
1991 1,256,226,4001992 1,322,806,400
1993 1,392,915,1001994 1,466,739,6001995 1,544,476,8001996 1,626,334,1001997 1,712,529,8001998 1,803,293,9001999 1,898,868,500
2000 1,999,508,500
2001 2,105,482,5002002 2,217,073,100
If, 83 is confidently p r e d i c t e d , airline activity doubles in volume 
into the early 21st century from its 1988 figure,*® familiar security 
activities will require to change in a great number of airports,
simply in order to handle the new influx of travellers from terminal
halls into departure lounges. In particular, many Asian locations
which have not accorded security full recognition in the past, will be 
placed under enormous new processing pressures. It is these airports 
which will also require to upgrade security drastically, not least
because of the threat which might easily be posed by indigenous
offenders or by external terrorist groups utilising the weaknesses
presented to them. The case of Bangkok in April 1988 may have
established an unwelcome precendent in this respect.
In addition, crowded terminals already place many a i r p o r t s ’ operating 
space at a premium, making the physical expansion of security almost 
impossible in some locations and, more generally, incompatible with 
growth objectives of the industry as a whole. In the absence of 
technological innovations in screening capabilities, simple arithmetic 
would dictate that a doubling of passengers under presently 
encountered inefficient security screening conditions could require 
either great extensions to the current processing time for passengers 
and their baggage through existing screening techniques (in turn 
compounding problems of delays and resulting in "security
bottlenecks") or else the installation of much additional screening 
equipment into already cramped airports.
As neither of these solutions offers viable long term benefits to 
passengers, it follows that a delicately balanced combination of 
measures and methods must be found, including the best available
technology, in order to make security screening more efficient in
Facts, Issue 9, (January 1989), p. 1
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terms of both time usage and reliability. Of course, the combination 
of technological limitations, growth in the aviation market and a need 
to improve screening efficiency may result in there being grave 
difficulties in producing the type, quality and quantity of advanced 
screening apparatus and new procedures which are sought. In that 
case, if security were to be treated with due respect, there are 
unavoidable moral and practical grounds for concluding that current 
passenger processing rates would require to be forced downwards to 
avoid the undesirable possibility of screening quality being 
prejudiced further. This is a prospect which would not be greeted 
enthusiastically by the industry, as an increase in labour-intensive 
searching would both place enormous pressure on already overcrowded 
airports and inhibit the planned growth of airline activity. In an 
amoral industry, it is reasonable to predict that such conditions 
would result instead in a wholesale reduction in the quality of 
s e c u r i t y , tempered only by frenetic but short-lived bouts of activity 
after the occurrence of an atrocity, to prevent a public crisis of 
confidence in the industry.
 T .Mxanc.e s
If expensive and lengthy research and development efforts were 
eventually to produce affordable and sophisticated security 
technology, the requirement to resort to more laborious forms of 
inspection could be reduced or removed but the need for a reappraisal 
and restructuring of security would remain. It is clear that neither 
the option of upgrading security technology nor that of resorting to 
more time-consuming methods is at all attractive, although each is to 
be preferred to a continuation in the increase in sabotage fatalities 
which could be expected if inactivity were allowed to prevail. A 
statement made by Gerry Edwards, aviation security consultant and 
former Chief Superintendent of Sussex Police at Gatwick Airport, sums 
up the dilemma which requires to be resolved by each airline concerned 
with security costs:
"Its profit margins are small and therefore heavy security costs 
seriously affect expansion and profitability. Nevertheless it 
has to meet the costs of resisting terrorism otherwise the 4
travelling public will lose faith in the airline, further cutting 
p r o f i t s . "* «
Edwards' second statement would, in practice, apply only with the 
addition of the proviso that airlines perceive the threat of terrorism 
as applying to them and then make the conscious decision to introduce 
sufficient security measures to allay public fears. With expensive 
security investment often being required to be made in features which 
would be invisible to travellers, such as good staff training, 
adequate manpower throughout an airport and computerised and 
integrated access control systems, there must always be a misguided 
temptation for the industry to increase spending on areas which 
involve a lower financial outlay but which the public will see, in 
order to give a false impression of adequacy.
*«G. Edwards, "Fragmented Security at British Airports", Terror 
Update, (September 1989), p. 5.
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Ultimately, if the industry views security in terms of financial 
profit and loss, any genuine improvements will most likely be made in 
the aftermath of a security crisis of which the travelling public 
takes note and upon which it makes rational decisions concerning 
future consumption of aviation services. This disturbing possibility 
was illustrated in 1986 by the British Select Committee on Transport:
"Commercial operators cannot be expected to operate other than 
according to commercial priorities. After the El-Al incident at 
Heathrow, the Committee visited the airport for the second time 
during this inquiry and found, in the words of a Transport and 
General W o r k e r s ’ Union shop steward, security to have improved by 
100 per cent. It was only a month before that incident, however, 
that representatives from one airline were urging the Committee 
to recommend that the Secretary of State reduce security 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . The difference was perhaps less of a difference 
between operators, than that in the meantime security had become 
a commercial issue,"*?
It is profoundly sad that security enhancement and reform might be 
dependent upon such un pr edictable and unreliable commercial 
considerations as these. It is unlikely that the expansion of the 
aviation market will be substantially inhibited by the threat of 
terrorism partly because of the importance to the industry of 
profitability and growth in the competitive setting, but also because 
of the statistically low frequency of aviation terrorism incidents,
illusion that particular aviation interests are 
targeted. In truth, statistical data from even can have no relevance whatsoever to the future, 
aircraft and passenger vulnerability to acts of 
hijacking and sabotage now provides a virtually free and open market 
for adequately prepared terrorists. Hence, gaming odds are entirely 
irrelevant to the problem. The low incidence of terrorism is due less 
to the security measures of the profit-oriented industry and more to 
the charitable inactivity of those who could repeatedly assault 
aviation but who, as yet, have elected not to do so.
If the above-noted factors alone were threatening the efficacy of the 
w o r l d ’s security system, there would be sufficient reason to voice 
deep concern at the speed at which the juggernaut of deregulation and 
profitability is progressing towards the next century. Yet, 
developing in parallel with them is the equally pressing problem posed 
within airports themselves, by operators seeking to subordinate 
considerations of security and its organisation to those of passenger 
processing efficiency and profit maximisation.
T h e  Compet i n g  - i  
In any public commercial undertaking, profitability must always be of 
primary concern, both from the viewpoint of a b u s i n e s s ’s legal 
obligations to its shareholders and in terms of basic survival in the 
marketplace. The growing competitiveness within aviation must be 
accompanied by airports and carriers increasing their concern for 
retaining a foothold in the industry while the threat of corporate
*?House of C om mons C o m m i t t e e  on Transport (1986), p. 14
which can present an 
highly unlikely to be 
the very recent past 
because the scope of
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ra tionalisation and the dangers of overextension of investment cannot be viewed as remote problems for many operators within the industry.
In such an economic climate, efficiency is of utmost and constantly increasing significance because, for example, if one airline can introduce an appreciably more streamlined and effective computerised reservations and ticketing system than its immediate competitors a potentially vital economic advantage will have been gained, which may lead directly to increased profits or decreased losses, in turn helping to fend off an unwelcome merger or avoid liquidation.
On the micro-operational level also, efficiency is crucial, with facilitation of passengers and the accurate fitting of departures into their tightly scheduled runway "slots" each being prime managerial concerns. It is obvious that the aim of facilitation and security personnel at airports should be identical - namely to promote, achieve and maximise the safe and efficient handling of departures. In practice, however, it seems that economic pressures can cause security operations to be subordinated, not simply to concerns of swift but responsible throughput, but rather to the unbridled demands of timetable management. As a transport union official told the Transport Select Committee, "commercial pressures to ensure the rapid movement of passengers [conflict] with detailed security procedures. "* «
A key example of this is often to be found in a i r l i n e s ’ attitudes to "late passengers" who arrive at check-in desks or departure gates after the posts should have been closed but who, nevertheless, are processed for their flights and rushed through security checks to catch their departures. A strong case can be made for such actions, particularly where flight connections have to be made after a first leg aircraft has arrived late. Also, striving to maximise seating efficiency seems to many carriers a more attractive option than reprocessing tickets or having to contend with irate passengers. Despite these factors, security must not be prejudiced by petty negligence and considerations of convenience. As Yeffet noted after observing security for a flight from Los Angeles International in January 1989;
"As departure time approached, tardy passengers began arriving. None were searched. A late passenger is always a securitythreat; you have to assume that he Is relying on the last-minute rush to help him smuggle something on board. To do the jobright, attendants would have to hold the plane, but theirpreoccupation at that point is to get it away from the gate on time."**
A commercially less attractive option, but one which might be more popular with the majority of passengers who arrive for flights on time, would be to refuse boarding to any traveller who arrives after a previously specified time, making exceptions only for certain well defined and specified cases. This could be reinforced by printing
*«House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p. 2
*’Yeffet and Barnes (1989), p. 136.
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latest check*”in times beside, or even in place of, departure times on c a r r i e r s ’ passenger timetables, because to both passengers and security teams it is knowledge of the former time which is of far greater practical importance. Alternatively, where some security activities are carried out by airport-related staff (as in the United Kingdom), the issue could be devolved away from airlines, with security officers being obliged to close their posts a few minutes prior to take-off.
While none of these options would be expected to be popular with an aviation industry obsessed with minimising “no show" passengers through such iniquitous practices as deliberate and considerable o v e r ­booking of passengers, the effectiveness of security must be given priority over the profit factor and any short term considerations of public relations. If it were to be adopted as an element of widespread security reform and if explained clearly to the travelling public, even such reductions in convenience could be made tolerable.
Another vexing problem, and one presented to British security managers after the sabotage of Pan Am Flight 103, concerns the entirely misguided and irresponsible instruction issued by the Department of Transport that "(any) item about which the searcher is unable to satisfy himself must, if it is to be carried in the aircraft, be consigned to the aircraft hold".*® This piece of advice, while based on the reasonable premise that the possibility of constructing explosive devices on board an aircraft should be denied to terrorists, openly conflicts with the wider Interests of security in granting a major and unnecessary concession to those of facilitation and customer services. Instead of transferring an unidentifiable and possibly explosive device or component from the passenger cabin to the equally vulnerable depressurised hold, its owner should be made to prove its innocence or else be required to give it up into the custody of the airport until such time as it can be retrieved or transported to its intended destination by land or sea.
It has been suggested above that security and facilitation activities can and should revolve around the same central aim of safe and efficient handling of flight departures. The stress which has been placed upon the conflicts which can arise between the two functions should not conceal the ability which undoubtedly exists for full cooperation with and involvement in security activities by staff whose principal role may lie completely outwith them. No special security or detection skills are needed to observe passenger, staff and baggage movements around an airport, but these simple techniques can provide valuable evidence of an intended security breach. If. however, facilitation staff are to view security as a matter for them rather than for a separate organisation they must be encouraged to be alert and must be rewarded for their diligence. Examples of cases being left for many minutes completely unattended at airports by security experts and journalists have caused concern with airport managers and even political embarrassment for government ministers.
*®House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989), p . 9.
News at Ten, Mon day 11 Decembe r 1989.
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If a system were to be instituted by which reports of unaccompanied baggage or suspicious behaviour could lead to the reporting staff member receiving a reward, security might become a greater priority in the minds of personnel. More radically, reports of securityweaknesses or irregularities could be encouraged in a similar way, as In situations in which airside staff could receive a sizeable"bounty" payment for every unauthorised person found on the ramp without a valid security pass. In such ways, the staffing gap whichcan exist between security and facilitation activities might start tobe bridged, integrating the two elements into the same formula.
7.4i..Huij[n A c t i y i t % _ a n d _ I * & h n p l o a x  in an Expanding A y i # l p n  Market
Plastic explosives, concealed detonators, non-metallic firearms, the intelligent use of airside infiltration processes by terrorist groups and the gross negligence of certain authorities, firms and individuals employed to prevent acts of air terrorism together illustrate the challenges and crises facing aviation security. The least complicated and apparently most attractive solutions which have been suggested for handling these problems are those which involve a return to visible, physical means of security - hand searches of all bags by intelligent, well-trained and well-motivated staff, detailed personal questioning of passengers and the limitations of passenger freedoms which have always been taken for granted in the setting of civil aviation.
Undoubtedly, there is much to be achieved by introducing certain advances which do not rely on technology, for any security system ultimately depends upon the calibre, ability and integrity of the staff operating it. It is equally important, however, to realise that in future, the development of airline travel globally will depend upon a constant reassessment of and improvement in the efficiency and capacities of each element within the security systems at airports, including those capacities of technological processes. This is the case because a return to a more physical approach would require operational conditions which would be inapplicable to the vast majority of airports and carriers under current conditions of market expansion, 2 2
? . 5 ,  T M .Ix .p e r v ie n c e _ o f  E L J l
In terms of passenger and baggage screening techniques it has been suggested that airlines and airports must progress in the direction taken by the carrier El A1 through employment of labour intensive means of security** (in addition to technologically advanced screening methods) by which items of luggage are painstakingly searched by hand and passengers questioned in depth by well-trained staff to form an
**Brenchley (1986), p. 2.
**It has been estimated that the well staffed security points of the carrier take an average of approximately five minutes to clear each item of baggage encountered. The German Tribune, 22 January 1989, 
P. 14.
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accurate profile of each t r a v e l l e r ’s character.** Although there is much to commend this policy to the airline which has used it so e f f e c t i v e l y , *5 it is proper to note that the carrier in question is only able to follow this protective course because of the unique nature of its flight operations.
The principal consideration which enables lengthy security activities for El A1 is the fact of its Israeli identity, requiring constant vigilance against extremist attack from any of the state's many governmental and sub-state enemies. As most of the carrier's passengers travel to or from Tel Aviv, the airline can depend upon its clientelle being aware of the unusually severe political dangers faced by the state of Israel, in turn guaranteeing that El Al can impose stringent and time-consuming security measures upon its travelling public. Indeed, many passengers elect to fly with the airline specifically on account of its high reputation for careful security screening and because of its record of preventing a t t a c k . As Wilkinson has observed:
" . . .  El Al's high reputation for passenger safety and security is a positive attraction for its customers, hence its extremely high load factor on the important trans-Atlantic route."**
Another benefit which El Al enjoys stems from its operational centralisation in Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion airport, which acts as the a i r l i n e ’s only major hub.** As activities are centred in Israel this permits ease of cooperation with public security agencies. Indeed, the c a r r i e r ’s major stockholder is the Israeli Government, Close administrative and resource links with Israeli authorities allow for unparalleled state support and for intelligence information easily to be fed into the a i r l i n e ’s advanced security system. Externally, El Al is doggedly independent to the point of being insular in its dealings with other branches of the aviation industry, its timetables advertising no transfer flights. This is the case despite the carrier's modest global operations - it employs no more than approximately 3,500 persons worldwide.** Low reliance on other airlines, however, allows for clear and definite lines of responsibility and independence of action in the field of security.*? Also, the provision of direct, transfer-free travel involving never more than two transit stops keeps the a i r l i n e ’s operations simple, to
**A/ew Scientist, 7 January 1989, p. 23; Conéé Nast Traveler, March 1989, p. 36.
*^McWhinney (1987), pp. 81 - 82.
:*Wiikinson (1989) IV, p. 15.
**At Ben Gurion airport also, security is given an unusually high priority, with over 25 per cent of its gross budget being spent on security charges.MacKenzie-Orr (1988), p. 5.
Flight International, 1 April 1989, p. 83.
Lipman, ttegatrends in Aviation, seminar paper (unpublished) presented at University of Aberdeen, 26 January 1989.
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the benefit of security control.
Perhaps the most Important consideration enabling El Al to carry out its dedicated forms of screening concern the nature of the a i r l i n e ’s flights themselves. Examination of its schedules reveals that the airline flies from its airport base in Tel Aviv to only 33 destinations, with no routings to Asian, South American, Oceanic or Pacific points and with only two ports of call in sub-Saharan Africa.*® This contrasts with British Airways' direct coverage of 131 airports worldwide from its centre at London Heathrow, with many additional services from other British sites.
As a small international carrier with only around twenty aircraft in its fleet,** with few destinations to service and with an absolute reliance on simple, linear routes, El Al can afford to station its own elite teams of security personnel at any departure point, where detailed screening can take place and from where the security staff can easily return to their Tel Aviv base. Another routing benefit which aids the carrier in its security policy is the considerable preponderance of medium and long-haul flights on its schedules. Of the c a r r i e r ’s 33 destinations from the Tel Aviv departure point, only four lie within a two hour flight radius, the average flight duration being as much as five-and-a-half hours,** As a result of this, its passengers do not normally resent the lengthy check-in time required of them, because, with its average two-and-a-half hour check-inallocation or even its more rare four hour period, the overall journey time is increased by only a moderately low proportion.
El Al runs a very small number of flights per week, with only 69 departures from Tel Aviv in that period. Unlike some of its larger rivals, it is not in danger of over-extending its security capacity with an unrealistically high number of flights to process byoverworked and undertrained staff. Instead, it could - if it were deemed necessary or desirable - expand its schedules without undue concern for the quality of its screening processes. It is worth noting that, currently, the airline's highly limited timetable ofdepartures easily allows it to work according to what amounts to a six day week, imposed to satisfy orthodox Jewish proponents of Sabbatarian doctrines.
In terms of El A l ’s passenger screening, the most important statistic to note is the number of occasions on which the airline makes embarkations of passengers because, while the security of aircraft arriving or stopping in transit can involve important security considerations, only embarkations involve the full array of screening procedures. The El Al timetable reveals that, worldwide, the airline need only screen passengers on 170 occasions per week - a tiny figure
*®E1 Al, IHnter Timetable 1989/90, pp. 1 - 9 .
* ^British Airways, Worldwide Timetable, 29 October 1989 to 24 Narch 
1990, pp. 136 - 161.
Flight International, 1 April 1989, p. 83,
**E1 Al, Ninter Timetable, 1989/90, pp. 1 - 9 .
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which signifies that the airline is under no time or work pressures on its worldwide screening schedules. This information is presented in Table 7.2. below, which illustrates the compact nature of El A l ’s international operations.
Once more it is useful to contrast this figure with that of a large airline. While El Al facilitates (weekly and on a global basis) 170 departures involving embarkation of passengers, British Airwaysprocesses 229 such flights from one small airport (Glasgow) alone, in the same time period. At larger, higher risk sites, the pressure on security staff of major carriers is still greater. Over any given week, many large airlines process more security-screened flights from a single airport than El Al processes from all of its departure points c o m b i n e d .
Additionally, of El A l ’s 34 airports of departure, 29 never have more than one passenger-embarking flight per day. Only Tel Aviv, Elat, New York, Brussels and London witness multiple El Al take-offs on certain days, and even then the workload is kept well within manageablelimits. Overall, as many as 22 of the a i r l i n e ’s 34 airports of departure have only one to three El Al departures per week, confirming suspicions that the carrier is unlikely to suffer greatly frompassenger congestion in its security activities. Because of these factors, security teams can focus their attention on a specific potential terrorist target without being concerned that the next f l i g h t ’s passengers will soon be appearing at the screening point.
It should be clear that El Al is an unique airline, working underconditions and according to criteria which are not found anywhere else in the aviation industry. Security comparisons between it and any major airline offering a broader range of flights from more airports cannot, therefore, be entirely valid. Its emphasis on detailed profiling of passengers and its painstaking preparation prior to ta k e ­off may only be tolerated by many passengers because they perceive that the carrier and the routes being flown by it are under a constant threat of violent attack. Its ability to take time over screening and to employ highly motivated and able staff may be envied by some a i r l i n e s ’ security managers, hard pressed to win a sympathetic and enthusiastic ear from time and profit oriented directors. Nevertheless, as Wilkinson astutely observed, even El A l ’s security strategy cannot be regarded as foolproof in every imaginable case of sophisticated terrorist attack:
"[Djespite considerable success the security measures on El Al flights cannot totally suffice. As we have seen, the terrorists simply switch their methods of attack to the most vulnerable p o i n t s .
For some situations it is true that emulations by other carriers and by airports of the best of El A l ’s unique methods could be beneficial as short term emergency measures at large airports or even as standard features at smaller, less crowded sites where due need could be demonstrated. In emergency situations, certain of its tactics are, in fact, often implemented. For example, at times of crisis for
**W i l kins on (1986), p. 254.
more detailed security teams.
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aviation security it is not uncommon for an a i r l i n e ’s flights to be delayed or rescheduled, and for passengers to be asked to check in for their flights earlier than advertised, in order that search and questioning procedures can be undertaken by In general terms, however, there can be little scope for any broad, systemic adoption of El A l ’s techniques into a growing aviation m a r k e t .
The new dynamics of aviation in the next century will require accepted security standards of even the less well prepared members of the industry to give way to changing conditions of pressure, the result of which may be for second rate, rigid security routines to be overtaken by chaotic disorganisation. With the expected expansion of passenger throughput in the next decade and with new airports being increasingly difficult to locate near centres of large scale urban growth there will be almost unimaginable strains placed on many existing airports and carriers to transfer passengers from terminals into aircraft and thence to the sky. The accelerating surge of passenger pressure will make it unrealistic and practically impossible for El A l ’s slow and steady methods to be adopted as common procedures because the time factor involved would result in unconscionable levels of terminal congestion. In any case, the considerable expense involved in training and employing high calibre security staff and of using traditional, labour-intensive means of searching endears El A l ’s methods to few of its competitors.**
For as long as the i n d u s t r y ’s directors insist on cramming more flights into their schedules and hiring semi-skilled labour to give the appearance of security activity to the travelling public, El A l ’s approach will continue to be inapplicable to the aviation market in general. Its detailed philosophy cannot glibly be mouthed with conviction by carriers which are neither prepared nor able to adopt its central tenets. The lack of security consciousness and the blind commitment to expansion on the part of most airlines has forced Wilkinson to conclude:
[F]or the vast majority of the w o r l d ’s airports and airlines the only feasible way to improved security is the design of an aviation security system which does not slow down the progress of the passenger through the controls."*®
As airports increasingly become congested in future, this aim mayrequire to be modified to permit passenger transit withoutunreasonable delay. Irrespective of the precise effects of future growth trends, it could hardly be more obvious that El A l ’s strong and attractive approach to security will not be generalisable, unless a much needed but improbable volte-face takes place in managerialattitudes to security and growth.
An additional and important factor In ruling out the processes from meaningful consideration involves the economic implications of the measures for airlines offering a large range of short-haul routes. At
:*Wil3on (1989), p. 16.
Wil ki n s o n  (1989) IV, p. 15.
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present, the benefits of taking a short, one hour flight as opposed, for example, to a five hour train journey, are obvious, particularly in an open aviation marketplace in which fares are increasingly being priced competitively. If, however, passengers were forced to check in for such a flight two or more hours in advance, were subjected to detailed security interrogation and routine physical searching and were also burdened with the added expense of increased security labour costs, the advantages of cheaper, unencumbered, direct rail transport from one city centre to another might become more apparent to travellers, leaving airlines to count the cost of decreasing demand for their services. Ultimately, short haul flights would become “in principle pointless."*?
It would be commercially unviable to introduce these siege tactics across the whole aviation sector of an otherwise unaffected transport market and, moreover, its imposition would very likely be deeply - resented by passengers and the industry alike, causing the inconvenience which terrorists delight in and disrupting the operation of the transportation market. Nevertheless, El Al's incomparable and constant experience of terrorist threat must mean that its example is one worth emulating wherever genuinely possible. As the British House of Commons Transport Select Committee observed in 1989;
"The size and complexity of the operation at some of our larger airports, and the enormous numbers of passengers and bags passing through, especially at peak times, means that it would be impracticable to increase all security levels to El Al standards.There simply is not the space to accommodate the necessary equipment and screening facilities nor the time to give each individual very close personal attention by security staff. However, we believe that in future even greater attention must be paid to the need for some airlines, and for other airlines flying ispecific routes which are considered at risk, to implement higher levels of security than is normal. Airport operators must make space available to meet such security requirements."**
Instead of indicating specific examples of security activity for other airlines and for airports to adopt in total, El Al's experience of high threat security activity should demonstrate to the industry the significance of broader truths. First, the airline recognises that the principle that sufficient security is an overriding factor in its corporate operations - an imperative which should never be compromised. Its dedication to security cannot be doubted, because of the emphasis which is placed on the importance of screening by the directors and managers who oversee the systems used.
Second, El Al has determined that in the presence of publiclyperceived terrorist dangers, passengers both respect and positivelydemand necessary security. As has been noted, the airline's ability to meet public demand rests in large measure on its unusual market %-activity. Nevertheless, assuming (for the moment) that security
* 'Georg Fongern, spokesman of the pilot's association, "Cockpit", quoted in The German Tribune, 22 January 1989, p. 14.
**House of Com m o n s  C o m m i t t e e  on Transport (1989), p. 1,
V,
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standards can be improved in the broader aviation marketplace, it follows that the industry as a whole could adopt a more positive opinion of security.
Third, El Al sets a vital example to other carriers in its recognition that outstanding staff capabilities, in addition to security technology or techniques, are central to success and progress in the struggle against violent aviation crime. Although El A l ’s actual practice may not easily be accommodated into the screening regimes of -4 competitors, the above-noted underlying principles of security could be adopted with ease.
An incidental point worth noting at this point concerns one major weakness suffered (in common with many airlines) by El Al through its adoption of a proudly independent security identity. Dudley has alluded to two examples in 1970 of El A l ’s commendable vigilance which failed to prevent acts of aviation terrorism on account of the c a r r i e r ’s reluctance to act against threatening objects and persons.The first of these took place in February 1970, when an explosive item of mail was deemed to be suspect by El Al staff but was merely refused passage and diverted to another airline. Then, in September of the same year, two men were refused access to an El Al flight at Amsterdam airport because staff found them to be suspicious. However, rather than delivering the men to Dutch Police or invalidating their tickets, staff simply turned them away from the gate. As a result, thepassengers (actually members of the PFLP) transferred flights and used their tickets to board a Pan American aircraft which they hijcaked to Beirut and Cairo.*? Such incidents should act as warnings to airlines of the dangers of adopting insular security policies and should motivate them to cooperate on an internal level to foil securitybreach attempts.
In place of the long delays and airport congestion which El A l ’ssecurity would undoubtedly entail if adopted in total, resort must be made by the industry to those means of upgrading security whichcombine effectiveness with swiftness of operation. The dilemma for policy makers is that no effective combination of techniques has yet been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, currently to be bothaffordable and available to meet a wide range of requirements.
While the aviation industry advances to meet the new century and its challenges of dauntingly large passenger flows, little directional guidance has been given to the future of security and to what itspriorities must be. Primarily it is evident that practicable security advances must in future rely upon the twin criteria which weretogether adopted when the introduction of security technology was made in the early 1970s - adequate screening coupled with passengerconvenience. If airports, carriers and travellers are to submit willingly to the reforms required by passenger growth and newterrorist tactics, the point of most obvious delays must remain "at the ticket counter rather than at the search barrier."®®
3'Dudley (1976 - 77), pp. 68 - 70 and p. 84. 
Wilkinson (1986), p. 252.
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TABLE 7 . 2 .
El Al E M B A R K A Î I O N  POINIS_AS AT. 4/1/90
e h m r k m i o n  p o i n t FLIGHT ROUTE DAYSAMSTERDAM (AMS) 530 AMS ETH TLV 2338 AMS - TLV 4 7
ATHENS (ATM) 542 ATM TLV 2 45
BOSTON (BOS) 204 BOS — YUL TLV 3
BRUSSELS (BRU) 312 MAN - BRU - TLV 1334 BRU — TLV 5 7336 BRU “ ETH 1
BUCHAREST (BUH) 572 BUH TLV 2 4
BUDAPEST (BUD) 368 BUD TLV 2
CAIRO (CAI) 444 CAI ** TLV 2 4 67
CHICAGO (CHI) 206 CHI w YUL TLV 1
COLOGNE (CGN) 354 CGN MUC “ TLV 3
COPENHAGEN (CPH) 376 STO - CPH TLV 1 3378 CPH TLV 4 7
ELAT (ETH) 319 ETH >— LON 1335 ETH BRU 1337 ETH TLV - AMS 2355 ETH - TLV FRA 2FRANKFURT (FRA) 356 FRA - ETH TLV 2358 FRA - TLV 1 34 67
GENEVA (GVA) 312 MAN - GVA « TLV 4346 GVA TLV 2
ISTANBUL (1ST) 582 1ST TLV 2 5
JOHANNESBURG (JNB) 512 JNB N80 - TLV 6
LISBON (LIS) 392 LIS MRS - TLV 3
LONDON (LON) 015 TLV - LON w. NYC 2016 NYC - LON - TLV 3310 LON ETH 1316 LON - TLV 1234 7318 LON - TLV 4 6
LOS ANGELES (LAX) 208 LAX - NYC - TLV 1 3
MADRID (MAD) 396 MAD TLV 1 4
MANCHESTER (MAN) 312 MAN BRU TLV 1312 MAN GVA - TLV 4
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MARSEILLE (MRS) 322 MRS - ROM - TLV392 LIS - MRS - TLV
MIAMI (MIA) 210 MIA - YUL - TLV
MONTREAL (YUL) 010 YYZ - YUL - TLV204 80S - YUL - TLV206 CHX - YUL - TLV210 MIA - YUL - TLV
MUNICH (MUC) 354 MUC - TLV554 CGN - MUC - TLV
NAIROBI (N80) 511 TLV - NBO - JNB512 JNB - NBO - TLV
NEW YORK (NYC) 002 NYC - TLV004 NYC - TLV008 NYC - TLV016 NYC - LON - TLV207 TLV - NYC - LAX208 LAX - NY.Ç - TLV
PARIS (PAR) 324 PAR - TLV
ROME (ROM) 322 MRS - ROM - TLV386 ROM - TLV
STOCKHOLM (STO) 376 STO - CPH - TLV
TEL AVIV (TLV) 001 TLV - NYC001 TLV - NYC - YYZ009 TLV - YÛL - NYC015 TLV - LON - NYC203 TLV - YUL - 80S205 TLV " YUL - CHI207 TLV - NYC ~ LAX209 TLV - YUL - MIA311 TLV - BRU - MAN311 TLV - GVA - MAN315 TLV - LON317 TLV - LON321 TLV - ROM - MRS323 TLV - PAR331 TLV - BRU337 TLV - AMS337 ETH - TLV - AMS347 TLV - ZRH - GVA347 TLV - ZRH353 TLV - MUC - CGN353 TLV - MUC355 ETH - TLV - FRA357 TLV - FRA363 TLV - VIE367 TLV - BUO375 TLV - CPH - STO377 TLV - CPH385 TLV - ROM
5
6
1234
45
41 345
4
45
5
5
1 345
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391 TLV - MR& - LIS 3395 TLV - MAD 1 4443 TLV - CAI 2 4 67511 TLV - NBO - JNB 4541 TLV - ATM 2 45563 TLV - WAW 2571 TLV - BUH 1 3581 TLV - 1ST 2 5
010 YYZ ~ YUL - TLV 1 3
364 VIE - TLV 3 5 7
564 WAW “ TLV 2
348 ZRH ~ TLV 12 45 7
* * * -,
TORONTO (YYZ)
VIENNA (VIE)
WARSAW (WAW)
ZURICH (ZRH)
KejL_to_±r@uisJLL_alri>An^L .emWAUL
Passengers embarking and disembarking 
Passengers d isembarking but not embarking 
*** as Passengers embarking but not disembarking 
***. = Passengers neither embarking nor disembarking 
7.,6f RestriÇtipn^JUi_C^riaae
The enormous passenger growth which is predicted within the aviation market may place burdens upon airports' security points which require more than simply technological solutions. An accompanying pressure for the industry will stem from the increased amount of baggage and cabin items which will require to be screened prior to boarding aircraft and the expansion in the number of vulnerable transfer bags - a category of items not previously considered necessary to screen in most situations. Furthermore, if passengers in future become forced into queueing at hold baggage security points in order to have their large cases inspected or screened, it might reasonably be predicted that travellers would be tempted to bring a lower proportion of holdbaggage, and bring instead more hand items, again placing undesirablepressure on carry-on baggage screening points.
Limitations on the number, dimensions, volume, mass and/or contents of passengers' bags may prove necessary, at least until efficientversions of TNA and other advanced technologies can be introduced, in order to accelerate and improve the performance of existing screening processes. Part of the mounting difficulty being faced currentlyflows from the aim of carriers to satisfy passengers' demands to carry as hand baggage bigger items than would have been permitted inprevious decades. Similarly, previously strict rules specifying amaximum of one item of hand baggage per person have largely beenallowed to lapse in recent years, causing a capacity problem forcarriers which has been described by one airline executive as having
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"grown out of hand".*i
Screening articles - and particularly transit and transfer baggage in tight schedules will become even more difficult in future, perhaps making it necessary for some forms of limitation to be imposed. Also, the worldwide proliferation in recent years of small, and thus portable, audio-cassette, radio, compact disc, television, video and computer equipment will make detailed and accurate screening of passengers' possessions virtually impossible until advanced technology can be introduced. The great sophistication of the r a d i o ­cassette bomb found in the PFLP-GC safe house in West Germany has already been noted, and should act as a constant and practical reminder that items which are difficult to screen are now also prime candidates for employment as devices for sabotage attempts.
Existing tactics for determining the nature of items which cannoteasily be screened are unspeakably primitive, involving, for example,merely the exposure of a frame of film within a camera or the activation of a cassette player. The crude rationale behind suchtests is that if the mechanisms contained in the items are able tooperate, then there can be little doubt that they are safe. Recentcases of terrorist igenuity have proved the pointlessness of thesemeasures. Nezar H i n d a w i ’s working pocket calculator which containedhis b o m b ’s initiating charge for the El Al sabotage attempt in 1986was designed to trick security guards into thinking that the devicewas legitimate and beyond suspicion. That it successfully passed British Airports Authority security personnel, demonstrates how easily alimentary mistakes can be made and prompts the idea thatmanufacturers of electrical goods should be encouraged clearly tolabel products with accurate metricated weights (excluding powerbatteries and "add-on" components) to assist screening staff operating in emergency conditions.
Because of technology, physically per flight to isolate c Although ho­of having to a course of t e r r o r i s t s ’ terms of rai
the upsurge in new threats posed by complex weapons the failure of existing techniques, the inability to take apart and inspect thousands of electrical devices and the lack of new screening apparatus with the capacity ompact bombs, an emergency stop-gap measure is required, one in the industry and no passenger relishes the prospect enforce or having to submit to carriage limitations, such action would seem reasonable, both in terms of restricting abilities to stow explosives in safe locations and in sing throughput efficiency in a growing market.
In February 1989, British Secretary of State for Transport, PaulChannon made clear to a special ICAO ministerial meeting in Montreal that some new form of restriction should be imposed:
"We need to ask ourselves, do we not, whether these devices should be carried on aircraft? ... Should we at least no longer allow them in checked baggage? Should we not at least require them to be presented at the check-in, perhaps for conveyance in
♦^Letter received by Geoffrey Lipman, July 1987
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the least vulnerable part of the aircraft?"**
It is interesting that the British Government's eventual decision on this question was to reject reform proposals and opt for the status 
quo, contrary to Channon's pronouncements. In April 1989 (in response to a Parliamentary question from Robert Litherland) Peter Bottomley, the Parliamentary Secretary for Transport, remarked that banning portable electrical goods would not be a practical way of improving security.** In fact, the opposite view could be argued, that until new and workable security methods are advanced, the only practical way of improving security in this field is to impose some form of restriction on carriage. Bottomley's reply rings only of a government unable to find electorally palatable solutions to difficult problems, and one which is unwilling to impose regulations which might be viewed by the industry and the travelling public as being unpopular in the short term. In respect of this point, it is perhaps significant that most airlines' major purchasing group for full-price tickets comprises business travellers, who might comprise the category of passenger most likely to be angered by the imposition of baggage re s t r i c t i o n s . * *
One month after the written reply was made, Channon was reported as having informed airports and carriers that electronic devices taken on board aircraft would from then require closer examination.*® How this was to be implemented in any worthwhile sense without congesting airport security points was not noted, further suggesting that a face- saving compromise had been adopted which could serve only to show the public that the British Government was conscious of the crisis to be tackled, though unwilling to take steps to resolve it.
Airlines of at least six European states were found by the current writer to be employing some form of restriction in 1989, either by number of bags permitted or by volume of container, while those of many other nations continued to allow freer movement of items.** It is clear that the imposition of restrictions should be agreed upon and imposed in unison by the industry in order that passengers might be able to expect uniformity in their travels. The current piecemeal approach breeds uncertainty and does not offer a fair norm system to the passengers it affects. The difficulties which unregulated rule- making could cause in this area are not difficult to imagine. It would be unfortunate, for example, for a passenger to be allowed to carry a computer out of one country but unable to convey it on to a transfer aircraft at a foreign airport. One simple means of reducing the risks of inconveniencing passengers with new and unexpected measures would be to print on flight tickets accurate details of
* * The International Herald Tribune, Tuesday 21 February 1989 (ph o t o c o p y ) .
**Ihe Independent, 26 April 1989 (photocopy).
Flight International, 25 February 1989, pp. 6 - 7 .
*®Flight International, 6 May 1989, p. 12.
**Private investigations undertaken by the current writer, 1989.
;
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national measures required by authorities of states in which the carrier in question lands flights. In recent years the Italian carrier Alitalia has included on its tickets information about Italian hand baggage number limitations, printed both in Italian and English.
Stricter regulation of the carriage of items which are difficult to screen by existing means, such as electrical, electronic and battery- operated goods and even such apparently innocent articles as cakes and confectionery, would not be unfair as a necessary protective measure for passengers. Additionally, it is foreseeable that certain ameliorating steps could be taken to soften the impact of imposed restrictions. One such step could involve the industry actually attempting to accommodate travellers' desires to carry such objects.For example, if passengers were offered the option of intimating to authorities an intention to carry electrical or electronic articles, then they could be instructed to arrive well in advance for detailed physical inspection of the items to take place. Alternatively, carriers might invest in a selection of the most popular devices in question, such as lap-top computers and mobile telephones, which could be hired or lent to passengers who had previously expressed an interest in using them during their flight or visit.**
It is correct to concede that any enforced limitation of p a s s e n g e r s ’ ibaggage contents would be very difficult to achieve. Any effort to speed facilitation by imposing restrictions could easily rebound on authorities faced with queues of irate passengers questioning security staff about the details of regulations being imposed. British restrictions on hand baggage for flights between Great Britain and Northern Ireland were imposed at one stage but were eventually withdrawn, having been found to be difficult to administer and enforce.*® If, however, such limitations were to represent an important and unique way by which aviation could be made safer for the travelling public, they should once again be given serious consideration by the industry.
A totally unrelated aspect of the problem encountered in restricting carriage of unidentifiable goods is to be found in discussion of the transportation of diplomatic bags. International law is clear that no obligation exists on the part of a carrier to convey any unexamined item protected by diplomatic protocol. The matter is laid out in the seven paragraphs of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961,** which does not specify that diplomatic bags should be subject to conditions of carriage different to those of ordinary
♦’Wilkinson, Hemorandua to International Foundation of Airline Passengers Associations, unpublished, 1989.
*®Information received from British aviation security expert, September 1989.
**Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, Vienna. 500 UNIS 95; UKTS 19 (1965), Cmnd 2565; 23 UST 3227; TIAS 7502; ATS 3(1968); JOF 17 Apr 71; 1971 RTAF 32; 55 AJIL 1064; 1 Ind TIL 508; 32 CNIA 23; 98 JDF 711; Brownlie I 212. Entered into force on 24April 1964.
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baggage or cargo. The provision of greatest interest is to be found in paragraph 3, which states:
"The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained."®*
This provision has been the issue of some debate among international lawyers, although certain states, including the United Kingdom, maintain that screening is, in principle, acceptable.®^ Farhangi has suggested that a degree of examination has generally been viewed as being reasonable, at least by the receiving state;
"Some states argue that this article excludes the electronic scanning of a bag as a form of constructive opening. The Convention arguably stops short of according "inviolability" to the bag as negotiators at the Convention, fully conscious of the dangers of abuse, did not intend to exclude external examination by equipment or dogs as some kind of safeguard for the receiving s t a t e . "® *
A receiving state is powerless to return a suspect diplomatic bag to its sending state.®* This norm, however, cannot be made to apply to airlines expected to carry diplomatic bags, because no obligation to carry unscreened bags exists. As a result, diplomatic bags can be treated by airlines as being items presented by conventional travellers and can be rejected if requests to screen them are refused. A problem facing a state which seeks to control the passage of arms and explosives to and from its territory in diplomatic bags concerns the continuing willingness of some carriers to permit unrestricted carriage without inspection. Hence, after the 1984 Libyan Peoples' Bureau shooting in London,®* the inability of British authorities to screen diplomatic bags, one of which probably contained the weapon used to kill MPC Yvonne Fletcher,®® may have been compounded by the readiness of an airline to allow free passage of all diplomatic baggage to Libya.
Although there is no evidence of diplomatic bags having been used by unscrupulous governments to conceal explosive devices designed to be used against civilian airliners, the prospect is not unimaginable and should certainly be foreclosed by security teams. The Italian Government recognised in 1986 the serious risks which exist and opted
®*Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, Article 27(3).
®*R. Higgins, "The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities; Recent United Kingdom E x p e r i e n c e , " American Journal of 
International Law 79 (1985), p. 647.
®*L.S. Farhangi, "Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity," 
Stanford Law Review 38 (1986), pp. 1534 ~ 1535.
, p. 1535.
®*rhe Tines, Wednesday 18 April 1984, p. 1.
®®M. Griffin, "Diplomatic Impunity," Student Lawyer, October 1984, p. 22.
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to subject diplomatic bags to security screening prior to boarding.®* ÏFAPA has campaigned for other states to follow a similar c o u r s e . ® ’
? T C o n M d e r a U o n s , p jL M r c r 8 t L _ in _  S * c u r i t y_.j E D M a o ^ n t
The vulnerability of aircraft on the ramp at airports has beendemonstrated in the many incidents of terrorist infiltration whichhave taken place prior to take-off (discussed above). In future, security should be built into aircraft, so that no easy means of access is available to intruders and none of the currently large range of hiding places exists for the placement of arms and explosives on board. This will be a major task, the scope of which cannot easily be contemplated. It is hoped that aircraft manufacturers will realise that security is a feature worthy of inclusion in design plans from the earliest stages and that security design engineers will beemployed to present imaginative ideas on improving aircraft in this vital respect. Improving upon aircraft design was an issue which was discussed at an ICAO special ministerial meeting in February 1990,with 8 proposal that potential hiding places be eradicated receiving widespread support.®®
For the present, the industry has indicated that it is unwilling to spend the many millions of dollars necessary to "harden" existing aircraft in carriers' fleets, as, for example, by reinforcing baggage holds such that an explosion might have reduced risks of total in­flight destruction. Instead, many security specialists believe that investment would be much better placed in developing better screening equipment and in improving UPon future aircraft designs.®* This practical consideration is one which should be respected, provided that efforts are made to improve upon designs in future and that work takes place in the short term to remove easily identifiableweaknesses.** In 1986, one major U$ aircraft manufacturer announcedthat, following passenger surveys, it had decided to incorporate new features in models under development to enhance passenger safety and
®*Press release from IFAPA, 20 September 1986.
® ’FJsne Facts, June/July 1986, p. 2. Note that strong evidence exists to suggest that at least one state sponsor of terrorist groups allowed plastic explosives to be conveyed in its diplomatic bags prior to and in connection with the Pan Am Plight 103 incident. The Guardian, Wednesday 10 October 1990, p. 1.
®*Flight International, 25 February 1989, pp. 6 - 7 .
® ’Opinion received from US aviation security expert, September 1989. See a Boeing spokesman's comment in Security fianagenent Today, November 1990, p. 47.
**The FAA is currently investigating means by which cargo containers can be strengthened to withstand a bomb blast. McGuire (1989), p . 
7. British investigations into the hardening of aircraft have also been undertaken since the Lockerbie incident, with the Department of Transport examining possibilities in conjunction with an ICAO study group on the matter. Press release from the Department of Transport, September 1990.
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comfort.*! If aircraft corporations were to regard security as anequally important planning priority, useful enhancement could more reasonably be expected.**
It cannot be stressed sufficiently often that protection of airport ramp areas must be achieved through the imposition of a strong landside/airside boundary. In addition to this factor, aircraftthemselves must be made more secure than has previously been the case for most carriers, if threats from saboteurs and hijackers are to be minimised. The absence of even conventional locks on many types ofcivil a i r l i n e r s ’ doors is indicative of the misplaced trust which theindustry has always had that its aircraft must be safe by dint ofairport security alone. The ability of journalists to gainunauthorised entry to aircraft merely by opening entry hatches or climbing through wheel housings into passenger cabins above has emphasised the true vulnerability of these valuable and important v e h i c l e s .
Extraordinary aircraft protection on the ramp can be achieved by employing security staff to stand guard over airliners which have been cleared as security sterile after servicing crews have worked on them. Alternatively, perimeter defence systems using microwave or laser technology can be placed in a cordon around sensitive aircraft. In this way an invisible boundary can be established which, if breached, will notify a central security point of illicit activity without alerting the intruder that detection has taken place.
An element of aircraft protection which could be useful in dealing with hijackings concerns the use of televisual devices to monitor activities on board flights. In 1985, a British firm, ContemporarySystems Design, commenced development of a pinhoie-camera technique which can relay images to a control unit receiver placed within the line of sight of the aircraft at a range of u p to one kilometre. By 1987, its Covert Aircraft Surveillance System, known as Medusa, was being marketed as a method "designed to provide Law Enforcement Agencies and Special Forces with real time intelligence during aircraft hijack/hostages situations." The broad surveillance offered by M e d u s a ’s microwave video technology derives from its ability to use up to eight cameras and microphones per aircraft, with signal security being guaranteed by frequency encryption. One of its greatest strengths is its control u n i t ’s compact dimensions, a television screen, video recorder and software keypad fitting into a single attaché case.** Costing £20,000 per unit for a Boeing 737, the Medusa system is well suited to installation in fleets subject to a high risk of hijacking.**
*!pia/?e Facts, September/October 1986, p. 1.
**Note that the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch recommended in 1990 that aircraft hardening should be widely introduced. Security 
Management Today, November 1990, p. 47.
♦^Publicity material for Contemporary Systems Design, 1987.
**The Observer, 18 July 1987, p. 6.
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Another monitoring system, produced by US company Saysen costs £40,000 per Boeing 747 but allows images to be relayed on the aircraft's radio frequency, enabling monitoring to take place anywhere. Also, the c o m p a n y ’s Chairman, Tony Crabb, has claimed that remote control piloting of flights could be achieved with the method and that forms of deception are possible, such as fuel gauge imply that fuel levels were low.*®
useful alteration, to
7.8 . Other Areag,, pt„Cpncerjt)
7-„8 = l. Cargo and Mali
In addition to the consideration given above to the needs of passenger security at airports, some other side issues have a direct influence on t r a v e l l e r s ’ safety in flight. For example, the danger posed by unscreened cargo consignments was illustrated on 2 May 1986 when an explosion killed many on board an Air Lanka aircraft. It is believed that the device was loaded with vegetables so that it would evade all security checks established for the flight.** Since the time of that incident, it has been far from clear that standards have improved at all on most civilian services.
If security levels are not to be allowed to fall to unacceptable levels, airports should centralise deliveries by instituting cargo, goods, mail and services transfer points where consignments can be accepted, documented and be made subject to the possibility - if not the likelihood - of a security search. Already, advanced X-ray and c hemiluminescence systems exist for the purpose of screening large objects, such as cargo consignments, and methods based on mass spectrometry and neutron bombardment might also be applicable to the task.*’
It is essential that increased protection be given to unaccompanied objects carried on civilian airliners, if only because it is a target waiting to be attacked by terrorists' explosive devices. In 1988, London Heathrow processed 600,000 tons of cargo, while the airport was used by some 600 freight agents, with, it seems, only El Al using cargo screening techniques on a regular basis.** It is not sufficient merely to require clear documentation and a trustworthy record of carriage, because patient terrorists can provide these, given time. Equally, the selective use of 24 hour shipping delays to provide a statistical possibility of confounding time bombs is now hopelessly outdated and should not be regarded as a sufficient guard against
* ® The Observer, 1990, p. 13. 18 July 1987, p. 6; The Times, Thursday 22 March
Discover, June 1986, p. 30.
♦ ’Information received in 1990 from a senior executive of an international aviation organisation raises doubts about the current qualities of existing cargo screening equipment. It seems that much more research and development will be required to produce a sufficiently advanced cargo screener,
*®Condé Nast Traveler, March 1989, p. 40.
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terrorism. Instead, the distinct possibility of advanced screening being carried out would provide a workable starting point for guarding against terrorist infiltration into cargo, mail courier services and aircraft supplies of bombs and firearms.
In respect of mail consignments on board aircraft, the possibility of terrorists using postal services should never be overlooked. The 1970 Austrian Airlines sabotage case was found to have centred on a piece of mail (containing a radio bomb) sent from Munich to a fictitious character alleged to have been living in Jerusalem. If doubts exist concerning the ability of airlines to intercept mail bombs, it should be remembered that the item - along with another which destroyed a Swiss Air Convair 30A on the same day - had first been presented to El Al for carriage but had been refused e n t r y . * ’
Equally, restricted crossing points should utilise security screening procedures for workers, aircraft crew and their baggage, to minimise risks posed by deliberate or unknowing carriage to the airside of weaponry and explosives. Although the trouble and expense involved in instituting rigorous screening for such activities might discourage action by aviation authorities, an obvious weakness urgently requires to be addressed if access control is to become a shield rather than a s i e v e . ’’
? .J.e2- Simulation_Cha#*)ers
The employment of skilled staff, advanced screening technology and sophisticated techniques would assist many airports in the struggle to keep pace with terrorist threats. Notwithstanding these factors, however, situations will probably continue to arise in which further actions might foe deemed useful, as where intelligence data indicates a specific threat from a particular p a s s e n g e r ’s hold baggage or where positive results have been received from screening articles which cannot easily be manually searched (such as electronic items anddiplomatic bags). In such circumstances it is the prerogative of the carrier to reject any article which cannot adequately be cleared inconvenient though that may be for all concerned.
Alternatively, innocence can be at least partially verified and so confidence gained by using flight simulation techniques to trigger any explosive devices which may be present in baggage. The most basic and inadequate of these techniques, though one which is still employed by certain members of the aviation industry, is to keep the bag stored ina secure venue for the duration of the flight. In this way, if anytiming device has been acti vated prior to check-in, it will run itscourse and detonate in, for example, an outlying hut, rather than in the hold of an aircraft. Alternatively, if the article passes the delay test it will be regarded wrongly as having proved Its benign nature and be placed on the next available flight. It need hardly be said that so passive a response to terrorist threats ill serves the contemporary needs of the aviation community.
♦ ’Dudley (1976 - 77), pp. 68 - 70.
’0Wallis, Beaumont Memorial Lecture, 1989.
231
Decompression simulation has long been recognised as a useful addition to the simple delaying tactic. Its employment is intended to overcome the ever-present dangers of barometric triggers by reducing air pressure to a level at which the targeted aircraft would be expected to fly. Dorey has discussed at length the required specifications for decompression c h a m b e r s . ’ ^
In future, much more sophisticated simulation chambers will be required, as t e r r o r i s t s ’ capacity to create novel triggering devices is pushed outwards. ECAC has recommended storing suspect articles as well as exposing them to low pressure (and to high pressure if the destination altitude was lower than the departure altitude); to simulated flight noise; to high frequency fields; to radiation; and to a c c e l e r a t i o n . ’ * In this way triggers relying on pressure variations, engine sound, radio signals, radiation screening and take-off acceleration would be interrogated by the simulator. In addition, temperature differences could be noted in flight simulations.
The capital and running costs of a comprehensive simulator chamber would perhaps be viewed as being excessively high for all but the most affluent of authorities. Despite its unique defensive capabilities it is unlikely that it would be introduced on a large scale. Instead, simple and inadequate methods will be more likely to be used or else simulation will be ignored, with suspect bags being rejected, made subject to controlled explosions or simply carried at risk.
7.9. Airport Design Feat u r es
With regard to facilitating improvements in aviation security many of the most difficult problems to be encountered involve the very designof airports themselves. The problems involved are twofold: first,public access buildings which contain openly displayed symbols of different n a t i o n s ’ airlines necessarily present a potentially  vulnerable target for airport attackers; second, terminals which are designed with ease of access in mind can also provide hijackers and saboteurs with possible routes to a i r c r a f t , ’ *
Open plan terminals incorporating freely available social amenities, a large number and variety of doorways, glass panelling onto the ramp, mixed access areas for arriving and departing passengers and unrestricted movement throughout much of the terminal have been standard features in some of the most important of airports constructed before the advent of aviation violence, when speedyfacilitation was the i n d u s t r y ’s only major planning c o n c e r n . ’ * Thesecommon and familiar characteristics, however, make airports more
’ iDorey (1983), pp. 240 - 2.
’’ECAC (1988), section 3.
’ *McWhinney (1987), p. 119.
’*MacKenzie-Orr (1988), p. 5. It has been established that bombexplosions in non-shatter-proof glass-constructed airports createmore human casualties from glass fragments than from the bombsthemselves. Norton (1987), p. 32.
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difficult to keep secure from the dangers of arms transfers, armed attack and s a b o t a g e . ’® Hence, instead of being discouraged from attempting violence at such venues, terrorists intent on airport attack are offered the benefits of access and a large, physically unprotected target area with sufficient publicly accessible vantage points from which to strike. It would be wrong to suggest that this vulnerability inevitably causes widespread passenger concern because, as Gallenschutz has observed, a different perception can exist as between the industry and its users on the environmental priorities of airports ;
"Airport personnel understand that security measures are essential, and are prepared to tolerate a certain amount of delay and inconvenience, and possibly a prison atmosphere of looks and bars, because they appreciate that the systems are installed partly for their own protection.The travelling public, on the other hand, likes to feel that the airport terminal is a place where they are welcome and comfortable. Airport designers and architects try to respond by creating an ambience and decor which is friendly, and the elimination of antagonising security hardware is to be encouraged. Likewise a lower profile for security personnel is desirable, both for the lessening of public tension and for the straightforward economic advantage of reducing operating o v e r h e a d s ."’*
Architectural and design features in the majority of the w o r l d ’s terminals have always been geared towards passenger comfort and convenience, the enterprise of highly profitable retail outlets and the operational needs of user airlines. As a result, requirements for adequate security have classically been overridden by important considerations of organisation and commerce. For example, most airports which are designed to enable the rapid entrance, transfer and exit of passengers, meeters, greeters and other visitors incorporate as one of their key features ease of movement throughout public areas.
Such a freedom provides a means by which terrorists may gain access to the very heart of the airport without being made to disclose their identity. Also, airports which allow shopping franchises to operate in their passenger terminals thereby present terrorists with potential hiding places for explosive devices or weapons. This compromise on potentially high standards of security can provide a considerable asset for the terrorist by weakening the structural defences possible at airports, so facilitating not merely opportunities for initiating hijackings and acts of aircraft sabotage, but also for attacking the airports themselves and their users.
A commercial difficulty for airport operators who must contend with restricting the scope of terrorists to attack their sites concerns the fact that most airports rely on franchises and concession sites for a large proportion of their revenue. Because this aspect of their
’^Dudley (1976 ~ 77), p. 71; J.W. Wegstapel, in Mendes de Leon andP1987), p. 100
1988), p. 243
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business is so lucrative, most airports are keen to make their terminals easily accessible, exciting and visually attractive places for travellers and others to visit, in the hope that money will be spent by those who pass through them. Unfortunately, æsthetically pleasing architecture and commercially oriented activities can militate against optimal security efficiency.
The legacy of weaknesses handed down to the present age by these older, vulnerable terminals is problematic in the context of airport engineering, as the vast - perhaps in many cases prohibitive - expense of redesigning airports to meet new requirements and the practical complications and inconvenience entailed in executing the plans, constrain efforts at radical reform. For these reasons, airports rarely undergo a security-motivated refitting to introduce less vulnerable structures. Instead, a limited degree of risk control can often be achieved by resort to the introduction of non-structural security elements. Reinforced and monitored peripheral fencing, illumination and televisual surveillance of exposed or vulnerable areas and an adequate and constant police or military presence at high risk points reduce dangers for vulnerable airports in a costeffective, though incomplete way. Even simple factors, including the design and location of airport fittings and furniture and thenurturing of passenger awareness of security issues can play a vital, if discreet, role.
In airports constructed in future, security features could more readily be accommodated in the planning and construction stages by,for example, keeping the number of terminal doorways to a reasonablylow number to permit a steady flow of persons and allow swift emergency exit, yet also enabling monitoring of all human traffic from the p a s s e n g e r s ’ first point of contact with the airport. Airports must also be prevented from becoming junctions for thetransfer of guns and explosives by keeping incoming and outgoingtravellers separate in their transit through terminals and byminimising the number of potential arms drop-off/pick-up points within them. Structural features such as separate departure and arrival terminals with clearly enforced one-way transit routes would allow greater confidence that "security sterile" zones had been established in which screened and unscreened passengers could not mix. Failing that, absolute physical obstruction between exiting and entering channels would provide a reasonable alternative.
7,9.1. JLocation of„.Security Points
In making the important decision concerning the most suitable location for security screening points within terminals, an unavoidablecalculation involving factors of risk, commerce, cost and feasibility must be made. In the case of existing airports which do not exhibit high security consciousness in their original design, the interplay of these factors may result in policy makers deciding against wholesale reorganisation, because of the expense, inconvenience and difficulty entailed in introducing new security into old layouts. Instead, an inappropriate, commercially oriented measure is usually adopted. The measure in question involves locating security screening zones in close proximity to departure gates. In its favour, it should be noted that this can be a means of achieving complete security sterility for targeted aircraft, if screening points are located near to the latest point of contact between passengers and the terminal and provided that
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security activities are carried out with diligence.
This screening policy allows freedom of movement throughout public areas such as entrance halls, shops and restaurants. At its best, this can present three benefits: first, as the security sterile zoneis small, it should be easy to control and police, with high levels of security posing no problem of convenience to non-travellers; second, if each gate is equipped with its own security point, passenger flow can he kept at a casual and steady rate, with passengers able to elect when to enter the departure lounge screening zone; third, airports are able to continue operating publicly accessible and profitable franchises and services. Drawbacks of the system include its failure to guard against attacks upon vulnerable terminal targets, such as check-in desks and ticket counters in the unprotected iandside areas. Also, practical staffing diff iculties and expense can militate against such a proposal being comprehensively introduced at larger airports with many gates. Instead, fewer screening points are frequently used, servicing several flights simultaneously, thus adding to congestion difficulties at busy t i m e s . ”  Furthermore, as unmarshalled passengers are prone to arrive at a departure lounge very shortly before their presumed boarding time, clearance delays can very easily be caused with the best of s y s t e m s . ’*
Some airport authorities realise the importance of high security in particularly vulnerable sites and take more stringent action to foreclose terrorists' inroads. For these very few authorities, issues of commerce are often ignored, as their prime concern is the safety of passengers - a commendable goal, though one which can involve high costs in several senses. Certain airport security specialists, including Dorey, maintain that the most vulnerble airports should transfer passengers safely from entrance hails immediately into security sterile zones, thus precluding any movement within the airport by unsearched i n d i v i d u a l s . ”  This policy requires the movement of all services (including toilets, lockers, shoos, restaurants and bars) beyond security checkpoints to make them security sterile and so hopefully protected from the dangers of arms and explosives implantation.** In such a scenario, unticketed persons
’’ Interview with British airport design specialist John Loder, Paris, France, September 1989. IFAPA has commented that one means of overcoming peak time congestion in terminals would be to introduce "staggered" check-in times, by which economy class passengers would arrive for processing significantly earlier than first and business travellers. Plane Facts, June/July 1986, p. 2.
’*D.Z. Abdul, Aviation Security (Management Aspects): Malaysian
Fxperience. Unpublished paper presented at International Aviation Management Training Institute Conference on Aviation Law and its Impact on Management, Bali, Indonesia, 10 May 1990,
” F,C, Dorey, "Security at Airport Terminals," Airport Technology 
International (1988), p. 249. In such advanced airports as Changi, Singapore, X-ray and vapour detection screening takes place at the terminal entrance. Clutterbuck (1990) I, p. 186.
Newsweek, 8 July 1985 (photocopy).
’S
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are either required to undergo identical screening procedures to those imposed on passengers or else are simply barred from entering the a i r p o r t .
With public access requiring screening of all persons and their possessions, an unfortunately high workload is placed on securitystaff, whose job should not require their energies to be dissipated onthe non-travelling public. At the largest airports, it isquestionable that general screening could be accommodated without involving large scale inconvenience and expense. This option is undesirable, because of the organisational difficulties involved in screening so many travellers, staff, wellwishers and others, and because of the inevitably damaging economic effects which such arestriction would have on demand for services from n o n - t r a v e l 1e r s , many of whom could be expected to be discouraged from entering airports under such conditions.
Equally, the closing of airports to all but the travelling public inevitably raises serious commercial considerations.®! The problems to be faced have been expertly described by Dorey;
"In 1973, when I was chief security executive for Northern Ireland Airports, in an effort to control a difficult situationit was arranged for non-passengers to be excluded from theterminal building at Aldergrove Airport as one facet of a stringent security system. Every person was searched and every person was X-rayed at the main entrance door. In effect thewhole airport had been converted into a security sterile area, but with devastating consequences upon the revenue previously earned from the c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s ’ trading a c t i v i t i e s , " * ’
Where government funds are available to prop up an airport made subject to such a form of defence, public exclusion can take place, because little or no financial injury affects the airport in question. It is to be trusted that a general trend in this direction would never take place, because of the need for large-scale and perpetual public funding or else general increases in costs for the industry and its users. Rather, a means of securing airports from violent offenders should be sought which does not unduly inhibit a i r p o r t s ’ commercial activities. To satisfy these demands, a mechanism is required by which adequate security protection can be imposed within airports, while permitting the operation of franchises and concessions. Described below is one such security plan devised by Fred Dorey, which can be made to operate at various security levels, depending upon the nature of the threat faced.
-I
After the Rome and Vienna airport attacks of December 1985, Dorey was contracted by the Swiss security firm of Kriton Security AO to assist in the development of a "door control" security system to be fitted into entrances of important but vulnerable buildings, such as banks. The aim of the system is to prevent the infiltration of firearms, explosives and other undesirable objects into the building by using
*!R. Wallis in Mendes de Leon and Zwaan (eds.) (1987), p. 8 8 . 
s’Dorey (1988), p. 249.
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the twin-doored chamber idea, in conjunction with advanced security screening apparatus.
Dorey recognised that it would be unfeasible to use this technique on airports with many entrances and that practicalities of airport usage would often require modification of it, so that instead of placing the system at the first point of contact with the teminsl, it could more realistically be located Just before a i r l i n e s ’ check-in areas. This policy has been implemented in the past by certain airport authorities, without employing high technology elements. For example, by placing check-in desks beyond security points, Saudi Arabia has afforded valuable protection to its three international airports,**
Using K r i t o n ’s methods just before the point of check-in, security throughput would be limited to passengers, rather than widened to cover all terminal entrants. Dorey has described the operation of the system thus:
"The door system monitors all persons and their hold baggage, cabin articles and indeed anything carried by hand, on an automated and continuous basis. Each pair of doors has an X- ray machine sandwiched between them upon which all carried items are placed. The person entering the door is automatically momentarily detained while a check for the presence of explosives and volume of metal being carried is made. ... If nothing suspicious is found the exit door of the booth opens allowing the person into the check-in area.If suspicion is aroused the person is requested, by taped voice or flashing notice, to pass through a side door into achamber. The recorded voice will instruct him to put allarticles being carried in pockets, into the armoured security drawer for inspection by the security staff. The exit door may then be released or other action taken depending upon what has been placed in the drawer. Any attempt to leave weapons in the booth (on the floor or lodged in the ceiling) to be taken through by a following accomplice is negated by a synchronous se l f ­checking of the door system prior to allowing entry to the next p e r s o n ."* *
Using advanced X-ray technology a processing rate of ten to fifteen seconds per passenger is claimed by Dorey, allowing an hourly processing rate of approximately 240 persons with baggage.*® At this rate, security screening for a wide-bodied aircraft could be facilitated within one hour bv using two doorway systems.Profiteering airport authorities might be unwilling to adopt any measures which threaten to slow down throughput rates to as low as four passengers per minute, citing the everpresent "need" to maintain fast facilitation rates. Nevertheless, the doorway screening system might be regarded as an important option for security managers at high risk airports, because it combines a high level of automated, advanced
**Informât ion received from Geoffrey Lioman, August 1987, 
**Dorey (1988), p. 249,
*®Dorey (1987).
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technology with a particularly secure and resilient landside/airside boundary. If combined with more advanced screening technology its capacity for detection would increase, strengthening further screening abilities. Once integrated into an airport as a design feature of principal importance, O o r e y ’s system could play a vital role.
Similar security criteria to those outlined above can be made to apply to the passage of passengers through airport terminals as was described above in relation to access control. Unmanned, automatic entrance and exit points can be installed at airports to promote u n i ­directional passage and prevent unwanted passenger regression. This is of particular use in seeking to prevent incomers entering a terminal via vulnerable exit points or to stop security screened passengers moving from airside to landside areas.
The myriad possibilities for terrorists and their accomplices to breach access control points can never fully be assessed. Nevertheless, as with the unlimited potential for in-service testing of security staff there are many ways in which the preparedness of airport facilities can be examined. Brenchley has remarked that the adoption of terrorist tactics can provide useful means of finding loopholes at airports;
"Security authorities need to have their airport defences placed under independent examination, Ingeneous and resourceful pseudo-terrorists, perhaps from special sections of the armed forces, should be tasked to study the problem of breaching airport security and to seek, by a variety of methods and unknown to the airport staff, to get dummy bombs on to aircraft. Thelessons learned from such exercises are invaluable. The moregaps that can be found, and rectified, the better. This is no area for false pride."**
7.9,2„. A High Security Airport: An Integrated Scheme
A dilemma for airport designers and managers is encountered in determining how to mediate necessary terminal security and adequate public freedom. A strong case can be made for restricting theliberties of the innocent, who currently enjoy access to most airportt e r m i n a l s ’ services, in order to limit the excesses of the guilty, who seek to pervert those freedoms for their own illicit purposes. While the capacity undoubtedly exists for the tightest of security standards to be introduced at the public areas of terminals, it is equally valid to observe that any needless transformation of swiftly efficient airports into slow-moving fortress-like installations would in itself grant a large concession to the excesses of terrorist intimidation. Clearly, a line requires to be drawn such that security will suffice to prevent and deter t e r r o r i s t s ’ activities,'? yet will leave airports able to function commercially.
'*Brenchley (1986), p. 3.
'^Although it should be remembered that in the absence of a unified, global approach to airport security enhancement, “deterrence" can only be expected to operate redistributively, passing air offenders from the stronger to the weaker sites. MacKenzie-Orr (1988), p. 5,
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While passengers are now well aware of the possible risks posed by aviation terrorism, the industry is equally conscious of the consequences of unnecessary processing delays and of discouraging commercial activity at airports. It is submitted that airport designs incorporating high levels of security should not be dependent upon the availablity of high levels of state or passenger-financed support simply because such support will not always be readily forthcoming. Below is discussed a possible solution to the problem of making all but the highest risk terminals commercially attractive venues which can also incorporate high security features by utilising better security processing designs. The proposed design scheme is intended to present features which could be adapted easily for new airports and might be able to be incorporated into some existing s i t e s . "
As should be evident from the foregoing discussion, the aim of security-conscious airport designers should be to produce plans for airports which incorporate measures for the prevention or deterrence of the three principal types of aviation violence - hijacking, aircraft sabotage and airport attack - while taking account of commercial and practical necessities. Inevitably, a "systems approach" to the task is needed, in which consideration is given to all aspects of security from the design of passenger routes and implementation of advanced screening equipment to the construction and location of seating and litter bins. It is vital for a u n i f i e d  landside/airside boundary to be established and for monitoring posts to be viewed as being centrally important features in that zonal shield. Once detailed organisational features are combined with adequate screening measures operated by skilled personnel (both described above) a framework for hijacking and sabotage prevention should exist.
The problem of airport attack risk minimisation requires other skills for its solution because unless all entrants to airports are screened at their first point of contact with their terminal of entry, the landside/airside boundary will lie sufficiently well inside the building to ensure some degree of vulnerability. If measures are to be taken to discourage any offence, it is important to recognise the factors which motivate offenders to carry out their illegal acts. In this case, it is apparent from the targets chosen by airport attackers that a primary factor in their selection is often the national identity of airlines which locate their check-in and sales desks on the landside. Accordingly, if all such nationally identifiable targets were to be removed to the airside, one major target category would be protected.
With such security shielding, there would be a much lower incentive for terrorists to strike at landside areas, although prudence won 1d still require the deployment in all public areas of adequate surveillance, of police and security patrols and of armed response teams in order to guard against the unexpected. It should be stressed that the removal of targets and the use of monitoring and response
" F o r  an interesting discussion of airport design possibilities, see Clutterbuck (1990) I, pp. 184 - 191 and Clutterfouck (1990) 11, pp. 148 - 150.
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methods would themselves be likely to inhibit or deter attacks. The entire system is intended to provide an integrated approach to the 
control of all types of violent air crime.
On arrival at an airport terminal employing the above-mentioned 
system, members of the oublie would pass through a limited number of 
doorways into one entrance hall. Passengers would, at this point, be 
faced with two distinct routing options within the terminal entrance 
hail. One possibility would be for them to enter a landside services 
hall, offering free access to a variety of services. In place of the 
familiar desks and stands which normal 1 y meet travellers and 
terrorists alike on entering passenger terminals, services unrelated 
to any airline or nation would operate. Hence, it is suggested that 
public areas of airports should be devoted to the provision of shops, 
restaurants, bars, banks, galleries, lounges and other services which 
will encourage visitors to spend time and money there, whether waiting 
for departures or arriving passengers, or simply passing through for 
Pleasure.
In this respect, the landside services hall would be in the airport, 
but not of it, offering a broad range of facilities of interest to the 
public, without presenting needless terrorist targets. The on-site 
purchase of airline tickets could be facilitated not through specific 
c a r r i e r s ’ desks, but rather by creating one neutral travel agency 
counter, patrolled by guards and monitored by CCTV cameras linked to 
security headquarters. Similar security activities would be conducted 
at the other particularly sensitive area of the landside zone, the 
arrivals point, where meeters and greeters would await passengers from 
in-coming flights.
The other routing option for passengers arriving in the terminal hall, 
and one which would eventually require to be adopted by those in the 
landside services zone, would be to proceed to their departures. The 
first point of contact passengers would have with aviation related 
services would be at a security zone - operated by the airport 
authority, rather than by individual carriers. The zone might readily 
involve a variation of D o r e y ’s doorway system, particularly if
impressive processing rates could be obtained from it. Enclosing the
security zone within an automated, blast and bullet-proof, double 
doorway system, monitored by armed state personnel would provide a 
powerful disincentive to attack.
Access to the security points within the zone would be gained only by 
passengers showing their tickets to security personnel at the first 
door, so as to limit the number of persons requiring screening to 
ticketed travellers. (Instead of specifying an earliest check-in time 
for travellers, tickets might display a latest screening time, beyond 
which access to aircraft would be imp o s s i b l e . ) Once passengers were 
within the enclosure of the first (landside) doorway, each traveller 
would proceed to one of the several screening points lying within the 
zone. The sampling and analysis times of the various screening
processes being used on passengers (such as metal and vapour
detection) and their baggage (which might include advanced X-ray, TNA 
and other appropriate techniques) could be capitalised upon by staff 
simultaneously conducting ancillary tasks. For example, all travel- 
related documentation could be inspected by computer for suspicious 
indicators. Time would easily permit W i l k i n s o n ’s airline travel pass 
idea to be incorporated as an important security feature here and the
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processes could be accompanied by security staff undertaking profiling 
interviews.
A major advantage of carrying out hold baggage screening at this point 
would be that the owner would be present to open the case, explain its 
contents and answer further profiling questions if necessary. Once 
the screening had been carried out satisfactorally, baggage would be 
banded or, if soft or zipped, sealed in a tough polythene bag, to 5
prevent subsequent additions being made to it by passengers or staff.
Next, the second (airside) doorway would open for all passengers 
deemed to be safe, allowing progress from the security zone to take 
place. For passengers found to be in possession of dangerous
substances or to be otherwise suspicious, the doorway system would 
prevent escape, necessitating his/her diversion to a separate side 1 
room for further investigation and possible arrest.
Each screened and cleared passenger would proceed to one of two 
facilitation zones, one for domestic passengers, the other for 
international travellers. The domestic zone would require passengers
to check in for their internal flights and have their baggage sent to 
a central processing area. In the international zone, passengers 
would undergo state passport control and then check in for their
departures and have all hold baggage dispatched. Because security 
checks would have been made prior to entry to the facilitation zones, 
no overt security activities or judgements would be required of c h e c k ­
in staff, although their casual observations of security risks might 
be channelled to security personnel. At the check-in areas, a 
computer-coded tag would be appended to each bag, cross-referenced to 
its o w n e r ’s boarding pass, for ease of reconciliation, should boarding 
lists and baggage manifests ultimately fail to correspond with each 
other.
At the central baggage processing zone it would be vital to maintain a 
routinely high level of security, so as to guard against the 
channelling into the system of infiltrated unscreened baggage from 
external sources. If it was available and regarded as necessary, 
extra pallet screening equipment using neutron bombardment or 
similarly automated techniques, might be used to verify that baggage 
consignments were free from external influence immediately prior to 
loading into aircraft holds. The processing zone might also house a 
mobile screening unit employing, for example, advanced X-ray or 
chemiluminescence techniques and installed in a van or trailer, to 
make extraordinary screening visits to aircraft viewed as being of 
high risk. Such a capacity would be useful in dealing with emergency 
situations, such as credible bomb alerts and conditions in which fixed 
screening apparatus was malfunctioning or difficult to install.**
Having checked in at the terminal, passengers would be free to move 
within an airside services area. It would be essential to maintain 
the integrity of the landside/airside boundary, so the services 
located beyond the security point should be sufficient to meet the 
needs of travellers waiting for their (possibly delayed) departures 
without requiring to exit the sterile area. A broad and exciting
'’Publicity material for AS&E, 1989; Publicity material for
Astrophysics, 1990.
. -'ti
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range of services would encourage departing passengers to spend m o n e y  
(for the benefit of the a i r p o r t ’s finances) and might also promote 
early arrival at the initial security point, thus militating against 
the worst effects of security congestion.
Once an impending departure had been announced, the passengers of the 
flight in question would move to the specified departure lounge. The 
time spent there, waiting for permission to board, could be occupied 
by conducting further security interviews, advance immigration checks 
or screening activities, if required, with the possibility of slower- 
operating apparatus (such as current chemiluminescence devices) being 
used at leisure. This would similarly be a suitable point at which 
the airline involved could join the security activities, if it wished 
so to do. As the initial security check would have been rigorous, it 
is foreseeable that only the most security-conscious carriers would 
wish to call their flights sufficiently early so as to enable further 
detailed surveys. In all cases, boarding passes would be read by o n ­
site computer terminals and comparisons made with baggage data 
similarly received from handlers loading the f l i g h t ’s aircraft baggage 
pallets. In this way, baggage discrepancies could efficiently be
dealt with well in advance of departure times.
This system would not be capable of any effectiveness unless 
accompanied by measures designed to deal with high risk transfer and 
transit flights. With passengers transferring or in transit from an 
aircraft originating from a low security airport, it might be deemed 
necessary or desirable to subject them and their baggage to the same 
quality of screening as described above. A separate transfer security 
screening point would be used in such cases, featuring similar 
measures to those outlined previously. This screening point would 
feed directly into the t e r m i n a l ’s facilitation zone, where transfer 
desks would await passengers and their baggage. Passengers arriving 
from airports deemed to have a high standard of security operations 
might be permitted to pass directly to the facilitation zone, their 
baggage being channelled to the processing area. For a transit stop 
involving a short grounding, it might be more economical and
convenient to process passengers into a separate, airside lounge, 
provided that it could be guarded adequately and that additional 
screening was not judged to be necessary in the broader interests of 
security. Otherwise, transit flights would simply be accorded the 
same treatment as transfers.
Finally, it would be necessary to introduce centralised cargo, 
courier, mail and supplies depots which would also act as
landside/airside transfer points for staff with access to sensitive 
areas. Using one depot for processing and screening all departing and 
transferring consignments and another for receiving arrivals would act 
in a similar way to the streaming of passengers into two distinct 
flows. The d e p o t s ’ on-site security screening points might not be 
able to handle all traffic (in the form of airside workers, their 
equipment, vehicles, supplies and cargo) passing through them, but 
they could at least implement spot checks on a proportion of persons, 
cargo and supplies passing through (discussed above). Obviously, 
security would be intensified with the adoption of a high screening 
proportion and made less reliable with a low proportion.
It might be possible to introduce such a system operated with
considerable dependence upon computer control. At least one
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interesting computerised security and facilitation system has been 
proposed to d a t e . "  The difficulties, expense and risks associated 
with such reliance should not be underestimated, however. In 
particular, It seems likely that an airport which used a central bank 
of computers to control its passenger operations would be a prime 
target for terrorist attack. Unimaginable havoc could follow the 
destruction of databases which controlled the automatic handling of 
baggage, the processing of p a s s e n g e r s ’ flight information and other 
vital activities. Equally, unnecessary re 1iance on electronic 
technology leaves any user vulnerable to an accidental shut-down of a 
system. In the case of security activities, such accidents could 
provide terrorists with opportunities to breach fallen defences and 
attack sensitive targets.
Diagrammatic representations of the proposed security system as it 
relates to passengers and members of the public, and hold baggage, 
cargo, supplies and services, follow. See below for:
TABLE 7.3. 
PASSENGER ROUTES THROUGH HIGH SECURITY AIRPORT
and
TABLE 7.6, 
BAGGAGE, CARGO, SUPPLIES AND SERVICES ROUTES THROUGH HIGH SECURITY AIRPORT
" B o y l e  (1989), p. 188 - 190
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Baggage routes
Cargo, supplies and/or services routes
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Ultimately, the principal security aim of airport designers In the 
future must be to rate the requirements of security at least as highly 
as those of commerce and convenience, adopting a broad portfolio of 
techniques (some elementary and cheap, others more complex and 
expensive) in order to foreclose resourceful terrorists' options. It
is vital that this capacity should be linked with the potential to
expand and adapt existing processes when required and to combine them
with new techniques and abilities as they become available. In
particular, it should be remembered that any system which is at first 
adequate but which eventually proves inflexible can expect only short 
term success.
7,10, Conclusion
There are several identifiable causes of the security crisis facing 
the aviation industry in the 1990s. One major factor is that of 
t e c h n o l o g y , with terrorist capacities easily enabling advanced 
explosive devices to be infiltrated past obsolescent security systems. 
If the evolving threats of terrorist organisations are to be contained 
with any degree of confidence in future, governments must consider 
carefully the need for increasing investment in promising research and 
development projects. In time, the introduction of a multi-faceted 
screening system designed to isolate a range of potentially 
threatening substances and objects should be sought at major airports. 
For other sites, economical, automated vapour detection systems should 
be marketed and Incorporated into security portfolios employing 
advanced X-ray, metal detection and - wherever possible - neutron 
technologies. It must be stressed that not every airline and airport 
in the world would be able to enhance its security to even acceptable 
standards in the near future, not least because of financial 
stringencies. For the same reason, few would be able to impose 
structures such as those described immediately above. Nevertheless, 
international action is required if terrorist threats are to be 
removed from the sizeable sector of the industry currently devoid of 
meaningful protection.
Another factor which must be given serious attention is the 
development of economic conditions in which flight activities have 
been permitted to expand in advance even of limited security 
capacities. It is inevitable that any private corporation will be 
motivated by profit maximisation and loss minimisation, but this 
should never be permitted to override vital interests involving high 
cost expenditure, such as safety and security in the aviation 
industry., It may be impossible to reverse the Industry's trend 
towards offering more passengers a greater number of flights. It 
would certainly be difficult to persuade many carriers to spend 
significantly more time, money and effort on screening passengers and 
items bound for their aircraft. Hence, where logic and persuasion
might fail, the imposition of regulatory structures and assistance
packages might more readily be expected to succeed.
Attention must turn to means by which airlines and airports can be 
assisted in raising their security standards and means by which
authorities might best oversee and regulate security activities. A 
prime consideration, to be dealt with in the following Chapter, 
involves the global admini strative difficulties which must be
considered in any discussion of industry regulation. To safeguard 
standards, and thus to protect the public interest, governments should
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be encouraged to become more directly concerned with the 
administration of security activities.
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CHAPTER 8
COORDINATING THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRPORT SECURITY
"The sad truth is that our governments lack the political will to set aviation security high on the international agenda. And even 
if they find the will, they lack a clear strategy and machinery to coordinate the effective international action that is 
r e q u i r e d . "%
"0 . In December 1988, was the security operation of Pan Am inFrankfurt on any heightened state?"
"A. We followed the security procedures set up by the FAA."? 
rod u c t ion.
This Chapter outlines some requirements for standardisation of state 
and industry responses to the changing needs of aviation security. As the threat of terrorism is faced globally, the case is presented for 
the international community turning to cooperation in the reappraisal
and improvement of aviation security, with the aim of better deterring 
potential offenders. The implementation of reform proposals on a 
global scale would Inevitably require wholesale reorganisation of activities, relatively much greater capital investment and higher 
security operating costs. A vital element in the Chapter's structure 
is, therefore, the discussion of a strategic scheme to finance the 
administration of such measures. the key component of which being a 
one dollar (US) per flight security levy on airline ticket prices. 
The Chapter concludes with the observation that as terrorists will 
become ever more capable of disrupting the aviation community, 
difficult decisions must be taken swiftly in order to find practical 
financial and organisational solutions to airports' practical 
problems.
8.2. National Aviation Security
Before any examination of international cooperative efforts can be 
undertaken, it is necessary to stress that in a world comprising sovereign states which guard their petty insularities as well as their legitimate national interests, effective cooperation can only hope to 
be built upon the firm foundations of national strength. Wilkinson
 ^P . Wilkinson, Interavia Aerospace Review, 7 (1989), p. 689.
^Testimony of Pan American World Airways employee. M . Huebner before 
US President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 1990. President's Commission (1990), p. 9.
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has drawn attention to the self-imposed isolationism which is the key 
characteristic of the problem involved:
"The basis of any improvement in global aviation security must be 
the enhancement and proven effectiveness of our national security 
systems. There is no adequate machinery of global order and law enforcement, and no international organisation yet capable of 
establishing such, which can be looked to as an alternative means 
of imposing a radical enhancement in aviation security. ... In 
the absence of any such integration we must look to enhanced national systems for improving our aviation security, and to 
improved bilateral collaboration with friends and allies as the 
most practicable and normal means of international action.
The first prerequisite for establishing an effective national system 
for security must be a properly administered security programme designed to set out a clear hierarchy of responsibilities for agencies 
involved in the activities and to regulate security functions in such 
a way as all bodies concerned can know with certainty what 
contribution is expected from them into the overall structure being 
imposed. The creation of such programmes should force governments to come to terms with the problems which require to be addressed and 
should prompt them to reassess the true nature of their existing 
security capabilities. As an extract from the opening paragraph of 
the ECAC security manual puts it:
"Each Member State should designate an appropriate authority 
within its administration to be responsible for the development, 
implementation and maintenance of a national aviation security 
programme. Each Member State should provide adequate legal 
powers and other appropriate means to ensure the implementation 
of its national aviation security programme. The objective of 
the programme should be to protect passengers, aircrew, ground personnel and the general public from acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation."*
Without a clear-sighted domestic policy on security administration, it 
is evident that overlapping competence and gaps in responsibility can
each lead to negligence developing and ultimately to crucial mistakes being made. Such elementary muddles may appear trivial, yet the US Presidential Commission investigating security organisation in the 
United States was left in no doubt that it required urgent attention 
by US authorities.s For example, in terms of intelligence, more 
efficient dissemination procedures within US and UK administrations 
and throughout the industry sectors which they are supposed to regulate might have resulted in warnings concerning the Pan Am Flight 
103 disaster having been treated more seriously when received. In any case, the poorly delineated tiers of authority failed to facilitate the passing of vital intelligence materials to agencies which might
3Wilkinson ( 1989) II, pp. 1 - 2 .
*ECAC (1988), paragraph 1.1,1. |
*See the C o m m i s s i o n ’s recommendations. P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission |(1990), pp. 121 - 125. 1
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have used them to great effect, suggesting either that the national 
aviation security programmes of the states involved could have been 
more explicit in their designation of roles for such scenarios or that 
existing provisions were being implemented inadequately.*
In its report of 1990, the US P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission made clear that there is a constant danger of poorly drafted national regulationsbeing used by the industry to conceal its security weaknesses.Lacking complete clarity in wording. standards can easily permit
serious loopholes to develop which, in turn, can be filled with 
convenient and discretionary activities not directed towards the 
enhancement of s e c u r i t y . ’ As any regulated industry should be
expected to act "according to the rule book" which is intended to 
govern it, it is imperative that "the rule book" should provide
minimal scope for potentially dangerous discretion which might later 
both allow lapses in vigilance to take place and exculpate bodiesresponsible for such lapses.
A good example of the problems involved is to be found in the sub­
contracting of security firms and the hiring of screening personnel in 
the United States. As with other aspects of aviation security policy, the employment of so-called security staff is left firmly within the 
jurisdiction of the industry in many states. This reliance on the 
laissez faire approach to employment management presents considerable dangers, because commercial considerations can easily push employers towards the lower end of the labour market. It is easy to imagine
that carriers would be governed by a fear of civil litigation 
following instances of insecurity leading to acts of aviation crime. 
Dudley has noted that Article 20 (1) of the Warsaw Convention can 
provide a defence for airlines able to prove that due care had 
genuinely been taken prior to boarding:
“It is worth restating that this is the defence that thecarrier and his agents took every necessary measure to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible to take such measures. 
Obviously as hi lacking has developed and become a steadily more serious risk so the onus would have been increasingly on the carrier to show that he had taken reasonable precautions to 
protect passengers and this may include forms of preventative 
s e c u r i t y . " ®
Unfortunately, American evidence from Yeffet (quoted immediately 
below) suggests that as the risk of air crime has increased, carriers have not been motivated to enhance security by, for example, employing 
a higher calibre of staff. Far from capitalising on this, it appears 
that prospective litigants have been precluded from raising court
actions by the nature of the US Federal regulatory system. Lack of 
supervision by US authorities in the way in which American security
, pp. 69 - 82.
’ Ibid., p . i i .
*Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 83.
'■■•ii
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staff are employed prompted Yeffet to comment that it is often theleast well-qualified candidates who are hired;
"In effect, the FAA has told the airlines that they areresponsible for their own security. This not only allows the FAA 
to avoid responsibility for security failures, it allows airlines to ignore their responsibility. The Warsaw convention limits their liability for security failures, as long as FAA procedures are followed. The result is that American airlines have made 
security a low priority. This can be seen in their choice of 
security companies. Virtually all American airlines hire firms based solely on the lowest price. The result: private security
firms hire personnel who would be [virtually] unemployable in any 
other i n d u s t r y ."’
The FAA's reluctance to provide detailed guidance to the industry on 
the precision with which its norms on staff qualities and other issues 
must be observed has led to the standards being abused. Yeffet 
commented in another source as follows:
"As it stands now, American carriers use FAA regulations as a 
bastion against lawsuits after they fail to prevent disasters. They tell juries listening to the complaints of bereaved families 
that they had adequate security - they met FAA standards."i*
It should be obvious that this form of reliance upon regulations is 
both contrary to their true purpose and a needless legal loophole by 
which the industry can evade liability. On an issue as basic as staff 
recruitment, a high standard of conduct must be expected from airports, carriers and sub-contracted firms. If self-regulation is 
inadequate to ensure that job applicants reach a sufficient level of excellence for security work, it must be for national authorities to 
impose high standards which require positive action, rather than low 
or non-existent standards which allow objective responsibilities to be ignored. A similar suggestion for the UK airport security employment 
market was endorsed by the British House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee in 1989.
Finally, with respect to national activity, governments must learn 
fully to cooperate with carriers and airports in introducing new security systems and structures. In particular, agreement should be 
sought with the industry that responsibilities for security activities 
should increasingly pass from airlines to less commercially 
competitive bodies, such as police departments, airport authorities or 
special publicly established units. In this way. greater personnel 
efficiency might be encouraged, costs might be shared equitably, expense saved and potentially unhealthy free market influences kept at
'Yeffet [1989], p. 2.
*0Yeffet and Barnes (1989). p. 137.
tiHouse of Commons Com mi t t e e  on Transport (1989). p . 1.
251
b a y .^’
8.3. Bilateral and Regional Security Agreements
The bilateral approach to problem solving is one which offers several 
exciting benefits for security, plus a number of severe limitations. 
It is certainly true that major powers could use their network of 
allies in the developing world to channel resources and expertise into 
airports. On the other hand, any such bilateral activity is bound to 
leave some unfavoured governments outwith its purview and is, in any 
case, unlikely to promote the necessary degree of global advancement 
which a broader, multilateral package might more easily facilitate. 
Although some major aviation powers, including the USA and Canada have 
offered bilateral assistance to developing nations, the resources 
available for such schemes have never been significant. More 
importantly, however, is the consideration which must be given to 
creating a security system on a global scale. Without detailed 
coordination efforts, upgrading can never lead to the development of 
fully integrated security systems.
ICAO has attempted to persuade its members to use the bilateral mode 
of agreement formulation to enhance security. An ICAO voluntary 
assistance programme on security operates on an ostensibly bilateral 
basis with the Organization merely monitoring and coordinating requests made by states in need of assistance and offers of support 
from donor countries. This arrangement allows requests for aid to be made directly to ICAO, which can forward them to possible donors or 
else assess the time scale in which support should be provided and decide whether or not to place the request on a priority list for urgent action, pending the availability of necessary funds.
ICAO concern for bilateral activity also extends to coverage of 
security standardisation. On 25 June 1986, the O r g a n i z a t i o n ’s Council urged all contracting States to insert into their bilateral agreements 
on air services a clause on aviation s e c u r i t y . This exhortation recognised that agreements which govern the terms and conditions upon 
which foreign civil air carriers may operate at airports are most 
often made on a bilateral basis. Accordingly, governments negotiating 
new air services agreements (and in particular those in a position of 
comparative economic strength, able to dictate contractual terms to 
others) could seek to introduce practical provisions with the express 
intention of raising security standards. In principle, the concept of 
bilateral security conditions in air services agreements is exciting, 
because of the ability of the maior aviation powers to use the threat 
of service withdrawal as an incentive to other, possibly less diligent states to take security more seriously. In practice, however, this 
would be dependent upon the major states in question first recognising 
for themselves the security prerequisites which should be included in
^’Suggestion proposed in a letter to Geoffrey Lipman from a US aviation security consultant, 18 February 1989.
13 ICAO Working Paper A27--WP/64 EX/19 12/7/89, paragraph 6.2.
!*For a discussion of bilateral air agreements and of their role with respect to security, see Gertler (1985), pp. 75 - 79.
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agreements and then providing means of finance to bring about the
changes sought. Also, meaningful action would require the larger 
powers to issue the threats in the first place, at risk of
antagonising their contractual partners and forcing undesirable 
disagreements to emerge.
Instead of taking such stringent. threatening and potentially 
expensive action, states responded to the ICAO initiative by reducing 
it to a second-rate means of voicing support for the O r g a n i z a t i o n ’s 
flawed standards. ICAO itself promulgated a model clause on security 
as a guide for states in their negotiations. The clause. however, 
only sets out a familiar list of vague or unimportant undertakings 
which have proved inadequate in the past to deal with the true dangers 
of terrorism.!* States which jointly assent to the terms contained inthe model clause agree to act in conformity with the provisions of the
Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, provided that both countries 
are parties thereto. The clause covers the provision of "all
necessary assistance" (unspecified) upon request of either party to ?
prevent threats to the security of civil aviation and to terminate 4:
incidents. It also calls upon both parties and their aircraft
operators to abide by all aviation security provisions contained in Annexes to the Chicago Convention (including Annex 17, which deals 
with security matters) without recognising that the Annexes themselves 
should first be upgraded and explicated, so as to make them worth f
enforcing in this way.!* Predictably, however, it remains silent on 4such vital issues as the means by which necessary standards should be introduced, administered and financed fairly.
Clearly, the responsible use of more powerfully worded security clauses in bilateral air services agreements, in conjunction with necessary resource redistribution measures, could result in a broad 
network of practical cooperation evolving, the significance of which
could be great in reinforcing tough security standards.
Unfortunately, while nothing prevents states from extending the scope 
of the ICAO model clause, it is feared that the original, rather unimpressive model will simply be copied by states or modified only slightly as the basis for security agreements. This concern wasintensified when, on 22 April 1986, US Deputy Secretary of State John
Whitehead made the following comment in a statement before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs:
"Since January the Department has launched negotiations with some
80 of our bilateral aviation partners for the adoption of an
improved aviation security article based on the ICAO m o d e l . " ! ’
While a more stringent version of I C A O ’s model clause would be useful
!*Cheng has described the terms of the ICAO model clause as "rather
tame". Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1989), p. 50.
!*ICAO Document LE 3/32-86/102, 26/11/86, pp. 26 - 28.
! ’J. Whitehead, Counterterrorism Policy (Washington D.C.: Department 
of State, 1986), p. 2 . The US P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission was positive 
in its assessment of the capacities of bilateral agreements to 
promote security. President's Commission (1990), p. 37.
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in efforts to improve security, bilateral activities of this type must 
always be restricted in their capacity to promote organised, coordinated advances. Regrettably, the experiences of the Summit 
Seven in attempting to give regional direction to firmly worded 
declarations leaves concern that genuine progress will be hard won even at the multilateral level. Nevertheless, while regional efforts •>
to enforce the failing provisions of the Hague and Montreal Conventions may have resulted in little more than embarrassment for 
states involved, regional efforts can play a vital role in the practical suppression ■ of terrorism. For example, high level intelligence-sharing between allies has led to greater understanding 
of terrorist groups' operations. Such fora as the European 
Communities' TREVI meetings should be supported by member states %improving information pools and channels of communication.is Another ;
means by which international cooperation within regions can prepare states to tackle terrorist incidents is through the introduction of procedures for the training and deployment of anti-terrorist units 
from ill-prepared allies. Also, after any incident of unlawful 
interference with aviation, communication should be undertaken between 
any affected states with investigations operating on a transnational 
level to determine the extent of security weaknesses presented and 
means of bringing about necessary improvements.!*
In terms of security standardisation, regional bodies such as ECAC can 
enjoy a useful role as consultative fora in which ideologically and 
economically compatible state delegations (such as of the liberal, western European governments) can discuss complex questions of security administration and technology. Although ECAC has no powers 
of mandate over states on issues of security, it is clear that its 
ability to focus delegations' attention on difficult matters leads to 
high level u nderstanding being reached by its like-minded members and 
may also serve to provide an otherwise unobtainable directional force 
to domestic security policy makers, so guiding the development of 
regional policies. In this sense, ECAC may be viewed as a regional 
equivalent of ICAO, though one which benefits from its members' 
political and economic similarities and from comprising a smaller 
number of members.
It would be wrong to suggest that ICAO could be expected to provide as
high a quality of guidance and policy leadership to its diverse 
membership, for while its global remit offers benefits of universal 
application, it also diminishes prospects of strong, unambiguous decision-making and reduces the quality of argument and of informal 
understanding between the parties involved. Equally, regional bodies 
with predominantly consultative powers should not be regarded as being able to formulate hard policies for standardising security within 
their individual regions, let alone for the broader setting of universal norms. Hence, regional bodies cannot be trusted to provide 
for the type of integration required to bring about radical changes on 
a worldwide basis, while doubt must exist as to the capacities of ICAO 
to reach meaningful agreement on difficult security questions.
isciutterbuck (1990) II, pp. 121 - 122.
I'ICAO Document A2 6 - W P / 5 3  EX/12 26/8/86, p. 2, s. 1.9.
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8.4. Reformulating And Standardising. Security Through International Action
Although a strong case can be made for extending the scope of national 
regulation and limited (bilateral or regional) cooperation on issues 
of security, such activities alone cannot be expected to suffice on an a ll-encompassing global scale. There will always exist areas of 
concern which could benefit from being consigned to a standing global agency competent to standardise often disparate day-to-day working
norms. A good example of the need which exists for integration of 
rules was presented to the US P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission by Timothy R. 
Thornton. Executive Vice President and General Counsel for Northwest Airlines:
"We had a dispute with a foreign government that went on for six 
months, where we were out of compliance with the FAA mandate as 
it related to extraordinary X-ray security of all checked baggage. (The foreign government] told us not to do it and the federal government told us to do it. Sometimes we were in 
violation of American laws. Sometimes we were in violation of 
the foreign laws of the airport where we operated. We were in
the m i d d l e . " ’*
Merely hortatory standards and recommendations such as those contained 
in I C A O ’s Annex 17 and even in more detailed security manuals cannot 
be trusted because of their static nature and their almost total lack of international enforcement. Divergence of policies and complete regulatory voids can only be expected where states are not members of 
an overseeing and on-going structure of control. It is valid to point 
out the desperate need for increased universal cooperation which c o ­exists with the problem posed by states' refusal to admit their 
vulnerabilities in the field of airport security. This amounts to a
paradox which will not easily be solved as it involves both a need to
extend areas of agreement covering security and a long-he Id 
unwillingness on the part of states to cede their domestic powers to 
the international community of which they are members.
Aviation terrorism is nothing less than a universal problem from which 
no government can afford to hide, requiring to be addressed with 
directness and honesty. G o v e r n m e n t s ’ empty declarations and token 
palliatives may temporarily calm public concern for the crisis which 
continues to haunt the industry, yet they cannot overcome basic 
terrorist threats. Effectiveness in response must require the global 
problem of terrorism to be dealt with by global problem solving techniques, for the simple reason that the civil aviation community is 
a community of diverse membership in which the strong and the weak operate together in a competitive yet intertwined and interdependent 
context. Under such conditions the security mechanisms of each 
government, airport and carrier require to be viewed as necessary components of a security shield for the entire industry, which in turn 
can only ever be as strong as its point of least resistance. With 
international flights from every continent feeding into the world-wide 
organism of civil aviation, the time has now arrived when weaknesses 
at any point in its immune system can and do allow terrorists and
’ ' P r e s id ent's Com m i s s i o n  (1990), p . 32
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their weaponry to pass into it like a devastating virus. In order to 
control this free-roaming virus of terrorism and to make it less 
virulent, it will be necessary to suppress the crimes involved through ï
dedicated global initiatives directed at offence prevention and f
offender deterrence.
A much needed qualitative leap in a i r p o r t s ’ security capacity could 
satisfy two urgent requirements for the global suppression of air
violence. First, greater efficiency in the detection of potential 
offenders at security points would actively prevent terrorists from >
fulfilling their aims. S e c o n d , pub lie demonstration of new capacities &
would force terrorists to reconsider the utility of targeting aviation 
and might thus divert many groups away from hijacking and sabotage.
Even if nothing else could be achieved by such reforms, a regeneration
of security capability would compel terrorists to revise their
strategies while indicating to the travelling public that aviation 
authorities can and do act positively for the protection of
p a s s e n g e r s ’ safety.
The foregoing discussion suggests that advances in security must be 
implemented on a universal scale for adequate progress to be made
against terrorism. Upgrading of richer and poorer n a t i o n s ’ security 
capacities in tandem should not, however, be undertaken with the
intention of achieving absolute uniformity of operations at every 
domestic and international site, for such would be economically unwise 
and, in any case, practically impossible. Without doubt, the
unparalleled threats posed by plastic explosives and similarly 
advanced substances and devices force the concerned observer to 
conclude that modern means of detection should be employed wherever 
budgets permit and that steps should be taken to lower the threats
posed by less well-secured sites as, for example, by limiting their 
capacity to accommodate high risk flights and wide-bodied aircraft.
Any globally formulated strategy should standardise different types of 
security operations for different types of threat faced, bearing in 
mind the diversity of airport operations undertaken throughout the 
world. Strategic action would require to be firmly underpinned by ensuring that certain minimal procedural safeguards would be adhered 
to at every location and that, wherever possible, notable sec u r ity 
loopholes would be foreclosed to scheming terrorists. Such a course 
would not easily be undertaken as it would be bound to meet with a
degree of opposition from governments and from the industry itself,
with questions of state sovereignty, finance and organisation placing 
considerable difficulties in its path. Furthermore, the practical 
realities of poor security being endemic in airports of the 
economically developing world and at least prevalent in many of those 
of the so-called developed nations require to be regarded as major 
problems.
8 .5. A irport S e curity in L e s s J D e v e 1oped Countries
In the interdependent world of civil aviation, the implications of a 
"north/south divide" in security capacity are indeed severe, 
particularly as terrorists have demonstrated their readiness to turn 
the inadequacies of the entire system to their best advantage. An 
example of this preparedness is to be found in the hijacking on 24 
July 1987 of an Air Afrique DC-10 to G e n e v a ’s Cointrin Airport. The 
circumstances in which the lone Southern Lebanese hijacker, Hussein
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Ali Mohammed Hariri, gained access to the aircraft with a firearm, 
ammunition and explosives may never be fully known or Publicised- It 
is clear, however, that he boarded the flight in Central Africa, as 
the aircraft had departed only from Brazzaville, the Congo and Bangui, 
the Central African Republic, neither of which is renowned for its 
high security standards.
The task of securing airports in less developed nations is one which 
presents manifold resource and implementational problems in terms of 
airport infrastructure, technology, staff capacities and general 
management. It has even been noted that at some sites there may not 
be sufficient electrical power sources available to operate screening 
e q u i p m e n t . ’ ! Inappropriate construction of airport terminals may also 
preclude the use of large screening a p p a r a t u s . ”  The precise scope of 
the less developed n a t i o n s ’ security problems is impossible to 
determine, partly because the governments concerned are reluctant to 
admit that their airports and airlines are inadequately resourced and 
partly because no authority with the required information has 
publicised the extent of the need, for fear of disclosing delicate 
information which might be of use to terrorists. The current writer, 
however, has interviewed security experts who have acknowledged the 
existence of maior security inabilities being experienced by many 
third world c o u n t r i e s ’ airport systems. In Soviet bloc and eastern 
European states also there appears to be a considerable need for
reassessment of security capacities at a i r p o r t s . ”  Polish academic 
Brunon Holyst has reported:
... security units have magnetic gates at their disposal and 
hand detectors for checking out the passengers. In most cases, 
this equipment is outdated or not in full working order due to 
Its long period of use and a lack of proper conservation
services. They are part of the aircraft commodities and as such, 
should be successfully replenished by Polish Airlines "L OT"."’ *
Such deficiencies are presently being countered in the USSR where, 
according to the Soviet Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation, Mikhail 
Timofeyev, “a new generation of preclearance equipment" at "the level 
of the latest world achievements" is being developed and installed, to 
counter the growing threat posed by hijackers and other air
c r i m i n a l s . ’ * In 1989, 300 firearms, over two thirds of a tonne of
explosives and 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  rounds of ammunition were found by using ore-
” Ian Gel lard, quoted in Rew Scientist 7 January 1989, p. 23.
” 8 . Holyst, "The Abduction of Polish Airlines LOT P l a n e s , " kioience 
A ggression and Terrorism 3 (1989), p. 132.
Soviet iieekly, 28 June 1990 (photocopy).
’ ♦Holyst (1989), p. 132.
’Sfzvesfia, 25 July 1990, reprinted in Novosti Press Agency press release, July 1990, p. 3. On the spate of Soviet hijackings in the 
summer of 1990 see Soviet Weekly, 28 June 1990 (photocopy); The 
Scotsman, 2 and 6 July 1990 (photocopies); and The Independent, 6 
July 1990 (photocopy).
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boarding screening techniques on Aeroflot departures, suggesting both 
that a genuine threat of air crime exists in the USSR and that a great 
deal remains to be done to prevent and deter it. It was reported in 
1990 that the risks of hijacking and sabotage were being taken 
seriously by Soviet authorities, which had decided to combine the 
competences of the KGB and the Interior and Civil Aviation ministries 
in a new security p r o g r a m m e . ”
The principal reason for inadequate security being found in the second 
and third worlds appears to be the expense involved for governments 
already overburdened with external debt and/or internal poverty, with 
liquidity difficulties and the poor supply of hard currency preventing 
investment in foreign technology and s e r v i c e s . ’’ One confidential 
report which was received by the current writer in 1990 described how 
a diplomatically prominent African state's foreign exchange crisis had 
affected resources for security operations. The c o u n t r y ’s only i n ter­
continental airport was equipped with broken screening apparatus and 
staff untrained in alternative measures. In addition, absolutely no 
landside/airside boundary existed, with unrestricted access to 
aircraft being possible. At the s t a t e ’s domestic sites, no security 
equipment whatsoever was available, with perimeter fencing at best 
being "inadequate". As a result of similar gross inadequacies across 
the continent, the s t a t e ’s airport authority chief had described sub- 
Saharan developing African n a t i o n s ’ standard of security as being 
" n o n - e x i s t e n t ’ *
This assertion is reinforced by experience, including that of the Air 
Afrique hijacking. More recently, on 20 September 1969, Brazzaville 
airport, in the Congo, was the last departure point for the UTA DC-10 
which was sabotaged, crashing over a desert in Niger and killing 171 
passengers and crew. The following day, the French a i r l i n e ’s Vice 
President, Pierre Chagniot, stated that there were enormous problems 
involved in securing some African airports:
"The security is very difficult in Africa with no fences around 
most of the airports, so it's very, very difficult to prevent 
people coming [into] the a i r p o r t . " ”
Grave concern has also been voiced by l A T A ’s Rodney Wallis, who has 
described the considerable social crisis which security needs recently 
caused at one African airport, a path over which inhabitants of two 
neighbouring villages used as their only connecting route. Also, the 
grass surrounding the airport runway was used by the v i l l a g e r s ’ cattle 
for grazing. A compromise between the requirements of security and 
access was struck only when the proposed layout for a new perimeter 
fence was altered to accommodate the access and grazing needs of the
’ ♦Soviet {■feeklVf 23 August 1990 (photocopy).
’ ’Holyst (1989), p. 131.
’^Confidential report on airport security (unpublished), received 
from Professor Paul Wilkinson, 17 January 1990. Broadly similar 
difficulties are outlined in President's Commission (1990), p. 35.
BBC, One O^Clock News, Thursday 21 September 1989.
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a i r p o r t ’s peripheral c o m m u n i t i e s . ’*
Security weaknesses in remote airfields may easily pose major problems 
for debt-ridden third world governments but they may also seem far 
distant and irrelevant to passengers and even security authorities in 
the more prosperous and better equipped states of the developed world. 
In fact, each hijacking and act of sabotage which commences at a poor 
s t a t e ’s international airport can, and normally does, have 
repercussions for many other countries, in terms of passenger 
casualties, hostage negotiations or subsequent criminal 
investigations.
It is disturbing to note that even in the least well-eauioped airports 
of the world, airlines of foreign states (including those of the major 
aviation powers) are still prepared to operate, apparently oblivious 
to the considerable dangers being faced by their crews and passengers. 
Some carriers claim that they insist on minimum security standards to 
be introduced before flights can be scheduled to or from vulnerable 
sites. Others use their own, or sub-contracted, security teams at 
times of perceived need. Probably many more, however, choose to 
ignore perimeter inadequacies. other access weak points, staff 
shortcomings and basic screening difficulties, despite the growing 
threat to many nations of hijacking and sabotage incidents and of drug 
and terrorist infiltration from these poorly prepared locations.
As the security needs of airports are necessarily as diverse as the 
security conditions in which the sites operate, the list of required 
standards for less developed s t a t e s ’ airports cannot foe limited. 
Instead, considering that security is frequently non-existent and that 
resources are often difficult to allocate for the purpose of upgrading 
standards, it may be more useful to draw attention to a small 
selection of security needs which require to be resolved urgently, not 
so as to make less developed airports safe from all possible risks, 
but simply in order to bring them to a slightly more satisfactory 
state in the short term. This process might be accomplished first by 
assessing the precise needs of an airport, looking particularly at its 
size and internat ional importance. After costing estimates and 
project Planning have revealed the extent to which security reform is 
feasible and necessary, action could be taken to facilitate the three 
great areas of action covered by passenger screening, object screening 
and access control. If appropriate funds were to be made available, a 
useful minimum equipment listing for the protection of airports from 
basic threats might include the following, derived from a Canadian LDC 
airport security assistance s c h e m e ’s suggested provision;
- walk-through metal detector devices;
- hand-held metal scanners (for passengers);
- explosive vapour detectors;
- carry-on baggage X-ray scanners;
- checked baggage X-ray scanners;
- access control and electronic surveillance equipment such as 
employee ID pass systems, video cameras, televisions and 
radios ;
- fencing;
’'Wall is, Beaumont Memorial Lecture, 1989.
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~ other ancillary e q u i p m e n t . ”
With such equipment, operated by well-trained personnel and dedicated Imanagers, a reasonable minimum standard of security might be 
maintained. Questions of resource availability, manpower quality and 
integrity from the risks of bribery and corruption would each require 
to be addressed for any fledgling security scheme to be operated with 
adequate efficiency. Discussion of the criteria by which such 
improvements might be made and of the means by which they could be 
monitored will be dealt with in the analysis of regional airports, 
be l o w ,
There can be no doubt that the upgrading of security where it is most 
needed will be an expensive and very difficult process, but it is 
equally beyond question that action must be taken for such upgra d i n g  
to be instigated in the short term, otherwise the safety of the 
w o r l d ’s airline users and staff would remain in serious jeopardy. If 
the need to protect passengers and crew of all nationalities were not 
sufficient justification for upgrading poor security wherever it is to 
be found, the argument of interdependence would certainly provide it.
It is clear that the entire civil aviation network requires more 
states than the rich and able to protect their airports and carrier 
services from terrorism. Hence, for example, if Geneva is more 
efficiently to be protected from the threat of hosting a political 
hijacking, or if French airlines are to preserve the safety of their 
passengers, crew and aircraft from bomb attack, then Brazzaville and 
Bangui must first be made safer. This inevitably implies that the 
poor and less capable members of the international community must be 
provided with channels of assistance to elevate their security 
standards to a more acceptable level of p r e p a r e d n e s s . This problem 
will be discussed below in the context of resource redistribution 
needs.
8,6. Regional Airports
Just as LDC airports' reform possibilities may be limited by practical 
considerations of finance, so may smaller airfields of the 
economically developed nations offering very limited schedules to a 
small range of similar destinations be restricted in their ability to 
introduce the most advanced and expensive of equipment and techniques.
While the familiar argument of total security requiring total 
vigilance can be made to apply to any aviation setting, concessions 
may require to be made for airports operating restricted schedules and 
low risk routes. Otherwise it would be logically necessary to require 
Benbecula and Lerwick airports to operate, for example, explosives 
detection, advanced baggage reconciliation or computerised access 
control measures equal in quality to those which might be expected of 
Heathrow and Gatwick - a proposition which, though not impossible, it 
is hoped would never require serious consideration. -I
The aforementioned high technological systems which are currently 
being developed will display their strengths not as universally valid
3!Information received by Professor Paul Wilkinson from Canadian 
aviation security consultant with government work experience, 
February 1990.
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forms of defence for all sites, but rather as special measures for 
those airports the flights of which require an unusually high degree 
of protection. For most small airports (such as domestic airfields, 
club venues and community airports) security will require to be 
maintained at appropriate levels, though not necessarily with the 
equipment expected at larger sites.
Some more significant regional operations can be highly successful, 
representing a substantial proportion of national throughput. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, airports controlled by local authorities 
handled 21.5 million passengers in 1988 and hosted 23 oer cent of 
flight traffic. Nevertheless, not all independent operations can be 
as financially self-sufficient as, for example, Manchester airport, 
which benefits from almost half of all British local authority airport 
t r a f f i c . ”  Economic problems surrounding independent regional 
airports can be severe, limiting their financial abilities to invest 
in expensive infrastructure. In oarticular, minor airports serving a 
small community will often be susceptible to unpredictable ticket 
price fluctuations and seasonal passenger trends.
In such conditions, maximum cost-effectiveness from all equipment can 
become an issue of basic economic survival rather than of profit 
growth, raising concern that a means should be found of defining 
security adequacy for such sites. Such a definition cannot embrace 
the constant and complete absence of passenger and baggage security 
activity for flights which can still be found at many small airports 
throughout the world, despite the demonstrated need for security to be 
taken seriously by all participants in the aviation industry. Rather, 
standardisation must seek to provide a truly adequate minimum standard 
of global security, below which no state, operator or airport should 
be permitted to fall.
Certain operational elements are involved in determining the extent of 
security preparedness required at smaller airports. These concern the 
criteria to be identified for adequately differentiating between 
airports of different security priorities, the qualitative variations 
in minimum security capabilities which should be tolerated and the 
concomitant limitations upon flight activities which should be imposed 
at sites deemed to be of a lower risk. In resolving the problems of 
regional a i r p o r t s ’ security gradation, it would be inevitable for some 
form of internationai standardisation to be u n d e r t a k e n , if only in the 
form of regional systems initiated by such organisations as ECAC. 
Once more, however, it should be noted that only global 
standardisation or a finely intermeshing regime of regional or t r a n s ­
industry accords could suffice for a universally integrated solution 
of the difficulties to be achieved.
Dealing with the criteria which can be adopted for determining whether 
the most stringent, advanced and expensive of new techniques (as those 
described above) should be applied by aviation authorities, it is 
necessary to examine the factors which should contribute to an airport 
being designated a high risk site. As aviation terrorism is a 
predominantly international phenomenon (with international flights
’’P ublicity material for Joint Airports Committee of Local
Authorities, 1990.
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classically being targeted) and as flights characteristically feed 
into a vulnerable global aviation network, a strong case can be made 
for protecting airports which process international flights. 
Unfortunately, this criterion fails to recognise that many 
international airports operate with only a small number of 
international flights, a much higher proportion of activities centring 
on lower risk flights, such as by general aviation, operating private, 
non-scheduled traffic. Moreover. because the designation of an 
airport as international or domestic need have little bearing on its 
importance to terrorists (a factor ignored by the ICAO air crime 
Conventions) another, more a c c e p t a b le, method of classification must 
be sought. Some flights of this nature should certainly be protected 
by modern means of security because the risk of hijacking or sabotage 
cannot be ruled out beyond reasonable doubt.
It is evident that an airport which accommodates only small aircraft 
might be expected to pose a lower risk of terrorist infiltration than 
a larger site providing a greater range of departures in more 
capacious aircraft. This is the case because only the latter type of 
airport can provide the larger, nationally identifiable and newsworthy 
targets which are and have always been the principal prey of the 
politically motivated offender. Recalling that in 1989 the FAA 
introduced its special priority rule concerning computerised access 
control to airports served by aircraft licensed to carry no fewer than 
60 p a s s e n g e r s , ”  it would be appropriate to suggest as a practical 
compromise between maximum security and financial viability that 
similar demarcations could be applied to airport security according to 
user c a r r i e r s ’ aircraft types, with exceptions to that rule being 
permissible in the event of atypical, high risk flights on smaller 
aircraft being identified by authorities responsible.
With further study and more advanced international cooperation, a 
scheme might be found by which a broader variety of security levels 
could be formulated according to certain operational characteristics, 
such as aircraft size, passenger throughput or locations served. 
Already, internationally re cognised standards exist for classifying 
airports in terms of passenger throughput, with the highest rating of 
"category 1 ” being applied to any site with more than two million 
passengers processed a n n u a l l y . ’ ♦ In 1989, the FAA categorised, or 
"phased" airports as follows for the purposes of introducing different 
levels of access control facilities:
TABLE 8.1,
FAA CATEGORISATION OF AIRPORTS BY PASSENGER THROUGHPUT
CATEGORY
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3
ANNUAL PASSENGER THROUGHPUT
Over 25 million 
2 - 25 million 
0.5 - 2 million
3 ’Nelms (1989), p. 690.
3+W.A. Crenshaw (1987), p. 99
i V './/a'
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Phase 4 Under 0.5 million.% &
It should not be difficult to establish some forms of workable
criteria by which regional operations could be c l a s s i f i e d . 3* 8y so 
doing, the least significant of sites might be permitted to operate 
with lower security preparedness, while moderately active airports 
would be required to impose a much higher level of security and major 
hubs would be expected to operate the most advanced systems. A
central feature of such a scheme would need to be its reliance upon 
passengers and their baggage undergoing more stringent screening
whenever they were to pass through any airport of a higher security
category than those which they had previously encountered in their
journey. While this might correctly be criticised as being 
inconvenient, expensive, time-consuming and possibly bureaucratic, 
graded security screening would act as an invaluable risk minimising 
mechanism in an otherwise ill-protected global system. Although 
screening cannot be universally high at all the w o r l d ’s airports, 
there can be no excuse for passengers boarding a flight at an 
unprotected site then transferring to another aircraft at a more 
sensitive airport without undergoing some form of screening 
appropriate to that transfer p o i n t ’s higher level of risk.
If low risk airports were to be provided only with the most basic 
level of defences, such as a constant police presence, complete 
perimeter fencing, simple security equipment and a small security
personnel presence, minimal security levels could be maintained.
These could be reinforced by a policy of total baggage reconciliation 
by passengers on the ramp and by staff being encouraged to report 
suspicious behaviour when observed. Of course, as has been stated 
immediately above, any flight from such a site, feeding into a notably 
more important airport would either require upgraded security 
activities to be carried out prior to departure or else on arrival 
would need its on-going passengers and their baggage to be channelled 
immediately to the landside of the transfer airport for stringent 
security screening to take place. If a carrier at a low risk airport 
wished to diversify its flights and offer departures in larger 
aircraft to more important destinations, it would require to upgrade 
the minimum level of security expected for all of its flights. In 
this way an on-going means of continual security assessment could be 
achieved, depending upon the willingness of state or private agencies 
to monitor the expansion of services and the accompanying need for 
increased security.s?
Clearly. the security standardisation needs of the developing w o r l d ’s
3*Nelms (1989), pp. 690 - 691.
3*Already, FAA standards exist by which US airports can be rated for 
security purposes according to size, passenger throughput, 
location, vulnerability, security capacity, etc-. N. Livingstone 
and D. Halevy in Lewis and Kaplan (1990), p. 227.
3?Note that lATA has proposed that the industry should adopt a tiered 
approach to security, with activities being carried out in 
accordance with three categorisations of risk. lATA, Airline 
SecLfrity and Fraud Prevention (Montreal; lATA, 1987) p. 2,
263
airports and of the developed n a t i o n s ’ regional sites are not
dissimilar. In each case, a means must be found of establishing the 
international standards described above and, of equal importance, of 
providing resources to precipitate required reform,
8,7. financial And Imolementatiqnal Reform Problems
The possible improvements detailed above represent the tip of the
security iceberg, for much more can and must now be achieved to make 
security adequate for the challenges which it will face in the future. 
While it is, therefore, vital that security should be a key priority 
for policy makers, it is regrettable that the issue has rarely been 
high on the political agenda of developed n a t i o n s ’ governments. most 
of which rely on the private sector to operate security activities 
within broad and often ill-conceived regulatory parameters. Security reform now requires that these delineations of competence be defined 
more rigidly. with greater state involvement taking place and
increasing standardisation made of practices and procedures 
international 1 y .
It should not be assumed, however, that any moves towards governmental 
activity and a global overview of aviation security can be implemented 
with ease, as states may be constrained by an ignorance of the
aviation c o m m u n i t y ’s needs or by an unwillingness to risk the 
consequences of reform. For example, fear of failure in the electoral 
democratic setting and a desire not to offend foreign governments 
which support terrorist organisations can contribute to this lack of 
political will, but one factor overrides both of these and is 
potentially more damaging than either. Governments are reluctant to 
undertake a radical reorganisation of global aviation security 
operations because of the vast expense which would inevitably be 
involved. No accurate figures can be found to illustrate the extent 
of investment necessary for the task but it is certain to run into 
billions of dollars w o r l d w i d e . 3% Although such a figure may disquiet 
the minds of governmental and industry policy makers, it should be 
noted that the major tasks of security reform would require only a 
small proportion of total operating costs for a large carrier, when 
judged by the expenditure daily entailed in covering fuel, salaries, landing dues and other simple outlays. Nevertheless, even major 
powers which benefit greatly from the success of civil aviation, such as the United States, seem more concerned with propping u p  budget 
deficits by means of unused aviation trust funds than with investing 
available resources in the future of the i n d u s t r y . 3?
To give some indication of current public spending levels on security 
technology research, the British Department of T r a n s p o r t ’s research 
budget for aviation security equipment in 1988 was only £500,000. As 
a result of the impetus of Lockerbie this was doubled to a figure 
which must still be unable to make a significant impact upon the
3*Estlmate of Professor Paul Wilkinson, 1989.
3 * Channel 4, Dispatches, W e d nesd ay 20 Decembe r 1989.
.-JTi ... ...
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security crisis.** By contrast and despite the above-noted budgetary 
constraints, comparable US Federal Aviation Administrât ion budgets for 1988 were set at ten million dollars (US).*^ What is required is a 
means of financing security quickly and effectively, because it is 
evident that while terrorists continue to hold the upper hand they 
will use their powers and freedoms to greatest effect. There is a clear case to be made for urgent public sector financing and control of all operational aspects of aviation security, based on the
indisputable fact, mentioned above, that terrorists attack a 
nationally-identifiable aviation target because it is likely to be 
perceived by the media and the public as a political extension of a 
particular government. In the words of Geoffrey Lipman. the Executive 
Director of IFAPAr
"The objective is not to disrupt aviation - t h a t ’s only a means -
the objective is to destabilize governments. In the final
analysis, the response is a government responsibility - and it 
should be met out of general funds for police, security, or even 
national defence."**
In 1989 this costing analysis was echoed by the UK House Select Committee on Transport: of Commons
"Whoever was responsible for the destruction of Pan Am flight 103
had the Government of the USA as its target rather than a 
particular airline and its passengers. For this reason alone, 
the Government should provide an increased input into security 
funding. If greater justification is required, Lockerbie has 
shown that passengers are not necessarily the only victims of lapses in aviation security. If the trend towards sabotage
rather than hijacking continues, we are all at r i s k . " * ^
Countries of the rich developed world could afford direct financial involvement in security - indeed, some actively finance aviationsecurity operations as part of their state defence programmes. A 
distinction which requires to be drawn at this point is that between 
the operational spending of individual governments, airlines and 
airports which enables current techniques to be employed day by day. evolving slowly and independently within each state, and the strategic 
spending which is now required to raise global capacities to a 
tolerable level for response to new types of terrorist threat. While both public and private sectors have been forced by recent events toconcede that a new, more dedicated approach may now be required, nosystematic, properly resourced proposals for such strategic financing 
have been put forward by either. This unfortunate omission from long­
term planning is, however, understandable as no agency has been able
**Wew Scientists 7 January 1989, p. 23; Press release from the 
Department of Transport, September 1990.
*1 O ' Ballance (1989) I, p. 19.
**G. Lipman in Mendes de Leon and Zwaan (eds.) (1987), p. 108.
* 3 House of Commons Committee on Transport (1989).
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to make accurate costing estimates for any radical reform plans.** In 
the most general of terms and guided by precedent on this subject, it 
might be predicted that states would be unwilling to pay the considerable price for any large scale reform packages, while the 
industry would be largely unable (in anything but the long term) to 
find the moneys required from within its present financial structures. Apart from the question of resources, organisational problems are 
entailed by reform needs, because it is difficult to identify which agencies would presently be prepared to oversee the global renewal of 
security capabilities.
8,7.1. ICAO Assistance Activities
In recent years, ICAO has expanded its operations concerning aviation 
security. Of particular interest is the creation (following the Air 
India sabotage of 1985) of a permanent Aviation Security Panel to oversee the setting of security standards and recommended practices. 
In addition to this undoubted administrative advance, the Organization 
has been active in developing certain financial mechanisms to assist states in upgrading security capabilities. I C A O ’s resource
redistribution activities have traditionally been carried out through 
its Technical Assistance programme, operated by the S e c r e t a r i a t ’s 
Technical Assistance Bureau with the assistance and supervision of the 
United N a t i o n s ’ Development Programme (UNDP).*^ This UN programme has been relied upon by ICAO to facilitate the aviation development of 
many poorer states, though the finances available to the Organization 
have traditionally been very low. In 1986, for example, net 
expenditure for I C A O ’s UNDP and other extra-budgetary projects was 
estimated at only $10,545,000 (US) with security upgrading schemes representing one of many benefiting causes.** To compound
difficulties, the UNDP finance available in any given year isdependent upon prevailing economic and political conditions. Hence,
from 1982 to 1983, total UNDP funding declined from $76,400,000 (US) 
to approximately $70,000,000 (US).** The Technical Assistance Bureau 
was allocated only approximately $60,800,000 (US) for 1989.** ICAO has described the limited operation of the UNDP for aviation projects 
in the following terms:
"Under the UNDP, the execution of the planned programmes and projects is delegated to the International Organizations as Executing Agencies; in the case of aviation projects, ICAO serves as the U N D P ’s Executing Agency. The degree of I C A O ’sparticipation is determined by the individual requests submitted 
by the Governments of developing countries, which are responsible 
for deciding what portion of the total assistance made available
**Vincent (1989), p. 40.
*s"Five Large Assistance Projects Announced," ICAO Bulletin, 44 (May 1989), p. 31.
**ICAO, Memorandum on ICAO (ICAO: Montreal, 1984), p. 54.
* * Ibid., p. 46.
**Europa Uorld Year Book 1990, (London: Europe, 1990) vol. 1, p. 68.
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to them by the UNDP should be used for civil aviation; on the 
average, during the past three decades, some four to five percent 
of the total resources made available by the UNDP has been used 
for this purpose, although certain countries have devoted a much 
larger proportion to aviation projects.'’**
An indication of the severe limitations imposed upon the UNDP Is to be 
found in its allocation of merely $1.2 million (US) to assist in the 
improvement of Asian a i r p o r t s ’ security systems.** In addition to 
this inadequate and sporadic funding received from outside ICAO, the
Organization can now itself provide a facility to developing states 
whereby an agreement is made involving the depositing of funds for the 
purpose of resourcing future assistance. These "F u n d s - i n - T r u s t " 
programmes allow ICAO to act in the knowledge that resources are 
available to finance their services.**
The Organization reconsidered its security-oriented aid granting role 
after the growing threat of sabotage had been made clear to its member 
states in the Lockerbie atrocity of December 1989. The 126th Session 
of the ICAO Council met in February 1989, when many transportation 
ministers were present to consult at the highest governmental level on 
key questions of security. The meetings resulted in the adoption of 
an interesting combination of decisions, some of which were 
traditionally bland. with others being slightly more adventurous than 
would normally be expected. Conscious of the need for some form of 
international activity to be undertaken following the Pan Am tragedy, 
the delegates unanimously adopted a resolution in the hope of 
precipitating future concrete work in the field of security. Of its
thirteen resolving clauses, six dealt with practical action for
states. They are presented below to indicate that although the 
meeting was attended by ministers with considerable powers, those 
proposals adopted for the guidance of domestic executives represented 
classically hortatory, non-commital and half-hearted ideas, instead of 
strongly worded, explicit and practical initiatives which - if
supported by resourcing provisions - might have prompted immediate 
progress :
"THE COUNCIL ...
4. URGES member States not yet party to the Montreal Convention 
(1971) to become parties to that Convention and its Protocol 
at an early date;
5. CALLS UPON member States to continue to assist in the 
investigation of such acts and in the apprehension and 
prosecution of those responsible;
6 . CALLS UPON member States to intensify their efforts for the 
implementation of existing Standards, Recommended Practices.
**ICAO (1984), p. 46.
* * Jane's Airport Review, February/March 1989. p. 40; P r e s i d e n t ’s 
Commission (1990). p. 35.
**ICAO (1984), p. 52.
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and Procedures relating to aviation security, to monitor such implementation. and to take all necessary steps to 
prevent acts of unlawful interference against international 
civil aviat ion :
7, FURTHER CALLS on member States. while respecting their
sovereignty, to substantially enhance co-operation and co- 
ordination between them in order to improve such 
implementation;
S. URGES member States that have the means to do so to consider
increasing technical, financial and material assistance to 
States in need of such assistance to improve aviation 
security through bilateral and multilateral efforts, in 
particular through the ICAO Technical Assistance mechanism;
9. URGES member States to expedite, in the light of Assembly
Resolution A26-7, App. C , research and development on 
detection of explosives and on security equipment, to 
continue to exchange such information, and to consider how 
to achieve an international regime for the marking of 
explosives for the purposes of detection."**
Hence, the important matters considered in the clauses were intimated 
as continuing to lie predominantly within the scope of s t a t e s ’ 
individual fields of action, rather than being issues on which the
ministerial meeting of the Council would provide a coordinated lead. 
Instead of facilitating the leadership which the aviation community 
needed to bring about reform, the ministers made clear their unanimous 
satisfaction with continued domestic control of security. It seemed
that if internationally coordinated progress were to be made, the
Council would rather urge it than facilitate it.
On a more positive note, although no major reform was promoted for the 
international level, the ministers were able to agree that ICAO itself 
should be better equipped to deal with responses to newly experienced 
terrorist threats and should be more able to respond to the needs of 
states with poor security infrastructures. The resolution directed 
the Committee on Unlawful Interference among others to investigate the 
need for new Standards and Recommended Practices on security to be drafted for inclusion in Annex 17. Also, the Committee was requested 
to determine (with the assistance of the Aviation Security Panel) the 
action which should be taken on some key areas of concern, including 
explosives detection, hold baggage screening, security of electrical 
equipment, reliable baggage reconciliation, cargo, mail and courier 
services, access control, advice to states, an ICAO monitored security 
training programme and security surveys.
The President of the Council and the Organization's Secretary General were each requested to submit any relevant Issues for consideration to
ICAO bodies with responsibility for fields not directly related to 
security and to propose to the Council means by which the ICAO
Résolut ion adopted by the Council of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization at the 7th Meeting of its 126th Session on 16 
February 1989, resolving clauses 4 - 9.
'Æ
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S e c r e t a r i a t ’s security team might be strengthened. During one of the 
Council meetings, the President and General Secretary prooosed that 
the post of head of the security unit should be upgraded to the level 
of Principal Officer to reflect the growing importance of the subject, 
and that the staff be doubled in size to six. or possibly seven, 
depending on funds made available by states. The expansion of the 
unit was intended to permit the provision of advice and assistance to 
states, as by surveying airports' security activities. writing 
security programmes and assisting with staff training. The proposal 
was adopted unanimously, with the aviation security branch of the Organization eventually growing in size from three staff to eight.**
One other modest advance made by the ministers, concerned the 
establishment of a mechanism for technical, financial and material assistance to be provided through ICAO to states with regard to 
aviation security.** The resource redistribution mechanism is designed to supplement the very limited work currently undertaken by 
the O r g a n i z a t i o n ’s inadequately funded Technical Assistance programme, 
mentioned above.** The many problems associated with this system 
resulted in 1989 in the ICAO Council and the Committee on Unlawful 
Interference each concluding that a better way of financing security 
upgrading required to be found:
"While the important role played by the UNDP through the ICAOtechnical Assistance programme was recognised as the mainstream 
of assistance, the inadequate availability of funds, the
elaborate administrative constraints governing its operation and 
the time frame involved, dictated the need to complement it with 
a subsidiary funding mechanism at a modest level to start with, 
which would allow greater flexibility, immediacy and a more
pragmatic approach to specific problems requiring urgent and 
limited attention in time and scope."**
In framing the objective of its new, complementary aviation security assistance programme. ICAO was careful not to restrict its freedom of 
action to go beyond the bounds of its general and rather imprecise 
security Annex;
"The purpose of the aviation security assistance programme
will be to provide the required assistance to States to meet
*3 ICAO information received after ministerial meeting of Council, 
February 1989; Airports International, January 1990, p. 19. For
information on the new roles of the expanded aviation security 
branch, see Flight International, 10 - 16 January 1990, p. 6.
**fC40 Working Paper 427-WP/64 F%/I9 12/7/89.
**Note that funding shortages have left ICAO unable to provide adequate assistance to a great many of its member states;
"ICAO has targeted its limited resources toward potential threats 
in Africa, virtually ignoring the rest of the w o r l d . " 
P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990), p. 35.
**ICAO Working Paper A27~0P/64 EX/19 12/7/89, paragraph 2.1.
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their obligations through the fulfilment of the objectives of 
Annex 17. as well as other objectives related to the improvement 
of aviation security."*?
The new initiative should allow many poorer states to benefit from 
ICAO security e x p e r t s ’ airport inspections and advice imparted on site 
or through local or regional seminars, with resources for training, 
minor costs for some security equipment, assistance in kind and 
certain other forms of aid also being provided. It will represent a 
new and unprecedented level of direct commitment from the Organization 
which, for the first time in relation to security, will be in a 
position of operational independence from individual states, from 
which position truly direct assistance will be offered on a priority 
basis. I C A O ’s particular willingness to become involved in surveying 
s t a t e s ’ airport capacities is heartening, as it should provide that a 
global intergovernmental agency will join state authorities (such as 
the FAA) and private initiatives (such as l A T A ’s limited but 
successful Intensified Aviation Security Programme) in this vital 
r o l e . *8 I C A O ’s surveys may even become more popular with governments 
than either the FAA or lATA alternatives, because they will not be 
associated with a foreign power or the airline industry and will 
probably be more readily available. Even in the private sector 
surveys, there can be a degree of tactful imposition upon states, as 
l A T A ’s Wallis has observed:
"If we c a n ’t get an invitation from a government at an airport 
where we know there is a problem then we try diplomatic 
persuasion. W e ’ve never failed to go where w e ’ve been needed."*?
The fact that I C A O ’s new form of surveys is offered purely for the 
benefit of requesting states, and not with any intention of coercing 
modifications to be introduced, should assist in their promotion and 
so aid their development. The plan for the s c h e m e ’s administration is 
simple, being based on the following proposal:
"The aviation security asistance' programme will be under the 
control and supervision of the Council and administered by the 
Secretary General:
a) it will be administered as part of the regular 
programme and will operate separately from the 
technical assistance programme;
, paragraph 4.1.
**IATA's inspection of airports by its security task force (drawn
from staff of participating airlines) commenced in 1976 and has 
operated since that time purely in response to g o v e r n m e n t s ’ 
invitations. As a measure of the extent of its operations, it is 
significant that in the eleven years to 1987 only 40 airport 
surveys were undertaken in 30 states, although the programme was
very substantially expanded in the late 1980s. lATA (1987). p. 3:
Norton, (1987) p. 32; and Wallis in Mendes de Leone and Zwaan (eds.) (1987), p. 92.
* * J a n e ’s Airport Review, February/March 1989. p. 40.
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bl accounting will be provided bv the Finance Branch using
strict procedures with reports provided to donor States 
as required:
c) standard audit procedures will apply and periodic 
reports will be made to Council;
d) output from this programme will be in addition to the 
existing programme of voluntary bilateral assistance 
between States; and
e) provision will be made so that States can contribute to 
the corpus of the assistance programme by other than 
financial means such as ;
spec i a 11) short-term assignment 
projects ;
of experts for
2) f e l l o w s h i p s ;
3) equipment ;
4) training programmes and training aids."*
The success of the scheme will be completely dependent on the 
prolonged willingness of richer states to subsidise the poorer 
because, while a we 11-resourced scheme could lend meaning to the 
resolving clauses on domestic action quoted above, it is equally true 
that any pointless financial gesture could be expected to relegate 
them to the level of mere recommendations. Initial undertakings made 
by certain ICAO members gave the Organization confidence that adequate 
funds might be made available for the scheme from such sources as 
discretionary payments and the realised surplus from some s t a t e s ’ 
annual budgetary commitments to IGAO,*i It is regrettable that 
confidence should have been allowed to be built on so uncertain a 
foundation, as any such ad hoc funding can provide absolutely no 
guarantee of continued progress beyond the end of each fiscal year.
What is needed is not the unspecified remainder of certain m e m b e r s ’ 
yearly contributions, but a definite commitment of considerable funds 
over a long period. While this new ICAO venture may help to overcome 
security difficulties on a small scale, the d i s c r e t !o n a r y , inadequate, unpredictable and essentially arbitrary nature of its state funding 
must mean that it will not be able to deal with the fundamental 
problems facing the aviation community as a whole. Hence, although 
the arrival of an ICAO-sponsored scheme can be viewed as a significant 
global initiative to assist states in improving their operational 
capacities, the pressing need for an integrated structural approach 
remains virtually untouched by recent developments.
At some time in the future it is at least theoretically possible that
*®ICAO Working Paper A27~yp/64 EX/19 12/7/89, paragraph 5.1.
d i f b i d . , paragraph 3.2.
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governments could find an efficient and financially adequate means of 
transferring their resouces to nations in particular need of security 
reform. Based on recent experiences of much less grandiose resource plans, it is almost certain that in order to do so, many years of 
wasteful bargaining would be required merely to establish which states 
should pay how much money to which agencies. Additionally, it may 
prove easier for large nations to avoid universal means of resource 
redistribution, relying instead on politically more attractive, though 
effectively less far-reaching bilateral or regional accords with 
friendly third world states - ignoring the needs of the ideologically 
incompatible.*? Since the middle of the 1980s, the United States has 
financed general security upgrading on a bilateral basis. offering certain foreign governments aid under its International Security and Development Cooperation Act, 1 9 8 5 ,*3 section 502 (a) of this Act 
authorises the Secretary of State to coordinate anti-terrorism 
assistance by the US Administration to foreign countries' 
a u t h o r i t i e s .* *
Beyond these considerations, practical difficulties of implementing Intergovernmental projects in a politically neutral manner would 
require to be resolved as, for example, support for security reform in 
one region might give rise to accusations of geographical or political 
bias from another. Even with ICAO having decided to support states' 
bilateral aid packages by providing for overlooked nations from its 
own security budget, resources will not permit a comprehensive coverage of the world's security needs. An apolitical alternative to 
direct state funding might provide the required impetus to promote 
security reform as a short term venture. One such scheme will be described immediately below.
8.8, A P a s s enger-Funded Security Strategy
The global security crisis which was thrust into public attention 
immediately after the Lockerbie disaster of December 1988 promoted 
concern within certain sections of the aviation industry. Of particular interest was the attitude taken to the difficulties facing 
the w o r l d ’s airports by IFAPA in Geneva, which correctly recognised 
that as a result of governmental funding being difficult to locate 
tirneously in sufficient amounts and from reliable sources. another 
means of strategic spending required to be found in the short term, if 
only to instigate some moderate advances in aviation security which 
might be consolidated upon with more determined action later. In 
early January 1989, I F A P A ’s Executive Director, Geoffrey Lipman contacted the F o u n d a t i o n ’s security advisory team of Paul Wilkinson 
and the current writer with the framework for a simple but promising 
funding scheme.
Lipman believed that I F A P A ’s research work over the previous three 
years had identified unsatisfied demand from airline passengers for
Airports International, January 1990, p. 19.
*3public Law 99 - 83 - August 8, 1985.
**For details of the State D e p a r t m e n t ’s Anti-terrorism Assistance 
Programme, see President's Commission (1990), p. 35.
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improved security and that this demand should be met by an 
international initiative designed to promote advances in global 
security capacities. He suggested that a scheme financed entirely by passengers could provide a sizeable fund to be administered 
internationally.** The rationale for this proposal was one of necessity rather than of responsibility, as IFAPA recognised that 
under normal circumstances fare-paying passengers should not be 
burdened with additional expenses,** However, realism dictated that 
emergency conditions could only recuire emergency tactics, thus 
entailing resort to the most direct and apolitical sources of 
available funding, for a swift and effective response to be commenced.
Radical improvements in global security capacity could, Lipman suggested, be financed through the global imposition on airline travel 
prices of a modest one dollar fUS) security levy for each air journey made by airline users, the levy being clearly marked on passengers' 
tickets.*? With over one thousand million such journeys being 
undertaken in 1988 alone and with the market for flights growing at a 
considerable rate,** universal adherence to the scheme by the industry 
(which might administer it) and by states (which might regulate and 
monitor it) would accrue a considerable fund in a very short time.
A problem which beset I F A P A ’s proposal concerned the stated reluctance
of certain governments and agencies to employ levies for security matters. Although authorities are normally keen to pass costs to fare-paying passengers,** the British Department of Transport has 
maintained that a UK security levy for domestic application which 
operated between 1978 and 1983 was “b u r e a u c r a t i c , complicated and 
costly to administer, and provided little incentive to efficiency."?* These arguments may have influenced Secretary of State Channon in his 
decision to reject IFAPA's international levy proposal when. in 1989
*srhe Glasgow Herald, 10 January 1989, p. 9.
**Ample evidence exists to show that operational security costs are 
often concealed in passengers' ticket prices. Almost from the outset of the US security Initiative of the early 1970s, security 
costs were accommodated in a $0.34 charge on users. McWhinney (1987), P. 84.
*?D. Johnston, Lockerbie (London; Bloomsbury, 1989). o . 194.
Plane Facts, January 1989. p. 4.
*?Note, in particular, that passenger surcharges were introduced by
the US Administration specifically to finance new aviation security 
activities as early 1 April 1973. Moore (1976), pp. 17 - 18.
?*Brltish Government (1986), p. 14
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it was submitted to him for consideration.?* It is, nevertheless, 
interesting to note that after the Pan Am Flight 103 incident, a £0.30 
security surcharge was Imposed at certain British airports.?? Factors 
of bureaucracy, administration and efficiency were certainly the 
principal policy determinants of the International Organization of 
Consumer Unions flOCU), a body which rejected I F A P A ’s levy proposal as 
being ill-founded and unnecessary,??
These reasons cannot be viewed as being conclusive in condemning the 
notion of the passenger levy, because the mechanism has. in the recent 
past, been adopted successfully and often unfairly to cover such areas 
as customs costs, domestic airport s e c u r i t y . immigration, airport 
expenses, airline default insurance, and even state fiscal greed in 
the form of non-itemised departure taxes.?* In 1986, the United 
States imposed a five dollar (US) international departure tax to act 
as a security supplement to an existing three dollar levy.?^ US 
carriers have been allowed to surcharge travellers for costs incurred 
by introducing new EDS equipment.?* On 1 January 1987, France 
introduced a security surcharge of 8 - lOFFr. per departing
passenger,?? On 1 July 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany 
permitted its airports to impose a 3.50DM security levy on all 
Also, the US Airport and Airway Trust Fund has been 
passenger levies and has served very effectively to 
provide US airports with “entitlement" funds for projects in many 
areas. An impressive $818 million (US) was liberated from the Fund in
p a s s e n g e r s . ? * 
accrued from
?*Note the contents of a letter, dated 15 February 1989. from the 
Secretary of S t a t e ’s Private Secretary, Roy Griffiths, to Geoffrey 
Lipman:
“While the Secretary of State agrees that we must improve 
security worldwide, he has reservations about an international
fund. His view is that the resources available through normal 
ticket sales are sufficient to finance security, and that there 
is no reason for either Governments or the industry to plead 
shortage of funds. ’
?? The Glasgow Herald, Saturday 30 June 1990, p. 7.
??Oiscussion with John Loder, lOCU delegate to ECAC, Paris, France, 
September 1989.
?*The New York Times editorial, reprinted in The International 
Herald Tribune, 21 July 1986 (photocopy); Lipman, The 
International Herald Tribune, 31 July 1986 (letters column) 
(photocopy); Lipman, Travel Neekly, 11 September 1986, pp. 12 - 14.
"^^Plane Facts, September/October 1986, p. 1,
?*McGuire (1989), p. 6.
??Pia/?e Facts, December 1986 / January 1987, p . 3.
?*rhe Glasgow Herald, Saturday 30 June 1990, p. 7.
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the 1989 fiscal year.?* Other, arguably less easily justified, forms 
of passenger levy have been suggested to cover other areas of aviation
activity and might be implemented in future.**
Moreover. any finance-raising means reaulres to be administered, so 
certain arguments of bureaucracy would apply irrespective of the 
merits of the method used. In an industry in which state levies have 
been used effectively for a wide variety of purposes (not all of which 
have been entirely legitimate) there should be no scope for principled 
opposition to the IFAPA scheme from agencies which have benefited from 
more exacting taxes in the oast, A security levy of the type 
envisaged could easily be designed to be minimal in its effect on 
ticket prices, short-term in its imposition and perpetual in its
benefits.
The foregoing discussion of the i n d u s t r y ’s conservative tendencies and 
s t a t e s ’ insular concerns in the realm of security should serve to 
remind that universality in matters of air crime is seldom more than a 
distant goal. For this reason, IFAPA concluded that total industry 
and authority support for such a scheme should not be expected. Even 
when considering only international flights and recognising that many 
states could be expected to boycott the scheme, IFAPA estimated that 
support from major aviation powers could result in the introduction of 
a fund which might accumulate as much as two or three hundred million 
dollars in the s c h e m e ’s first year of operation. Combined with the 
possibility of voluntary contributions being offered by concerned 
states and by the industry itself, a target of one billion dollars
could be reached perhaps within four years, at which point 
contributions could c e a s e . From that point the fund would be self- 
sufficient for future years by generating over a hundred million 
dollars per annum in bank interest, which would then be disseminated 
to approved projects and used for strengthening global security as a 
modest but sure long term strategy.
The proposed levy figure of one dollar (US) is significant because it 
would represent only a very small increment to ticket prices vet could 
result in a major fund being accumulated in time. This fund would be 
used with the intention not of solving the w o r l d ’s security resourcing 
difficulties in the short term, but rather of providing a motivating 
force by which long term progress might be encouraged.
Precisely computed costing estimates for required projects based on
? *Jane's Airport Review, June/July 1989, p. 9. Koch has remarked 
that in 1989 the Aviation Trust Fund enjoyed a surplus of an 
astounding $5.8 billion (US) with annual revenue at the time standing at $3.6 billion (US). His suggestion that the Fund should be tapped by the FAA to provide resources for security enhancement 
should be considered seriously. International Herald Tribune. 
Tuesday 4 April 1989 (photocopy).
**In particular, the United States has suggested that the Warsaw 
Convention, 1929, might be revised to include an insurance 
component financed by a permanent $5 (US) passenger levy on all 
international flight tickets. H. Cap Ian in Lewis and Kao Ian (1990), pp. 133 - 134.
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the actual security needs of the global aviation industry would be 
difficult to determine with accuracy but could be expected to exceed 
the proposed figure. For this reason, it should be stressed that the 
le v y ’s purpose would not be to raise standards to a required level of 
excellence by any precisely cost-assessed mechanism or by permanent 
use of passenger levying. Instead, it would be intended first to provide basic, emergency funding to satisfy the greatest security 
reform needs, then to function as a catalyst, encouraging necessary 
resources to be made available from states. If the levy were to be 
set at one dollar on the clear understanding that it would not be 
subject to increase and would be phased out after a limited and 
specified number of years, an equitable and responsible framework for 
establishing a security fund could be set in place.
In terms of accumulating the money, IFAPA has suggested that the 
collection of passengers' levy contributions need not cause undue 
administrative difficulties because an existing industry channel might 
be employed for the purpose, if its operator, lATA, could be persuaded 
of the need for action:
"The easiest way would be through a ticket surcharge remitted 
through the airline Clearing House. This would eliminate any 
extra line-ups at airports and would cover most of the passengers 
on scheduled airlines. A precedent exists for the worldwide 
collection of international surcharges to cover dramatic fuel increases in the 70s. Charter and domestic airlines could remit, however, through nationally appointed agencies - based simply on 
the total number of passengers carried."**
There is little doubt that an adeptly administered fund could
contribute to the establishment of a broad range of beneficialprojects including research and development programmes for more
efficient and cost effective screening systems, grants and/or soft loans for less developed countries (enabling vital investment in 
technology to be made) and training schemes to give a comprehensive 
security education to personnel in rich and poor countries alike. 
Another, much more ambitious, security-related objective of the fund 
might be internationally standardised research into computerised passport systems to aid in the identification of terrorists in
t r a n s i t .
Because of the need for international coordination of such a levy fund 
proposal, IFAPA and its security advisers agreed that the offices of 
ICAO would be uniquely, if not ideally, suited to administering the 
fund. The reasons for this decision were that ICAO is the foremost 
forum for high-level aviation regulation, with a skilled and experienced Secretariat, with a key interest in promoting securitydevelopment on a global scale and with the ability to influence 
industry policies via governments which send delegations to its 
headquarters in Montreal. While non-governmental bodies such as lATA
could easily administer a fund, it was agreed that the nature of the
work to be undertaken with fund income would often require action to 
be taken by states, rather than by carriers or airports. Hence, a 
body which constituted part of the United Nations system of
'IfJane Facts, January 1989, p. 3.
276
Specialized Agencies and which had displayed a useful, if flawed, record of promoting state activity was deemed to be a more appropriate 
custodian of a security fund.**
It was originally proposed that, if instituted, the fund should be administered centrally by ICAO in Montreal, with direct 
intergovernmental involvement and control being exercised in order to overcome administrative and diplomatic problems caused by the 
limitations of state sovereignty. Sadly, however, private 
conversations between the current writer and a security officer of the 
Organization in September 1989 revealed an unwillingness to consider a 
security levy as a realistic funding solution. The staff member 
claimed astutely that member states of ICAO would almost certainly 
elect to block any effort systematically to Internationa lise the 
financing and standardising of security administration, because 
governments are jealous guards of their sovereign discretion in 
sensitive areas of aviation policy which have always been subject to 
the protection of domestic jurisdiction. No scheme which placed the 
allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars in the control of a 
bureaucracy or of a fluid collection of states could expect to find 
support from the major members of the aviation cartel.*?
Another factor which must be considered is that of the O r g a n i z a t i o n ’s 
budgetary provision. In 1989 the total net budget appropriations were 
$33,7 million (US) to finance I C A O ’s entire internal operations.** 
The sudden arrival of an extra annual spending allocation amounting to 
virtually three times that figure might cause nervousness in the 
O r g a n i z a t i o n ’s Secretariat that it was expected to administer a wholly 
unprecedented magnitude of resources in an efficient and equitable way 
for only one specific area of activity. The security officer made it 
clear in private discussion that he thought that ICAO would not be 
prepared to take on the extra workload and difficult administration of
**While the Chairman and President of one of the w o r l d ’s foremost 
airlines enthusiastically supported I F A P A ’s surcharge suggestion 
(in a letter addressed to Geoffrey Lipman, dated 8 March 1989), he 
warned that " ICAO is not action oriented!" so should merely be 
encouraged to continue in its role of prescribing international 
performance standards. He also noted his c o r p o r a t i o n ’s "grave 
reservations about assigning operational responsibility to ICAO." 
In response, Lipman commented (on 24 March 1989) that no individual 
government or private sector body could combine I C A O ’s authority 
and respectability. The levy proposal was, he claimed, "designed 
to push ICAO and governments to act on the responsibility to 
provide protection to passengers."
*?There is, of course, no administrative reason why an 
intergovernmental organisation should be equipped to take care of 
large scale global aid funds. As examples, note that two other UN 
Specialized Agencies, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) each operate field programmes in which over 
$300 million (US) are disseminated annually, Europa Norld Year 
Book 1990, vol. 1, pp. 54 and 80.
* * Ibid., vol. 1, p. 68.
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so politically sensitive a fund.**
These blunt admissions amounted to an honest and deeply significant 
recognition that states effectively wish to preside over a badlv 
regulated, insufficiently resourced and uncoordinated set of aviation 
security practices in preference to acting for the benefit of air travellers, because that action would require a lowering of their 
barricade of sovereignty. As such it was an endictment of an
intergovernmental body composed of member states divorced from the 
needs of the industry which they are supposed to serve and which are 
doggedly unwilling to adapt outdated attitudes to the evolving issues 
of air violence suppression. Predictably, perhaps, ICAO will be able 
to conceal its members' weaknesses behind its ad hoc resource scheme,
which cannot provide adequate finance to bring about meaningful
reform, but which can be expected to serve as a public relations tool 
and an excuse for further inaction by member states.
IFAPA remains convinced that ICAO would be able to operate a levy- 
financed security fund, were it to be given the opportunity and incentive to do so. However, recognising that this forum may be
precluded by its membership from operating in so radical and fast-moving a way, other fora should be considered. Wilkinson is in no 
doubt that private sector alternatives exist:
"In the light of the great reluctance of nation-states to 
pool even a small part of their sovereignty in the interests of 
combating terrorism, the world civil aviation community passengers, aircrew, airlines and airport authorities - should give careful thought to the possibility of taking further 
measures of self-help, using the channels of their international 
non-governmental organisations such as IFALPA, IFAPA and lATA.
They are in a unique position to take the initiative in starting an international aviation security fund. If governments 
prove u n willing to act there are other ways of collecting and a dministering the money. lATA and the airlines and consumer organisations should take joint steps to initiate a special passenger levy; to set up an independent body to administer the 
funds; and to establish and monitor a programme of security technology research and development, enhancement of security 
management and training, and a proper international airport 
security inspectorate. Governments and intergovernmental 
organisations are not the only bodies capable of performing these tasks. The aviation industry must act itself if goverments fail 
to act."**
Wilkinson is correct in noting that private organisations can achieve
similar goals to those which ICAO might be encouraged to follow. However, he and IFAPA believe that intergovernmental involvement could
**Private conversations with ICAO security specialist, September 1989.
®*P, Wilkinson, "Aviation Security in the 1990s - The Lessons of 
Lockerbie," International Security Review, January/February 1990, 
p. 25.
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result in vital advances being made which would not be possible in 
private fora. For example, activities such as airport inspection and 
monitoring are much more effective when carried out under the auspices 
of government-hacked agencies. It is clear that well-organised 
inspection schemes operated by the Organization would be more highly 
valued and respected than l A T A ’s ad hoc and small scale activities in 
the field. Even existing ICAO inspection facilities offer states the benefits of high-level consultation and support, without the need of 
state-backed threats. If this service could be extended and made more 
freely available through systematic funding initiatives, the 
Organization would be acting for the benefit of global security.
Also, in matters involving integrated policy decisions, 
intergovernmental agencies can agree upon coordinated action, while private bodies are forced to debate at a lower level, taking decisions 
only on industry-wide bases. Hence, every effort should be taken to 
convince states that ICAO remains the key to broad success in matters 
of security reform, because no other aviation body commands sufficient 
authority with governments. If I C A O ’s members are to be convinced of 
the need for integrated, large-scale financing of security enhancement 
as an immediate means of promoting advances, it is clear that their fears must be dispelled - by no means an easy task. As the Organization's poorer member states have long noted an interest in 
adopting effective resource distribution measures,*? and as all member states could be expected to support the principle of technology 
development which requires no public funding, it follows that the 
notion of a privately funded security initiative might receive general 
support, provided that resources were to be used where they would be 
most badly needed and that adequate control of the funds involved 
could be ensured for major powers.
Incentives would be required to reassure the richer states that any decision-making process involving a security fund would be based on
equitable foundations which would not alienate the developed aviation 
nations by giving unprecedented freedom of action to the numerical majority of developing countries. One means by which this might be 
achieved would be to place the fund in control of a new ICAO 
Commission on Aviation Security, which might incorporate the existing 
Committee on Unlawful Interference and Aviation Security Panel. The proposal for a Security Commission is not new, having been made by the Israeli delegate to the 26th ICAO Assembly in September 1986. At that 
time, it was suggested unsuccessfully that the Committee on Unlawful 
Interference should be upgraded to the status of a Commission so as to give security a higher priority in the affairs of the Organization.** 
Another reason for wishing to supercede the existing C o m m i t t e e ’s 
structure is that its membership of fifteen is elected by the Council, 
solely from representatives of Council member states. By contrast, 
the Air Navigation C o m m i s s i o n ’s membership is appointed by the 
Council, but from nominations received from any Contracting State.
In the 1970s, when the rigid bloc structures of ICAO precluded more
*?See the discussions of the ICAO Montreal Conference, February 1988 
Montreal, Canada. See also Hill (1989), pp. 97 - 98.
**ICAO Document A26-WP/75 EX/15 22/9/86, paragraph 2.2.
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meaningful cooperation by its members on the powers to be contained in 
the Hague formula, it would have seemed extremely unlikely that any 
such proposal for a security authority could meet with s u p p o r t .
Recently, however, signs of hope have emerged, with the creation of
the Aviation Security Panel, with ICAO taking a more active role in 
promoting security enhancement in developing nations and with a
general lessening of east-west tensions. Above all, the broad support
from many of I C A O ’s members for Arnold Kean's scheme for the creation 
of an Explosives Technical Commission as a vital element in the 
proposed ICAO agreement on marking plastic explosives (discussed 
above) could act as a prelude to more detailed standard-setting 
arrangements, with similar structures being adopted for other areas of 
security a c t i v i t i e s , ® ’
The Commission could partly comprise a small selection of states 
representing the most important aviation p o w e r s . This selection could 
be made by, for example, appointing to the Commission the five states 
with the biggest global shares of scheduled airline travel, a three- 
yearly accounting assessment being made for this purpose. These major 
powers would be joined on the Commission by a majority of states to be 
chosen by the ICAO Council (on recommendations received from any ICAO 
member) serving for staggered three year terms of office, A 
Commission of fifteen members (equal in size to the Air Navigation 
Commission) would be large enough to include important interests but 
sufficiently small to enable easy operation by its expert members on 
difficult policy issues.
Such a model could be introduced to handle practical matters of direct 
action affecting both large and small states, in preference to 
ungainly plenary methods or direct control by the powerful Council. 
Veto powers should be avoided in the establishment of such a 
committee, as the combative example of the UN Security Council is one 
which should be avoided wherever practical, but politically delicate 
resource-based decisions require to be made. In order to make the 
body answerable to the members of ICAO as a whole, it would report to 
the Assembly through the Council.
In terms of resource allocation, the Commission could be charged with 
two complementary functions. The first of these would be to 
distribute a proportion of fund investment income (decided by 
Commission members) to development schemes in less developed nations, 
thus providing the much-demanded finance which the third world has long needed but rarely received. Second, remaining income would be 
allocated as research funds for advanced technological projects, 
tendering for which would be expected to be received predominantly 
from developed states and their corporations. A possible means of 
placating the minority of major aviation powers would be to specify 
that research funding would be given to states for distribution to
®’The structure of the ETC, proposed by Kean and accepted by the ICAO 
Legal Committee Sub-Committee, envisaged the operation of a fifteen 
member Commission elected on a regional basis, serving for a period 
of three years. The standards produced would be subject to uniform 
application by those states accepting them. iC/$C~NEX~REPORT, 
19/1/90, p. 15; Draft Convent ion, Article IV, in LC/$C-MEX~
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their scientific and engineering agencies strictly in accordance with 
their financial contributions to ICAO. Hence, a state which 
contributed 25 per cent of I C A O ’s annual budget would have a right to 
call UP to 25 per cent of the passenger levy f u n d ’s research 
allocation for its own projects, while a state with a membership
assessment of only 0.06 per cent, could expect only a commensurate
proportion for research. It should be emphasised, however, that as 
the distribution of aid-related finance would not be connected to 
budgetary assessments, even the smallest states could apply for large 
aid grants. In these ways both the numerical majority of I C A O ’s 
member states and the select grouping of important aviation powers 
would stand to gain financially from the existence of a levy fund. Nevertheless, the distinct possibility of states electing to dismiss 
the idea of a levy must still be recognised.
If an ICAO security fund were to be established, acquiring political 
recognition and the confidence of the international community, it 
might provide for the expansion of the ICAO m e c h a n i s m ’s permanent 
airport inspectorate for global security verification. Securityinspection by an intergovernmental agency is urgently needed on a 
large scale, because for too long airports have been treated by state 
authorities as though they are bus termini of no political 
significance. In the next century governmental attitudes to the 
industry must change, with airports and aircraft finally being recognised as vulnerable targets for politically motivated violence. 
Eventually, new attitudes to the security interests of the industry might even result in greater international regulation by a permanent 
authority, with standards and recommended practices for airport security acquiring an obligatory character in place of their currently 
non-binding nature.
In a world comprising diverse sovereign entities, it would be over- 
ambitious to hope prematurely for compulsory powers of inspection and 
mandatory upgrading of security on pain of economic sanctions,
although just such a scheme of action has been proposed in the p a s t . ’ ® 
Initially, a more determined consensual approach to standardisation 
of, for example, the two vital areas of security screening
implementation and staff training, would represent a useful foundation 
on which to build future progress in the form of well-defined,
enforceable and monitored standards. I C A O ’s concern for these two issues was d emonstrated when, in 1989, an internal report to the 27th
’^International Security Review, January/February 1990, p . 9. 
McWhinney has also made the following suggestion concerning the 
application of international sanctions:
"Preventive private commercial sanctions of this sort, directed 
not merely against delinquent states that actively sponsored or 
sheltered aerial pirates, but also against those that simply 
failed to apply control measures in robust fashion, have always been recognised as part of the defence armoury available to the 
"special legal community" of the Air against aerial piracy. Why 
not use them against states guilty of omis s i o n - f ai lure to exercise due care and foresight?" McWhinney (1987), p. 124.
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Session of the Assembly made the following comment on the 
more flexible financing of security upgrading:
need for
"During their deliberation on this subject, the Counci 1 and 
the Committee on Unlawful Interference particulary emphasised the 
two aspects of aviation security, that is implementation and 
training, as the basic and immediate needs of S t a t e s . " ’ ?
A broadly supported security authority, financed from a variety of 
sources, would be an ideal body to instigate work on this area, 
because it would have guaranteed levels of income to enable it to produce standards which would require monetary outlay internationally. 
Airlines might justifiably be reluctant to support passenger levies 
because of the administration and expense which they would incur and, 
more importantly, in case a fare increase were to cause demand for air 
services to decrease, causing profits to be eroded. E v i ^ n c e  from a 
poll undertaken by IFAPA in conjunction with Interavia Aerospace 
Review, however, indicates that the travelling public would value the 
opportunity to contribute to the improvement of security. Not only 
did 84 per cent of responding passengers state that they would be 
willing to pay the IFAPA levy, but of that proportion exactly 25 per 
cent claimed that they would be prepared to pay up to four dollars 
extra and the remaining 75 per cent noted willingness to pay even 
m o r e . ”  (In view of such support possibilities, a strong case could 
be made for proposing a levy well in excess of one dollar, with the 
intention of addressing a greater range of security problems with 
greater directness.) An excerpt from the results of the poll are 
reproduced below.
TABLE 8 . 2. 
E X T R A C T ED R E S U L TS OF SECURITY P OLL U N DERTAKEN BY IFAPA WITH INTERAVIA AMONGST FREQUENT FLYERS IN EUROPE AND THE USA; APRIL - MAY 19.89”
q u e s t i o n
Would you be willing to pay 
a nominal security levy on 
your air tickets for a 
special fund administered 
through the International 
Civil Aviation Organization 
to develop hi-tech detection 
equipment, improve training,
monitor airport security
OPIIPN
YES
NO
TOTAL (%j 84
16
*?ICAO Working Paper d27-WP/64 12/7/49, paragraph 2.1. ^
Results of Security Poll Undertaken by IFAPA with Interavia Amongst 
Frequent Flyers In Europe and the USA, April-May 1989, p. 1.
’ ?The poll was conducted in April/May 1989 in Europe and the USA with 
5000 frequent fliers polled. European countries included Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Holland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.
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procedures and generally upgrade security in all of the 
w o r l d ’s airports in a way 
which will not slow down 
passage through controls?
If yes, how much extra would $1-4 21
you be willing to pay? $5-9 37$10+ 26
Number of replies; 1220
Such evidence is not absolutely conclusive with regard to true 
passenger preferences, but it cannot be denied that the survey result 
Indicates at least a concern on the part of a statistically valid 
cross-section of business travellers to find a swift solution to 
aviation s e c u r i t y ’s problems. This concern is heartening because it 
suggests very clearly that if passengers were to be demonstrated the 
practical benefits which could flow from the levy, public confidence 
in aviation could be expected to increase, in turn positively 
benefiting carriers and airports.
8.9, C o n e 1usi p n
I F A P A ’s proposal represents a difficult strategy which could never 
provide a miracle cure for terrorism - hijackings and acts of sabotage 
will continue despite the best preventive and deterrent measures 
adopted to defeat them. A security fund, however, would act both as a 
starting point and a sign post for the i n d u s t r y ’s long march to 
sufficiency, encouraging innovât ive and practical solutions where now 
only intractable problems are to be found. First, however, 
governments and the aviation community must be made convinced of the 
le v y ’s role, which in turn must involve authorities making a 
potentially humiliating public admission. either tacitly or openly, 
that aviation remains vulnerable and requires urgent action to 
reinforce it.
G o v e r n m e n t s ’ stubborn refusal to recognise the extent and severity of 
present crisis conditions should not justify the luxury of inaction or 
the false economy of third rate airport security measures. If they 
hold a passenger security levy to be unworkable, let them propose a 
more suitable, operable and financially adequate alternative. 
Reluctance to do so can only imply continuing state apathy. A great 
deal of discussion within and between governments and throughout the aviation industry would be required before a security fund could be 
set up, yet the beauty of a passenger-financed system is that multi- 
million dollar projects could be undertaken without reliance on 
governmental resources and at only negligible cost to passengers. 
Whether governments would be prepared to witness the development of a 
privately-inspired and passenger-financed initiative with
unprecedented scope for security enhancement remains a moot point. 
Until it can be resolved, organisations such as IFAPA are entitled to 
remain sceptical about g o v e r n m e n t s ’ true priorities;
"The passenger may not mind paying his fair share, but he 
might wonder why governments are able to ignore international 
conventions they have signed to prevent criminal acts against
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civil aviation and to punish those r e s p o n s i b l e . " ’*
Plane Facts, June/July 1986, o, 2,
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CHAPTER 9
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
"It all depends on how far States see an advantage in allowing, 
and are prepared to allow, certain matter solely within their own 
criminal jurisdiction to be a subject of international treaty 
regulation. It is all a question of will on the part of States. 
If they have the will, they can do anything. But unfortunately, 
for reasons which are only too well known, there is not always 
such will."*
"The conclusion to be drawn when considering the fight 
against terrorism is no novelty. International terrorism can be 
suppressed only through international cooperation. It must be 
consistent and openly declared. It must be seen. It must ignore 
and raise itself over national "selfish* interest. 
Theoretically, but also practically. Western states can afford to 
do it. Do they really wish t o ? " ?
9.1. The Future of the Hague Formula
Without doubt, domestic and international legal mechanisms have played 
and will continue to Play a useful and necessary role in preparing 
states for the task of harmonising their criminal justice systems to 
enable such measures as rendition and prosecution of suspects and 
punishment of convicted offenders to take place. This preparatory and 
regulatory framework should not. however. be construed as a viable
form of "suppression" in the most complete sense of the term, because
of air c r i m e ’s identity as an offence grouping in which the most 
serious, most threatening and most insoluble forms of activity (that 
is, politically motivated violence) are also those which are least 
likely to be deterred through any resort to law. Suppression of the
crimes concerned will be, at best, incomplete. Murphy has correctly
commented r
"The effectiveness of these global conventions as anti terrorist
?Cheng in Cheng and Brown feds.) (1989), d . 45.
?N . Gal-Or, "The Pendulum of Arab International Civil Transportation 
Terrorism," The 1986 Annual of Terrorism (1987) p. 188.
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measures is questionable."?
After the collapse of the US-led Rome Conference in 1973. Bell 
correctly noted;
"The U.S. effort to eliminate "safe havens" was based on the 
assumption that once the terrorists knew they would be prosecuted 
in all cases, terrorism would stop. This presumption ignores two 
realities. First, in many cases terrorists are so fanatically dedicated to their cause that they are fully prepared to accept 
capture. The second reality facilitates this inclination:
imprisonment of terrorists occasions follow-on action to free 
those in jail."*
As has been observed above, processes of intended criminal deterrence 
can only acquire meaningfulness when applied to situations in which 
possible offenders are compelled to abandon their offence plans or are 
convinced that the formulation of such plans should not be attempted. 
The legacy of politically-inspired hijackings, aerial sabotage
incidents and airport attacks which has been handed down throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, as though in spite of I C A O ’s suppression efforts, 
indicates that the most ruthless aviation terrorists form one small, 
but important, category of air offender for whom the prospect of
detection, capture and puni shment holds little or no suppressive 
value. For a small number of terrorists. the possibility even of 
death itself is not enough to dissuade them from violence.
It is a fair comment that genuine improvements in rendition efficiency 
and in the willingness of governments to cooperate on legal and 
political levels to isolate terrorists, their organisations and their 
state sponsors, would probably result in a reduction in terrorist 
activities against aviation and its users. As justification for this 
assertion, it should be r emembered that the world has benefited from the implementation of the Hague formula against apolitical offences 
and could. in theory, gain from a progressive development of its
norms, in the direction of terrorism suppression.
For this r e a s o n , it is vital that the forms of progress promoted by
ICAO and other bodies be encouraged and accelerated and that new and 
imaginative methods of improving cooperative efforts be attempted by 
the international community. At the same time, it is important to 
admit that practical limitations on the extent and effectiveness of 
cooperation and the scope of the legal subject matter dealt with may 
exist. ICAO and its member states have not yet demonstrated an 
ability or willingness, in practice, to come to terms with the nature 
of terrorism suppression or with the cooperative efforts which might 
start to influence its exponents.
3J.F. Murphy. "The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat
International 35 (1986) p
Coopérât ion, 1989. p. 2.
Terrorism." Columbia Journal of Transnational Lay.
44, in M . Crenshaw, Terrori sm and East-Nest conference paper. ISA/BISA Joint Conference, London
*Bell (1975). P. 1340.
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Indeed, if the experience of the state actors in the Kuwaiti hi lacking 
of 1988 can be used as a y a r d - s t i ck for the limitations of practical consensus within the international community, the rigid limits to cooperation which some states impose in their dealings over aviation 
terrorism must be recognised as a central - and possibly constant 
element in problem-solving processes. In short, the world 
underestimates at its peril the practical inability of such states as Algeria to enter I C A O ’s conventional regime and of the regime's 
signatories to find solutions to all offence types encountered.
A pragmatic recognition that universal adherence to the aut dedere aut 
judicare doctrine is almost certainly neither viable nor particularly 
desirable. would assist states in coming to terms with the reality of 
a current, two-pronged problem. The problem in question is that the 
international standards which were hoped by many of their framers to 
be workable, suppression-oriented remedies for all types of air crime 
either have not operated in some cases or else have not been permitted 
to operate to suppress a large number of the most important form of 
incident within their purview. In either case, it is reasonable to 
take issue with l A T A ’s understanding of the ICAO family of agreements 
as "the legal basis for the security of the international civil 
aviation s y s t e m " , & noting instead that it can act as the basis for 
states to evade their moral duties of care towards airline passengers. 
If aviation is to be made secure, a much more practical form of suppression-based cooperation will be required to supplement existing s c h e m e s .
The determination of poli tically-motivated air offenders is unlikely 
to decrease in a world in which intergovernmental cooperation on 
aviation crime is seen to be impoverished. Furthermore, it is well 
established that the control of terrorist crimes through expensive 
practical cooperation is a low priority for many., if not most 
states.* It has also been remarked that true universalisation 
meaningful improvement and workable enforcement of the norms are 
unlikely to take place, except in the long term, through the slow and 
uncoordinated accretion of individualised standards and through the 
unpredictable, unregulated and often unprincipled adaptation of each 
s t a t e ’s own practice in the field. Hence, while retaining an open 
mind on the issue of s t a t e s ’ future courses of action, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that the doctrine of aut dedere aut Judicare 
will always need practical, as well as legal, reinforcement.
9,2. National Aviation Security. Initiatives
Wilkinson has correctly suggested that s t a t e s ’ national policies on 
security form the "building blocks" with which global protection can 
be c o n s t r u c t e d .? It is obvious that multilateral cooperation on 
security can best be effective only after firm policies, clear 
delineations of authority and rigorous procedures have been 
implemented at the domestic level. Equally, of course, the role of
*IATA, Public Relations Backgrounder (Montreal: ÎATA, 1987], p . 
*Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1989), p. 37.
’Wilkinson (1989) I and II.
i l
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regional bodies such as ECAC can be vital by acting as fora in which 
states can Inform their neighbours of progress made and difficulties 
encountered. In such ways, national policies can be made to
coordinate with those of other compatible states, so forming a 
framework of independent but parallel policies.
While such organisations have a considerable and vital coordinating 
role to play in the context of regions containing economically
developed, and thus broadly similar, states, a maior problem is 
encountered when dealing with less developed nations. It is difficult for security standards to foe made a priority in states suffering from 
liquidity difficulties or labouring under enormous external debt.
Therefore, active coordination of progress must be less easily
achieved, first requiring a degree of resource injection to raise
security standards.
It should be emphasised, however, that while grants and soft loans
should foe offered to the poorest governments by those states able to
afford them, supplying financial assistance and technical packages 
alone cannot suffice. In addition, security " k n o w - h o w " must foe 
conveyed if future generations of security staff are to be educated in 
their home countries. Managerial skills must be instilled in those 
with responsibility over airport systems, with intelligence skills, 
technical expertise and negotiating capabilities each requiring 
detailed examination. Above all, the administrative muddles which 
have afflicted developed nations' security processes must not be 
allowed to develop in newly emerging security-conscious LDCs. In 
effect, they must be assisted to establish their own national security 
programme and to promote simple lines of communication between 
domestic and external agencies. ICAO and lATA each have useful roles 
to play in transforming security systems in future. It is to foe hoped 
that the expansion of these organisations' support activities will 
continue in future, permitting greater action to reinforce third world 
s t a t e s ’ domestic policies.
9.3. The Need for Improved International Regulation
It has been stressed above that in the interdependent international 
civil aviation community, global cooperation must represent more than 
a useful option by which certain difficulties can be discussed. The 
universal approach to security standardisation is essential because 
nothing less can prompt governments to make the changes required for 
the increased safety of passengers and crew.*
*Note that economic factors can act to inhibit s t a t e s ’ unilateral 
decision-making processes. When the US legislature was debating 
the geographical extent of an in-flight passenger smoking ban. 
Congress extended its coverage only to domestic flights, because it 
was realised that in the absence of multilateral discussions, 
travelling smokers would be likely to desert US carriers for 
foreign airlines which had no such restrictions. The Gîssgov 
Herald, Saturday 30 June 1990, p. 7. A similar situation with 
security regulation could easily be present throughout the world 
a prospect recognised by at least one senior airline executive, 
quoted in P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990), p. 35.
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The history of air crime suppression testifies to s t a t e s ’ constant 
inability and/or unwillingness to introduce means of enforcement to 
regulatory structures and standardising norms concerned with criminal 
justice and security. Not only did the efforts of the 1973 Rome 
Conference and the "Summit Seven" fail to produce workable sanctions 
provisions, but the provisions of Annex 17 and other international
"rules" on airport security remain nothing more than guiding
exhortations. It is an inescapable fact that legislation. be it
domestic or international, acquires effectiveness in general
accordance with the extent to which it can be brought to bear against 
those who breach its provisions. The lessons of the 1970s from I C A O ’s 
air crime conferences, coupled with the continuing inability of states 
to bring a sufficiently high proportion of terrorist offenders to 
justice, highlight the grave difficulties which exist in either 
attempting to use current standards as intended or encouraging n o n ­
conforming states to adhere against their will. Despite a readily
identifiable need to pursue progress in this direction as a long-term 
goal, efforts at enforcement should also be directed towards the 
imposition of adequate preventive capacities.
Although the current global conditions in which the international
aviation community is forced to operate clearly indicate that s crisis 
of air terrorism requires to be addressed with urgency, no signs exist 
which wouId suggest that governments are closer to realising a need to 
seek the promulgation of enforceable standards on aviation security 
issues. Indeed, if a humanitarian and political calamity of the 
dimensions of the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster has failed to shake 
authorities out of their naïve ambivalence, then it can validly foe 
predicted that terrorists will be required to perpetrate acts of 
unprecedented, grotesque violence before any realistic policy change 
by states and the industry can be expected. Nevertheless, options in 
enforcement should be considered at this point, as governments might, 
at some stage in the future, be forced to reconsider the state of the 
w o r l d ’s security provision and so might seek means by which to enforce 
minimum security standards against those nations which fail to 
maintain adequate preventive control against air crimes.
How any enforcement mechanism on aviation security could operate in a 
divided world remains a difficult problem. Formal notions of global 
tribunals at which negligent authorities would be brought to account 
for their failures may be attractive propositions but they cannot be 
regarded as viable short-term options. Using poor security as a
criterion for sanctions imposition would not likely meet with success
within existing structures such as ICAO or even the ".Summit Seven", 
despite US unilateral security sanctions having been successful in 
drawing public attention to the poor condition of security at Athens 
airport in 1985.* Paradoxically, the considerations of power and 
sovereignty which ensured the US Admini strat ion of success in 
punishing Greece in the decentralised context of unilateral sanctions 
imposition would probably operate to discourage entry to any 
cooperative, centralised body designed to rule against states 
operating inadequate security systems.
While Clutterbuck is correct to note that the seven industrialised
*Brenchley (1986), p. 12.
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powers (which together control 80 per cent of the "western" w o r l d ’s 
air traffic) could unite to promote the introduction of worthwhile 
procedures, in so doing taking with them many other interested
p a r t i e s , 10 it is hard to deny that these same powers have been
reluctant to extend radically the scope or improve upon the capacities
of their dormant Bonn Declaration, even when faced with annual
opportunities to do so. Had the “Summit Seven" demonstrated any
determination to implement its existing machinery against hiiack 
havens and state sponsors of terrorism, it might have been more
appropriate to have assessed the chances of their extending the Bonn 
framework to cover simple, apolitical cases of technical negligence bv 
the criminally blameless. Current international conditions serve to
keep such a structure of organisation and activity off the agenda of 
the powerful nations.
9,4. A New Aviation Security Forum
The decentralised "organisation" of international aviation security 
has failed to keep ahead of advancing t h r e a t s . n  An imaginative, but 
operable, course for future action might be to regard the integrity of 
aviation as a global priority and so to place the regulation of 
security under the legislative and executive control of the 
international community, via a permanent, standing committee on 
security. B y developing this idea in the form of a new universal
authority armed with certain powers to enforce its own security 
standards, a means might eventually be found of introducing the 
proposal in a practical w a y . In place of current exhortations and 
recommendations framed by I C A O ’s Aviation Security Panel, a more
formal regime based on obligatory norms might be developed in the
long term to set aviation security on a proper footing for its future 
e n h a n c e m e n t .
Earlier references to the possibility of an ICAO Aviation Security 
Commission being established dealt only with prospects of it carrying 
out existing competences of the Committee on Unlawful Interference and 
new resource redistribution activities. Were any such Commission to 
prove successful in executing its responsibilities and so gain the 
respect of member states as a whole, scope might exist for it to 
assume more important, rule-framing, monitoring and enforcement 
roles. In the broadest of terms and, for the present, ignoring the 
inevitable practical difficulties which would threaten the success of 
the proposals, an ICAO Aviation Security Commission could be empowered -j 
to make highly specific security regulations whenever necessary and on 
a permanent basis. Hence, the static, reactive nature of 
international regulation couId be overcome by the introduction of a 
rule-making authority capable of presenting necessary rules quickly
and of providing financial support from the passenger levy fund for
states unable to pay for resultant security changes.
^®Clutterbuck (1990) I, p. 77. See also Clutterbuck (1990) II, p p . 
144 and 150.
As evidence for this, note that ICAO enacted new standards on 
baggage reconciliation two years after the Air India disaster which 
had demonstrated an urgent need for reform in the area. 
P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990), p, 38.
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Any form of norm enforcement requires an efficient scheme of 
regulatory monitoring. An ICAO aviation security monitoring team 
could be instituted by the proposed Commission to carry out routine 
inspections of all airports with the capacity to make unannounced soot 
checks - a practice currently deemed unacceptable under existing ICAO 
and lATA inspection schemes. Reporting confidentially to the 
Commission. the team could recommend action required to be taken to remedy any deficiencies found at any site visited. The Commission 
could be given the option of ratifying the team's findings and 
requiring reforms to be implemented or, if persuaded by submissions 
from the state in question, of moderating the t e a m ’s recommendations 
or of rejecting them completely.
It is pointless to suggest that any international authority dealing with aviation security would ever be likely to be entrusted with 
workable powers to impose economic sanctions - the prerogative of sovereign states and of the most important of supranational bodies. 
For the international community to do so would be a reckless venture 
which would only invite disunity within itself. For constituent 
states to permit an authority such swingeing powers might be construed 
as a blatant form of corporate masochism, bearing in mind the scope 
which would exist for findings of security inadequacy to be made, even at more advanced airports.
In more general terms, and notwithstanding the current discussion of 
theoretical enforcement possibilities for the future, it seems entirely unlikely that any global security enforcement initiative resting upon the use of such sanctions could be successful. si mol y because entry to it would rest upon consensual means. No state would 
be likely to wish upon itself the prospect of its security being 
Placed under expert scrutiny and the subsequent possibilities of 
public ridicule and passenger abandonment. Even the most important of aviation powers distance themselves from the needs of regulating the 
industry, relying on the inexactitude of Annex 17 to protect their 
carriers from justifiable accusations of security inadequacy. These 
powers would wish instead to be free of all external scrutiny which 
might probe at the weaknesses known to lie close beneath their thin veneer of respectability. This should not be taken to mean, however, 
that no internationally applicable sanctions are foreseeable in theevent of security negligence.
9,5, An International Publicising System
A simple, but potentially valuable, enforcement mechanism could be 
contained in the threat or use of published warnings against a 
particular state's airports or carriers. A weapon of great power but 
simple operation would exist if the proposed Commission were armed 
with the powers to persuade authorities that security was in a poor 
state, to demand action for its improvement and, in the last resort, 
to condemn publicly aviation interests which refused to take the steps necessary to raise standards of security wherever r e q u i r e d . Public 
blacklisting of an airport is a serious and potentially dangerous step 
for any authority to take because of the commercial effects on the
state in question and the risks of alerting attackers to the existence 
of easy targets. Nevertheless, when threatened, it can have 
beneficial effects in the short term without requiring further
coercive action. On rare occasions when threats were to fail to bring
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about desired changes, publicising details of weak airport security 
could be construed as being nothing short of a valid public service, 
designed to draw t r a v e l l e r s ’ attention to a hazard worthy of 
a v o i d a n c e .
This policy has already been adopted unilaterally by US authorities in 
accordance with the airport inspection programme established in its 
Foreign Airport Security Act.i% If PAA inspectors checking foreign 
a i r p o r t s ’ security provision determine that faults exist, warnings may 
be issued to authorities concerned, with the expectation of immediate 
improvements being instituted and of the problems being solved in the 
short term. In April 1986. Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead 
reported that no formal warnings had been issued under the Act, but 
that inspectors had identified areas for improvement in a variety of 
states, which had been rectified following "strong, though discreet. 
FAA and Embassy representations."i* Other useful powers concerning 
curtailment of air services and public blacklisting of airports are 
contained in the US Foreign Assistance Act, 1985 and the International 
Security and Development and Co-operation Act, 1985.** There would be 
no reason to prevent other states or private sector bodies commanding 
public respect by publicising serious security faults wherever evidence of them was overwhelming and a clear public interest could be 
argued.** AOCÎ has noted that such a means of enforcing security 
might be very effective.**
In the absence of any clear desire on the part of the international
community to take upon itself the roles of standard setting, 
monitoring and enforcing, possibilities definitely exist in the short 
term for hegemonic control to take place by any maior aviation power prepared to risk the possible consequences of forcing standards to 
rise. Since the Pan Am atrocity of December 1988. the FAA has 
demonstrated a willingness to dictate terms of security to foreign aviation authorities without prior consultation, a variety of demands
**For a detailed description of the operation of the US inspection 
scheme, covering 247 airports in 99 states, and of its attempts at 
international cooperation generally, see P r e s i d e n t ’s Commission (1990), pp. 28 - 39.
*3Whitehead (1986), p. 3 .
**These powers have been employed against such airports as Manila, 
between May and September 1986, and Athens, between June and July 
of the same year. In both cases, the publication of advisory 
notices forced authorities to make security a vital, economic priority. Dawson. (1986) 1 1 , p . 27 - 28; Cheng in Cheng and Brown (eds.) (1988), p. 51.
**Note that from 26 September 1990, the British Secretary of State 
for Transport was granted new powers to enforce security 
regulations against negligent or reckless operators and airports. 
Among these powers is the ability to close an unfit airport until 
security weaknesses have been rectified. Press release from 
Department of Transport. September 1990.
**Nelms (1989), p. 692.
292
having been made by it for implementation bv foreign authorities.**
The most keenly contested of these measures was a requirement for all 
foreign airlines to submit details of their national security 
programmes to the FAA in 1989. If the FAA found that the programmes 
did not meet its standards, it could demand alterations to them, with 
aviation sanctions being one possible outcome in the event of ultimate 
inadequacy. T ransportat ion Secretary Skinner justified this by 
stating that it was intended;
" ... to ensure that the 111 foreign airlines currently serving
US airports have adequate security measures to protect civil
aviation against criminal acts of violence."*®
The dangers of such a course being adopted include the problems posed 
by alienating otherwise close aviation partners. lATA's Rodney Wallis 
has described the FAA policy as being "extra-territorial rule-making" 
and has noted that many states upon which the requirement was imposed 
were angered that the requirements were not made to apply to US 
carriers.** The British and French governments also fear that 
national sovereignty will be challenged, with the British Department 
of Transport claiming in 1989 that only limited support can be 
expected by the FAA.*® More important for any hegemonic power is the 
possibility of needing to assist states incapable of raising their 
security standards uni 1 at era 11 y . However, if adequate resources can 
be provided as security aid packages, the hegemonic route to reform 
might be one of the most direct. Already the FAA has offered to 
provide states lacking any formally documented security programme with 
a standard form version to act as a starting point for further 
d e v e 1o o m e n t ,* *
9,6. Prospects for More Stringent Monitoring
It is to be predicted that in the wake of the post-Lockerbie .,4 
transfers of Ray Salazar and Frank Burns (two senior aviation security 
representatives of the FAA moved into other less prominent positions) 
and the publication of the highly critical President's Commission 
Report in 1990, the FAA will have no choice but to enforce a higher 
level of security on other states with airports served by US airlines 
and/or with services flying to the United States. Fear of adverse 
publicity and of professional dismissal should motivate remaining FAA 
security staff to tolerate fewer weak spots. Regrettably however, 
such considerations of tension and unease cannot be condusive to the 
promotion of good working relationships with overseas partners. If 
security standards and cooperation are not both to be impaired in 
future, the FAA must find a way of proceeding in a forceful but 
diplomatic way, in its dealings with external governments.
**Wallis, Beaumont Memorial Lecture, (1989).
*®Jane's Airoort Review, Tune/July 1989, p. 9. 
**Jbjd. , p. 40.
*®Norris (1989), p. 694.
* * Jane's Airoort Review. June/July 1989. p. 9.
' V-.
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A piece of US legisation which displays a willingness to lead other 
nations unilaterally where multilateral initiatives have failed is the 
International Security and Development Co-operation Act, 1985 
(mentioned above). This law has reduced questions of economic
sanctions imposition and other forms of direct action to a domestic
decision-making level. Under Section 503 (a)(2) the President is 
given wide powers to act against any government which "supports
international terrorism", while Sections 501 and 502 establish an 
anti-terrorist assistance program, with Section 504 specifically 
Placing a trade embargo on Libya. In addition. Sections 506 and 507 
call for a renewal of international activity to combat terrorism and 
Section 1115(a)(1) orders the US Secretary of Transportation to
assess :
" ... the effectiveness of the security measures maintained at
those foreign airports being served by air carriers, those
foreign airports from which foreign air carriers serve the United 
States, those foreign airports which pose a high risk of
introducing danger to international travel, and at such other 
foreign airports as the Secretary may deem appropriate."
If these standards do not comply with the rather lax provisions of 
I C A O ’s Annex 17, the President may, under the terms of Section 1115 
(e ) (2) (D) of the Act, prohibit air carriers from flying between such 
airports and the United States. In 1986, FAA inspection teams visited 
approximately 300 foreign airports for the purpose of inspection.** A 
measure of the Bush A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s concern for monitoring standards 
of security may also be gauged from the fact that in 1989 the FAA 
announced its intention to increase bv 35 per cent the number of 
security inspectors in its employment. As a result, in a twenty month 
period, the i n s p e c t o r a t e ’s workforce was set to rise to 670 persons.**
The weakness of the executive power involved is to be found in the 
inability of Annex 17 to provide adequately high levels of guidance 
for the President on the question of security standards. For this
reason, a review and radical upgrading of its terms should be made by
ICAO, so that its example might be a useful one for states and its 
standards might be reasonable guides for legal purposes.
9,7, Public Pressure
It is possible that a wave of public outrage might precipitate 
admissions of inadequacy from the authorities which regulate security 
activities. in turn forcing states to consider binding enforcement 
measures. The institution of the European Court of Human Rights and 
other agencies empowered to make findings against the states which 
established them and to force changes to be made in domestic policy 
and legislation illustrates the possibilities which exist for the 
establishment of such useful fora, whenever fundamentally important 
questions of state behaviour cannot be avoided by governments.
The difficult process which would be required to bring about such a
**W.A. Crenshaw (1987), op. 82 - 83.
*3 Jane's Airport Review. February/March 1989. p . 2.
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reversal in municipal attitudes to security would entail convincing 
first the public, and then governments that aviation terrorism is an 
abomination equivalent to genocide, slavery or torture. This, itself, 
would need responsible governments to review their policies and 
attitudes towards political offence exceptions to rendition and 
support for states and organisations which promote the use of terror 
as a political instrument - a requirement which has always proved a 
stumbling block to the advances of terrorism suppression. In short, 
progress can be expected to be as slow and erratic as it has ever been 
on these questions.
One means by which authorities might be encouraged to increase the 
pace of reform is the use by concerned sectors of the international 
aviation community of economic boycotts. Resort to such an open use 
of economic pressure might be made to mirror the successful practice 
of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations 
fIFALPA) which on June 19 1972 mobilised both public opinion and the 
ICAO Council by its m e m b e r s ’ twenty four hour global flight boycott, 
in protest against an increasingly difficult threat posed to aviation 
by terrorist groups and by governmental inaction to promote 
enforcement of the aut dedere aut iudicare standards.** Several 
writers have also drawn attention to the success of IFALPA merely in 
threatening strike action in the case of an FI A1 a i r c r a f t . crew and passengers detained in Algeria in August 1968.** Such focussing of 
international attention upon the actions of the state was sufficient 
to secure the releases sought. Moreover, the Federation has also successfully applied unoublicised pressure to motivate certain states 
to introduce improved security measures.**
Similar publicity-seeking activities were proposed to IFALPA after the 
TWA sabotage of 2 April 1986, though these options were rejected, 
perhaps because of fears of possible legal consequences for striking pilots.** If such fears are allowed to override temptations to become 
involved in political processes, a useful method of forcing change via
* * 0 ’Donnell (1973), pp. 990 - 992. See also Bell (1975), d p . 1334 - 5; Evans (1973), p. 670; Fenello (1973), p. 1066; McWhinney (1987).
p p . 51 - 52 and pp. 74 - 76. It has been observed that the 24 hour
work stoppage succeeded in promoting greater intergovernmental 
activity even although court injunctions within the United Statesseverely limited the scope of the strike. Troncoso Cortés (1973).
p. 568.
**Wilkinson (1986), p. 257; McWhinney (1987), p. 27; and R.L.S. 
McKeithen. "Prospects for the Prevention of Aircraft Hi lacking 
Through Law," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 9 (1970), p p . 73 - 76.
**M.S. McNeil, "Aerial Hijacking and the Protection of Diplomats.'' 
Harvard International Law Journal 14 (1973), p . 598.
**MoWhinney (1987), p . 28.
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the private sector will have been lost.*® In future» coopération with 
other organisations and pressure groups within the industry might
produce even more dramatic results for the enforcement of the legal 
regime or for the strengthening of security. Clearly, much untapped 
potential remains for this mode of international self-help, for as 
McWhinney has stated in connection with what he terms the F e d e r a t i o n ’s 
" r e s e r v e  c o n t r o l " :
"By and large. ... I F A L P A ’s potential to curb or control the 
hijacking problem seems hardly to have been used to the full. 
With a membership of 44,000 pilots in 54 countries, I F A L P A ’s
ability to mount a crippling, if not necessarily complete, 
boycott against a delinquent State is clearly there, as was
d emonstrated in the Algerian case in 1968."*®
9.8. An International Civil Aviation Security Strategy
In addition to the possibilities of the industry imposing economic
pressures on states to precipitate change, it is foreseeable that less 
developed countries might adopt a more aggressive attitude towards 
bringing about reforms in the existing security deployment patterns 
which have resulted in such a low level of preparedness in many 
states. A strong argument can be made to the effect that the conduct 
of international civil air services between rich and poor states has 
been undertaken with scant regard to the resource requirements of the 
economically less advanced partners.
Such circumstances should not be tolerated by the industry, not least 
because of the interdependence which characterises it - if existing 
structures are weak. both rich and poor states will suffer. The economic inequalities which exist, constraining progress towards 
greater security development for the poorer actors in the 
international system, ensure that in the absence of a dedicated 
international assistance initiative, enhancement of existing standards 
will be hard won. Nevertheless. a factor of equality in this public 
in t e r n a t ional dimension can be found in the form of the legal 
sovereignty which characterises all states irrespective of wealth, 
size or influence and which entitles each to enter into international agreements and thereafter to rely upon their terms.
The 162 parties to the Chicago Convention, 1944*® have agreed. under 
the terms of Article 1 and subject to certain clearly defined 
exceptions, that each state has "complete and exclusive sovereignty 
over the airspace above its territory". Article 6 utilises this 
provision to establish (once more with provisos) that the operation of scheduled international civil air services can only take place
*®Although, note the determined lobbying by the Swedish p i l o t s ’ union 
for the extradition from Sweden of a 17 year old suspected hijacker 
in June and July 1990, Soviet Meekly. 28 June 1990 (photocopy); 
The Scotsman. Thursday 12 July 1990 (photocopy).
**McWhinney (1987), p. 75.
3®As at January 1990. M. Dixon, 
(London: Blackstone, 1990), p . 92. Textbook on International Law
296
within a state by a carrier of another if the host state expressly 
oermits 
ensured 
services 
It was 
boycotts
that activity. Hence, a valuable measure of equality is 
for all states, which are empowered to discontinue air 
with other parties on serving notice of intention to do so. 
this power which enabled the “Summit Seven" to contemplate 
under the Bonn Declaration and which could provide for a
different form of collective action by LOCs in future.
It is foreseeable that at some future stage, many third world states 
might be keen to introduce a higher quality of airport security than 
is currently available. This enthusiasm for reform might be catalysed 
by, for example, a realisation, following the appearance of a trend 
towards air crime commencing in developing nations. that action must 
be taken to strengthen security on a global basis. If security 
development was sought bv a third world state or its carriers but 
financial considerations precluded it, there would be nothing to 
prevent it from taking good advantage of its powers of sovereignty as 
declared in the Chicago Convention by seeking assistance from richer 
aviation partners, whose airliners flv into its jurisdiction. One 
means of achieving improvements within a state would be to draw up 
stringent security regulations contained within a comprehensive 
national security programme, with the expectation that foreign 
airlines and their states of registration would provide adequate 
resources for the upgrading.
Inevitably, any one sovereign state which aimed to use such a means of 
persuasion would meet with little success, as even the threat of service suspension by the poor host nation would be meaningless when 
viewed in the contexts of the economic benefits to be lost bv 
terminating air commerce and of the other regional market 
opportunities available to a rich aviation power. If, on the other 
hand, a coalition of like-minded LDCs fas found in regional aviation 
policy conferences) were able to muster sufficient I.DC group cohesion 
to present a determined bargaining posture towards richer nations, the 
costs of losing access to a wide range of developing markets would be raised dramatically for the aviation community of the richer world. 
This potential for the developing nations to disrupt existing resource structures led one “Summit Seven" state's chief public servant with 
responsibility for aviation security to remark, to the current writer that the Chicago Convention now has the status of the most important 
international agreement influencing aviation security, He noted that 
major aviation powers are already being made to agree to their 
providing resources for security enhancement when periodic renegotiation of air services agreements becomes necessary with 
certain third world states.** There is little doubt that such a trend 
could evolve greatly in future, if only third world governments were 
motivated so as to act in concert and take advantage of their 
potentially impressive bargaining power.
9.9. From Global Ideals to Practical Realities
The creation of a new international aviation security order involving 
large-scale transfers of resources from richer to poorer nations and a 
new delineation of responsibilities throughout the international
**Interview with civil servant, Paris, France, 6 June 1990.
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community could undoubtedly have serious consequences for governments
accustomed to the pre-existing regulation in the field. Without well-argued justification being made bv poorer nations for the 
redistribution of those resources, maior states will continue to avoid 
enforcing security and providing aid to carry out reform. Instead, 
they will continue to prefer tolerating unacceptablv high levels of 
aviation terrorism. avoiding all possibilities of global security 
structures being enforced via any inconveniently autonomous 
intergovernmental agency.
It is highly improbable that any systematic method of norm creation 
and enforcement via an international authority will ever be instituted 
by the international community because of the desire on the part of 
many states to hold fast to their individual regulatory rights within 
their own territories. Such subsidiary reasons for inactivity as 
expense and upheaval could be cited as factors contributing to s t a t e s ’ 
unwillingness to take the Initiative required to establish 
international mechani sms for the control of aviation security
activities. Evidence of state ambivalence towards resolving difficult problems of regulation draws the observer to conclude that the
predominant cause of governmental reluctance in the area is the satisfaction of most authorities with the existing municipally-based 
structure of norm creation and supervision.
Many states and certain sectors of the industry have a vested interest 
in preserving the status auo because without clear lines of 
responsibility being drawn and Particularly in the absence of a
conscientious overseeing body empowered to force the implementation of 
change. continuing freedom of action can only be encouraged.Moreover, while the current regime is permitted to exist. powerful 
sovereign states will have good reason for promoting the type of 
initiatives which are directed as much towards the enhancement of good 
public relations as of good security. For as long as responsibility
for security errors can be passed from one agency to another without
any being prepared or expected to admit fault, the various actors 
involved will evade liability internationally - though not necessarily domestically in courts of law.
9.10. Private Means of Enforcing Security
A valuable means by which security reform might be precipitatedrelates to action taken by passengers against carriers and
authorities, the negligence of which can result in acts of aviation violence being allowed to be committed. If states' efforts to 
motivate change in industry-related policies fail to result in 
adequate progress being made, consumers of air services might be 
tempted to use legal measures of self-help. In addition to promoting 
public abandonment of high-risk routes, airports and carriers, and to 
leading boycotts of dangerous or negligent services in the style of 
IFALPA in the 1960s and 1970s. resort to civil courts could make the less concerned members of the industry take note of security 
inadequacies. Litigation would always require to be premised on the need to overcome the restrictions of the Warsaw Convention 1929. bv seeking to show, for example, wilful misconduct on the part of a 
c a r r i e r .
In 1989 and 1990, civil actions were considered and commenced bv some bereaved families of Pan Am Flight 103 victims. In particular, the
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airline and its insurer received notiication that it would be sued for 
$300 million (US) in a wilful misconduct action relating to Pan A m ’s 
alleged failure properly to institute its Alert Security initiative in 
the latter half of the 1 9 8 0 s . ** Without question, the possibility of 
courts enforcing such damages aoainst a carrier and insurer would 
force the industry to reconsider security requirements. Although the 
financial penalties involved would not necessarily drive successful 
corporations to bankruptcy, the long-term effects on insurance 
premiums and the bad publicity derived from delicate evidence being 
drawn from executives in long court cases would each compound any 
monetary problems.
Additionally, v i c t i m s ’ families might even consider security 
activities when determining the uses to which awarded damages might be 
put. In the above-noted case, the cartel of Flight 103 v i c t i m s ’ 
families decided that any eventual award should be donated to a 
foundation for the promotion of world peace. An appropriate 
beneficiary of such moneys would be a privately organised airport 
security foundation. charged with the responsibility of disseminating 
interest payments to needy projects. The theoretical prospect of $300 
million (US) or more being placed in trust for the improvement of 
global aviation security is an exciting one, not least because it 
would assist in suppressing the very form of crime which has caused 
the deaths of so many airline passengers. Ultimately, what states are 
reluctant to attempt, individuals might achieve through legal avenues 
and practical means.
9,11. Concluding Remarks
Meaningful reform of airoort security is a project full of paradoxes. 
Reform is a requirement for the short term, the goals of which must be 
sought in the long term. It is conceived for the genuine protection 
of the industry and the public, some members of which may resent the 
painful labours necessary for its birth. It is intended to aid 
governments in their protection of global communications and their 
promotion of peace, yet several states will continue to ignore the 
extent of the predicament from which the industry must be rescued. 
Progress must be time-consuming, unpopular with many and costly for 
all, but the prospect of continued vulnerability cannot be 
countenanced. Instead, policy makers must be made to recognise that 
adequate airport security is a necessary insurance policy, the premium 
of which must somehow be paid, for the cost of airport security is 
truly a price worth paving.
The practicalities of introducing the changes required at airports now 
rely on the workings of politics, accurately described as the art of 
the possible. Contrary to the belief of some authorities. the 
challenge of security advancement is possible to meet in the contexts 
of time. democracy and economics. Cynics may deride systematic 
security reform as a politically untenable dream. yet constructive 
problem-solving efforts from bodies such as IFAPA have suggested that 
change could be effected where it is most urgently needed - at the 
political levels of organisation and finance. In future, aviation 
security enhancement should not be allowed to fall prey to the vested
3 * The Independent. Thursday 29 March 1990. p. 7.
299
interests of those ooliticIans who would view the subject only as an 
irritating nuisance on which to practise their craft of compromise.
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